Transparency and Disclosure, Company Characteristics and Financial Performance: A Study of the Emerging Libyan Stock Market by Ben Mansour, Osama
University of Huddersfield Repository
Ben Mansour, Osama
Transparency and Disclosure, Company Characteristics and Financial Performance: A Study of the 
Emerging Libyan Stock Market
Original Citation
Ben Mansour, Osama (2013) Transparency and Disclosure, Company Characteristics and Financial 
Performance: A Study of the Emerging Libyan Stock Market. Doctoral thesis, University of 
Huddersfield. 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/18085/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
  
 
Transparency and Disclosure, Company Characteristics and Financial 
Performance: A Study of the Emerging Libyan Stock Market  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osama M Ben Mansour 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the University of Huddersfield in Partial Fulfilment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
The University of Huddersfield 
University of Huddersfield Business School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2013
2 
 
Abstract 
Corporate scandals and financial crises have focused attention on corporate governance (CG), 
including the quality of transparency and disclosure (T&D). Although many empirical studies 
have been carried out on CG in developed countries, an insignificant portion of that literature 
is focused on T&D in developing countries.  
Taking a sample of 27 financial companies, this research looks at the issue of T&D in Libya. 
Employing both primary and secondary data, the study covers the period 2005-2008 during 
the emergence of the Libyan Stock Market (LSM). The research objective, questions and 
hypotheses are mapped onto a research framework that includes antecedent and subsequent 
variables of T&D.  
Firstly, the study uses time-series data to provide empirical evidence relating to the level of 
T&D in annual reports by Libyan financial companies. The results reveal that overall T&D, 
three categorises and most of the twelve subcategories showed a statistically significant 
increase over the period under review, but that it was still low in Libya compared to other 
countries (developed and developing) when applying Standard & Poor’s (S&P) data, and 
variation in levels of T&D from company to company in Libyan.  
Secondly, this research analyses and explores the consequences of six characteristics on the 
level of T&D in annual reports. The characteristics being; listed status, ownership structure, 
company size and age, type of industry and audit peer reviews. The results revealed that T&D 
and three categories in general associated with all variables displayed a statistically significant 
increase during the examination period of four years. All corporations tested conformed to 
this rule with the exception of large companies, although the results were mixed statistically 
when tested with twelve subcategories. Furthermore, companies listed in LSM provided more 
T&D than those not listed, the public sector provided more T&D than the private sector, the 
banking sector provided more T&D than the insurance sector and companies with audit peer 
reviews provided more T&D than those without. Whilst small companies provided more T&D 
than other companies, and the variation in levels of T&D for different age groups was unclear. 
Thirdly, the research investigates the relationship between fourteen variables related to T&D 
practice and three accounting measures of financial performance: return on capital employed 
(ROCE), return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). The study finds that there is a 
relationship between four variables and ROCE, two variables and ROE, and three variables 
and ROA. However, only one variable (disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors) has a 
relationship with all three financial performance measures. Disclosure on the corporate 
governance framework has the most impact on ROCE and ROA, while disclosure relating to 
major share ownership and voting right has the most impact on ROE. 
The thesis makes several contributions. It adds to the limited literature on T&D in developing 
countries, especially to a transition economy like Libya’s. In doing so, it provides a 
benchmark for further studies of T&D by Libyan companies. In particular, it pioneers the use 
of S&P’s T&D index methodology in Libya, which enables a comparison with T&D in other 
countries. A notable feature of the research is the relatively comprehensive set of variables 
used, including “audit peer review” as a corporate characteristic that might affect the level of 
T&D, and the exploration of the possible relationship between fourteen variables of T&D and 
three financial performance measures.  
Future research should be able to build on this study and perhaps examine other company 
characteristics (e.g. size/type of auditor, and external auditor’s reviews that are limited to 
quarterly reviews), use other measures of company performance (e.g. Tobin's Q or specific 
elements such as competitive strategy, corporate culture or business ethics) or include samples 
from other industries as the Libyan economy and stock market develop. 
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TPTC Total Profit / Total Cost 
Lev. Leverage 
PER Price Earnings Ratio 
NI Net Income  
Ts Q Tobin’s Q 
MTBV Market-to-book- Value 
REPS Rates Earning per Share 
MTSR Market-to-sales Ratio  
SR Share Returns  
EVAI Ratio of Economic Value Added  to Invested Capital 
R-S Revenues-Sales 
PM Profit Margin 
TSR Total Shareholder Return 
SG Sale Growth 
TOT Total Assets Turnover 
NS Net Sales 
SR Share Repurchases  
ADCR Average of the Daily Continuous Returns 
PS Performance of Stock 
MASPR Market Adjusted Stock Price Return 
TR Turnover Ratio (sale/assets) 
OM Operating Margin 
SE Salary Expenditures  
NE Net sale-to-equity 
LP Log Profits 
OI Operating Income 
VSP Volatility of Stock Prices 
EVAC Economic Value Added Capital Ratio  
SG Sales Growth 
SP Stock Price  
TAT Total Assets Turnover 
SANE Real sales/average number of employees 
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RI Return on Investment 
EPS Earnings Per Share 
RTAG Rate of Total Assets Growth  
CFPS Cash Flow per Share 
NAPS Net Assets per Share 
CACL Current Assets Divided by Current Liabilities 
FORC The Financial and Operating Results of the Company  
CO Company Objectives 
MSOVR Major share ownership and voting right 
BMKER Board Members, Key Executive and their Remuneration   
RPT Related Party Transactions 
MFRF Material foreseeable risk factors 
MIRES Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders 
GSP Governance structures and policies 
PIAD Preparation of  information audit and disclosed according to high standard of 
accounting, disclosure and audit 
EAM External audit and monitoring  
EAACR External audit and audit committee role 
EAAS External auditors accountable to shareholders 
CDI Channels for dissemination information allow for fair, timely, and cost 
efficient access to information by user 
CGF Corporate governance framework, complemented by effective approach that 
addresses and promotes the provision of analysis 
EQ Empirical Question   
H Hypothesis 
Q Questionnaire  
IAS International Accounting Standard  
ISA International Standard Audit 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
CIPE Centre for International Private Enterprise 
AICPA The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
IFRS International Financial Report Standard  
FSL  Financial System Law 
TCCS Traders and Commercial Companies and Supervision 
LFC Libyan Financial Companies 
LSM Libya Stock Market 
LLSM Listed in Libya Stock Market 
NLLSM Not Listed in Libya Stock Market 
SPSS Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
Chare. Characteristics  
Pa. Panel 
Ob.  Objective  
DV Dependent Variable 
IV Independent Variable 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Weakness in CG, low disclosure rates and lack of transparency are often considered 
causes of, or contributors to, financial crises and corporate scandals. It is worthwhile 
pointing out that CG has become a significant issue in the world since the Asian 
financial turbulence in 1997, which many believe was due in part to weak CG and low 
levels of transparency (Stiglitz, 1998), and the spectacular collapse of Enron in the 
US, prompting calls for increased transparency in financial reporting. 
       Since then, CG has become a key issue in international business agendas with 
regard to not just corporations but also governments and supranational authorities. 
The CG models of the early 1990s reflected specific contextual conditions–economic, 
political, historical and cultural (Markarian, Parbonetti, & Previts, 2007).  
      CG effectively delineates the rights and responsibilities of each group of 
stakeholders in the company. Ho and Wong (2001) view transparency as a major 
indicator of the standard of CG in an economy. The issue of CG has provoked calls 
for greater T&D from companies around the world (Lin, Huang, Chang, & Tseng, 
2007). Transparency of corporate disclosure has become one of the crucial 
components of CG principles issued by organisations worldwide (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development -OECD, 2004). Zingales (2008) argues that 
the demise of Lehman Brothers (fourth-largest bank in the United States, went 
bankrupt in 2008) was the result of its very aggressive leverage policy in the 
governance context of a major financial crisis. The aspect of this crisis have to be 
found in bad regulation, lack of T&D, and market complacency brought about by 
several years of positive returns. Lehman’s bankruptcy led to a reassessment of risk, 
in particular in the market for credit default swaps. According to the World Bank, 
companies in South Asian countries are still wrestling with the problem of low 
information transparency (The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 1998). 
     This chapter comprises of seven sections: section 1.2 discusses the research 
motivation, whilst section 1.3 lists the research aims and objectives of the study. In 
16 
 
section 1.4 the empirical research questions are presented. Section 1.5 presents the 
research methodology undertaken. Section 1.6 discusses the main finding of this 
study. Finally, the organization of the thesis is presented in section 1.7.  
1.2 Motivation 
The objective of this section is to demonstrate why this topic was chosen for this 
study. The aim of the study is to contribute to the literature on CG especially T&D in 
developing countries by investigating the T&D of Libyan listed companies. In June 
2006, the Libya Stock Market (LSM) was established and adopted the OECD 
principles 2004. This provides the opportunity to examine whether new regulations 
caused any statistically significant increase on the extent of T&D in Libyan financial 
companies. In addition, it should help evaluate whether theories originating from 
western countries are able to explain variations in T&D in the context of Libya. This 
study is motivated by three major considerations: studies of T&D, the effect of 
company characteristics on T&D, and its relationship with financial performance 
which continue to be important to academics and professional researchers.  
      There are many researchers examining CG in developed countries but only a few 
in developing countries. Furthermore, most empirical studies about CG are about 
ownership structure, independence of board, audit fees, audit committee and 
shareholders rights. Unfortunately, only a limited number of pieces of literatures are 
devoted to testing the differences in T&D and corporate characteristics or the 
relationship between T&D practices and company performance. These relationships 
and expected benefits of T&D are more important for emerging markets such as 
Libya, because emerging markets are in dire need of external capital and increased 
foreign investment as their economies are growing faster than those of developed 
countries. However, given the relative lack of research in developing countries, 
especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and in those undergoing 
transition from a planned to a market economy, it is believed that Libya is an 
interesting case for study. Furthermore, T&D is identified as one of the biggest 
challenges facing the implementation of CG especially in developing countries 
(Centre for International Private Enterprise - CIPE, 2003). 
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      The significance of the T&D argued by prior CG studies suggests that a rigorous 
investigation of the questions and issues raised by these studies may be needed in 
developing countries (where there are few studies). Bhat, Hope, & Kang (2006) 
suggest that CG data is beneficial in evaluating the believability and quality of 
financial data, that is that the data utilized by analysts to come up with their earnings 
forecasts. Additionally, they show that CG information is even more important when 
financial disclosure is less transparent. Bujaki and Mc Conomy (2002) supply 
evidence that companies accused of CG failures tend to have poor T&D prior to 
failure. This suggests that investors should be wary of companies with poor T&D. 
Ramsay and Hoad (1997) suggest that T&D can help shareholders and other 
stakeholders to monitor managers. Further T&D is likely to reduce uncertainty about 
future prospects and to facilitate a more precise evaluation of the company (Botosan, 
1997). Disclosure of information is one of the tools to reduce the cost of capital and 
agency conflicts will reduce if the shareholders are able to monitor the management 
based on the disclosure of information (Htay, Aung, Rashid, & Adnan, 2012). 
       T&D of financial information are critical components of the CG framework 
(OECD, 2004), and are viewed as an important indicator of CG quality (Aksu, 2006). 
Disclosure is clearly central to accountability and indeed to public confidence in the 
corporate system (Cadbury, 1993). Newer developments in corporate finance, 
economics and law have emphasized the importance of various legal factors in CG 
issues, including the role of financial disclosure (Hope, 2003b). According to Cadbury 
(1999) the foundation of any structure of CG is disclosure. Openness is the basis of 
public trust in the corporate system; the fund will flow to the centres of economic 
activity that inspire trust. The effect that the business system tend to have on the 
practices of CG in which transparency is regarded among the determinants of 
successful CG modes is one of the outcomes of research (Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi, & 
Hilton, 2005).  
      Mallin and Jelic (2000) suggest that transition economies might offer more fertile 
ground for study, because transition economies often have weaker rules and wider 
variations between companies in CG practices. Therefore, De Nicolo, Laeven, & Ueda 
(2008) propose that improvements in CG quality have a positively significant impact 
on all measures of macroeconomic outcomes considered, especially in the 
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transparency dimension, as shown by the positively significant effect of the stock 
price synchronicity indicator. Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi, & Hilton (2005) argue that the 
different modes of CG and information disclosure can have an important influence on 
companies’ performance. Kumar (2012) report that emerging market system after the 
crisis in East Asian economies 1997 and Brazil in 1998 are embracing market based 
CG mechanism, focusing on more T&D and protection of shareholder rights. 
      This study investigates the level of T&D of Libyan financial companies during the 
four years from 2005 to 2008 associated with the emergence of the Libyan Stock 
Market. A high level of T&D contributes to the establishment of confidence in capital 
markets and promotes a better flow of foreign direct investment into a country 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001). Several studies have examined the effect of disclosure 
quality and practices on investors. The corporate disclosure quality can be measured 
by examining the timeliness, detail and lucidity of the information (Sengupta, 1998). 
Prior studies have measured corporate disclosure quality based on the corporate 
disclosure practices measured by the Financial Analysts Federation (Sengupta, 1998) 
and the Association for Investment Management and Research (Bushee & Noe, 2000; 
Price, 1998). Both organisations evaluate disclosure quality along with different 
disclosure categories: reports (annual and quarterly) and informal communication 
such as public releases or discussions. With a different approach, Botosan (1997) 
developed a disclosure index to represent disclosure levels. Yu (2007) argues that CG 
practice disclosures are classified into two groups, the first classification investigating 
the determinants of governance disclosure while the other classification investigates 
the economic consequences of governance disclosures. This study adopted two 
groups; the first classification investigates the determinants of governance disclosure, 
because it investigates the level of T&D with the emerging Libyan Stock Market and 
the effect of six company characteristics on T&D. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) report 
that all corporate disclosure theories consider company characteristics as important 
drivers for disclosure; they are important from an empirical viewpoint, where 
empirical research typically controls the endogenous determinants of disclosure policy 
that are not inevitably part of the underlying theory (Core, 2001). According to 
Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 205) previous studies used index disclosure, the 
association between the level of disclosure and specific company characteristic was 
19 
 
frequently investigated. The second examines the economic consequences of 
disclosure, because it investigates the relationship between T&D practices and 
company financial performance. Ertugrul and Hegde (2005, p. 22) argue that CG may 
affect future company performance, but future performance does not affect CG. Wu, 
Quan, and Xu (2011) report that when evaluating CG practices, both company 
performance and the variability of company performance should be taken into 
account. Xin and Xiao (2011) report that information transparency is one of the most 
important aspects of CG, this plays a very important role in company performance. It 
can reduce internal and external information asymmetry, reduce agency costs, 
improve the external governance mechanism, and in doing so can improve business 
performance. 
      Libya is an emerging economy with its first stock market established in 2006; for 
these reasons, CG is most important in this period of the Libyan economy. However, 
what is of vital importance for investors before deciding to invest their funds, is to 
obtain sufficient information to be confident that the investment is financially sound 
and will continue to be so in the expected future. According to Organisation for 
OECD (2004, p. 13) “CG is an increasingly important factor for investment 
decisions”. The OECD principle of CG covers six areas: ensuring the basis for an 
effective CG framework; the rights of shareholders; the equitable treatment of 
shareholders; the role of stakeholders; T&D; and the responsibilities of the board. 
Indeed, the emergence of financial scandals all over the globe will continue to 
highlight CG issues, especially with regard to issues of control and accountability, 
T&D, necessitating more ideal forms of board structure that could thwart such 
scandals (Arsalidou & Wang, 2005). According to OECD (2004, p. 22), the fifth 
principle states that “the CG framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the 
financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company”. 
      To the best of the author’s knowledge no study already exists in the Libyan 
context. Furthermore, according to Larbsh (2010) and Magrus (2012), the T&D in 
Libya may be a fertile field for future research, due to their importance in Libyan 
economic development. The study of T&D in this thesis is motivated by: 1) the few 
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studies on CG in general and T&D in particular in Libya, and 2) the emphasis placed 
on improvements in T&D with the emergence of the Libyan Stock Market.  
      However, Lang and Lundholm (1993), Leuz (2003), and Miller (2002) suggest 
that while performance is related to disclosure, the nature of the relation is unclear. 
Therefore, the relationship between company performance and T&D still need further 
investigation in order to increase the literature of this area. 
      It should be noted that this study was conducted before the start of events in early 
2011, which led to the collapse of the previous regime in Libya. 
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
The main aim of the study is to investigate the levels of T&D in Libyan financial 
companies, identify the effect of company characteristics on T&D, and explore their 
relationship with company financial performance (Return on Capital Employed - 
ROCE, Return on Equity - ROE and Return on Assets - ROA). This general aim has 
been divided into six objectives, which are:  
1- To assess the level of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies 
during the years 2005 to 2008 on three levels: overall transparency and disclosure, 
according to three categories, and according to twelve subcategories, in their 
annual reports. 
2- To compare the level of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies 
with those in other countries (developed and developing).    
3- To assess whether there are variations between companies in transparency and 
disclosure practices in their annual reports. 
4- To assess the extent to which transparency and disclosure is associated with listed 
status, ownership, size, and age, type of industry and audit peer review in Libyan 
financial companies during the years 2005 to 2008 on three levels: overall 
transparency and disclosure, according to three categories, and according to 
twelve subcategories, in their annual reports. 
5- To determine the relationship between transparency and disclosure practices, and 
company financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA). 
6- To find which variable of transparency and disclosure practices has the most 
impact on company financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA).  
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      These objectives focus on current issues that are important for shedding light on 
the general quality of T&D, leading to: agency problems between the manager and 
shareholders, as well as between stakeholders being minimized; reduction of 
asymmetry of information between inside and outside investors; reduction of the 
agency cost. They are also important for informed decision-making: by providing the 
basis for informed decision-making by stakeholders, shareholders and potential 
investors with respect to financial performance monitoring, corporate transactions and  
capital allocation; by more efficient allocation of assets, through its influence on 
lenders and investors who must assess risks and returns and decide where best to place 
their money; by strengthening the efficiency of capital allocation as well as offering 
the benefit of reducing the costs of capital; by providing clarity on the extent to which 
companies meet legal and ethical requirements; by helping the public understand the 
company’s activities, policies and performance with regard to ethical and 
environmental standards, as well as the relationship of the company with stakeholders 
and communities which are influenced by its process.  
1.4 Empirical Research Questions 
To achieve these objectives the study will address the following empirical questions 
which proceed from the literature review: 
      The first objective in this study is to assess the level of T&D in Libyan financial 
companies during the years 2005 to 2008 on three levels (see Figure 1.2). This study 
sets an empirical question (EQ) to investigate as follows: 
EQ1- Have Libyan financial companies improved the level of T&D in their annual 
reports since the emergence of the Libyan Stock Market? 
      The second objective of this study is to compare the level of T&D in Libyan 
financial companies with companies in other countries. This study sets an EQ to 
investigate as follows: 
EQ2- Do Libyan financial companies provide a low level of T&D in their annual 
reports compared to companies in other countries? 
      The third objective of this study is to assess whether there are variations between 
companies in transparency and disclosure practices in their annual reports as follows:  
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EQ3- Do Libyan financial companies vary in their transparency and disclosure          
practices in their annual reports? 
     The Fourth objective in this study is to discover the level of T&D in Libyan 
financial companies’ associated with company characteristics, to explain the effect of 
special company characteristics on the level of T&D during the years 2005 to 2008 on 
three levels (see Figure 1.2). The empirical research questions investigate the different 
levels of T&D for six company characteristics.  
       This study sets an EQ to investigate the different levels of T&D according to 
listed status as follows: 
EQ4- Do companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market provide more T&D in their 
annual reports than companies not listed? 
       This study sets an EQ to investigate the different levels of T&D according to 
ownership structure as follows:  
EQ5- Do public financial companies provide more T&D in their annual reports than  
         Private “individual” companies? 
       This study sets an EQ to investigate the different levels of T&D according to size 
of the company as measured by total assets, as follows: 
EQ6- Do companies with greater total assets provide more T&D in their annual 
reports than those with fewer total assets? 
       This study sets an EQ to investigate the different levels of T&D according to age 
of the company as measured in years, as follows: 
EQ7- Do older financial companies provide more T&D in their annual reports than         
younger age companies? 
      This study sets an EQ to investigate the different levels of T&D according to 
industry type as measured by banks and insurance companies, as follows: 
EQ8- Does the banking sector provide more T&D in their annual reports than the         
insurance sector? 
      This study sets an EQ to investigate the different levels of T&D according to audit 
peer review as measured by companies that have audit peer review and companies that 
do not, as follows: 
EQ9- Are companies that have audit peer review more likely to provide T&D 
information than companies that do not have audit peer review? 
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      The fifth objective in this study addresses the issue of the relationship between 
T&D practices, and financial performance. The study adopts fourteen variables of 
T&D practices in the Libyan business environment (see Figure 1.3). In previous 
studies, the literature has noted many variables for company performance 
measurement related to CG (see Appendix 3). Rather than relying on a single measure, 
this study measures company performance by three financial performance indicators: 
ROCE, ROE and ROA. The study expects to find a relationship between T&D 
practices, and company financial performance for some reasons. First, higher T&D of 
the company has to ensure that agency problems between the manager and 
shareholder, as well as between stakeholders are minimized. Second, higher T&D of 
the company’s business reduces asymmetry of information between shareholders and 
managers. Third, higher T&D of the company’s business reduces the agency cost. 
Fourth, the more T&D on information there is, the stronger the investor decision 
ability, and the more efficient the allocation of assets is. On the other hand T&D 
might affect market based measures more than accounting based measures of financial 
performance. Thus, this study proposes the following research question:  
EQ10-Is there a relationship between T&D practices and financial performance?  
The sixth objective, the study examines which independent variable has the most 
impact on the dependent variable by addressing the following research question:      
EQ11-Which of the independent variables (T&D practices) has the most impact on the 
dependent variable (financial performance)? 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This section presents a summary regarding the study methodology to meet the aim of 
this study. Chapter Five of this study provides the specification of the detailed 
methodology used, including the rationale for the selection of the research 
methodology. 
      This study employs a quantitative approach (statistical analyses). The quantitative 
approach is based on the positive paradigm (see Figure 5.3). The research objective, 
questions and hypotheses are mapped on to the research framework. In the framework 
this study is examining and investigating empirically those variables within Libyan 
financial companies (see Figure 1.1 below). 
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      This research focuses on Libyan data for the financial years ending 2005 to 2008. 
The research methods used to test the hypotheses includes univariate (independent 
sample ANOVA and Paired T-test for parametric, and Friedman and Wilcoxon for 
non-parametric; independent sample parametric Pearson’s correlation) and 
multivariate (independent and dependent sample parametric Regression by Forward 
Selection Method) (see Chapter 5) procedures applied to the sample of 27 Libyan 
financial companies (LFC) as of 1st January 2008.  
      First, data was collected using Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure 
(S&P’s T&D) tool to highlight the level of T&D in Libyan financial companies from 
2005 to 2008 financial years in their annual reports; use of secondary data from 
previous empirical studies to compare the level of T&D in Libyan financial 
companies with companies in other countries; investigate whether there are variations 
between companies in T&D practices in their annual reports. In addition investigate 
the statistically significant increase in T&D with six company characteristics during 
the years 2005 to 2008 in their annual reports. Second, use of a questionnaire in 
accordance with the T&D practices in Libya to determine the relationship with 
financial performance. The designing of the questionnaire entirely depended on the 
T&D practices in Libya and on the related literature T&D. (see Chapter 5).  
       The framework of this study are classified into two groups of practice disclosures: 
the first classification investigating the determinants of governance disclosure 
(company characteristics); and the second classification investigates the economic 
consequences of governance disclosures (company financial performance). Figure 1.1 
explains the framework of this study as follows:   
Figure  1.1 Framework of this Study 
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      The framework (Figure 1.1 above) shows that T&D practices might be affected by 
certain company characteristics, that T&D practices might in turn be associated with 
company financial performance.  
This study first uses time-series data to investigate the different levels of T&D by 
using data from 27 Libyan financial companies’ annual reports for the years 2005–
2008 by applying S&P criteria. The data for this study has been collected from 2005 
(just one year before the establishment of the Libyan stock market) until the year 
2008, which was the last annual report year available when this study began. The 
scoring process systematically assesses the T&D rate with 98 binary (Yes/No) 
questions. By using this data set, the study can separately assess the level of T&D in 
Libyan financial companies since emergence LSM on three levels: overall, three 
categories, and twelve subcategories, in their annual reports (see Figure 1.2, part 1). 
Then, compare it with companies in other countries (see Figure 1.2, part 2). Also, 
assess whether there are variations between companies in T&D practices in their 
annual reports (see Figure 1.2, part 3). Figure 1.2 explains the first conceptual 
framework in this study using S&P T&D as follows:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure:  1.2 Framework  S&P T&D 
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      Secondly, by using the above data and scores this study investigates the difference 
between the extent of T&D according to six company-specific characteristics: listing 
status, measured by whether listed or not in the Libyan Stock Market; ownership 
structure, measured by public and private sector; size of the company, measured by 
total assets; age of the company, measured in years; type of industry, measured by 
banks and insurance companies; audit peer review, measured by whether companies 
have audit peer review or not (see Figure 1.2, part 4). 
      Thirdly, this study examines whether CG as measured by T&D practices is 
associated with the financial performance of listed financial companies in Libya, 
using data from 25 out of 27 Libyan financial companies (93%), the data being 
collected by applying a questionnaire technique. The questionnaire uses a fourteen-
category procedure to assess methodically the T&D practices with a five-point Likert-
scale, binary (Yes/No) questions, as well tick box questions (see Subsection5.7.2). By 
using this data set, this study first, determines the relationship between fourteen 
variables of T&D and three company performance. Thereafter find which variable of 
T&D has the most impact on financial performance. Figure 1.3 explains the second 
conceptual framework in this study using questionnaire technique as follows:    
         Figure  1.3 Framework Overall T&D 
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1.6 Main Research Results 
The main researches finding in this study are presented in six sections as follows:  
In general time-series evidence for the S&P T&D index indicates that, on level, T&D 
practices of Libyan financial companies improved during the same period. These 
findings further highlight the need for the LSM to push for T&D reform. 
The results in this study show that the level of T&D in the annual reports of Libyan 
financial companies improved during the four years; total T&D showed a statistically 
significant increase for all pairs years and for the four years, but was still low. The 
best of the three categories of T&D was financial transparency and information 
disclosure, and the lowest level was ownership structure and investor rights (OSIR). 
The subcategories of accounting policy review were very high whilst voting and 
shareholder meeting procedures were very weak. However, the level of T&D was low 
when compared with companies in other countries, and there were variations between 
companies in T&D practices in their annual reports.   
       The results of this study measuring the level of T&D according to six corporate 
characteristics. First listed status showed the difference in levels of T&D associated 
with listed and unlisted companies in the LSM. Total T&D for the two groups, listed 
in the Libyan Stock Market (LLSM) and unlisted in the Libya Stock Market 
(NLLSM), showed a statistically significant increase for all pair years and for the four 
years. Companies LLSM showed more T&D information than those not listed. 
       The second element to be examined was the difference in level of T&D 
associated with ownership structure. Total T&D for two groups, public and private 
sector, showed a statistically significant increase for all pair years and for the four 
years. However, companies in the public sector provided more (T&D) information 
than companies in the private sector. 
      The third element to be examined was the difference in level of T&D associated 
with company size as measured by total assets. Total T&D for two groups, small and 
middle companies, showed a statistically significant increase for the four years, and 
small companies for all pair years, while larger companies revealed no statistically 
significant increase for the four years. However, the small size companies gave more 
T&D information than middle and large size companies.  
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      The fourth element to be examined was the difference in level of T&D associated 
with company age. Total T&D for three groups, younger, medium and older, showed 
a statistically significant increase for the four years, and the older companies showed a 
statistically significant increase for all pair years. However, the companies of younger 
and medium age provided more T&D information than the older ones.   
      The fifth element to be examined was the difference in level of T&D associated 
with type of industry. Total T&D for two groups, banks and insurance companies, 
showed a statistically significant increase for all four years, but the banks also showed 
a significant difference increase for all pair years. However, the banks companies 
provided more T&D information than the insurance.  
      The sixth element to be examined was the difference in level of T&D associated 
with audit peer review. Total T&D for two groups showed statistically significant 
increase during the four years; also, the companies with audit peer review showed a 
statistically significant increase for all pair years. However, the companies with audit 
peer review had more T&D information than companies without audit peer review. 
      This study seeks to determine the relationship between variables of CG practices 
as measured by fourteen variables of T&D and three variables of financial 
performance indicators as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA. First, the study 
showed that there are relationships between four variables of T&D practices Major 
share ownership and voting right (MSOVR); Board members; key executive and their 
remuneration (BMKER); Material foreseeable risk factors (MFRF) and corporate 
governance framework, complemented by effective approach that addresses and 
promotes the provision of analysis (CGF) and ROCE. Second, there are relationships 
between two variables of T&D practices (MSOVR and MFRF) and ROE. Third, there 
are relationships between three variables of T&D practices (MFRF, Governance 
structures and policies “GSP” and CGF) and ROA. Furthermore, the independent 
variable (CGF) was shown to have the most impact on the dependent variables 
(ROCE and ROA), and the independent variable (MSOVR) had the most impact on 
the dependent variable (ROE).  
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1.7 Organization of the Study 
The current study has been organised into nine chapters and a brief overview of each 
chapter is presented as follows: 
      Chapter one, the introduction, describes the motivation of the study and provides 
information on scope, aims and objectives, empirical questions, and research 
methodology of the study, in addition to the main research results.  
Chapter two contains a description of the Libyan CG framework. It offers an 
introduction and background about the Libyan economic sector. The external CG 
landscape is described in detail. These include Libya Commercial Law, Financial 
System Law, Income Law, Banking Law, Foreign Capital Investment Law, and CG, 
the quality of the accounting and auditing, and LSM regulation. For each of these 
external CG legislations, where applicable, its origins, CG provisions, strengths, 
weaknesses and challenges are comprehensively discussed.  
      Chapter three is a review of prior studies on CG in general and T&D issues in 
particular and related areas that have been carried out. Firstly, it offers working 
definitions of CG, and provides a focus of prior studies on CG. Secondly, it provides 
an overview of CG principles. Thirdly, role of T&D in good governance, and provides 
detail of agency theory and information asymmetry, which is related to CG, useful for 
explaining the role of T&D in CG. Fourthly, an overview of T&D definitions, cost 
and benefit of T&D, T&D and annual reports, role of T&D in the stock market, and 
environment factoring effecting T&D. Fifthly, T&D and company characteristics. 
Sixthly, T&D and financial performance. 
      Chapter four presents the development and formulation of testable hypotheses.  
This study collected primary data by two methods, the S&P T&D score and a 
questionnaire, and secondary data from previous studies. The study set eleven 
empirical questions (see Subsection 1.5), and applied eleven hypotheses to answer 
those questions.  
      Research hypotheses are conceptually developed and prepared for empirical test in 
Chapter four. This chapter develops hypotheses with three main parts. The first is the 
extent of T&D with the emergence of the LSM which will be argued overall and 
according to three categories and twelve sub-categories (see Appendix 1). 
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Comparisons will be made with companies in other countries. In addition to 
addressing variations between companies in T&D practices in their annual reports.  
The second is the extent of T&D with six company-specific characteristics: listing 
status measured by LLSM and NLLSM; ownership structure measured according to 
whether a public or private company; company size measured by total assets; age of 
the company measured in years; industry type measured by banks and insurance; and 
audit peer review measured by whether companies have audit peer review or not – 
Overall consideration will be given according to the three categories and twelve sub-
categories. Third, previous literature and requirements in the Libyan environment of 
fourteen T&D practice variables and three accounting measures for financial 
performance will be discussed. In three parts for each variable, the theoretical 
literature will first be discussed, followed by a review of the previous empirical 
literature. In addition the fourteen T&D variables will be argued to find which 
independent variables have the most impact on three dependent variables. 
Furthermore the eleven hypotheses with sub-hypotheses will then finally be developed 
on the basis of the review for each variable.  
      Chapter five discusses the research design, namely, the sources of data and 
methodology that will be applied in the empirical parts of this study. Chapter five 
presents research methodology. First, it reviews the research aims and objectives of 
this study, the philosophy of the research, and the research population. Second, the 
chapter divides into two parts, the first part about S&P T&D, and the second part 
about the questionnaire that is used in this study. Each part of the chapter gives 
information on research design, data collecting, validity and reliability of the study, 
and data analysis.  
      As at 01/11/2009 when the data collection began, there were a total of 30 
companies listed by the Libyan Ministry of Economy and Trade. As three of the 
companies were not established until after 2008, they are excluded from the study, 
leaving a total of 27 companies to be sampled from 2005 to 2008 (2005 before the 
LSM was established, June 2006 when the LSM was established, and 2007 the first 
year the LSM started working). Company-level T&D data was collected from annual 
reports obtained for the 27 companies. Secondary data will be used for prior literature 
to compare company-level T&D in Libya with companies in other developed and 
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developing countries. In addition, fourteen variables of T&D practices data will be 
collected from the questionnaire obtained from 25 companies to determine the 
relationship between T&D practices and financial performance, and to find which 
T&D practices (independent variable) has the most impact on financial performance 
(dependent variable).  
      This chapter contains descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics have been 
divided into two main parts. The first part presents a summary of descriptive statistics 
of data collected from annual reports. One-way ANOVA (more than pair years) and 
Paired T-test (pair years) for Parametric method, and Friedman (more than pair years) 
and Wilcoxon (pair years) for Non-parametric technique are used to test the 
hypotheses H1 to H9 and their sub-hypotheses. Pearson’s correlation technique is used 
to test H10and their sub-hypotheses, and Multiple Regression analysis technique is 
used to test H11 and their sub-hypotheses. 
      Chapters six and seven in this study are related to results. Chapter six shows the 
results of the statistical analysis. This chapter starts with descriptive statistics, then the 
first tests of the hypothesis of the difference in level of T&D during the four years. 
The second compares the level of T&D with companies in other countries. The third 
find variations between companies in T&D practices in their annual reports. The 
fourth test of the hypothesis is the statistically significant increase of T&D according 
to six corporate characteristics (listing status, ownership of company, size, age, 
industry type, and audit peer review) measured by inferential statistic test.   
      Chapter seven starts with descriptive statistics, then the first tests of the 
hypothesis of the relationship between T&D practices and three companies’ financial 
performance (ROCE, ROE, and ROA); the second test of the hypothesis is which of 
the independent variables (T&D) has the most impact on the dependent variable 
(financial performance), measured by inferential statistic test.  
      Chapter eight discusses the results of the research presented in chapter 6 and 7. 
      Finally, Chapter nine gives an overview, the aims and objective, and summary of 
research methodology of this study, its implication for investors, companies, and CG; 
specific T&D will be presented. After that, the contribution, recommendations, 
limitations, and future research are presented, followed by the conclusions.   
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Chapter 2 Background of the Research Setting: Libya 
2.1 Introduction 
This study is concerned with T&D practices in Libyan financial companies. The CG 
issues were controlled by both fiduciary restraints developed in the commercial law 
and supplemented by legislation so that modern directors’ duties are an amalgam of 
commercial law, equity and statute (Thomson & Jain, 2006). To understand this issue 
the aim of this chapter is to explore the CG and T&D legislation, rules and codes 
related to company governance in Libya. For each of these laws, rules and codes, and 
hence provide the contact for the empirical study, its origins, CG provisions, 
strengths, weaknesses and challenges will be discussed. The chapter also provides a 
useful background to the Libyan economic situation.  
      This chapter introduces the distinctive features that characterise the Libyan 
economy. Since Libya is a developing country, its economy will certainly need to 
undergo certain changes in order to become a fully-fledged, developed one, which is 
what the Libyan authorities are striving for. Ntim (2009) argues that changes in the 
macro environment, such as government regulations and tax policies may impact 
differently on CG structures and financial performance over time.  
      This chapter is arranged as follows: section 2.2 relates to Libyan economic 
sectors; financial regulation is summarized in section 2.3; section 2.4 overviews CG in 
Libya; the quality of accounting and auditing in Libya are summarised in section 2.5; 
section 2.6 reviews the Libyan stock market; section 2.7 gives the summary and 
conclusion of this chapter.  
2.2 The Libya Economic Sectors 
During the period 1951-1978, the Libyan economic system was mixed between public 
and private sector. Following the 1979 and 1980 nationalisation of the private sector 
by the Libyan government, the economy sector became owned, controlled and 
supervised by government institutions. In 1988 a bye law No. 8 was promulgated 
which allowed the private ownership of economic activities. However, the private 
sector started again as from 1990s. Therefore, in October 2004, Libya applied to be an 
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observer member of the World Trade Organization, and the Libyan Stock Market was 
established for the first time in 2006.       
      Libya is an oil and gas producing and exporting country and oil constitutes the 
backbone of its economy. The Libyan economy is different from the economy of 
Western countries in several aspects. This section highlights some of these aspects. 
First, it is a relatively small sized developing economy that depends exclusively on 
crude oil and natural gas extraction and exporting. Crude oil exports represent more 
than 90% of the total Libyan exports and both sectors, oil production and natural gas 
extraction; constitute about 27% of the gross domestic product. As pointed out earlier, 
oil is the main source of income in Libya. There is hardly any other resource in the 
country (Altunisilc, 1995, p. 48). Before the discovery of oil, Libya was considered as 
one of the poorest countries. Libya overcame the difficult economic circumstances of 
the 1950s with American aid and British financial support, along with UN backing 
through carefully planned programmes (Altunisilc, 1995). Before the economic 
development of Libya which took place after the discovery of oil, the Libyan populace 
earned their living through agriculture and animal husbandry (Higgins, 1968, p. 820). 
The limited number of enterprises that existed before were controlled by Italian 
expatriates (Bait-El-Mal, Charles, & Taylor, 1973). Second, the Libyan economy is in 
transition to a market economy and in order to do so it has to initiate changes and 
undertake measures that boost its economy.  
      Many researchers asserted that the Libyan economic situation developed 
positively after the discovery of oil and that this development led to an increase in the 
investment of foreign capital in the country (Altunisilc, 1995). With the increase of 
international oil companies’ investment in Libya after 1959, the need for direct 
foreign subsidies declined. This revenue continued to rank Libya as the second largest 
oil producing country in the Arab world. Oil export revenue was $ 38.2 billion in 
2007, $40.1 billion in 2008 and $47.1 billion in 2009. 
2.3 The Financial Regulations 
The Libyan authorities have undertaken several financial regulations and acts to 
promote their economy. These acts, measures and regulations will be presented and 
discussed in this section. The market for corporate control rewards good performance 
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but judges under-performance with either falling share price as investors leave the 
stock or takeover bids occur by more aggressive managers. 
      The aim of this section is to summarise: the Libyan Commercial Law in 
subsection 2.3.1; the Financial System Law in subsection 2.3.2; the Income Tax Law 
in subsection 2.3.3; the Banking Law in subsection 2.3.4; the Foreign Capital 
Investment Law in subsection 2.3.5.  
2.3.1 The Libyan Commercial Law1 
The Libyan mercantile law and the income tax law are considered the most important 
legal factors that affect the regulation of accounting practices in Libya. The Libyan 
Commercial Law was enacted in 28/11/1953; it comprised regulations concerning 
business activities performed by individuals disregarding their legal status. It 
embodies the rules executed on traders (Libya State, 1970). These rules bound every 
trader to abide by the regular daily bookkeeping, inventory and budget at the 
minimum level according to Article 58 of Traders and Commercial Companies and 
Supervision (TCCS) (Libya State, 1970), and to maintain special files for 
correspondence and dialogue relevant to trade affairs according to Article 59 of the 
TCCS (Libya State, 1970). The most formal measures and objectives that guarantee 
the consistency of these books are outlined below. Every page of the obligatory book 
must be numbered and stamped, the first instance stamped by the court. Furthermore, 
it is crucial for the registrar to write attestation on the first page of each book, 
indicating the number of pages and confirming the official title with the signature and 
the date on this attestation. Books and files should not have blank spaces or anything 
written in their margins or between the lines, neither should they have any erasures, 
according to Article 60 of the TCCS (Libya State, 1970). The law binds every trader to 
preserve these books and files for a period of not less than five years, as stated in 
Article 64 of the TCCS (Libya State, 1970). It also binds the board of directors to set 
up the fiscal year Balance Sheet for joint-stock companies, to calculate profit and loss 
and to attach a report to the Balance Sheet demonstrating the progress of the 
                                                     
1The new Libyan Commercial Law No 23 was enacted in 2010, and according to the article No.1359 
started working as of the date of its publication in the Code of legislation in 21/08/2010.  
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company’s activity, as laid down in Article 272 of the TCCS (Libya State, 1970). The 
Balance Sheet content of assets and deductions has to be fixed in the Balance Sheet 
with the overall value, as stated in Article 273 of the TCCS (Libya State, 1970) and 
should be approved by the General Assembly, according to Article 516 of the TCCS 
(Libya State, 1970). The board of directors should submit a copy of the Balance Sheet 
and the calculation of profit and costs in an appendix to their report together with the 
control committee’s report and the General Assembly approval minute to the trade 
register bureau within 30 days of endorsement, as set down by Article 583 of the 
TCCS (Libya State, 1970).  
      The Libyan Commercial Law has clarified many rules concerning estimating the 
assets, establishing the legal reserve, increasing and/or decreasing the invested capital 
and distributing profit. Among the important rules regarding the valuation of assets 
are the following: 
• Assets are valued based on their original cost; 
• The inventory should be valued at the “lower cost or market”; 
• The Trademarks should not be valued higher than their cost or purchase price, and 
the values of these assets are to be amortized each financial year in accordance with 
their useful life; 
• Debts should be valued at their estimated realizable value; 
• The organization and development costs may be capitalized with the consent of the 
board of directors, in which case the capitalized values should be amortized over a 
period not exceeding five years; and 
• The Goodwill cannot be recorded unless it is purchased; once recorded, it should be 
amortized in the coming years by a suitable amount estimated by the directors and the 
board of auditors, according to Articles: 574, 575 and 576 of the TCCS (Libya State, 
1970). 
      The legal reserve is established by deducting no less than 5% of the net annual 
profit until the value of this reserve is 20% of the company’s capital; this is regarded 
as part of the retained profits classified as standing capital (Article 557). The increase 
in the company’s capital is realised by issuing new shares with a price higher than 
their nominal value. This is realised before completing the establishment of the legal 
reserve or via transferring the reserve surplus to the company’s capital by issuing free 
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new shares or by increasing the nominal value of the floating shares, as stated in 
Articles: 578 and 590 of the TCCS (Libya State, 1970). The reserve surplus may be 
decreased when it surpasses the enterprise’s needs or in the event of losses of more 
than a third of the capital, by exempting the participants from paying the remaining 
instalments or returning the capital instalment to the State in compliance with the 
current legislation Articles: 578 and 590 of the TCCS (Libya State, 1970). 
      The commercial law also stipulated the need to appoint auditors, as set down in 
Article 550 of the TCCS (Libya State, 1970) so as to monitor the company’s 
administration and to ensure the sound progress of the company’s activities in 
accordance with the law. Article 553 of the commercial law details the duties of the 
auditing board. The law obliges the auditor to submit a report to the General 
Assembly on the outcomes of the fiscal year activities, expressing his view regarding 
the progress of the company’s work together with the authenticity and the 
endorsement of its budget and accounts, as described in Article 580 of the TCCS 
(Libya State, 1970). When the legal system which governs information disclosure is 
not enforced, companies are not likely to disseminate high quality information 
disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Libyan commercial disclosure requirements are 
very low, and companies are only required by law to provide a balance sheet and 
income statement together with the external auditor’s report and directors’ report 
(Article 572). However, the Commercial Law 1953 does not specify what this annual 
report should include, nor does it indicate the format of this report. 
2.3.2 The Financial System Law 
The Act concerning the Financial System Law (FSL) (Libya State, 1967) was first put 
into effect in 1967. According to Article 1 of the FSL, this law permits the Treasury 
Secretary to control the State Budget and to plan for future expenditure. In order to 
implement this, the Treasury Secretary assigns a Finance Controller to every 
institution, and organisation. The role of this controller is to prepare a report on the 
institution’s policies; he then presents it to the Treasury Secretary. A copy of their 
report is forwarded to the concerned secretariat, organisation and/or institution. Kilani 
(1998, p. 213) observed that this procedure is based on the principle that “the Treasury 
should be wherever the public money is”. As a result, the Treasury Secretary gets 
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involved in all publicly held organisations. In general, all the administration processes 
of the budgets are identical. Based on Article 6, every budget consists of two sections: 
revenue and expenditure FSL (Libya State, 1967). The expenditure itself embodies 
three divisions: wages, general expenses and new projects. Moreover, Article 23 of the 
FSL (Libya State, 1967) requires that the Treasury Secretary should prepare an annual 
report for the Public Control Office, embracing detailed information of the State’s 
budgets and expenses. It also embodies suggestions for its improvement, debts or any 
emergency accounts, as well as trusts. 
2.3.3 The Income Tax Law2 
The Income tax law that was in force in Libya during the period from 1923 to 1968 
was the Italian income tax law (El-Sharif, 1981). But after initiating certain necessary 
amendments to suit the local circumstances, a new income tax law was enacted for the  
first time in Libya in 1968 (Central Bank of Libya, 1971, 1977). In 1973, this law was 
substituted by the Income Tax Law No. 64 (Libya State, 1973), which has had a direct 
impact on accounting practices in Libya; it has been applied by many companies for 
the purpose of setting up external financial reports.  
      The Libyan income tax law does not differentiate between income tax and other 
ordinary activities or between income tax and other unusual activities (Shareia & 
Buferna, 2001), whether this income is a product of an activity sale or of any of the 
activities involving material or non-material assets (Article 65).Both Income Tax Law 
No. 64  and the Stamp Law No. 65 (Libya State, 1973) were amended in accordance 
with the principal popular congresses’ resolution adopted when the congress held its 
meetings during the period from 26/12/2002 to 2/1/2003. In March 2004, Income Tax 
Law No. 11 substituted the Income Tax Law No 64; it is worth noting that a 
significant change was initiated in the new law. It offers tax allowances, especially for 
those with high incomes, and it has also deleted the public tax category of income and 
increased the value of each category in the progressive taxes on activities (Libya 
                                                     
2The new Libyan Income Tax Law No. 7 was enacted in 2010, and according to the article No.105 
started working as of the date of its publication in the Code of legislation in 21/08/2010.  
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State, 2004). The recent changes have encouraged the private sector to make more 
profit and, thus, to contribute to Libyan development plans. 
2.3.4 The Banking Law 
The deregulation of the banking system is one of the most significant steps towards 
reconstructing the Libyan economy. During the year 2005, the banking system 
witnessed an important development. Law No.1 for the year 2005 (Libyan State, 2005) 
was passed; this legislation governed banks, money and credit. The law enclosed 
several articles specifying the Central Bank’s responsibilities, the work of the 
commercial banks, currency control and penalties for commercial discrepancies. The 
law stated that the Central Bank should be renamed the Central Bank of Libya. It also 
defined the Bank’s functions that are related to its organisation, the monetary issues, 
and the maintenance of its stability, the organisation of credit, the banking policy and 
the bank supervision on administering the state’s economic policy. In the field of bank 
work, it stipulated that the Bank should contribute to financing the development plan 
and to participating in economic projects.  
      It also stipulated that the commercial banks should adopt the form of joint-stock 
companies with a paid-in capital of not less than 10 million Libyan dinars divided into 
nominal shares for general subscription. It also permitted foreign banks to open 
branches or bureaus representing them in Libya in accordance with the conditions 
specified by the Central Bank of Libya. In the field of control, the law authorised the 
Central Bank of Libya the right to formulate general rules for controlling and 
supervising the rating of assets, specifying the rates of liquid assets, defining aspects 
of investment and determining the reserves to be provided, together with observing the 
financial rates and fixing the interest rate for all credit and debit accounts and discount 
prices. The law warned against the operations of the banking affiliation without the 
prior consent of the monetary authorities. In the field of banking confidentiality, the 
law obliged the banks not to enforce any restriction on the freedom of depositors that 
manage their own balance and guarantee the confidential maintenance of their 
account. The law had also forbidden dealing in foreign currency and the transfer from 
and into the country except under certain conditions specified by the Central Bank of 
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Libya via authorized banks and institutions. It also allowed every national or judicial 
person to preserve any foreign currency he possesses in a commercial bank.  
      In the framework of enhancing the safety of the banking system, the Central Bank 
of Libya shoulders the responsibility of monitoring and following up the effectiveness 
of controls and the internal audit in banks. In the context of the international efforts to 
combat money laundering and financing terrorism, in accordance with the existing 
international standards and supporting documents prepared by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the team of the Financial 
Action Group on Money Laundering, the Central Bank of Libya took the necessary 
required precautions. It passed Resolution No. (40) For the year 2002, and endorsed in 
December 2005 Law No. (2) for the year 2005 concerning Anti-Monetary Laundering, 
the establishment of a Financial Information Unit for the Central Bank of Libya and 
the selection of terms of reference, as indicated by the resolution, “Creating a banking 
supervision and a monetary unit called the Financial Information Unit for the Central 
Bank of Libya specialized in monitoring and following-up all operations conducted by 
the banks”. 
       Although Bank Law No. (1) for the year 2005 in article No. 46 stated “the bank 
during the four months from the date of the end of its fiscal year should be display of 
their financial statements for the year ended in accordance with the International 
Financial Accounting Standards”, Banks in Libya are still in their early stage to 
comply with these requirements.  
2.3.5 The Foreign Capital Investment Law3 
 Foreign Capital Investment Law No. 5 of 1997 (Libyan State, 1997) along with other 
Libyan laws and regulations concerning foreign investment comprise many of the 
protections international corporations demand when they invest in a country. Law No. 
5 and its implementing regulations were enacted in 1997, with additional regulatory 
amendments made in 2002. So far, there has been little evidence demonstrating how 
                                                     
3The new Libyan Foreign Capital Investment Law No. 9 was enacted in 2010, and according to Article 
No.31 started working as of the date of its publication in the Code of legislation on 21/08/2010.  
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these rules are really enforced, but foreign investors coming into Libya will take it for 
granted that the law will be applied as it is written and will not be altered after they 
arrive. The law aims at encouraging direct foreign investment in sectors such as 
industry, agriculture and services. It has become understandable to most countries of 
the world that investment is not any more a colonial instrument used to expropriate a 
nation’s wealth as it used to be in the past (Gilston & Rockville, 2004). 
      Law No. 5 covers sectors such as transportation, health, education, and maritime 
services. District laws and rules govern the oil, gas and banking sectors. The law 
offers incentives for investors including exemption from some tariffs and import fees 
besides release from income taxes for five years. It permits the export of products and 
the repatriation of profits and provides for arbitration of disputes in the Libyan courts. 
Foreign investors need to be registered and to have their investments endorsed by the 
Investment Board. The board has already approved 91 investments, including 41 in 
2004. The Libyan Secretary for Tourism addresses investment in tourism, which is 
expected to be a major source of income in subsequent years.  
      The General People’s Congress (the highest legislative authority in Libya), for the 
purpose of attracting foreign investments and accelerating the social and economic 
development, enacted Law No. 5 that encourages foreign capital investment. In line 
with the implementation of ‘the Development Plans’ of 1980, the rise of a private 
sector, the growth of foreign investment and the impact of globalisation, a strong 
demand for changing accounting and accounting education has emerged (Ahmad & 
Gao, 2004). 
      Foreign investment was not allowed in the banking sector (but this is now 
changing). Libya plans to privatise two publicly owned banks, but their ownership 
will be restricted to Libyans. The banks are under the control of the Libya Central 
Bank. The Central Bank endeavours to upgrade the Libyan banks, to introduce 
modern technologies and to promote international standards so that when the time is 
appropriate to permit foreign banks to come to Libya, the Libyan banks will be in a 
position to compete with the foreign banks (Gilston & Rockville, 2004). 
      Table 2.1 provides Libyan investment projects according to areas and by type of 
capital for the years from 2000 to 2009. 
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Table  2.1 Libyan investment projects according to areas and by type of capital  
Area 
 (2000-2009) 
Number 
of projects 
Type of Investment 
Size of Foreign 
Investment in LD 
Size of Local 
Investment in LD 
Total in 
LD 
Industry 54 1,001,447,812 793,061,533 1,794,509,345 
Tourism 51 303,480,100 173,540,916 477,021,016 
Services 28 147,670,645 148,123,291 295,793,936 
Health 10 24,716,604 23,403,289 48,164,893 
Agriculture 2 5,808,730 - 5,808,730 
Real Estate 1 3,553,000 3,553,000 7,106,000 
Total 146 1,486,721,891 1,141,682,029 2,628,403,920 
Source: The Annual Report of (Libyan Foreign Investment Board, 2009) 
      The performance indicator, foreign direct investment, which is prepared by the 
Trade and Development Agency of the United Nations (UNCTAD), indicates that: 
• Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and Jordan are considered leading countries with good 
performance and high potential. 
• Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia have low performance in spite of high 
potential. 
• Morocco, Egypt and Sudan exceeded their performance capabilities. 
• Syria suffers from a lack of performance. 
• Yemen suffers from a lack of performance and potential.  
      However, Alfergani (2010) find that there are many challenges facing the Libyan 
policy environment in order to reorganise the business environment to make it more 
attractive for foreign direct investment. 
2.4 Corporate Governance in Libya 
The international CG literature states that most developing countries have for long 
periods adopted Western CG systems; deplorably, in many cases, the contribution of 
these systems to the developing countries’ socio-economic development tends to be 
very restricted. The historical Libyan culture of CG is poor. The Governor of the 
Central Bank of Libya in 2005 published for the first time an introduction to CG in 
Libya through an introductory paper covering the practice of CG in the banking 
sector. Larbsh (2010) suggests that the CG framework in Libya is less developed, and 
Libya has lagged behind its neighbours. Also, the study reveals that the absence of 
principles of CG has led to the weakness of accountability and responsibility 
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processes. The influence of the opaque economic structure, outdated legal system, 
influences of culture and social norms, political interference, and lack of accounting 
professionalism in the CG framework were also evident. The weakness of the 
education system and the stakeholders’ activism were other factors in the CG 
framework. Magrus (2012) argues that CG in Libya is in its early stages of 
development and is characterised by a weak legal environment, lack of knowledge 
about CG, and the influence of cultural, social and economic factors is evident. 
Larbsh (2010) argues that the Libyan government encourages the improvement of CG 
through some efforts such as:  
1- Transforming the public sector through privatization of the public sector. 
2- Encouraging foreign investment through publishing of new laws.  
3- Encouraging the private sector to effectively increase accountability and reduce the 
spread of corruption.  
      Good CG is vital for establishing companies that are transparent, that are focused 
on long-term value creation and that can respond effectively to market pressures. 
Defined originally in terms of the mechanisms that resolve day-to-day issues between 
owners and managers of a company, CG has expanded to a great extent in its 
application and significance – especially in emerging markets – both as a tool for 
developing efficient companies and as a medium of reforms in a variety of economic, 
political, and financial areas (Nadgrodkiewicz & Shkolnikov, 2010).  
      Porter and Yergin (2006) argue that there are six key political governance 
indicators (Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Voice 
and accountability, Rule of law, and Control and corruption) in MENA; they find that 
only the rank of political stability in Libya is better than MENA (see Figure 2.1). 
Figure  2.1 Governance Indicators 
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Libyan Accounting and Auditing 
There are no accounting principles or auditing standards in Libya (Bait-El-Mal, et al., 
1973; Buzied, 1998; Kilani, 1988). In the absence of these principles and standards, 
companies in diverse industries or even in the same industry applied various 
accounting principles, regulations, rules, methods and procedures. As a result, the 
choice of accounting standards, methods and techniques is left entirely to the interests 
of each company’s accountant, manager and/or auditor in accordance with their 
educational background (Buzied, 1998; Kilani, 1988).  
2.4.1 Accounting Quality in Libya 
Accounting information has played a significant role in the Libyan economy for over 
half a century. Resource allocation, monitoring social and economic development 
plans and establishing a product-pricing system all rely on accounting information 
(rather than on the mechanism of the market forces). The users of accounting 
information are principally the state and the state agencies. This economy is thus 
essentially different from the Western market economies where private investors and 
creditors are among the major users of accounting information (Ahmad & Gao, 2004). 
      Libya’s position as a less-developed economy with its embedded Arab and 
Muslim traditional conventions and beliefs contrasts with the more developed 
economies such as the US and the UK. Libya is a representative of a significant 
number of less developed economies with similar ethnic and religious backgrounds, 
which are striving to follow the competitive structures and processes widespread in 
the global economy. However, two factors, especially, can be identified as the most 
likely ones that explain the limited role of accounting in Libya. The first factor that 
adversely affects investment is the absence of any agreed-upon accounting standard 
and/or a general framework for an accounting system in Libya which could be utilized 
to provide guidance on how such systems can be sustained and developed. The second 
factor is the inconsistency between the adopted accounting system and the country’s 
environment, particularly the culture context (Buzied, 1998).  
      Although Libya’s laws (e.g., the Tax Law, the Commercial Law) have played an 
important role in developing its accounting systems in Libya, there is an absence of a 
comprehensive framework with regard to accounting standards, practices and 
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methods. Such situation has limited the utility of accounting reports. Moreover, the 
absence of an accounting framework has led to a poor linkage between the economic 
development needs in Libya and the accounting information supplied by the 
companies. Consequently, the usefulness of this information in monitoring, planning 
and evaluating as well as preparing the national accounts, has become limited. 
Accounting in Libya should provide information crucial for effective evaluation and 
decision making at both the micro and macro levels. 
      Records that indicate precisely how and when the accounting profession was first 
established in Libya are not available. Since the early 1950s, the development of the 
Libyan accounting profession has been significantly influenced by a number of 
factors, among which are the educational system, the instruction of accounting 
academics, the preferences of international companies, the expertise of international 
accounting companies and to a certain extent, the speedy transformations in the 
Libyan social, economic, political and legal environment. Western influences have 
driven the Libyan accounting profession to pursue a path similar to that of its 
counterparts in the UK and the US. (Kilani, 1988). Compared with the Western 
accounting profession, which has existed for more than a century, the Libyan 
Accountants and Auditors Association is quite young. It is only 39 years old. It was 
established when the Certified Public Accountant system was introduced officially in 
1973 by Law No. 116 of 1973 (Libya State, 1974). Following this date, the profession 
has become more formal. Moreover, accounting has become a popular course of study 
since 1957, when the Faculty of Economics and Commerce was established at 
Garuonis University in Libya. The preference for the US system was apparent because 
many Libyan students graduated from American universities during the 1970s (Kilani, 
1988). The entire Libyan accounting systems together with the accounting principles, 
procedures, reporting, profession and education are found to be transplanted from the 
Western world, particularly from the UK and the US (Buzied, 1998; Kilani, 1988, 
1998). The utility of this approach in developing countries is questioned, as the output 
of the current accounting systems in most Libyan companies is found to be of limited 
use and can only play a minor role in the country’s development process (Buzied, 
1998). 
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      Libya needs an increase in the relative benefit of accounting information for 
economic development; such increase can ensure the incorporation of the previous 
characteristics. Developing accounting in Libya must therefore comprise the use of 
unified accounting policies on the level of the main sectors in a manner that will allow 
the results obtained to be compared on one hand, and connected with the needs of 
national accounting on the other hand. This may be initiated by setting up an 
accounting manual and several forms of financial statements for companies with 
similar activities, with the flexibility that allows for understanding issues related to 
every sector and company and meeting any new development as well. Standards need 
to be developed to assess investment enterprises for both the public and private sectors 
and to assist in making fair judgements concerning efficiency and effectiveness in 
using available resources (Shareia, 2006).  
      Ellabbar and Havard (2005) find that the level of accounting disclosure of Libyan 
construction companies is lower than that of Egyptian companies. El-Firjani (2010) 
suggests that the accounting profession in Libya is still in its early stage of 
development and is still lacking a clear structure in order to develop corporate 
accounting practices.  
      Moreover, Scott and Troberg (1976) identified a number of factors that may 
differentiate accounting systems and practices in developing countries such as Libya 
from those of developed countries. These include: tax accounting regulation and 
auditing standards; lack of timeliness of accounting information; shortage of qualified 
accountants at all levels; lack of qualified accounting instructors; and inadequacy of 
locally authored accounting textbooks and the teaching of accountancy at college 
level. Very few of those developing countries that have professional accounting 
bodies offer a national qualifying examination such as in Libya. That constraint and 
those imposed by the scarcity of educational resources cause gaps to remain between 
the demand for and the supply of accounting technicians and qualified accountants 
and the development of the accounting system. Shareia (2010) argues that as Libya is 
a centrally planned, politically ideologically driven country, its accounting systems 
and accounting profession have not been developed autonomously, but rather in 
response to government requirements. Verriest et al. (2012) found that strong CG 
companies disclose more information, comply more fully and use IAS 39’s carve-out 
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provision less opportunistically. Therefore, accounting bodies such as the Libyan 
Union of Accountants and Auditors must establish and tighten the accounting and 
auditing standards that are suitable for the Libyan environment. Larbsh (2010)  argues 
that weak adoption of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the absence 
of Libyan Accounting Standards affects full disclosure and results in a deficiency in 
the content of reports and statements in Libya. Ellabbar (2007) suggests that there is 
an absence of domestic Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and the major 
impact on disclosure requirements has come from Libyan laws related to economic 
activities. Few relevant Libyan laws and regulations influence accounting in this 
respect. Eldarragi (2008) shows that the profession in Libya is suffering from a severe 
lack of legislation and standard. 
      There are many obstacles facing successful implementation of IASs in Libya, 
including: culture, low education, technical and specialist accounting and auditing. 
Hove (1986) argued that accountants in less developed countries should be made 
conscious of the fact that accounting practised in developed countries might not be 
related to their environment and, hence, they must try to develop accounting practices 
that are suitable to the their national environment.  
2.4.2 Audit Quality in Libya 
From the early 1970s to the present day, UK and US foreign oil companies have 
proceeded with established practices and systems. Direct foreign oil investment in 
Libya has robustly affected Libyan accounting practices and promoted the audit 
profession to operate within the established frames (Bait-El-Mal, et al., 1973). The 
Libyan auditing profession itself has been intimately modelled on those of the US and 
the UK over a period of six decades. The nature and development of the audit 
profession in Libya could thus be contrasted with the US and UK contexts of audit 
behaviour (Ritchie & Khorwatt, 2007). 
      The legal imperatives originate from the legal statutes endorsed in 1973 (Law No. 
116). This calls for the suspension, expulsion or imprisonment of auditors who fail to 
‘live up to the expected professional standards’. More specific provisions relate to the 
disclosure or communication of client information and professional ethics. The same 
law (Article 53) founded the Libyan Auditors and Accountants Association, 
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specifying its role and responsibilities, and provided its statutory legal powers. 
Presently, there are around 500 members of the Libyan Auditors and Accountants 
Association.  
      The Libyan Auditors and Accountants Association do not only undertake sole 
responsibility for implementing the legal statutes on behalf of the Government but it 
also manages every facet of the auditing profession. Auditors are not allowed to 
practice unless they are members of the Libyan Auditors and Accountants Association 
and all civil proceedings by clients can only be pursued via the Libyan Auditors and 
Accountants Association itself. The professional body can itself impose the 
suspension of a member for up to 3 years, the expulsion or imprisonment of others 
(i.e. the latter with the support of the appropriate public authority) if the auditor is 
deemed to have violated the ‘professional requirements of honesty and integrity in 
their professional work’. A recent example for exercising such powers was the 
imprisonment of an auditor for deception; he produced two different sets of accounts: 
one for the tax authorities and a more profitable one for the commercial bank from 
which the client was seeking a loan. The Libyan Auditors and Accountants 
Association also provides numerous services expected of a professional body: 
enhancing professional education and development, managing entry to the profession, 
safeguarding members’ rights, founding pension provisions and ensuring the 
communication of new developments throughout the profession. Competition is 
limited in the profession since members are not allowed to advertise their services or 
to use other intermediaries to undertake professional audit work on their behalf. Until 
very recently, the Libyan Auditors and Accountants Association had not documented 
the code of ethics but it has now adopted the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) code in its entirety, providing the groundwork for its own 
ethical standards and judgements. This is an appealing, though perhaps not surprising 
development, further promoting the previous links to the auditing standards and 
practices in the US (Ritchie & Khorwatt, 2007). 
      Therefore, one amongst audit practices in Socialist People's Libyan adopted from 
USA is audit peer review. The scope of the AICPA’s audit peer review program 
followed the nine components of internal control that were stipulated in Statement of 
Auditing Standards 25 (AICPA, 1980) and Statements of internal control Standards 
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No. 1 (AICPA, 1979). In essence, audit peer review was designed as a compliance test 
to ensure that companies designed, implemented and maintained quality review 
systems. This is often accomplished through the audit peer review of documentation 
and a check of procedures that are followed. Hence, review systems are usually 
struggling to elaborate audit failure and to support the legitimacy of the audit method 
as an entire(Power, 1993). 
      Ritchie and Khorwatt (2007) argue that Libyan auditors work in a developing 
economy context; they have explicated the reasons for their strong affinity to the 
accounting and auditing practices, standards and professional education in the UK and 
the US. The significant differences in the operational context in terms of the religious, 
political and social behaviours and their effect on the competitive environment would 
suggest tensions or difficulties in directly applying these ‘borrowed’ professional 
standards. 
      Ahmad and Gao (2004, p. 369) observe that as a result of the increase in both the 
number and size of the accounting companies and the lack of regularity in accounting 
and auditing standards and practices, an urgent need emerged to set up a professional 
body that shoulders the responsibility for developing a general framework of 
accounting. To meet such demand, Law No. 116 was enacted in 1973. This is the first 
law that governs accountancy and other related areas. It embraces: (1) the 
establishment of the Libyan Auditors and Accountants Association; (2) the 
accountants’ registration; (3) exercising the profession; (4) the fees; (5) pension and 
contribution fund; (6) the obligations of the accountants and auditors; (7) the 
penalties; and (8) the general and transitional provisions. The Libyan Auditors and 
Accountants Association were established in June 1975 with the following objectives: 
- To organize and improve the status of the accounting profession and to improve the 
standards of accountants and auditors professionally, academically, culturally and 
politically; 
- To organize courses and to encourage members to participate in conferences and 
seminars in the field of accounting both internally and externally and to keep abreast 
of recent developments, events and publications whether they are articles published in 
academic periodicals or lectures; 
- To establish a retirement pension fund for its members; 
49 
 
- To increase co-operation between its members and to protect their rights; and 
- To take action against members who violate the conventions and code of ethics of 
the profession. 
      Moreover, Eldarragi (2008) shows that the analysis of audit reports in Libya 
indicates that there are different forms and contents of audit reports and no united 
standard. In addition, a large number of the issued audit reports do not comply with 
reporting standards. However, an internal and external audit report in Libyan 
companies was one of the reasons for the low disclosure practice in Libya. El-Firjani 
(2010) finds that the level of professionalism of auditors in Libya is below the 
required standard. Furthermore, accounting and auditing professional bodies have a 
limited role in developing the accounting and auditing profession in Libya.  
2.5 The Libyan Stock Market 
In June 2006, the LSM was established with the crucial remit of raising capital under 
an economic reform programme among corporations and investment abroad, which 
has made a significant contribution to growth of the Libyan economy. With reference 
to the encouragement of savings and investment, the market’s role is responsible for 
offering investors the opportunity to participate, development of Libya’s economic 
sector in general and the private sector in particular and to share in the growth 
companies’ ownership, thus realising economic objectives.  
       Hossain et al. (1994), envisages a scope for further research in the field of 
corporate disclosure in emerging capital markets. CG is an increasingly significant 
factor for investment decisions. However, in emerging markets such as the MENA, 
the concerns are much more fundamental. Many countries lack legal conventions and 
frameworks that ensure the investors adequate protection and guarantee that the 
dominant shareholders do not change the rules and that the boards understand and 
fulfil their role objectively and responsibly. Moreover, in most developing countries, 
the stock markets are in their infancy; they have a restricted role to play in the 
economy, so applying CG only to listed private companies misses the point. In 
MENA, for instance, the state-owned enterprises account for an important fraction of 
the gross domestic products, the family-owned and the other small and medium-sized 
enterprises that comprise the bulk of all companies. One of the key challenges facing 
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reformers is how to convince companies that are not using stock exchanges to raise 
capital to the values of good CG (Nadgrodkiewicz & Shkolnikov, 2010). 
2.5.1 The Establishment of Libyan Stock Market 
The Libyan stock market was started in 2006 under decision No. 134, and supervised 
by the Ministry of the Economy until 2008. Thereafter, under decision No. 436 in 
2008, the Libyan Stock Market started as a company under the holding company 
‘Economic Development Fund’ with a capital of Libyan dinar 50 million.   
General People’s Committee Resolution 134 regarding the revised establishment of a 
stock market in Libya determined its Memorandum Agreement. The fourth clause of 
the LSM law dictated market membership, including the following entities: 
Subscribed companies with capital no less than the limit stated by the market’s 
administration committee; Commercial and specialised banks; Financial funds; 
Insurance companies.  
      Ellabbar (2007) argued that the most critical factors in establishing an active 
Libyan Stock Market include: clear political environment; an adequate legal 
framework; a stable economic environment; an adequate market infrastructure; 
adequate accounting and auditing standards; and an adequate tax framework.  
       Intended CG (rules, regulations and measures) to achieve and provide the best 
protection and the balance between the interests of the company’s managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders associated with them and to apply these rules in 
the first place on the joint-stock companies listed on the market, as well as heading 
financial joint-stock companies.  
2.5.2 Objectives of the Libyan Stock Market 
Article No. 3 in Committee issued decision No. 134 of 2006 for the purpose of 
establishing the Libyan Stock Market; the main objectives are as follows: to prepare 
an appropriate investment environment in order to achieve general welfare; to control 
and observe financial transactions; to serve social and economic development; to 
establish the required standards to ensure and secure the correctness of the financial 
market’s transactions; to develop cooperative relationships with other regional and 
international financial markets; to organize stocks (shares) of new public companies; 
to encourage the saving habit and raise investment knowledge in order to direct capital 
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to the most beneficial sectors; to contribute in the process of privatisation of state-
owned enterprises; to develop the competence of the LSM’s employees by conducting 
the necessary training; and to conduct research and collect statistical data about the 
listed companies. 
2.5.3 The Libyan Stock Market Structure 
Within the economy, the establishment of the Libyan Stock Market was a major 
action and step towards improvement of the financial institutions, in order to enable it 
to realise a better utilisation of financial resources by mobilisation of domestic 
savings, encouraging foreign savings and channelling such resources towards 
productive projects through the development of a sound capital market. 
      The current structure in the LSM consists of two types: a primary and a secondary 
market. Corporations or other institutions issue shares to the public in the primary 
market. The secondary market is a locus where shares previously in circulation are 
traded once they have been issued in the primary market.  
The Libyan Stock Market consists of nine departments: Legal Affairs; Control 
Oversight and Supervision; Trading; Central Listing and Depository; Communications 
and Information Systems; Public and Quality Relations; Financial and Administrative 
Affairs; Research Studies and Development; Membership and Administrative Affairs. 
      The Libyan Stock Market is still in the process of growth, the number of listed 
companies in the Libyan Stock Market up to January 2010 was very few, the ten 
companies being five banks, three insurance companies, one cement producer, and a 
Libyan Stock Market company. Additionally, by the second half of 2008 there were 
15 brokerage companies licensed by the Libyan Stock Market to trade in the market.  
In the Libyan legal system, a company can be formed with limited liability and 
comprising on three individuals functioning solely as a broker.  
      In relation to T&D, the Code recommended listed companies to have a written 
code to determine their policy and regulation. In addition, the Code recommended all 
companies to disclose at the same time, as their annual financial reports, the 
following: the CG practices; conflicts of interest; whether the chairman and members 
of the board and CEO have membership of other boards; full information about the 
chairman and other directors; chairman and members of the board and CEO 
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ownership in the company; brief description of the responsibility of the sub-
committees in the company as well as the names of the members, the name of the 
chairman and the time of meetings during the year; the manifesto about all 
remunerations and bonuses to the chairman and other members as well as the top 
management and watchdog committee; any commercial disputes, penalty, fines or 
obstruction suffered by the company; the annual review of results of evaluation of the 
procedures’ efficiency of internal audit; amendments to the company’s bylaws; the 
company’s capital structures. 
2.5.4 The Importance of the Rules of Good Governance in Libyan Stock Market 
The Libyan Stock Market set of principles relating to CG can be summarized in the 
following (Libyan Stock Market, 2007): 
2.5.5 For Companies 
1- Contribute to raising economic efficiency through establishing solid foundations 
for a strong relationship between the company managers, the board of directors and 
the shareholders.  
2 - Provide an opportunity for working on a regulatory framework that can be set up 
via considering the company’s goals, and that can identify the means necessary for 
achieving them by providing appropriate incentives to the members of the Board of 
Directors and the management, both operational in order to achieve the objectives of 
the company, which take into account the interests of the shareholders. 
3 - Lead to openness on the global financial markets and to attract the investments of a 
broad base of investors (especially foreign investors) to finance projects. If the 
companies do not rely on foreign investment, they can enhance the confidence of the 
local investors and thus increase the capital at a lower cost. 
4 - Foster the confidence of investors because such rules ensure the protection of their 
rights. Thus, the companies that apply the rules of CG properly attract more investors.  
Such companies are capable of withstanding a crisis since they allow investors to 
contemplate the market before venturing on selling their shares even when the market 
is exposed temporarily to financial crises. Furthermore, in case of a crisis, prices do 
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not fall sharply because of the confidence in the company’s capability to overcome 
such crises. 
      These principles function as an illustrative map that guides all regulators in the 
capital market and all the corporate members of the Board of Directors, both 
operational and management companies. 
2.5.5.1 For Shareholders  
1 - Help ensure the rights of all shareholders such as the right to vote and the right to 
participate in the decision-making process for any significant change that may affect 
the company’s performance in the future.  
2 - Secure full disclosure of the company performance, the financial situation and the 
decisive decisions that have been taken by senior management officials and that help 
the shareholders to determine the risks associated with investing in these companies.  
• The Principles Underlying the Rules of Good Governance 
1- The protection of the rights of shareholders   
2- The provision of equal treatment for all shareholders   
3- The protection of the rights of stakeholders or of those that deal with the company 
(such as the banks, the creditors, the suppliers... etc) 
4- The attention paid to T&D; they should be handled accurately and timely. 
5- The definition of the responsibilities of the Governing Council.  
• Equity 
The equitable treatment of all shareholders’ rights, as not to compromise the interests 
of the company is consistent with the market system and implementing regulations. 
The company helps shareholders exercise their rights and facilitate their access to 
information. The Statute of the company ensures shareholders their rights for access to 
adequate information; there is no distinction among shareholders regarding the 
provision of information. The following are the rights of the shareholders concerning 
the meeting of the General Assembly: The General Assembly shall convene at the 
invitation of the Governing Council and the Council shall convene if requested by the 
External Auditor or if 20% of the company’s shareholders approve of the meeting.  
The General Assembly also has the right to convene at least once a year during the 
four months following the end of the fiscal year. It must announce the date, the place 
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and its agenda ten days prior to the meeting. All relevant information should be 
published in a brochure and posted on the company’s website. It should also work to 
facilitate the participation of the largest number of shareholders and endeavour to 
specify the time and the place that is most convenient for the shareholders as well as 
the topics shareholders desire to discuss.  
      It should also encourage members to get actively engaged in discussions and to 
raise the points or the questions that are of interest to them. The responses of the 
Assembly members should be to the point; they should address the issues that are 
worth discussing and their answers should be precise so as not to expose the 
company’s interest to damage. It should also enable shareholders to familiarize 
themselves with the minutes of the meeting published in the newspapers or in the 
specialized bulletins that publish the proceedings and deliberation of the formal 
convention. 
• Voting Rights 
Voting is a basic right that the shareholder exercises. It cannot be invalidated, but the 
company must facilitate the exercise of this right; it can approach the division of votes 
when voting to elect members of the Governing Council in the General Assembly. 
The shareholders should appoint one who summons other shareholders to attend the 
meeting of the Assembly. The representatives should be legally authorized to disclose 
their policies in the voting.  
•  The Rights of Shareholders in Dividends 
The Governing Council should establish a lucid policy concerning the distribution of 
profits and that policy should be in the interest of all shareholders, the company, and 
the General Assembly. It should announce the date of distributing profits and the 
deadline for distributing them.  
•  Disclosure and Transparency 
The disclosure policies, procedures and the supervisory systems should be formulated 
in compliance with the rules specified by the market.  
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•  Disclosure in the Report of the Board of Directors  
In addition to what is stated in the Listing Rules, the Board of Directors must issue a 
report on the provisions that have been applied. The report should incorporate the 
names and the classification of its company members together with a brief term of 
reference to the board committees and a statement of remuneration and any 
punishment, penalty or limitation imposed on the company in addition to the findings 
of the annual audit.  
• The Board of Directors 
The functions of the Governing Council are to adopt the strategic directions, to 
determine the objectives of the company and to oversee the implementation of the 
rules and regulations. The Board should also develop systems and adopt measures 
necessary to monitor the implementation of the strategies both internally and 
externally. The developed strategies, policies, standards and procedures should be 
made consistent, clear and specific with regard to the membership of the Governing 
Council. It should also develop a written policy governing the relationship among the 
stakeholders; thus protecting and preserving their rights. 
• The Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors possesses the powers and authorities necessary for the 
management and for shouldering the ultimate responsibility for the company and the 
Council. The responsibilities of the Governing Council should be clearly stated in the 
statute of the company. The Board should also guide the Council to implement its 
functions in good faith in order to realise the interests of the company in general. The 
Council must ensure that the company provides adequate information to its members. 
The Governing Council may sell, mortgage and/or discharge the Company’s debtors 
of their obligations but only if it is authorized to do so by the company.  
• The Composition of the Board of Directors 
The Statute of the company’s number of board members and the means of terminating 
their terms of office are determined by the Assembly in accordance with the term of 
office stipulated in the Statute of the company. According to the Board Statute, 
members of the Board who do not comply with rules and regulations as well as non-
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executive members who do not hold membership of the Board of Directors could be 
relieved of their duties. 
• The Board Committees and Independence 
The Board of Directors should form a number of committees. For the company’s 
claims to be fully functional the company should be committed to inform the Board 
about its activities and that should be done with complete transparency. It should also 
appoint a sufficient number of members for the non-executive committees to resolve 
tasks that may result in conflicts.  
•  The Audit Committee 
The Governing Council of the committee of non-executive members provides the 
company’s board with proposals concerning the Governing Council rules for selecting 
members of the Audit Committee and its functions including overseeing the 
management of internal audit and the study of the internal control system as well as 
that of accounting policies and other related functions.  
• The Committees that Examine Nominations 
The Governing Council of the Committee informs the company’s general assembly 
about the proposals of the Governing Council and the rules for the selection of 
Committee members and its functions which include recommendations on the 
Assembly nominations to the Council and a review of the structure of the Governing 
Council among other tasks.  
•  The Board Meetings and the Agenda 
The Board members should devote adequate time for carrying out their obligations 
which comprise the preparation of the meeting agenda of the Council and those of the 
Standing Committees. The Temporary Governing Council adopts the agenda when the 
proceedings are over. The Council meetings’ minutes including the voting process 
should also be documented and stored for further reference. 
•  Emoluments of Members of the Governing Council 
The General Assembly should determine the emoluments of the members of the 
Governing Council as deemed appropriate. 
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•  The Internal Audit Department  
The Company’s internal control system should be managed by full-time officials who 
report directly to the senior management members. The officials should present a 
quarterly report to the Governing Council and to the Oversight Committee on the 
company’s commitment to the provisions of the laws and rules governing their 
activities. 
• Conflict of Interest  
The Company’s system should provide for sending written statement to the members 
of the Board of Directors, the managers and the staff members when a conflict of 
interest arises; it should also maintain the company professionalism and integrity and 
develop an internal system that could monitor the implementation of its rules and 
regulation. It should not allow the President or any member of the Governing Council 
to participate in any action that would violate the company code of conduct, ethics and 
integral behaviour. 
• The Audit Committee 
The Company’s oversight committee should be appointed by the General Assembly; it 
should have all the rights and duties set forth by the Libyan Commercial Law. The 
Committee should prove in its oversight that it has carried out all the required 
investigations and enquiries. 
      Therefore, from the above, the Libyan Stock Market has advanced CG practices in 
listed companies which are one of the most important steps leading to the 
development of the Libyan economy.   
2.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed relevant background information for this study. It has 
presented a brief background about the Libyan economy; financial laws; quality of 
accounting, auditing, CG; and organisation of the Libyan Stock Market and their 
impact on CG practices. Several key factors influence CG practices: quality of 
economy; statutory requirements e.g., commercial, financial system, income tax, 
foreign capital investment and banking law; high quality standards e.g., code of CG, 
accounting, auditing, financial report standard; culture; and business ethics.  
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       This chapter shows that in the Libyan environment: the economy is not 
considered a market economy per se; weakness of law legislation and regulations; an 
absence of code of CG, accounting, auditing, financial report standards and business 
ethics, which led Libyan companies to have poor governance practices. The Libyan 
economy is in dire need of many reforms: economic, legal, administrative and 
financial. An example would be the introduction of Libyan accounting principles and 
auditing standards, the introduction of its own accounting systems, the foundation of 
the Libyan Auditors and Accountants Association which is responsible not only for 
implementing legal statutes on behalf of the government but also for managing every 
facet of the auditing profession, issuing rules on good governance for both companies 
and shareholders together with clarifying the principles underlying them.  
      An essential element of an effective CG framework is the legal system. This is 
because the legal system defines the responsibilities of the parties and also enables 
enforcement. Like many other developing countries, Libya seeks to develop its 
economy through integrating into the global economy. This process requires the 
Libyan government to improve its economic environment by an effective enforcement 
of a well revised legal system. 
      Another factor that critically affects the practice of CG is the issue of legal system 
enforcement. Berglof and Claessens (2004) observed that, enforcement is more than 
regulation, laws-on-the-books or voluntary codes, it is the key to effective CG, at least 
in transitional and developing countries. Hence, good CG practice is related to fair and 
effective enforcement of the legal system to provide investors’ confidence. 
The next chapter draws on the literature review as a basis for development hypotheses 
and build the research framework and methodology for this study, such as overview of 
CG and principles, the role of T&D in good governance, overview of T&D, and issues 
related to T&D.   
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Chapter 3 Literature Review: Transparency and Disclosure 
3.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an essential theoretical and empirical 
background on CG in general and T&D issues in particular in both developing and 
developed countries.  
      Agency theory and asymmetry of information will in particular be adopted to 
explain the role of T&D in good CG. This chapter will focus on the need for CG and 
theories advocated by researchers to describe the phenomena. In addition, the 
conclusions of this chapter relating to the perceived gaps in the existing body of 
research will provide the basis for a theoretically grounded/supported theoretical 
framework that will be developed in chapter four.  
      This chapter presents a review of the relevant literature covering the major issues 
related to CG and especially T&D. This chapter is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 
overviews CG. Section 3.3 then looks at CG principles. Section 3.4 covers the role of 
T&D in good governance. Section 3.5 overviews T&D. Section 3.6 presents T&D and 
corporate characteristics. Section 3.7 looks at the major issues related to the 
relationship between T&D and financial performance. Finally, section 3.8 gives the 
summary and conclusion of this chapter.  
3.2 Corporate Governance 
Over recent years, there has been substantial attention towards the CG practices of 
organisations. CG systems serve different functions in different countries. 
Anandarajah (2004) and Sharar (2010) argues that there is no universally accepted 
definition of CG. 
       According to Mallin (2003) generally speaking, the definitions of CG given 
address different elements from different perspectives: 
1.  The system of controls within the company; 
2.  The relationships between the company’s board/shareholders/stakeholders; 
3. The management of the company in the best interests of the shareholders or 
stakeholders); and 
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4. The greater transparency and accountability that enables users of corporate 
information to determine whether the business is being managed in a way that they 
consider appropriate.  
       The OECD (2004, p. 12) definitions of CG “CG is the rules and practices that 
govern the relationship between the managers and shareholders of corporations, as 
well as stakeholders like employees and creditors-contribute to growth and financial 
stability by underpinning market confidence, financial market integrity and economic 
efficiency”. 
      It is important to note that there are many players with vested interests in CG. 
These are the shareholders, the management and board directors as well as employees, 
suppliers, customers, banks, regulators and the general community at large. One can 
view CG as an overall structure within which companies are directed and controlled. 
Within this structure, each body has its own commitments and obligations: the boards 
of directors, for instance, are accountable for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders’ role in governance is to select the directors and the auditors. The 
responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, putting them 
into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to the 
shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s activities are susceptible to laws, rules 
and regulations and to the shareholders’ performance in general meeting (Arsalidou & 
Wang, 2005). Boards that are empowered by a strong CG system exercise better 
control over the various risks the business encounters. The members of the board have 
to ensure high levels of transparency since those help reduce the risk of fraud or theft 
due to the increased accountability and the likelihood that fraud or theft will be 
discovered; they should adopt clear procedures and responsibilities for taking 
important decisions since that guarantees that major decisions are made on a well-
informed and objective basis; strong CG standards help ensure that the company is 
acting in the best interests of the shareholders. 
      CG structure provides useful information to investors and creditors to reduce 
information asymmetry and helps the company to improve performances (Chiang & 
Chia, 2005). Han and Saif (2008) report that good governance increases company 
valuation and  performance and decreases financial fraud and the cost of capital. 
Claessens (2006) indicated that better CG is likely to improve the performance of 
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companies, through more efficient management, better asset allocation, better labour 
practices, or other efficiency improvements. Sheridan and Kendall (1992), assert that 
achieving good CG requires a system of structured operating and controlling to fulfil 
the following objectives: a) complying with all of the relevant legal and regulatory 
requirements; b) achieving a long-term strategy of goals of the owner which may be 
maximising shareholder value or controlling market shares; c) maintaining excellent 
long-term relations with customers and suppliers in terms of service, quality and 
financial settlement procedures; and d) securing the interests of employees all the time 
and ensuring that they are guaranteed a positive working atmosphere, further training 
courses, health coverage, and fair retirement packages. Bai et al. (2004) find that there 
is a positive relationship between good T&D proxies and market valuation in China. 
Judge et al. (2003) show that effective CG may be essential to company performance 
in Russia.  
      According to Duztas (2008, p. 18) 
Good governance is far more than a ‘check list’ of minimum board and management 
policies and duties. Even the most thoughtful and well-drafted policies and procedures 
are destined to fail if directors and management are not committed to enforcing them in 
practice. A good CG structure is a working system for principled goal setting, effective 
decision-making and appropriate monitoring of compliance and performance. 
      Previous studies demonstrated that CG structure exerts a significant impact on 
company value and shareholder welfare (Chung, Wright, & Kedia, 2003). It is 
pertinent to point out that the CG guidelines are a mechanism by which a company 
can reduce agency costs and better align the interests of the boards and the suppliers 
of capital (Picou & Rubach, 2006). According to Aguilera et al. (2008), research on 
CG mostly focuses on a universal link between CG practices (board structure, 
shareholder activism) and performance outcomes, but it fails to consider how 
interdependencies between the organization and the diverse environments could lead 
to variations in the effectiveness of the different governance practices. CG is 
important to financial analysts since it relates 1) to the integrity and the credibility of 
financial disclosures; the insiders are the major source of financial disclosures and 2) 
to the role of governance disclosures in reducing uncertainty surrounding future 
performance (Bhat, et al., 2006). 
      Therefore, the empirical studies mainly focus on specific dimensions or attributes 
of CG such as top management and compensation; the role of non-executive directors; 
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board structure; board composition; social responsibilities and internationalization; 
capital market pressure and short-termism; other control mechanisms like director and 
managerial stockholdings, executive labour market and corporate control market, 
ownership concentration, debt financing. Berghe (2002), argues that the relationship 
between CG such as directors, management and shareholders has been the central 
topic of governance studies for a long time; focusing merely on the legal company and 
the company as the agent of the shareholder seems no longer sufficient and time has 
come to view the governance of the company as a whole. It is usually claimed that 
good CG enhances a company’s performance (e.g., Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994; 
Brickley & James, 1987; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Chung, et al., 2003; Hossain, 
Cahan, & Adams, 2000; Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, & Davidson, 1992).  
      On the other hand, empirical contributions (e.g., Bauer, Guenster, & Otten, 2004; 
Brown & Caylor, 2004; Drobetz, Schillhofer, & Zimmermann, 2004; Foerster & 
Huen, 2004; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2004) find that there is a weak relationship 
between company performance and CG index. Furthermore, studies have reported a 
negative association between CG and company performance (e.g., Bathala & Rao, 
1995), while others for example, Park & Shin, (2004) Singh & Davidson Iii, (2003) 
Prevost et al., (2002) have found no relationship at all between CG and company 
performance, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) find a negative significant relationship 
between the extent of disclosure and net profit margin ratio in UK companies. Core et 
al. (2006) use the GIM index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick) to find that CG has a 
significant negative association with future operating performance as measured by 
ROA. Bowen et al. (2008) find that discretion due to poor CG quality is positively 
associated with future operating cash flows and ROA. (see Appendix 3)   
      According to Singh et al. (2002), it is worth pointing out that the analysis of CG 
structures in developing countries has long been impeded by a lack of detailed 
information. One benefit that arose from the Asian crisis and from the focus of the 
international financial institutions on governance structures is the assembling of a 
large body of evidence on CG structures in developing countries at the World Bank. 
Most of the current empirical studies examine the correlation of specific CG aspects 
and companies’ market value or performance. A relatively limited number of studies 
use a CG index in order to examine whether governance practices affect the 
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company’s market value (Xanthakis, Tsipouri, & Spanos, 2004). Governments have 
an important role to play in improving CG. They can strengthen the laws that protect 
shareholder interests and reinforce the relevant laws and regulations (Bai, Liu, Lu, 
Song, & Zhang, 2006). 
      Mitton (2004) argues that the companies which have stronger governance are more 
profitable, but their greater profitability accounts for only part of the higher dividend 
payouts. It has become evident that CG addresses the agency problems that are 
brought about by the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. 
Previous studies illustrate that CG structure significantly influences company value 
and shareholder welfare (Chung, et al., 2003). 
      Javid and Iqbal (2010) report that previous studies have shown that good CG 
practices have led to:  
 Lower risk of systematic financial failure for countries. 
 A significant increase in the economic value added of companies. 
  Higher productivity. 
       The above findings of these empirical researchers are mixed and as a result, it is 
often difficult for users to draw any company conclusion on the relationship. On the 
other hand, studies undertaken considering the overall CG mostly provide evidence of 
a significant relationship between governance and company financial performance 
measures by accounting and market. However, Biswas & Bhuiyan  (2008) argue that 
Whether better CG causes higher company financial performance still remains a valid 
research question for reasons such as ambiguity regarding the direction of causality. 
      In previous studies, researchers from different parts of the world have mostly 
come forward with correlation between these two variables (CG and company 
performance). Rather than examining the impact of a complete set of governance 
standards on company performance, these studies mostly investigate the impact of 
single governance characteristics on company performance. This study focus on 
investigates T&D practices as a key element of CG and examines fourteen company 
variables and three measures of financial performances. 
      Many empirical studies have been performed on the subject of relationship 
between CG and financial performance, mostly in developed and a few in developing 
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countries. Table 3.1 illustrates some of the key areas of research of the past twenty-
seven years into CG and financial performance.  
Table  3.1 Corporate Governance and Company Financial Performance: Forward 
Measures Employed 
No. = Number of financial performance, Fr. = Frequency of variables and %= Percentage variables 
      Previous studies demonstrated mixed relationship between CG and company 
performance. Most of those studies examine the relationship between company 
performance and CG such as: board structure, i.e. independent directors, separation of 
chairmanship and CEO role, board committee, foreign directors, director or 
managerial ownership, monitoring by boards, and board size; ownership and other 
control mechanisms, i.e. insider ownership, ownership concentration, family 
ownership, institutional investor ownership, takeover control, monitoring by large 
shareholders, shareholder rights, and other control mechanisms; relationship with 
governance structure; social responsibility, competitive or collaborative board politics; 
impact of internationalization; compliance with the code of compliance; audit 
committee; and T&D. In previous studies, the one hundred and eight researchers used 
No. Measure of company 
performance 
Fr. % No. Measure of company 
performance 
Fr. % 
1 Return on Equity 40 15.6 22 Assets Per Share 1 0.39 
2 Return on Assets 72 28 23 Total Assets Turnover 2 0.79 
3 Revenues-Sales 3 1.17 24 Rate of Total Assets Growth 1 0.39 
4 Rates Earning Per Share 8 3.13 25 Cash Flow Per Share 2 0.79 
5 Tobin’s Q 54 21 26 Return on Investment 2 0.79 
6 Return on Capital Employed 3 1.19 27 
Ratio of Economic Value Added  to 
Invested Capital 1 0.39 
7 Net Income 1 0.39 28 Economic Value Added Capital Ratio 1 0.39 
8 Total Profit / Total Cost 1 0.39 29 Sales/Average Number of Employees 2 0.79 
9 Profit Margin 5 1.95 30 Net Sales 1 0.39 
10 Price Earnings Ratio 3 1.17 31 Share Repurchases 1 0.39 
11 Current Assets Divided by Current Liabilities 1 0.39 32 
Average of the Daily Continuous 
Returns 1 0.39 
12 Leverage 3 1.17 33 Performance of Stock 1 0.39 
13 Market-To-Book- Value 11 4.28 34 Market Adjusted Stock Price Returns 2 0.79 
14 Market-To-Sales Ratio 2 0.79 35 Turnover Ratio (Sales/Assets) 1 0.39 
15 Quick Assets / Current Liabilities 1 0.39 36 
Operating Margin (Operating 
Income/Sales) 2 0.79 
16 Share Returns 1 0.39 37 Salary Expenditures 1 0.39 
17 Stock Price 1 0.39 38 Total Debt/Total Assets 1 0.39 
18 Operating Profit / Operating Income 2 0.79 39 
Cash Dividends/Book Value of 
Shareholders’ Equity 1 0.39 
19 Total Shareholder Return 2 0.79 40 Operating Income 1 0.39 
20 Market Return 12 4.67 41 Volatility of Stock Prices 1 0.39 
21 Sales Growth 6 2.33 Total 257 100% 
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forty-one financial performance measures. The key measures used to financial 
performance are ROA, Tobin’s and ROE. Table 3.1 shows that the most of the 
researcher used ROA (72 out of 108) approximately 28 % form all financial 
performance using (257). In additional Tobin's Q and ROE was 21% and 16% 
respectively. The key measures used to independent variables are board structure, 
chief executive officer duality and ownership structure. The key methodology used is 
annual report and questionnaire. The analysis used to examining relationship between 
CG and financial performance are Pearson correlation, Spearman rank correlation, 
Chi-Square test, simple and multiple Regression analysis. Therefore, previous studies 
provide a ‘window’ into the mixed research conducted to date that explores 
relationship between CG and financial performance (for more detail please refers to 
Appendix 3). 
3.3 Corporate Governance Principles 
According to the OECD principles, companies must provide material information on 
the financial and operating results of the company, on the company objectives, the 
major share ownership and voting rights, members of the board and key executives 
and their remuneration, related party transactions, any material concerning predictable 
risk factors, material issues concerning employees and other stakeholders and 
governance structures and policies.  
       The OECD 2004 definition of CG sets the rules and practices that govern the 
relationship between the managers and shareholders of corporations, as well as that 
between the stakeholders: the employees and creditors who contribute to growth and 
financial stability by fostering market confidence, financial market integrity and 
economic efficiency. However, the aim of this study is to determine T&D, one of the 
rules and practices of CG, to reduce agency problems and asymmetry information 
between management and shareholders of corporations, as well as those between other 
stakeholders, which leads to fostering market confidence and the financial market, 
improving company performance and reducing the agency cost by minimizing the cost 
of capital.  
      The OECD (2004) published Principles of CG are:  
I. To ensure the basis for an Effective CG Framework 
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The CG framework should uphold transparent and efficient markets, comply with the 
rules of law and clearly communicate the division of responsibilities among different 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
II. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
The CG framework should safeguard and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights. 
III. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
The CG framework should guarantee equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the 
opportunity to attain effective redress for infringement of their rights. 
IV. The Role of Stakeholders in CG 
The CG framework should acknowledge the rights of stakeholders approved by law or 
through mutual agreements and promote active co-operation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
V. Disclosure and Transparency 
The CG framework should also ensure that timely and precise disclosure is made on 
all material matters with respect to the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership and governance of the company. 
A. Disclosure should include but should not be limited to material information on: 
1. The financial and operating results of the company. 
2. Company objectives. 
3. Major share ownership and voting rights. 
4. Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives as well as 
information about board members, their qualifications, their selection process and 
whether or not they are regarded as independent by the board. 
5. Related party transactions. 
6. Predictable risk factors. 
7. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
8. Governance structures and policies, particularly the content of any CG code or the 
policy and process by which it is implemented. 
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B. Information should be prepared and unveiled in accordance with high quality 
standards of accounting, financial and non-financial disclosure. 
C. An independent, competent and qualified auditor should conduct an annual audit in 
order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that 
the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the 
company in all material respects. 
D. The external auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to 
the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit. 
E. Channels for disseminating information should consider equal, timely and cost-
efficient access to relevant information by users. 
F. The CG framework should be complemented by an effective approach that 
addresses and encourages the provision of analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, 
rating agencies and others; an approach that is relevant to decisions made by investors 
and free from material conflicts of interest that might compromise the integrity of their 
analysis or advice. 
VI. The Responsibilities of the Board 
 The CG framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the 
company and shareholders. 
      The OECD Principles reflect not only the experience of OECD countries but also 
that of emerging and developing economies (Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 2005). They are 
greatly relevant to the non-OECD economies. Claessens (2003) maintains that the 
experiences of economic transition and financial crises in developing and emerging 
market economies confirm that a weak institutional framework for CG is incompatible 
with sustainable financial market development and growth. The OECD CG Principles 
provide specific guidance for policymakers, regulators and market participants for 
improving the legal, institutional and regulatory framework supporting CG, with close 
attention to the publicly traded companies (Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 2005). The OECD 
principles are not confined to financial disclosure since they envisage the company as 
a whole. Hence, alignment with the OECD must include changes in culture, methods, 
technologies, processes, ethics, policies and scope. Information and information flow 
is critical in order to institute a new point of balance (Lazarides, 2009). Many Asian 
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countries have attempted to model their CG codes on the OECD Principles of CG 
(Arsalidou & Wang, 2005). 
      The theories underlying CG have been drawn from a variety of disciplines, such as 
economics, law, finance and accounting, amongst others. According to Teh (2009), 
one can deduce from the OECD Principles of CG 2004 that they are very much based 
on the principles embedded in the Cadbury Code and the Combined Code. The OECD 
Principles are more complete in the sense that they also emphasise the importance of 
corporate strategy as part of overall corporate performance. Although the OECD 
Principles are more general in order to take into consideration the different corporate 
structures and cultures of member countries, they are nevertheless based on the Anglo-
American CG model. McCarthy and Puffer (2008) report that the standards developed 
by OECD 2004 contain principles based on agency theory acknowledging the primacy 
of owners (shareholders), as well as the roles of board directors as their 
representatives, and managers as their agents. Dalton, Daily, Certo, and Roengpitya 
(2003) argue that agency theory is the theoretical basis of most research on CG. 
Mülbert (2010) argues that agency theory provides a suitable framework, since, after 
all, CG is all about agency conflicts among different stakeholders, in particular about 
the principal–agent conflict between managers and shareholders, and about how to 
solve possible conflicts among them. Cotter et al.’s (2011) call for “agency theory 
could be used to explain CG disclosures”, this study proposes an agency theory that 
will be able to explain the role of T&D in good CG (see Section 3.4 below). 
3.4 The Role of Transparency and Disclosure in Good Governance 
Disclosure and enhanced transparency are vital because they are the twin cornerstones 
that protect shareholders’ rights. Complete disclosure practices along with 
transparency in Financial Reporting can build confidence and enhance the assurance 
of the investor community. Voluntary disclosure positively influences the 
performance of companies and safeguards the interests of shareholders. On the other 
hand, murkiness in disclosure practices can contribute to distrustful and unethical 
behaviour leading to poor valuation of the company. 
      Agency conflict exists when managers (agents) undertake opportunistic actions, 
such as earnings management, to maximise their own interests. Within companies 
69 
 
where poor financial transparency and information disclosure practices are adopted, 
managers are more likely to use their information advantage to pursue private benefits 
of control, which ultimately leads to an increase in the agency costs encountered by the 
shareholders. As the agency problem worsens, insiders (such as the executives or the 
controlling owners) can easily exploit the wealth and rights of small shareholders; For 
this reason, poor CG is associated with bad disclosure practices (Chen, Chung, Lee, & 
Liao, 2007). According to Eisenhardt (1989, p. 58) and Jerab (2011, p. 4), agency 
theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationship. 
The first is the agency problem that arises when a) the desires or goals of the principal 
and agent are different and b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what 
the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the 
agent has behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises 
when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. The problem here is 
that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk 
preferences. Hart (1995) points out that CG mechanisms are necessary if agency 
problems persist and contracts are incomplete. Klapper and Love (2004) also provide 
evidence for associations between CG mechanisms and either the extent of the 
asymmetric information or the contracting flaws that companies encounter. 
      Filatotchev & Boyd (2009) report that CG has been framed in terms of agency 
theory and has explored links between different CG practices and company 
performance. CG mechanisms are designed to cope with agency problems and 
asymmetry of information. Hart (1995, pp. 679-680) indicates that CG mechanisms 
are necessary if agency problems exist and contracts are incomplete. Watson et al. 
(2002) report that, according to agency theory, the main purpose of financial reporting 
is to monitor the efficiency of managers; managers might use disclosure to try to 
convince shareholders they are acting optimally.  
      Previous researchers have relied on asymmetry of information as a supporting 
theory to explain the link between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) in 
modern corporations (e.g., Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006a; Shabbir & Padgett, 2005). The 
theoretical and empirical literature on information asymmetry, for example, Ross 
(1977), suggests that there is significant information asymmetry between outside 
investors and inside managers. Spence (1973) observes that if information asymmetry 
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exists between company’s managers and investors, the company can provide 
information to the investor in order to eradicate the asymmetry. T&D are integral to CG. 
Higher transparency and better disclosure reduce the information asymmetry between a 
company’s management team and financial stakeholders, equity and bond holders, 
alleviating the agency problems in CG (Patel, Balic, & Bwakira, 2002). Improving T&D 
practices eventually leads to better CG, largely because the disclosure practices of a 
company can be viewed as efficient mechanisms for the protection of the rights of 
outsiders. Better T&D practices can help shareholders to gain better understanding of 
the companies’ management practices; thus, helping to reduce the information 
asymmetry encountered by investors (Chen, et al., 2007). Good T&D mechanisms are 
set in place to fundamentally protect the rights of the minority shareholders, creditors 
and other outsiders who do not have instant knowledge about the company and its 
prospects, from drawing out of private benefits by insiders based on their superior 
information. This, in turn, is expected to minimise the informational asymmetry in the 
company and the probability of fraud, and to enhance its detection, leading to lower cost 
of capital and, hence, higher company value. A related informational benefit of good 
T&D practices is that it increases the investor consciousness and confidence which 
lessens the uncertainty of the returns to the capital suppliers and which, as expected, 
would reduce the company’s cost of external capital and, hence, increase its value 
(Aksu & Kosedag, 2006). As Patel et al. (2002) put it, T&D are integral to CG and 
higher transparency and better disclosure reduce the information asymmetry between a 
company’s management and its financial stakeholders – equity and bond holders – thus, 
mitigating the agency problem in CG. Previous researchers suggest that agency 
problems can be resolved through, first, increasing incentive alignment between agents 
and principals; second, effective principal monitoring of agents; and third, optimizing 
the risk-bearing properties of principals and agents (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Boeker, 
1992; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989; Zajac & Westphal, 1994).  
      Literature states hat better T&D is associated with lower information asymmetry 
between managers and investors. Botosan (1997) notes that recent research suggests a 
positive association between increased disclosure and positive capital market effects 
and that the companies increased disclosures, specifically, reduce the information 
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asymmetry between managers and investors which, thus, decreases the companies’ 
cost of equity capital. Chen et al.(2007) report that information asymmetry is higher 
for companies with poor information T&D practices. Healy and Palepu (2001), 
Schrand and Verrecchia (2004) and Jo and Kim (2007) argue that there is increasing 
evidence that disclosure generally develops transparency and hence reduces 
information problems. Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) observe that the most 
highlighted benefit of transparency is that it reduces asymmetric information and thus, 
lowers the cost of trading the company’s securities and the company’s cost of capital: 
first, to offset this benefit, commentators typically focus on the direct costs of 
disclosure as well as the competitive costs arising because disclosure provides 
potentially useful information to product–market rivals; second, while both of these 
factors are certainly important in the companies’ disclosure decisions, they are not 
particularly related to CG. Cai, Liu, & Qian (2008) argue that information asymmetry  
leads to higher costs of direct board monitoring and therefore a reason for companies 
to rely further on indirect governance mechanisms, such as market discipline and CEO 
incentive alignment. 
3.5 Transparency and disclosure 
Disclosure is the communication of information about an entity to external parties 
(Frost, Gordon, & Pownall, 2005). Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004) define 
governance transparency as the strength of disclosures utilized by outside investors to 
hold officers and directors accountable. It has become evident that increased public 
interest in transparency motivated stock exchanges and regulators to initiate 
regulations on the provision of governance-related disclosures by public companies. 
Transparency, thus, may assist in ensuring good governance; the temptations that 
seduce managers are properly taken care of and the information on which managers 
base their business decisions is subjected to external checking. Although the 
transparency mechanisms in the emerging system economies do not include 
compulsory disclosure to the widest audience, there are mechanisms built in the 
institutional structure that expose management to a considerable degree of checking. 
The institutions concerned are ones which are sensitive to national and oligarchic 
priorities, rather than to short-term economic gains and stock market value for the 
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individual company (Millar, et al., 2005). Stanwick and Stanwick (2005) suggest that 
improving CG disclosure is related to enhancing transparency, promoting sound 
capital markets and regaining the confidence of stakeholders. 
      One major indicator of the standard of CG is transparency  in an economy (Ho & 
Wong, 2001). According to Gregory (2002), the principal characteristics of effective 
governance consist of transparency, which is reflected in the disclosures made by the 
company. It includes the disclosure of relevant operational and financial information 
and internal management processes of oversight and control. Millar et al. (2005) argue 
that the issue of institutional transparency arose in relation to the dissemination of 
information and disclosure to the company stakeholders. 
      Corporate disclosure aims not only at investors, but also at creditors, employees, 
regulatory agencies and the public at large. As a rule, disclosure performs a 
facilitating function: it is designed to facilitate, assist or enable the decision-making of 
the persons to whom it is addressed (Borgia, 2005). However, Yu (2007) classified 
studies on CG practice disclosure into two groups: the first one examines the 
determinants, and the second one scrutinizes the economic consequences of 
governance disclosures. Cadbury (1993) commented on the focus of the CG issues his 
committee had addressed. He set out a number of general principles aimed at 
encouraging “Full disclosure”, seeking “a right and inevitable” trend by companies 
towards more openness. The two important parameters of disclosure are: “Disclosure 
is central to accountability and indeed to public confidence in the system” and 
“Disclosure will remain a basic platform of any proposal for raising corporate 
standards”. 
      The term quality is used interchangeably with the term transparency because the 
concepts of quality and transparency are elusive (Kothari, 2000). Transparency refers 
to “a process by which information about existing conditions, decisions and actions is 
made accessible, visible and understandable” (Ho & Wong, 2001, p. 154).         
Transparency permits users to observe the results and implications of the decisions, 
judgements and estimates of statement preparers. Full disclosure relates to furnishing 
of information necessary for decision-making, thereby providing sensible assurance 
that investors are not misled. The other major source of problems that contributed to 
the Asian financial crisis was the lack of transparency in major markets (Zingales, 
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2008). A governance system, respected by those under its authority, must reflect 
transparency and trust more than anything else (Olson, 2009).  
      According to Borgia (2005), media stories on transparency often focus on what’s 
wrong at the top: on CEOs who report misleading or deceptive financials and on the 
secret deals between high-ranking military officers or backroom pacts among 
politicians, while some leaders are guilty; for a corporation to be truly transparent, 
four key elements are required:  
- An open culture and a commitment to transparency from the corporation’s most 
senior leadership. 
-  Programs and processes that promote and ensure openness at every level, that 
reward transparency and penalize people for their deception, treachery and fraud.  
- Proficient and well-trained workers, managers and administrators at all levels of the 
corporation with the wisdom, integrity, confidence and security to perform and 
pronounce what is right and to recognise and act when the corporation or individuals 
are not doing things that should be done. 
- Established means of proactive communication to the corporation’s important 
stakeholders.  
According to Borgia (2005, p. 20), the new view of transparency implies several 
important characteristics:  
- A trend toward more transparency rather than less.  
- More forceful scrutiny from more groups or individuals around the world.  
- More comprehensive demands for new kinds of information.  
- More complex requirements in assembling, analysing, and reporting information.  
- More proactive attention by both the observer and observed.  
- More debates about what information should be made public.  
      The discussion above suggests that strategic transparency is influenced by two 
factors: (1) the orientation of the institutional infrastructure in a certain economy and 
(2) the foundation of a business system in a certain economy (Tarek Ibrahim & Chong 
Ju, 2006). When managers choose not to disclose all the relevant information in their 
possession in their financial statements, there is an information gap between the 
managers and users and consequently a lack of transparency and asymmetry 
information (Marshall & Weetman, 2007). Bai et al. (2006) argue that financial 
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transparency and adequate information disclosure are, undoubtedly, important in all 
countries, particularly in developing ones. Managers play a crucial role in securing the 
interests of not only the existing owners but also the potential investors. Honest 
managers should provide sufficient, accurate, and timely information concerning the 
company’s operations, financial status, and external environment. A common factor 
determining the success of a CG structure is the extent to which it is transparent to 
market forces.  Such transparency is more than pure financial transparency; as it can 
also be based on factors such as governmental, banking and other types of institutional 
transparency mechanism (Millar, et al., 2005). 
      However, a recent study by Tadesse (2006, p. 34), relating the incidence of 
banking financial crises in the 1990s to the regulation of disclosures made by banks, 
characterised the arguments over disclosure in the bank sector into two parts: The first 
part is the transparency-stability view – disclosure enhances transparency and 
improves information flows, thereby helping market discipline and leading to the more 
efficient allocation of resources, with sound banks rewarded and the unsound 
penalised. On the other hand, the second part, the transparency-fragility view, holds 
that ‘disclosure creates negative externalities’. Jo and Kim (2007) found that 
transparency-reducing disclosure is concentrated in companies that substantially, but 
temporarily, increase disclosure prior to the offering. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2007)find that reforms that seek to increase transparency can reduce company profits, 
raise executive compensation, and inefficiently increase the rate of CEO turnover.  
      Therefore, information disclosure could be classified into two categories: 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure as follows: 
3.5.1 Mandatory Disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure rules ensure equal access to basic information (Lev, 1992). As a 
result of the post-Enron increased awareness of the economic merits of good CG, 
T&D, many countries have augmented their mandatory disclosure requirements via 
enacting new laws and regulations. Mandatory disclosure is restricted by two factors: 
first, the evolution of the business system, which favours family and concentrated 
ownership, reduces the potential role of the outside shareholders and furnishes a 
parallel, family-based channel of influence and information for other stakeholders. 
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Second, the role of the banks as providers of long-term capital, which in the past 
further reduced the motivation for open disclosure to the market of potential outside 
shareholders. Finally, the limited extent and reliability of the legal infrastructure 
means that even mandatory disclosure rules might not provide adequate protection to 
minority shareholders’ rights (Millar, et al., 2005). However, mandatory items of 
information are those items which should be legally disclosed in annual reports by the 
respective Acts and Ordinances governing  (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). 
       CG structures should ensure that the minority shareholders receive “transparent” 
and reliable information about the value of the company and that the company’s 
managers and large shareholders do not deceive them out of the value of their 
investments. Developing and maintaining a sophisticated financial disclosure is 
necessary to keep up with the international standards, to boost the confidence of 
investors, to increase attractiveness and to invite foreign direct investments. 
      Transparent disclosure requires the provision of “material” information. It is the 
omission or misstatement information that could influence the economic decisions 
made by the users of information. Applying the concept of materiality in developing 
disclosure requirements helps companies and regulators to determine what information 
is truly relevant. There are some disclosure deficiencies that should be averted; these 
are: 1) the inadequate disclosure of related-party transactions; 2) the concealment of 
large enterprise debts through related-party transactions and the off-balance sheet 
financing, such as cross-guarantees within corporate groups; 3) the insufficient 
reporting of contingent liabilities, especially loan guarantees granted to related and 
unrelated parties; 4) the inadequate segment information that would have revealed the 
risks related to specific sectors such as real estate. Furthermore, regulators, chambers 
of commerce, business groups, institutes of directors, and self-regulatory, academic 
and professional organisations must contribute to this effort to raise the awareness of 
shareholders’ and the public’s right to corporate transparency. 
     First-class information on capital and control structures is also critical for the 
exercise of governance powers. Insight into the type of companies that already report 
on CG can be of interest to regulators, allowing for a formal requirement on CG 
disclosure. The mere fact that companies are obliged to disclose information does not 
automatically mean that a change of behaviour is required or that substantial costs will 
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need to be sustained. Furthermore, the OECD Principles state that disclosure 
requirements are not expected to place irrational administrative or cost burdens on 
enterprises, nor are companies required to make available information that may 
endanger their competitive position. Many countries have adopted the concept of 
material information in order to determine what information should be disclosed at a 
minimum; this concept is defined as ‘information whose omission or 
misrepresentation could affect the economic decisions adopted by users of 
information.’ The specific disclosure requirements imposed by the OECD Principles, 
fall into four categories: the content of information required to be disclosed, the 
manner whereby the information is to be prepared, the requirements that necessitate an 
annual audit be carried out by an independent auditor, and finally the channels for 
disseminating information (Arsalidou & Wang, 2005). 
      The Greenbury committee in (1995), observes that specifically addressed the 
disclosure requirements of director remuneration. However, there seem to be two 
serious omissions of disclosure, namely, the aggregate remuneration for outside 
directorships and the time spent in connection with them. The remuneration a 
company pays to outside directors sitting on its board is revealed but it is not 
necessarily the remuneration paid to its ‘inside’ directors by outside companies for 
sitting on their boards. Without full revelation, a shareholder may vote for the election 
or the re-election of a director believing that they are dedicating their full time and 
attention to the company affairs while they may not be (Ward, 1998). 
3.5.2 Voluntary Disclosure 
Corporate voluntary disclosure and its determinants are considered important research 
areas that have attracted both analytical and empirical researchers in accounting since 
the 1970s (Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Xiao & Yuan, 2007). Voluntary disclosure is 
measured by the amount and detail of non-mandatory information included in the 
management discussion and analysis of the annual report (Eng & Mak, 2003). Meek et 
al. (1995, p. 555), define voluntary disclosure as: “the focus of an increasing amount 
of attention by accounting researchers. Voluntary disclosure-disclosure in excess of 
requirements-represents free choices on the part of the company managements to 
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provide accounting and other information considered relevant to the decision needs of 
users of their annual reports,”  
      Simultaneously, the companies themselves have poured out additional voluntarily 
disclosures such as the voluntary expensing of the employee stock options since 2000 
in the US (Aksu & Kosedag, 2006). Healy and Palepu (2001) present a complete 
review of the voluntary disclosure literature. They observe that research into voluntary 
disclosure decisions tends to focus on the information role of reporting for capital 
market participants. They identify five forces relevant to managers’ decisions to 
voluntarily disclose information for capital market reasons: 1) the capital market 
transactions hypothesis: the company’s incentives to make voluntary disclosures in 
order to reduce information asymmetry and hence decrease the cost of external 
financing through reduced information risk. 2) The corporate control contest 
hypothesis: when the corporate performance is poor, the managers use voluntary 
disclosures in an attempt to increase the company valuation and to account for the 
poor performance; thus, lessening the risk of management job losses. 3) The stock 
compensation hypothesis: managers who are rewarded with stock compensation have 
an incentive to use voluntary disclosures to reduce the likelihood of insider trading 
allegations, and companies have incentives to increase disclosures to minimise 
contracting costs with managers who receive stock compensation. 4) The litigation 
cost hypothesis: managers have an incentive to disclose bad news to avoid legal 
actions for inadequate disclosure, but on the other hand, they also have an incentive to 
reduce disclosures of forecasts that might prove to be imprecise. 5) The proprietary 
costs hypothesis: voluntary disclosures will be restricted if managers perceive that 
disclosure could be competitively harmful. 
      The extent to which voluntary disclosure alleviates resource misallocation in the 
capital market depends on the degree of credibility of information on the company’s 
economics that is not available from other sources, including required disclosures. 
Because managers have incentives to make self-serving voluntary disclosures, it is 
unclear whether management disclosures are credible (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Prior 
research has directly examined the impact of security litigation on managements’ 
voluntary disclosure of bad news; these studies provide conflicting evidence on the 
nature of litigation-based disclosure incentives (Johnson, Kasznik, & Nelson, 2001).   
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A company’s extent for voluntary financial disclosure was implimented with two 
alternate disclosure scores. These scores were obtained using a three-step process: (1) 
indentifying voluntery disclosure items; (2) rating the importance of each disclosure 
item; and (3) computing disclosure scores (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987). 
      Therefore, companies may adopt voluntary corporate disclosure in situations 
where mandatory disclosure is not conventional.  
3.5.3 Transparency and Disclosure and Annual Reporting 
The annual report  is one of the most important sources of corporate information 
(Botosan, 1997). At the top of every analyst’s list (of financial reports used by 
analysts) is the annual report to shareholders. It is the major reporting document and 
every other financial report is in some respect a subsidiary supplementary to it 
(Knutson, 1992). The annual report is the focus of disclosure index because the annual 
report is generally considered to be one of the most important sources of corporate 
information (Lang & Lundholm, 1993).  
The annual report is one of the avenues available for companies to report their 
financial performance. Financial reporting and disclosure are potentially important 
means for management to communicate company performance and governance to 
outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
      Disclosure of information about items in the financial statements and their 
measures is detailed where required in the notes to the financial statements. Although 
there is some concern of potential disclosure overload, the greater disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry (Hope, 2003a). Prior research scrutinizes the usefulness of 
financial information by investigating the extent of the companies’ disclosures and the 
quality of the accounting information disclosed in annual reports. Studies that relate 
the level of disclosure to company characteristics include (Cooke, 1989a, 1992; 
Imhoff, 1992; Malone, Fries, & Jones, 1993; Singhvi & Desai, 1971). These studies 
provide evidence on the association between the disclosure level and the company 
characteristics such as the company size, the listing status, the company auditor, the 
scope of business, the risk of trading and the industry type. Most studies in this area 
use a disclosure index to measure the disclosure level or the disclosure quality. 
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      Holland (1999) investigated the role of financial reporting in private and public 
CG. The case, which financial institutions argued for, was that the limited quality of 
public information, particularly in financial reports, was a major restriction on their 
ability to act in fund management and CG roles. 
      According to Bushman et al. (2003), corporate reporting involves periodic 
disclosure of company-specific information on a voluntary and/or mandatory basis. 
This information includes five aspects of corporate reporting: 1) the financial 
disclosure intensity, 2) the governance disclosure intensity, 3) the accounting 
principles used to measure financial disclosures, 4) the timeliness of financial 
disclosures, and 5) the audit quality of financial disclosures.  
      As stated earlier, transparency is the timely and adequate disclosure of the 
operating and financial performance of a company and its CG practices as related to 
its ownership, board, management structure and processes. Transparency is, thus, an 
important factor exposing the company’s charm to investors as a crucial element of 
CG. The degree of transparency depends on both the willingness and the ability of the 
management to remedy any informational inconsistency with the market participants. 
In the long run, the capital markets will flourish only if a transparent informational 
environment is founded. Today, transparency in Financial Reporting is very vital. 
According to Pownall and Schipper (1999), financial statements are of high quality if 
they possess three attributes: transparency, full disclosure, and comparability. Those 
companies those fall short of the transparency standard, risk considerable damage to 
management credibility. They risk losing shareholder confidence, which definitely 
inflicts damage on market capitalization, credit rating and market liquidity. On the 
other side, enhanced voluntary disclosure has gained positively in building a 
transparent system. Voluntary information disclosure and transparent financial 
reporting help companies build long-term sustainable competitive advantages. 
3.5.4 Cost–Benefit of Transparency and Disclosure 
CG research identifies the benefits of the diverse governance practices. Most 
approaches hypothesise that enhanced company performance results from minimising 
action costs or maximising the company’s resource base (Aguilera, et al., 2008). 
Although many theories were proposed to explain disclosure practices, some 
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researchers relied solely on their intuitive reasoning that is based on cost and benefit 
analysis. Undoubtedly, more disclosure is better from the perspective of the 
information recipient, but in the real world, disclosure is not costless, as argued by 
Bhushan and Lessard (1992, p. 150). Cost–benefit analysis is required since it weighs 
the benefits of additional disclosure to investors against the costs, both direct and 
indirect, to issuers. Apart from the direct cost of disclosure, there are the indirect costs 
relating to the competitive disadvantage and the costs resulting from interference or 
regulation by government. One of the most frequently cited objections to augmented 
disclosure requirements is competitive disadvantage (Blake, 1992). 
      Among the benefits of disclosure to a corporation are reducing uncertainty about 
financial performances and future prospects, weakening the bargaining powers of 
participants and increasing their belief/recognition of mutual interest within the 
corporation. Other benefits lie in any positive contribution to the achievement of its 
goals; this contribution can only result from the positive influence that information 
has on the discloser or the third party’s behaviour; other benefits include lowering the 
cost of capital. Frankel and McNichols (1995) suggest that this is especially the case 
with companies that use external financing more frequently. In fact, some researchers 
argue that there is a clear commercial reason for companies to disclose as that will 
minimise the cost of capital (Choi, 1973; Meek & Gray, 1989). In other words, 
disclosure can be used as a public relation tool especially if it receives awards for 
reporting and also adding credibility to management (Elliott & Jacobson, 1994).  
      In the dichotomy between ownership and management of a corporate operation, 
management has better access to the information about the business operation than the 
owners and other external stakeholders, which thus creates information asymmetry. 
This information asymmetry provides management with an opportunity to extract 
resources and deceive the owners. According to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
information asymmetry is negatively correlated with corporate information disclosure, 
indicating that increased accounting transparency and greater information disclosure 
will decrease information asymmetry. Investors, creditors and other external users 
gain access to better corporate information when information disclosure requirements 
are increased. Management is more likely to follow corporate policies and government 
regulations under tighter information disclosure requirements, which make it more 
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difficult to conceal any conspiracy and deception (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). The 
increased information disclosure will also improve market efficiency in the capital 
market, and thus, help reduce the market risk for investors and potential investors. As 
Patel and Dallas (2002), put it, the cost of capital will decrease if a corporation’s 
accounting information becomes more transparent from a higher degree of disclosure. 
Information disclosure helps to augment the stockholders’ confidence in a corporation, 
improve corporate image and promote support for the corporate management team and 
its decisions. 
      Investors require companies to disclose high quality information in order to make 
economic decisions. Greater disclosure is assumed to boost the investor’s welfare and 
will thus attract investors to trade more aggressively. Managers are claimed to have 
better information about the economic performance of the company and there are 
incentives available to managers to withhold value-relevant unfavourable information 
(Sengupta, 1998). 
     Botosan (1997) develops a disclosure index to measure the disclosure level of 
manufacturing companies. In her study, she directly examines the association between 
the company’s voluntary disclosure levels and the cost of equity capital. She argues 
that since the cost of equity capital is difficult to obtain, prior research has adopted an 
indirect approach by examining the impact of disclosure on variables that are expected 
to be positively related to the cost of debt. Sengupta (1998) documents the relationship 
between disclosure quality and the cost of debt; he argues that lenders and 
underwriters consider corporate disclosure in assessing the degree of detail and the 
clarity in the annual and quarterly reports, the management discussion with financial 
analysts and the frequency of press releases to calculate the default risk. 
      However, a number of empirical studies have supported the prediction of a 
negative relation between disclosure and the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Botosan 
& Plumlee, 2002; Frankel & McNichols, 1995; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999); thus, 
establishing an important link between information disclosure and economic 
efficiency.  
      Therefore, According to Madhani (2009, p. 8) the most important merits of 
complete disclosure and better communication are: 1) Increased management 
credibility. 2) More long-term investors. 3) Increased trading volume. 4) Higher 
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institutional ownership. 5) Increased liquidity. 6) Decreased volatility. 7) Decreased 
bid-ask spread. 8) Greater analyst following. 9) Improved access to and lower cost-of-
capital. 10) Improved relations with the investment community. 11) Higher share 
prices. 
3.5.5 Role of Transparency and Disclosure in the Stock Market 
Disclosure studies presume that even in an efficient capital market, managers have 
superior information to outside investors on their companies’ expected future 
performance. If accounting and auditing regulations work perfectly, the managers’ 
accounting decisions and disclosures communicate changes in their company’s 
business economics to outside investors. Alternatively, if accounting regulations and 
auditing are imperfect, which is a more likely possibility, the managers make a trade-
off between making accounting decisions and disclosures to communicate their 
superior knowledge of company’s performance to investors and managing reported 
performance for contracting, political or CG reasons. Management motives for 
making voluntary disclosure and their credibility are, thus, interesting empirical 
questions (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
      Information disclosure plays a key role in all of the internal governance 
mechanisms (includes incentive plan, board of director’s and compensation of 
manager) and external governance mechanisms (includes government, external 
auditing and professional investors) to ensure whether the governance mechanisms of 
the listed companies work well or not (Lu & Chen, 2009). Financial transparency 
enables market participants to better assess the companies’ future performance by 
providing detailed information that is useful in predicting future earnings whereas 
governance transparency provides information useful in assessing the quality of the 
financial information. Even if it is hypothesised that both financial and governance 
transparencies improve the financial analysts’ ability to predict future earnings, it is 
not clear whether these two types of disclosures substitute or complement each other 
(Bhat, et al., 2006). Eldomiaty and Choi (2006, p. 284) define strategic transparency in 
corporate information disclosure as “the ability of companies to signal or provide 
adequate and relevant information timely and effectively to their shareholders, or to 
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other major parties such as policy makers who stimulate or restrain their behaviour 
within the principal’s interest and in a way acceptable to the society”. 
      Markets are far from perfect, and transactions, deals or bargains between actors 
have costs related to the process of coming to an agreement. Organisations emerge 
simply because they are the most efficient form of dealing: they reduce transaction 
costs. Where transaction costs are minimal or low, the market mechanism works 
perfectly well. Where transaction costs are high, iterations of market transaction are 
too costly and a hierarchy will replace the market (Freeman & Evan, 1990). 
      According to Healy and Palepu (2001), corporate disclosure is crucial for the 
functioning of an efficient capital market. Companies provide disclosure through 
regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, management 
discussion and analysis among other regulatory filings. Moreover, some companies 
engage in voluntary communication, such as managing forecasts, analysts’ 
presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites, and other corporate 
reports. Finally, there are disclosures about companies made by information 
intermediaries, such as financial analysts, industry experts and the financial press. A 
wave of corporate scandals (Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat . . .) at the beginning of the 
millennium has placed public confidence in capital markets on top of the agenda of 
today’s business (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008). 
      Researchers consider six forces that affect managers’ disclosure decisions for 
capital market: capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock 
compensation, litigation, proprietary costs and management talent signalling (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). Disclosure and the institutions created to facilitate credible disclosure 
between managers and investors play an important role in reducing these problems.  
       Bushee and Noe (2000) maintain that institutional investors are susceptible to 
corporate disclosure practices. First, institutional investors might be attracted to 
companies with good disclosure quality because such disclosure could reduce the 
price impact of trades. Second, good disclosure may affect the potential for beneficial 
trading opportunities, which raises the interest of institutional investors. Early 
research studies examined the effect of different mechanisms. They deal with: the 
proportion of independent directors in the board (Chen & Jaggi, 2000); the ownership 
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structure; the shareholders relationships (Ho & Wong, 2001); and the institutional 
investors’ activism (Bushee & Noe, 2000; El-Gazzar, 1998). 
      Therefore, from the discussion above, it has become evident that corporate 
disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market. The companies 
provide disclosure through regulated financial reports, including the financial 
statements, footnotes, management discussions, analysis, and other regulatory filings. 
Furthermore, some companies engage in voluntary communication, such as 
management forecasts, analysts’ presentations and conference calls, press releases, 
internet sites and other corporate reports 
3.5.6 Environmental Factors Affecting Transparency and Disclosure 
Many researchers in accounting and financial reporting believe that certain 
characteristics of the environment inherent in a country influence disclosure; this gives 
rise to the environmental determinism theory. Among those who believe in this theory 
are Mueller (1968), Nair and Frank (1980), Radebaugh  (1975), and Seidler  (1967). 
Cooke and Wallace (1990) argue for three factors: international (outside the country), 
external (within the country but outside the company) and internal (within a country 
and inside a company). Summarises environmental factors affecting disclosure 
quotations from Cooke and Wallace (1990), as follows in Figure 3.1.   
Figure  3.1 Environmental Factors Affecting Disclosure 
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       Researchers have examined relationships between corporate characteristics and 
disclosures for more than 40 years (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999).  
3.6 Transparency and Disclosure and Corporate Characteristics 
Prior empirical studies have recognised the relationship between the extent of 
disclosure and some company-specific characteristics such as size, ownership, 
industry type, liquidity, leverage, profitability, and auditor type. Therefore, the prior 
researches have examined the disclosure according to three types: aggregate, 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure (see Appendix 4). Acording to Lang & Lundholm 
(1993), Wallace, Naser, & Mora (1994), Camfferman & Cooke (2002), and Alsaeed 
(2006), company-specific characteristics are categorized into three groups: structure-
related variables; market-related variables; and performance-related variables. 
      Singhvi and Desai (1971) documented the association between the quality of 
corporate disclosure measured by the disclosure index and company characteristics. 
They maintain that the quality of disclosure is related to characteristics such as: size, 
number of stakeholders, rate of return, earning margin, listing status, and the size of 
the company). In this study, company-specific characteristics used will be measured in 
next section. Cooke (1989a, 1992) investigated the association between the disclosure 
quality of national annual reports and company characteristics. It employed a stepwise 
approach to examine the relation between the extent of disclosure and the company 
characteristics, namely the quotation status, the parent company relationship, the 
annual sales and the total assets as a proxy for size and number of shareholders. The 
results indicate that the company size and the listing status are considerably related to 
the level of disclosure. Malone et al. (1993) investigated the relation between the 
extent of corporate disclosure and the characteristics of companies in the oil and gas 
industry. Choi (1999) examined the disclosure quality of corporate environmental 
disclosures in this context: he reports that: a) companies in high profile industries 
unveil systematically greater quantities of information than their counterparts in lower 
profile industries, b) the corporate size is found to be positively associated with the 
tendency to disclose and finally, c) when the analysis is restricted to the discloser 
group, financial leverage and corporate age emerge as significant variables.  
      Table 3.2 shows previous studies: company characteristics Effect on T&D. 
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Table  3.2 Previous Studies: Company Characteristics Effect on T&D 
No. Company Characteristics Fr. % No. Company Characteristics Fr. % 
1 Company size 69 20 43 Age of company  7 2 
2 Ownership structure  11 3.2 44 Equity ratio 1 0.29 
3 Rate of return 10 2.88 45 Dividends  1 0.29 
4 Listing status 15 4.3 46 Ownership distribution 2 0.58 
5 Audit company 17 4.9 47 Official domicile 1 0.29 
6 Profitability 21 6.1 48 Internationality 1 0.29 
7 Industry composition 1 0.29 49 Length of incorporation 1 0.29 
8 Industry type 29 8.4 50 Foreign sales 1 0.29 
9 Liquidity 11 3.2 51 Debt ratio 1 0.29 
10 Capitalisation ratio 1 0.29 52 Domestic culture 1 0.29 
11 Auditor type 13 3.8 53 Complexity of business 3 0.87 
12 Leverage 31 8.9 54 Accounting standard adopted 1 0.29 
13 Growth in net assets 1 0.29 55 Multiple listing status 1 0.29 
14 Multinational affiliation 3 0.87 56 Foreign activates 2 0.58 
15 Type of manager 1 0.29 57 Proportion of outside directors  1 0.29 
16 Assets in place 8 2.3 58 Size of audit company 18 5.2 
17 Quotation status 1 0.29 59 Dispersion of shareholding 1 0.29 
18 Parent company relationship 2 0.58 60 Profit margin  2 0.58 
19 Foreign listing  6 1.7 61 Foreign & Arab ownership 1 0.29 
20 Government ownership 1 0.29 62 Board composition 3 0.87 
21 Earning volatilities  1 0.29 63 Type of information 1 0.29 
22 Market risk 1 0.29 64 Country legal origin 1 0.29 
23 Cash flow risk 1 0.29 65 Shareholders of audit committee 1 0.29 
24 Source of financing  1 0.29 66 Audit committee size 1 0.29 
25 Total percentage of shares held by the public sector  1 0.29 67 
Audit committee financial 
expertise 1 0.29 
26 Level of diversification  2 0.58 68 Risk-adjusted returns 1 0.29 
27 Performance variability 2 0.58 69 Shareholders owned 1 0.29 
28 Issuing securities 1 0.29 70 Payout ratio 1 0.29 
29 Foreign operation  1 0.29 71 Identity of auditor 1 0.29 
30 Corporate gearing  1 0.29 72 Board size 2 0.58 
31 Industry diversification  1 0.29 73 Industrial sectors 1 0.29 
32 Industry composition 1 0.29 74 Institutional investor’s ownership 1 0.29 
33 Earning margin  2 0.58 75 Number of subsidiaries  1 0.29 
34 Sale  1 0.29 76 Change in profitability 1 0.29 
35 Operational complexity  1 0.29 77 Change in leverage 1 0.29 
36 Qualification of principal 
accounting officer 1 0.29 78 
 
The effect of Saudi Organization 
of Certified Public Accountants 
creation on the level of 
accounting disclosure 
1 0.29 37 Commercial law type 1 0.29 
38 Financial leverage 1 0.29 
39 Labour pressure 1 0.29 79 Barriers to entry 1 0.29 
40 Local ownership 1 0.29 80 Securities and exchange 
commission notification  0.29 41 Industrial membership 1 0.29 
42 Market discipline 1 0.29 81 
Ownership stake held by public 
banks and insurance companies 1 0.29 Total 347 100% 
No. = Number of company characteristics variables, Fr. =Frequency of variables and %= Percentage variables 
      Table 3.2 illustrates some of the key areas of research of the past fifty years into 
disclosure and corporate characteristics. The eighty-two researchers used eighty-one 
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corporate characteristics measures. The empirical studies related company-specific 
characteristics considered as potential proxies for the level of disclosure, use a 
classification of three main groups: structure-related variables (e.g., company size, 
company age, ownership dispersion, and debt); market-related variables (e.g., industry 
type and company audit size); and performance-related variables (e.g., return on 
equity, liquidity, and profit margin). Table 3.2 shows that the most of the researcher 
used company size (69 out of 82) approximately 20 % form all corporate 
characteristics using (347). In addition, leverage 8.9 % and industry type 8.4 (for more 
detail please refers to Appendix 4). 
      Therefore, many empirical studies have been performed on the subject of effect of 
company characteristics on T&D, mostly in developed and a few in developing 
countries. The key measures used to company characteristics are company size, 
leverage and industry type. However, no researcher was found to be using the effect 
of audit peer review on disclosure. The key measures used to dependent variables are 
the level of voluntary disclosure, the level of social responsibility disclosure, the level 
of corporate environment disclosure, disclosure of financial and non-financial 
information and the level of T&D on CG. The key methodology used is disclosure 
statement in annual report and review company’s website. The analysis used to 
examining effect of company characteristics on T&D are ANOVA tests, Chi-Square 
test and T-test. Therefore, literature findings related the effect of company 
characteristics on the extent of T&D were different effects. The current study using 
six company characteristics (structure-related and market-related) may affect T&D, 
will be discussed in the section 4.5. 
3.7 Transparency and Disclosure and Financial Performance 
This section discusses the relationship between T&D and company financial 
performance. The review of extant literature contained within this section defines the 
concepts of T&D and financial performance and explores the potential importance of 
context-specific variables upon their relationship (see Appendix 3).  
       Rogers (2008) suggests that CG can influence over 34% of the financial 
performance of banks in Uganda. Bushman and Smith (2003), in their survey, provide 
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encouraging evidence of a positive relation between the quality of a country’s 
corporate disclosure regime and economic performance.  
      Black et al. (2003) show a strong positive correlation between disclosure to 
investors and company value. Mitton (2002) in a sample of 398 companies cross 
countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Korea) finds that 
significantly better stock price performance is associated with companies that had 
indicators of higher disclosure quality in 1997 and 1998 during the East Asian 
financial crisis. Chen et al. (2002) show that better returns of shares of a certain 
company are associated with better information disclosure. Naser et al. (2002) suggest 
that high marginal profits would tempt the management information to present more 
information. Huang and Hsiao (2009) argue that, when the financial performance as 
measured by returns on assets, earnings per share is better, and returns on equity, 
when the transparency information disclosure is higher. Chen and Jian (2006) find that 
companies disclosing more transparent information benefit from a significantly lower 
interest cost of cost than those disclosing less transparent information. Chi (2009) 
finds that the overall company performance is positively related to the quality of 
corporate disclosure practices, indicating that better T&D practices are a set of 
stronger CG mechanisms leading to good corporate performance. Rogers (2008), who 
finds that financial T&D are positively related with most financial performance 
(capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and liquidity). Miyajima (2005) finds that 
information disclosure is significantly associated with better ROA. Klapper and Love 
(2004) find a positive association between T&D score and ROA using the Credit 
Lyonnais analysis. Jiamsagul (2007) finds that there is a positive relationship between 
T&D and ROA using the S&P T&D score. Xu, Li and Liu (2009) provide evidence of 
a positive relation between disclosure quality of accounting information with CG 
efficiency which is enterprise value per share, earnings per share, ROE and ROA. 
Chen et al. (2004) found that companies with a high quality of T&D can reduce the 
cost of equity in countries where the legal protection of investors is relatively strong. 
Li and Tang (2007) find that information disclosure is positively associated with 
financial performance as measured by: ROA; total assets turnover; rate of total assets 
growth; net assets per share; earnings per share; and operating cash flow per share. 
Callahan and Smith (2004) find that disclosure practices in the management’s 
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discussion and analysis section of the annual report predicts future company 
performance and market value. Aksu and Kosedag (2005) by using S&P T&D index 
found that companies with higher scores, especially in the category of board and 
management structures, have higher ROA and ROE. Cheung et al. (2010) find a 
positive and significant relation between company disclosure index into overall 
disclosure mandatory index and voluntary disclosure and market valuation. Also, 
voluntary disclosure index is related to the market valuation, but does not relate to 
mandatory disclosure and the market valuation. Jiao (2011) shows a positive relation 
between the companies’ mandatory and voluntary disclosure and future operating 
performance, stock returns, market valuation, and research and development. Chen et 
al. (2007) find that companies with better CG measured by S&P T&D have better 
market liquidity. Healy et al. (1999) suggest that enhancement of the disclosure 
ratings are accompanied by a swell in companies’ stock returns. Mitton (2002) find 
that companies’ higher disclosure quality is significantly associated with better stock 
price performance. Botosan (1997) finds that the increasing level of disclosure by 
companies leads to reducing the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, and hence reduces the cost of a company’s equity capital. Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) indicated that higher levels of disclosure should lead to a lower cost 
of capital by reducing the transaction costs and the information risk. Ho and Wong 
(2001) indicate that the existence of an audit committee is significantly and positively 
associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Durnev and Kim (2005) indicate 
that more concentrated cash flow rights practice higher quality CG and more 
disclosure; and moreover, higher value in the stock market is associated with 
companies that score higher in governance and transparency rankings. Bauer et al. 
(2008) argue that governance provisions dealing with financial disclosure do influence 
stock price performance. Cheung et al. (2011) good T&D can predict future market 
valuation. 
      On the other hand, Haat et al. (2008) find that company performance is not 
associated with the level of disclosure and timely reporting, and disclosure and 
timeliness are not significant contributing factors in the relationship between CG and 
market performance. Huang, et al. (2011) find that information T&D has a significant 
negative relationship with ROE. Kinney et al. (2004) show no significance between 
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fees paid for internal audit services or financial information systems design and 
implementation and earnings restatements. Javed and Iqbal (2007) document that the 
T&D mechanism has no effect on company performance as measured by Tobin’s Q.  
      Therefore, financial performance measures by accounting, market and economy 
have focused on large corporations within America, Europe and Asia. There are very 
few empirical studies for the MENA area. In addition, little empirical evidence exists 
concerning the relationship between T&D in the MENA. However, from Appendix 3, 
the great variation in findings among the different studies on this relationship is a 
result of the differences in measurement methods used, for both CG and financial 
performance. Therefore, most of those researchers examined the relationship between 
CG measured by board, CEO and ownership, and financial performance as measured 
by accounting performance ROA and ROE, and market performance by Tobin’s Q. 
Agency theory dominates research on CG and financial performance relationships; 
however, extant researches provide no consensus about the direction and magnitude of 
such relationships. Consistent linkages have not been demonstrated for T&D and 
financial performance. Chen and Dodd (1997) indicate that the frequently used 
accounting measures of corporate performances are earnings per share, return on 
capital, and ROA. Johnson (2000) finds strong evidence supporting the importance of 
CG with respect to the financial performance of companies during the Asia financial 
crisis.  
      This study examines the relationship between T&D and financial performance 
(ROCE, ROE, and ROA). In addition, this study expects those variables of T&D 
practices to have a positive relationship with financial performance. For two reasons, 
this study prefers to use future financial performance rather than contemporary 
financial performance as dependent variable. First, T&D requires more time before its 
effect on company performance is reflected. Second, many of the T&D researches 
link CG variables to future company performance.  
       Previous studies such as for example Jiamsagul (2007) argues that research use 
future performance to allow for the lag effects of governance influence on company 
performance. Ertugrul & Hegde (2005) report that CG might affect future 
performance. Bhat, Hope, & Kang (2006) argue that the role of the governance 
disclosures in reducing uncertainty surrounding future performance. Gillan, Hartzell, 
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& Starks (2003) argue that companies with better company performance are able and 
willing to choose better CG practices, as this may further raise their performance in 
the future. 
       However, some have shown that the problem lies in the use of either survey data 
or publicly available data as these sources are generally restricted in scope. It has also 
been shown that the nature of performance measures, i.e. restrictive use of accounting-
based measures such as ROCE, ROA, ROE, or restrictive use of market-based 
measures (e.g., market value of equities) could also contribute to this inconsistency 
(Gani & Jermias, 2006). 
      Table 3.3 shows previous studies that use future performance:   
Table  3.3 Researchers using Future Performance 
 Year & author Performance Examining country 
1 Core (2001) ROA and stock 
market return. 
 
 Whether the predicted component of compensation 
arising from the board and ownership structure 
variables is correlated with future period company 
operating and stock market performance. 
US 
2 Bhagat & Black 
(2000) 
ROE, ROA, and 
stock market 
performance. 
Correlation between company performance and 
board composition computed at two different times, 
early 1988 and early 1991. 
US 
3 Bhagat & Black 
(2001) 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
ratio of sales to 
assets, and market 
adjusted stock price 
returns 
Whether the degree of board independence 
correlates with various measure of long-term 
performance of large American companies. 
US 
4 Brown & 
Caylor   
(2004) 
 
Return on equity, 
profit margin, sales 
growth, Tobin’s Q, 
and shareholder 
payout. 
Which of the eight categories (audit, board of 
directors, charter/bylaws, director education, 
executive and director compensation, ownership, 
progressive practices, and state of incorporation) 
underlying Gov-score are most highly associated 
with company performance. 
US 
5 Core et al. 
(2006) 
ROA Stock returns and operating performance for 
strong and weak CG companies.   
French  
6 Jiamsagul 
(2007) 
ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
and stock return. 
Investigate whether T&D and board of directors 
affect three performance measures. 
Thail-
and 
7 Larcker, 
Richardson, & 
Tuna (2007) 
ROA and excess 
stock returns 
Examining the association between typical 
measures of CG and various accounting. 
US 
8 Bhagat & 
Bolton (2008) 
Stock return, ROA, 
and Tobin’s Q,   
The relationship between CG and company 
performance.  
US 
9 Hermes & 
Katsigianni 
(2012) 
ROA and Tobin’s 
Q 
Investigate whether differences of CG practices 
across companies 
explain variations in performance 
Greece 
10 Lopes & 
Walker (2012) 
Operating earnings The relationship between future company 
performance and company-level CG arrangements 
Brazil 
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     Therefore, literature findings related the relationship between T&D and company 
performance were mixed. Section 4.6 will discuss whether fourteen variables of T&D 
practices have a relationship with three financial performances. 
3.8 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter provided a review of the literature in relation to the theoretical and 
empirical background of CG in general and T&D particular. Although studies related 
to T&D has been done in CG area (most of them in developed countries), this research 
is still limited. In the MENA region, a few studies have concentrated on T&D; 
however, there is no evidence that this subject has been tested in Libya. 
       Based on the above discussion in chapter three, the following points can be 
identified: 
 Previous study examining effect of company characteristics on T&D, even though 
there are more than eighty-one variables measured in literature review, most of those 
using company size variable, and to the best of my knowledge, no previous study has 
examined the effect of audit peer review on the level of T&D (see Table 3.2). 
 Most of the researchers in past assessed effect of company characteristics 
associated with disclosure of financial information and few with non-financial 
information (see Appendix 4).  
 Past research focused more on relationship between overall CG or few variables of 
it such as board structure, chief executive officer duality, ownership structure, 
shareholder’s rights, audit committee, and audit fees, and one or more financial 
performance such as ROA, Tobin's Q, and ROE (see Table 3.1). While, there is a 
limited literature examining relationship between T&D and financial performance (see 
Appendix 3). 
 The previous studies determine relationship between T&D and financial 
performance by using index, and measure T&D in annual report, not all different 
types of company disclosure that may exist.  
 The majority of T&D studies cover a single point of time, i.e. one year only. 
However, a longitudinal study on a yearly basis that can trace disclosure practices 
over a number of years may help to provide more explanation as to how disclosure 
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practices evolve over time. In addition, it will help trace the trends of disclosure 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). 
 Although, there are very few studies of CG concerning Libya, and none of the 
previous disclosure studies in the Libyan context examines the effect of company 
characteristics on the extent of T&D and relationship between T&D and financial 
performance. 
 Most of the previous studies examine the effect of company characteristics on the 
extent of T&D or the relationship between T&D and financial performance, none of 
the previous disclosure studies examining both together. 
 The majority of disclosure studies examining the relationship between of overall 
disclosure and one or more financial performance. 
 The majority of disclosure studies using S&P T&D in developed and few in 
developing countries, and none of the previous disclosure studies in MENA.  
 There have been no previous disclosure studies to find which variable of T&D 
practices has the most impact on company financial performance. 
       The current study tries to contribute to CG literature through examining the T&D 
practices in Libyan financial companies. The study is intended to cover four years 
(from 2005 to 2008) that emergence LSM. 
      The literature review provided in chapter two and three (this chapter) forms the 
basis for the hypotheses developed in chapter four. The next chapter is the 
development of the hypotheses in this study.  
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Chapter 4 Development and Formulation of Testable Hypotheses 
4.1 Introduction 
Many studies have been carried on the issues of CG and its association with the 
company characteristics and their relationship with company performance. Chapter 
three discussed the major issues related to CG in general and T&D particularly, as a 
prelude to the formulation of a set of hypotheses to be tested in this study.   
      The main aim in this chapter will be to develop hypotheses to test the T&D in 
three parts: the first, the extent of T&D with the emergence the Libyan Stock Market 
(H1 H2 and H3); the second, the extent of T&D associated with six company 
characteristics (H4, H5, H6, H7, H8 and H9); and the third, the relationship between 
T&D practices and financial performance (H10 and H11). Hence, this chapter will 
review previous empirical work and set eleven hypotheses for the current study as 
well as sub-hypotheses.   
      Full disclosure and transparency of financial information are vital components of 
the CG framework (OECD, 2004) and are regarded as an important indicator of CG 
quality. Indeed, Beekes and Brown (2006) find that companies with higher CG quality 
make more informative disclosures. Sadka (2004) provides both theoretical and 
empirical evidence that the public sharing of financial and analyst reports (market 
transparency) has enhanced factor productivity and economic growth in 30 countries. 
Parum (2005) defines CG as “A set of principles concerning the governing of 
companies and how these principles are disclosed or communicated externally”. 
Howell, Heatley and Talosaga (2011) argue that the agency problem can be found in 
all areas of cooperative endeavour including the coordination of entities in the same 
layer of a hierarchical structure, for example between shareholders. Agency costs are 
the additional costs of using an agent compared to the principals undertaking the task 
themselves. Agency costs arise because the agents and principals, in general, have 
different interests, different attitudes to risk, and different access to information 
(information asymmetries).  
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      T&D practices are important elements of CG because investors and other 
corporate stakeholders need sufficient information about a company’s operations and 
financial performance to make investment decisions and assess risk. 
      Theoretical and practical studies related disclosure discuss factors might to 
influence disclosure, for example, Cooke and Wallace (1990) argue for three factors 
to influence disclosure: international (outside the country), external (within the 
country but outside the company) and internal (within a country and inside a 
company) (see Figure  3.1). Considering the previous studies the current study assumes 
nine hypotheses related to, these three factors might affect transparency and 
disclosure. First, stock market established in Libya (external factor); second, adopted 
the OECD principles 2004 in Libyan Stock Market (international factor); and third, 
company-specific characteristics (internal factor) structure-related variables (company 
size, company age, and ownership structure) and market-related variables (listed 
status, industry type, and audit peer reviews).   
      In addition, based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and previous 
empirical studies (see Appendix 4), there is positive relationship between T&D and 
companies performance. The theory of agency and disclosure has been perhaps one of 
the most important areas in the study of corporate finance and accounting, direct 
empirical evidence on the issue is scarce (Jo & Kim, 2008). Renders et al. (2010) find 
that companies can improve their performance by adhering to good governance 
practices. This study assumes hypothesis to find a positive relationship between 
fourteen variables of T&D practices and company financial performance. 
      However, these relationships and expected benefits of T&D are more important 
for emerging markets such as Libya because they are in dire need of external capital 
as their economies are growing faster than those of more developed nations. 
Therefore, this study does not aim at developing a theory or hypotheses but rather 
seeks to describe the transparency and disclosure practices in Libyan companies’ 
annual reports and to investigate the relationship between the transparency and 
disclosure practices and a number of financial performances measured.  
       Therefore, based on the preceding review of theoretical and empirical literature, 
this chapter develop hypotheses and a conceptual framework in relation to the extent 
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of T&D, the effect of company characteristics on T&D, and the relationship between 
T&D and financial performance. 
      The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides an 
overview of the S&P T&D Index, and pinpoints the one research hypothesis. Section 
4.3 shows the S&P T&D Index comparable with companies in other countries, and 
pinpoints one research hypothesis. Section 4.4 provides T&D variations, and pinpoints 
the one research hypothesis. Section 4.5 presents a review of T&D and company 
characteristics and identifies the six research hypotheses, which are tested in this 
study. Section 4.6 shows T&D and financial performance, and identifies the two 
research hypotheses, which are tested in this study. Section 4.7 gives the summary and 
conclusion of this chapter.  
4.2 Standard & Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Index 
Recently, the T&D score criteria of S&P have been used as a measure of CG. For 
example, Patel et al. (2002) used S&P T&D for 354 companies in 19 emerging 
markets over the three years ending 2000. They showed that price to book equity ratio 
is positively correlated with T&D scores. The market places a premium on companies 
with a lower asymmetric information problem. In addition, free-float is also positively 
correlated with T&D. Using only US data, Patel and Dallas (2002) provide  evidence 
that US companies with high S&P T&D rankings have lower market risk (beta), 
higher price to book equity ratio, and larger size. Some researchers have used the 
Standard measurement criteria to gauge information disclosure in their country (see 
Appendix 5).  
      Aksu and Kosedag  (2005) find that the companies with higher scores, especially 
in the category of board and management structures, have higher returns and 
accounting measures of profitability. Wu and Bowe (2012) report that bank with high 
T&D with adopted international accounting standards, is more likely to experience 
growth in its deposit base and are more able to attract funds by offering higher interest 
rates. 
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      Johnson et al. (2000) argue that: 
“Agency problems can make countries with weak legal systems vulnerable to the effects 
of a sudden loss of investor confidence. Countries with weakly enforceable minority 
shareholder rights are particularly vulnerable. If such a country experiences even a 
small loss of confidence, outside investors reassess the likely amount of expropriation 
by managers and adjust the amount of capital they are willing to provide. The result can 
be a fall in asset values and a collapse of the exchange rate.” 
      Libya is an emerging market; thus, agency problems will appear in Libya, because 
of Libya’s transition to a market economy. Agency theory would suggest that such 
managers have similar objectives to other shareholders, but in some cases, their 
personal objectives may predominate to the detriment of other shareholders. 
      However, it is more important to study the level of T&D in Libyan companies 
with the emergence the Libyan Stock Market and the Libya economy transaction to a 
market economy. Hence, low levels of T&D lead to higher information asymmetry 
which exists in capital markets because the managers know more than the investors 
about the value of the company. Nestor & Thompson (2000) report that the T&D 
norms are low, insiders can have selective exchange of inside information.  
      However, Wang, Meng, Huang and Huang (2011) report that companies with 
lower transparency might raise debts extensively, and that would further impact on 
stockholders’ equity, inducing a more serious agency problem. Fama and French 
(2005) and Bessler et al. (2011) indicate that information asymmetry between 
management and investors is the sole reason for the pecking order. This implies that 
information T&D have an impact on corporate financing decisions. Yet, based on the 
perspective of the debt financing agency problem, excessive leverage will hurt 
shareholders. In addition, as corporate information T&D improves, the agency 
problem is minimised, and investors become more willing to be involved in the stock 
market. Edelen, Evans and Kadlec (2011) present empirical evidence on the role of 
T&D in resolving agency conflicts and addressing agency costs in delegated 
investment management. Ashbaugh, Collins and Lafond (2006) and Ang and Ma 
(1999) find that companies reporting lower disclosure quality and transparent earnings 
have a higher cost of equity. Huang, Fu-Hsing and Chung-Jen Fu (2011) find that cost 
of capital and CG have a significant positive impact on corporate disclosure. Patel et 
al. (2002) argue the agency problem in CG can be mitigated in practice in several 
ways: 1) a vigilant board of directors; 2) a transparent ownership structure; 3) timely 
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and adequate disclosure of financial information; and 4) clarifying the conflict of 
interests in allowing majority shareholders or large creditors to manage the company. 
In addition Al-Saeed (2012) indicates that there is a significant positive relationship 
between T&D codes, and reduction of the global financial crisis implications. 
      This study explains the T&D in Libyan financial companies in their annual report 
during the four years when the Libyan Stock Market emerged. Marston and Shrives 
(1991) concluded that the annual report is the most comprehensive document 
available to the public and is therefore the main disclosure vehicle. The annual report 
is even more important in the case of Libya because some companies do not publish 
interim reports. Bayoud, Kavanagh, & Slaughter (2012a) suggest that annual reports 
are considered as the most important document in Libyan companies. 
      In this study the first empirical research question (EQ1, section 1.2) asks, “Have 
Libyan financial companies improved the level of T&D in their annual reports since 
the emergence of the Libyan Stock Market?”  
      The emergence of LSM was one of the most important factors leading to the 
improvement of T&D in Libyan companies in their annual reports. Therefore, for the 
reason, this study assumes first hypothesis transparency and disclosure in Libyan 
financial companies increase during fiscal years from 2005 to 2008. 
      This study expects to find the level of transparency and disclosure has improved 
during the period. This study examines whether overall S&P T&D has different levels 
during the years from 2005 to 2008. To test EQ1, the study sets the hypothesis as 
follows:  
H1: There is a statistically significant increase in S&P transparency and 
disclosure in Libyan financial companies’ annual reports, through fiscal years 
from 2005 to 2008. 
      In this study the first hypotheses is “There is a statistically significant increase in 
S&P T&D in Libyan financial companies’ annual reports, through fiscal years from 
2005 to 2008”.At the second and third level of T&D by three categories and twelve 
subcategories this study set sub-hypotheses related to the first hypothesis as follows:  
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Table  4.1 The Sub-hypotheses Related to First Hypothesis 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H1.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
H1.1.1 Transparency of ownership 
H1.1.2 Concentration of ownership  
H1.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures 
H1.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
H1.2.1 Business focus 
H1.2.2 Accounting policy review 
H1.2.3 Accounting policy details  
H1.2.4 Related party structure and transactions 
H1.2.5 Information on auditors 
H1.3 Board and management structure and process 
H1.3.1 Board structure and composition 
H1.3.2 Role of board of directors 
H1.3.3 Director training and composition 
H1.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive 
4.3 Standard & Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Comparable with 
Companies in other Countries 
Libya is an emerging economy whose first stock market was first established in 2006 
a period when CG is very relevant. Libya is improving in the area of corporate 
governance but when compared with other developed economies when the hypothesis 
is tested it is expected to be low especially when the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) data 
and variation in levels of T&D are taken into consideration. 
      Saidi (2005) argued that, given the fact the corporate sector in MENA is mainly 
comprised of small and medium enterprises, it is important to develop a positive 
incentive for compliance with best practices for CG and disclosure, by providing 
public recognition and establishing a reward system for good CG. Also it is 
imperative to reduce the cost of compliance with CG principles by providing tool-kits, 
training and other means of support. 
      T&D practices do not develop in a vacuum (Ho & Wong, 2001); Archambault and 
Archambault (2003) argue that there are many factors that affect the quality of overall 
disclosure. Environmental factors affecting disclosure noted in the literature include: 
political system, the legal system, CG practice, ownership structure, financial system, 
culture, colonial background, education level, technological development, stage of 
economic development, inflation, size and efficiency of capital market, the 
independence of auditors and demand for a public accounting market.   
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      Larbsh (2010) examined whether Libyan companies should provide more 
disclosure, employing nine variables to measure that: timely and accurate disclosure; 
company objectives; foreseeable risk factors; issues regarding employees and other 
stakeholders; impact of the company’s activities on the society and environment; 
ownership structure; remuneration policy; conducted by an independent, competent 
and qualified auditor; and audited and disclosure in accordance with international 
standard of accounting. He finds that the six groups (academic staff, external auditors, 
investment advisors of bank, company employees, government officials, and 
investors) that participated in the survey believe that Libyan companies should 
disclose all issues regarding employees and stakeholders in the annual reports.  
      Magrus (2012) report that most Libyan companies do not meet their obligation to 
disclose information. Elmogla (2009) reports that Libyan companies generally 
disclose some information related to social responsibility, but the amount of 
information is low compared with counterparts in developed countries. In addition, 
Mashat (2005) shows that mainly companies provide some measure of social 
disclosure, although the volume of information disseminated is low compared to 
developed countries. Some reasons for this might be a lack of awareness of the 
importance and the perceived benefits of corporate social responsibility disclosure, 
absence of pressure to disclose this kind of information, the weakness of the 
accounting profession, and the lack of mandatory disclosure requirements.  
      In the Libyan environment: the developing economy; weakness of law legislation 
and regulations; an absence of code of CG, accounting, auditing, financial report 
standards and business ethics (see Chapter 2). According to the classification of 
Transparency, Libya has a low level of transparency with a rise in the level of 
corruption. In the index of Transparency International, during the last five years from 
2007 to 2011, Libya ranked 131, 126, 130, 146 and 168 respectively out of 183 
countries. Therefore, from the above this study assumes second hypothesis Libyan 
financial companies have a low level of transparency and disclosure in their annual 
reports. 
       In this study, the second question (EQ2) seeks to explain “Do Libyan financial 
companies provide a low level of T&D in their annual reports compared to companies 
in other countries?” The secondary data collected from previous studies used S&P 
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T&D. This study expects to find low level of T&D compare with companies in other 
countries. This study examines whether “Libyan financial companies provide a low 
level of T&D in their annual reports compared to companies in other countries”? To 
test EQ2, the study set the hypothesis as follows:  
H2: Libyan financial companies have a low level of transparency and disclosure 
in their annual reports compared to companies in other countries. 
At the second level of T&D according to three categories this study set sub-
hypotheses related to the second hypothesis as follows:  
Table  4.2  The Sub-hypotheses Related to Second Hypothesis 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H2.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
H2.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
H2.3 Board and management structure and process 
4.4 Transparency and Disclosure Variations 
Mallin and Jelic (2000) suggest  that transition economies might offer more fertile 
ground for study, because transition economies often have weaker rules and wider 
variations between companies in CG practices. Ho & Wong (2001) found that there 
were large variations in voluntary disclosure practices among companies in Hong 
Kong. 
      The economy of Libya is in transition with weaker rules. The study assumes third 
hypothesis where there is variations of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial 
companies’ annual reports. 
       This study expects to find variations in Libya financial companies T&D in their 
annual reports. This study examines whether “There are variations between companies 
in T&D practices in their annual reports”? To test EQ3, the study set the hypothesis as 
follows: 
H3-There are significant variations in Libyan financial companies’ transparency 
and disclosure in their annual reports.   
4.5 Transparency and Disclosure, and Corporate Characteristics 
There are three broad categories of corporate characteristics or attributes that can 
affect the degree of corporate T&D. The first category consists of the financial 
characteristics of the company (Hossain, 2008a), the second comprises the company’s 
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CG characteristics (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004), and the third consists of 
market discipline variables (Chipalkatti, 2002; Nier & Baumann, 2006). 
      Previous studies find that the quality of corporate disclosure is associated with 
certain company-specific characteristics. Company-specific characteristics found to be 
associated with quality of disclosure by Meek et al. (1995) are company size, 
international listing status, leverage and country of incorporation; by Chow and 
Wong-Boren (1987), company size, financial leverage and proportion of assets-in-
place; by Singhvi and Desai (1971), listing status and earnings margin.  
      A considerable international literature has developed which investigates the 
association between corporate characteristics and disclosure levels in corporate annual 
reports (e.g., Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989c, 1992; Firth, 1979; McNally, Eng, & 
Hasseldine, 1982; Singhvi, 1968a; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace & Naser, 1995; 
Wallace, et al., 1994) (for more details see Appendix 4). 
      This empirical study examines the influence of six company-specific 
characteristics on the general level of T&D in the annual reports of financial 
companies listed in Libya. Six variables, both financial and non-financial, which are 
intended to capture different company characteristics that can influence the degree of 
T&D, are proposed in this study. These variables are described in detail in the 
following subsections. In consistent with previous studies, the study includes listed 
status, ownership structure, company size, age of the company, industry type, while 
audit peer review is introduced the first time. 
       The typical methodology employed is to construct a country-relevant disclosure 
index and to relate the quantity of informational items disclosed to selected corporate 
characteristics. The empirical research questions EQ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 in section 1.2 
ask whether “there is a relationship between the extent of T&D and corporate 
characteristics”. The subsection identifies and discusses the six research hypotheses 
drawn from research framework and empirical questions in this study. Furthermore, 
the extant literature identifies several company-specific characteristics effect on 
transparency and disclosure.  
      This study expects to find a company characteristics effect on the extent of 
transparency and disclosure. The general hypothesis is: “There is a statistically 
significant increase association between annual reports of high quality S&P 
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transparency and disclosure, and corporate characteristics”. On the basis of the 
empirical research questions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 this study tests the level of S&P T&D 
for all corporate characteristics measured as follows:  
4.5.1 Listed Status 
According to Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), the stock market listing status of a 
company is a mechanism that helps the interest conflicts between principles and 
agents.  
      There is reason to suspect that the extent of disclosure is associated with listing 
status (Buzby, 1975). When a company wishes to have its stock traded on a stock 
market it must first file a listing application. This application calls for the inclusion of 
an extensive amount of information pertaining to the company’s affairs. Also, the 
contents of the original listing application must be periodically updated. 
According to Wang, et al. (2008, p. 16): 
“As suggested by agency theory, firms with dual listing status (foreign and domestic), 
such as B-share companies, are extremely motivated to disclose more voluntary 
information as compared to firms that only issue domestic shares, and as such, provide 
us with a unique setting to explore the characteristics affecting corporate information 
disclosure in emerging economies.” 
      Additionally, the company must sign a listing agreement as part of the listing 
application. Among other things, this agreement requires that the company issues 
yearly reports to its stockholders and partially delineates the form and contents of the 
financial statements included therein. In addition to the financial statements, several 
other specific disclosures are required to be included in the annual report. 
       The emerging markets of Asia and South Africa have significantly higher T&D 
compared to the Latin American, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern emerging 
markets (Patel, et al., 2002).  
      According to Cooke (1989a), disclosure is very variable and there is a significant 
association between the extent of disclosure and listing status. A significant difference 
in the extent of disclosure was found among the three categories of companies: not 
listed, listed only on one stock market, and multiple listed.  
      Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) report significant variability in the amount of 
disclosure required as part of the listing and filing requirements of stock markets 
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around the world. Raffournier (1995) suggests that pressures from outside markets 
play a major role in the disclosure policy of listed companies since companies whose 
activities are internationally diversified do exhibit a larger extent of disclosure than 
more domestic companies. Haniffa (1999) recorded that more new companies are 
formed in new stock markets than in established stock markets. As such, disclosure 
will be important in competing for the limited resources. This attribute is especially 
important for developing countries compared to developed countries. Besides, listed 
companies of recent origin may not yet have fully appreciated the relationship 
between disclosure and cost of capital. 
      Singhvi and Desai (1971) maintained that  the quality of disclosure in annual 
reports is influenced to a great extent by the listing requirements of a stock market.       
Frost, Gordon and Pownall (2008) examine how five financial reporting and 
disclosure quality proxies are related to emerging markets companies’ cross-listing 
choices and their access to the global capital market. Their five financial reporting and 
disclosure quality proxies are: transparency of the annual report, global vs. local 
auditor, local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), translation of the 
annual report into English, and voluntary dissemination of information through 
websites; they find evidence of a strong association between each of their five proxies 
and emerging markets companies’ participation in US and UK stock markets. 
Table 4.3 shows that summary results prior empirical studies the relationship between 
the extent of disclosure and listing status as follows: 
                 Table  4.3 Listing Status 
Year Author Listing status Domestic Multiple 
(1961) Cerf   
(1971) Singhvi & Desai   
(1975) Buzby ×  
(1979) Firth   
(1989c) Cooke   
(1991) Cooke   
(1992) Cooke   
(1993) Malone et al.   
(1994) Wallace et al.   
(1994) Hossain et al.   
(1999) Mahmood   
(2009) Curuk   
(2012) Bremer   
(2012) Wen et al.,   
                   Key:  Significant, × Not Significant 
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      From literature review in this area, this study expects to find that company listed 
in stock market is positive associated with transparency and disclosure levels. In this 
study, the fourth question (EQ4) about the corporate characteristics asks, “Do 
companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market provide more T&D in their annual 
reports than companies not listed?” 
      To investigate this question, the study set the hypothesis as follows:  
H4: Companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market provide more transparency and 
disclosure in their annual reports than companies not listed. 
       In this study, the fourth hypothesis is “Companies listed in the Libyan Stock 
Market provide more T&D in their annual reports than companies not listed”. At the 
second and third level of T&D by three categories and twelve subcategories this study 
set sub-hypotheses related the fourth hypothesis as follows:   
 
4.5.2 Ownership Structure 
The ownership of a company can be concentrated in the hands of various shareholders 
such as, the state, individual or a group of individuals, foreign investors or institutions 
like banks, non-bank financial institutions, non-financial institutions, and family 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
       Agency theory suggests that where there is a separation of ownership and control 
of a company, the potential for agency cost arises because of incentive conflicts 
between contracting parties (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hossain, et al., 1994). It is 
Table  4.4  The Sub-hypotheses’ Related to Fourth Hypothesis 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H4.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
H4.1.1 Transparency of ownership 
H4.1.2 Concentration of ownership  
H4.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures 
H4.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
H4.2.1 Business focus 
H4.2.2 Accounting policy review 
H4.2.3 Accounting policy details  
H4.2.4 Related party structure and transactions 
H4.2.5 Information on auditors 
H4.3 Board and management structure and process 
H4.3.1 Board structure and composition 
H4.3.2 Role of board of directors 
H4.3.3 Director training and composition 
H4.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive 
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assumed that a wider dispersion of share ownership of a company is associated with 
its compliance with mandatory disclosure rules. This proposition is explained in terms 
of positive (agency) theory of accounting because modern companies are 
characterised by a separation of ownership and control.  
      This arrangement for corporate control generates agency costs resulting from 
conflicting interests between management and owners and across classes of owners  
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency costs tend to be higher for 
companies with a widespread public ownership of securities, therefore, shareholders 
of such companies press for more adequate information for monitoring purposes 
(Watts, 1977). 
       In discussing ownership structure as an important determinant of disclosure, most 
studies looked at it from the diffusion perspective. However, it is important to 
recognise that there is a variety of equity owners that exist in the market which may 
include local individuals, companies and banks, foreigners, nominees, government 
agencies and professional investment funds. Each of these groups will have an impact 
on disclosure and as such, care should be taken in the selection of the appropriate 
proxy to use, depending on the environment of the country (Haniffa, 1999). Leftwich, 
et al. (1981), Craswell and Taylor (1992), McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Hossain 
et al. (1994) and Raffournier (1995) observe that disclosure will be superior to 
companies whose ownership is disseminated because it helps owners to observe the 
behaviour of management as predicted by agency theory. 
      Stakeholders in different organisations apply unlike pressures with a view to 
information disclosure; organisations with foreign or private performance might have 
to abide by the demands of the foreign country’s reporting requirements and might 
also be permitted to implement it their country. On the other hand, such organisations 
might also choose not to disclose more information disclosure to avoid setting a 
precedent for other organisations or tax evasion.   
      Empirical evidence relating the influence of ownership structure to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure is mixed. For instance, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) find a 
significant association between ownership structure in diversified Australian 
companies and voluntary segment disclosure, while Craswell and Taylor (1992) find a 
significant association between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure reserves 
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in the Australian oil and gas industry. Healy and Palepu (2001) find that disclosure is 
associated with institutional ownership.  
      Foreign regulation – in particular that imposed by the Securities Exchange 
Commission – is an important factor in this explanation. The greater the need to raise 
capital outside the country, the greater the likelihood of additional voluntary 
disclosures (Cooke, 1989c). Hossain et al. (1994) record that foreign listing status is 
significantly related to voluntary disclosure levels. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggest 
that there is a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and foreign 
ownership. 
      Table 4.5 shows that summary results previous studies the relationship between 
the extent of disclosure and ownership structure as follows: 
                       Table  4.5 Previous Studies of Ownership Structure 
Year Author Ownership structure 
(1992) Craswell & Taylor × 
(1993) McKinnon & Dalimunthe  
(1994) Abu-Nassar & Rutherford × 
(1994) Hossain et al.  
(1995) Raffournier × 
(1996) Al-Modahki × 
(1999) Haniffa  
(2000) Depoers × 
(2003) Eng & MAK  
(2005) Alsaeed × 
(2012) Ismail & Ibrahim    
                           Key:  Significant, × Not Significant 
       From literature review in this area, this study expects to find that ownership 
structure is positive associated with transparency and disclosure levels. The fifth, EQ5 
about the corporate characteristics asks “Do public Libyan financial companies 
provide more T&D in their annual reports than private ‘individual’ companies?” To 
investigate this question, the study set the hypothesis as follows:  
H5: Public financial companies provide more transparency and disclosure in 
their annual reports than private “individual” companies. 
       In this study the fifth hypotheses is “Public financial companies provide more 
T&D in their annual reports than private “individual” companies”. At the second and 
third level of T&D according to three categories and twelve subcategories this study 
set sub-hypotheses related to the fifth hypothesis as follows:   
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Table  4.6  The Sub-hypotheses’ Related Fifth Hypothesis 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H5.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
H5.1.1 Transparency of ownership 
H5.1.2 Concentration of ownership  
H5.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures 
H5.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
H5.2.1 Business focus 
H5.2.2 Accounting policy review 
H5.2.3 Accounting policy details  
H5.2.4 Related party structure and transactions 
H5.2.5 Information on auditors 
H5.3 Board and management structure and process 
H5.3.1 Board structure and composition 
H5.3.2 Role of board of directors 
H5.3.3 Director training and composition 
H5.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive 
4.5.3 Company Size 
Agency theory predicts that larger companies will disclose more information in their 
accounts to alleviate the potential for wealth transfers from suppliers of outside capital 
to managers (Hossain, et al., 1994). Marston (2003) indicates that agency theory and 
cost–benefit analysis can all be used to show that a positive relationship among 
company size and disclosure can be expected. She argues that larger companies incur 
higher political costs, having an increased need for external funds, and political costs 
can be reduced by improved disclosures.  
      Size has been found to be a significant factor in explaining difference in the extent 
of disclosure in a number of different countries, (see e.g., Belkaoui & Kahl, 1978a, 
1978b; Cerf, 1961; Cooke, 1989a, 1992; Firth, 1979, 1980; Singhvi, 1968b; Singhvi & 
Desai, 1971; Stanga, 1976). When speaking of an association between asset size and 
disclosure it really refers to the special characteristics surrounding the size of a 
company and their logical link to the extent of disclosure (Buzby, 1975).  
      Many researchers argued for the relationship between disclosure and organisation 
size (see Table 4.7 below). Organisation size is one of the characteristics that have 
been extensively related to disclosure policy (Hassan, 2004). There are many reasons 
why large organisations might disclose more information than small organisations 
(Cooke, 1991). Larger organisations are expected to provide more transparent 
information as they incur lower costs in accumulating detailed information. They have 
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more profitable securities and they have superior ease of financing (Cooke, 1991). 
Also (e.g., Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Ahmed & Nicholls, 1994; Cooke, 1989b, 1989c; 
Wallace, 1987) provide evidence that company size is positively associated with 
disclosure level. Cerf (1961) recorded that there is a significant impact of size with 
both voluntary and mandatory disclosure in both emerging and developed stock 
markets. On the other hand, a large size organisation might also choose not to disclose 
more information to avoid setting a precedent for other organisations. McNally et al. 
(1982) suggest that, significantly different levels of voluntary disclosure are closely 
associated with differences in corporate size. The proxies for size that have been used 
in studies include total assets (e.g., Bazley, Brown, & Izan, 1985; Cerf, 1961; Chow & 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a; Haniffa, 1999; Singhvi, 1968a; Wallace, et al., 
1994). 
      Singhvi and Desai (1971) recorded that a positive relationship between the asset 
size of a corporation and the quality of disclosure can result from many reasons. First, 
the cost of accumulating detailed information is relatively high for smaller 
corporations. In larger corporations, such information is accumulated for internal 
reporting to top executives and, therefore, disclosure of such information is not a 
costly affair for them. Second, the management of larger corporations is likely to 
realize the possible benefits of better disclosure, such as easier marketability of 
securities and greater ease in financing. Smaller corporations usually do not raise 
funds in the securities market and, therefore, cannot realise the possible benefits of 
better disclosure. Finally, smaller corporations are likely to feel more than larger 
corporations that the full disclosure of information could endanger their competitive 
position. 
      Previous study in this area suggests company size as the main determinants of 
corporate disclosures (e.g, Healy & Palepu, 2001, Lang & Lundholm, 1993). Leuz 
(2003) asserts that company size is expected to be statistically significant with level of 
disclosure. Foster (1986) argued that company size is the most commonly used control 
variable in disclosure studies (see Table 3.2). The size of a company is likely to 
positively affect disclosure practices for a number of reasons. First, preparing and 
disseminating detailed annual reports is costly. Hence, larger companies are more 
likely to have an incentive to disclose detailed information because it is relatively less 
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costly for them to do so. Second, because annual reports are usually the main source 
of information for competitors, Buzby (1975) points out that extensive disclosure in 
their annual report puts small companies at a competitive disadvantage to large 
companies in their industry. This means that small companies are likely to bear higher 
opportunity costs in providing detailed disclosures than are large companies (Owusu-
Ansah, 1998). Therefore, smaller companies may be reluctant to disclose more 
detailed information about their activities. Third, some studies show that greater 
disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Choi, 1973; 
Elliott & Jacobson, 1994). Therefore, large companies may be motivated to disclose 
more in order to get relatively cheap capital through the security market to finance 
their growth. Fourth, large companies are more likely to have a broad-based 
ownership structure which requires more comprehensive information to meet the 
information needs of various groups of users (Jaggi & Low, 2000). However, size 
could be measured in a number of different ways, e.g., total assets, fixed assets, 
current assets, bank borrowing, turnover, viz. capital stock, shareholders’ funds, 
number of shareholders, total equity, market capitalisation, debt ratio, debt to equity, 
and sales. There is no overwhelming theoretical reason to prefer the size variable to 
any other (Cooke, 1992; Marston, 2003). In this study, the size variable is considered 
as total assets, because the size by total assets is common in research studies.   
      Table 4.7 shows summary results prior empirical studies the relationship between 
the extent of disclosure and companies size as follow: 
Table  4.7 Previous Studies of Companies Size 
Year Author 
Company Size 
Total 
assets 
Total 
equity 
Sales Market 
capitalis-
ation 
Intangible 
Assets 
Total 
Revenue 
(1961) Cerf       
(1968a) Singhvi       
(1971) Singhvi & Desai       
(1973) Choi       
(1975) Buzby       
(1976) Stanga    ×    
(1978) Courtis        
(1979) Firth        
(1980) Salamon & Dhaliwal       
(1982) McNally et al.  ×     
(1986) Foster       
(1987) Wallace    ×    
(1987) Chow & Wong-Boren       
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(1988) Saudagaran ×  ×    
(1989a) Cooke        
(1990) Tan, Kidam & Cheong,       
(1991) Cooke       
(1992) Cooke       
(1993) Lang & Lundholm       
(1993) Malone et al. ×      
(1994) Abu-Nassar & Rutherford         
(1994) Wallace et al.       
(1994) Ahmed & Nicholls  ×  ×    
(1994) Hossain et al.       
(1995) Raffournier  ×      
(1995) Wallace & Naser    × ×   
(1995) Hossain et al.       
(1996) Al-Modahki       
(1996) Soh        
(1996b) Zarzeski ×  ×    
(1997) Inchausti       
(1997) Patton & Zelenka       
(1998) Craig & Diga ×  ×    
(1999) Craven & Marston       
(1999) Haniffa        
(1999) Ahmed & Courtis       
(2000) Depoers        
(2001) Riahi-Belkaoui        
(2002) Haniffa & Cooke       
(2003) Leuz       
(2004) Khanna, Palepu & Srinivasan       
(2004) Bushman et al        
(2005) Mangena & Pike       
(2005) Durtschi & Easton       
(2005) Alsaeed       
(2006b) Cheng, Collins, & Huang       
(2006) Tinalkar       
(2006b) Barako, Hancock, & Izan       
(2006) McFie       
(2007) Barako       
(2007) Bhuiyan & Biswas       
(2007) Mathew, Elsie, & Joseph       
(2007) Holder-Webb et al.       
(2007) Aljifri & Hussainey ×      
(2008) Aly & Simon       
(2008) Iskander       
(2008b) Hossain       
(2009) Foong Soon et al.         
(2009) Doaa, Jon, & Khaled  ×      
(2010) Pahuja & Bhatia       
(2010) Cho et al.        
(2011) Kang & Gray      ×  
(2011) Mia & Al- Mamun       
(2012) Ismail & Ibrahim         
Key:  Significant, × Not Significant 
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      Company size appears to be an important factor, being selected as a predictor of 
T&D such that larger companies are predicted to be more likely to be transparent and 
disclose ratios than smaller companies. This is consistent with agency theory and 
related empirical studies (see Table 4.7). Reviewing T&D literature, this study expects 
to find that company size is positive associated with transparency and disclosure 
levels. The sixth, EQ6 is “Do companies with greater total assets disclose information 
to a greater extent than those with fewer total assets?” To investigate this question, the 
study set the hypothesis as follows:  
H6: Companies with greater total assets provide more transparency and 
disclosure in their annual reports than those with fewer total assets. 
       In this study the sixth hypotheses is “Companies with greater total assets provide 
more T&D in their annual reports than those with fewer total assets”. At the second 
and third level of T&D by three categories and twelve subcategories, this study set 
sub-hypotheses related to the sixth hypothesis as follows:   
Table  4.8  The Sub-hypotheses Related to Sixth Hypothesis 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H6.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
H6.1.1 Transparency of ownership 
H6.1.2 Concentration of ownership  
H6.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures 
H6.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
H6.2.1 Business focus 
H6.2.2 Accounting policy review 
H6.2.3 Accounting policy details  
H6.2.4 Related party structure and transactions 
H6.2.5 Information on auditors 
H6.3 Board and management structure and process 
H6.3.1 Board structure and composition 
H6.3.2 Role of board of directors 
H6.3.3 Director training and composition 
H6.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive 
4.5.4 Age of the Company 
The extent of a company’s disclosure may be influenced by its age (Owusu-Ansah, 
1998). The age of a company may be relevant, as older companies may have built up 
differential experience in corporate reporting over time (Camfferman & Cooke, 2002). 
When an organisation has been listed for a long time, it might have more established 
information disclosure and better knowhow compared to newly listed organisations. 
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On the other hand, newly listed organisations might also choose to disclose more 
information disclosure to enhance CG. 
      Owusu-Ansah (1998) pointed out three factors that may contribute to this 
relationship. First, younger companies may suffer competitive disadvantage if they 
disclose certain items such as information on research expenditure, capital 
expenditure, and product development. The competitive disadvantage would arise 
when the information disclosed by the newly established companies is used to their 
detriment by the other competitors. On the other hand, older companies may naturally 
be motivated to disclose such information as its presentation may be less likely to 
damage their competitive position. The second potential contributory factor is the cost 
and the ease of gathering, processing, and disseminating the required information. 
These costs are likely to be more onerous for younger companies than for their older 
counterparts. The third and final factor is the situation that younger companies may 
lack a ‘track record’ to rely on for public disclosure and therefore may have less 
information to disclose or fewer rich disclosures. Camfferman and Cooke (2002) 
identified a number of new variables, such as the age of a company to be investigated 
by future studies. The rationale for selecting this variable lies in the possibility that old 
companies might have improved their financial reporting practices over time. 
      Barton and Waymire (2004) find that younger companies have higher reporting 
quality. Alsaeed (2005) suggests that there is no association between the age of the 
company and disclosure. Choi (1993) argues that companies that have been listed 
recently may want to raise additional capital at the lowest cost in the future compared 
to matured companies which have less reliance on external funds, and as such, newly 
listed companies will disclose more information for that purpose. Kakani et al. (2001) 
show that newer companies, as a result, take to the market in spite of disadvantages 
such as their lack of capital. 
      Table 4.9 shows summary results prior empirical studies and the relationship 
between the extent of disclosure and age of the company as follows: 
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                          Table  4.9 Previous Studies by Age of the Company 
Year Author Age of the company 
(1998) Owusu-Ansah  
(2004) Barton & Waymire  × 
(2006) Alsaeed × 
(2006) McFie × 
(2007) Bhuiyan and Biswas × 
(2008b) Hossain  
(2010) Cho et al.  
                                  Key:  Significant, × Not Significant 
      From literature review in this area, this study expects to find that company age is 
positively associated with transparency and disclosure levels. The seventh, EQ7 about 
the corporate characteristics asks whether older financial companies in Libya provide 
more T&D in their annual reports than younger companies. To investigate this 
question, the study sets the hypothesis as follows:  
H7: Older financial companies provide more transparency and disclosure in their 
annual reports than younger companies.   
      In this study the seventh hypothesis is “Do older financial companies provide 
more T&D in their annual reports than younger companies?” At the first level of 
overall T&D, at the second and third level of T&D by three categories and twelve 
subcategories this study set sub-hypotheses related to the seventh hypothesis as 
follows:   
Table  4.10  The Sub-hypotheses Related to Seventh Hypothesis 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H7.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
H7.1.1 Transparency of ownership 
H7.1.2 Concentration of ownership  
H7.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures 
H7.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
H7.2.1 Business focus 
H7.2.2 Accounting policy review 
H7.2.3 Accounting policy details  
H7.2.4 Related party structure and transactions 
H7.2.5 Information on auditors 
H7.3 Board and management structure and process 
H7.3.1 Board structure and composition 
H7.3.2 Role of board of directors 
H7.3.3 Director training and composition 
H7.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive 
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4.5.5 Type of Industry 
The industry restriction recognises the fact that an information set can vary according 
to the nature of the industry. Cooke (1989c) states that there might be a dominant 
company in a sector of the economy with a high level of disclosure. Inchausti (1997) 
argues that companies in the same industry type  will disclose similar information.  
      Stanga (1976) agrees that many disclosure deficiencies appear to exist in the 
published annual reports of large industrial companies. These deficiencies are 
unfortunate when one considers that the cost of disclosing many of the information 
items in the model would be minimal. Cooke (1989c) established that companies 
categorised as ‘trading’ disclosed less voluntary information than other industry types. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) agree that strong support was found for industry 
membership as factors motivating the voluntary disclosure of segment information. If 
size is an important explanatory variable then industry type and  listing status may be 
important interacting variables (Cooke, 1992). 
      Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985, p. 48) include industry as an explanatory variable 
on the grounds that: 
“Industry membership, perhaps partly at least by virtue of its surrogate properties, has 
been found . . . to be correlated with accounting method choice”. 
       On the other hand for example Tan and Tower (1993)find that no significant 
relation exists between half-yearly report disclosure and industry type.  
However, this study speculates that mandatory and voluntary T&D practices of 
companies are not likely to be the same across different financial companies. There 
are several reasons for this speculation. Companies in certain industries may have 
difficulties in reporting adequately due to the nature of work involved, some industries 
are more vulnerable to financial crises, industry-specific laws or regulation, and the 
oversight and control of its industry. It’s possible that this may affect the T&D and 
reporting practices of the companies in this industry. 
      Table 4.11 shows summary results previous studies the relationship between the 
extent of disclosure and industry type as follows: 
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                      Table  4.11 Previous Studies by Industry Type 
Year Author Industry type 
(1976) Stanga   
(1978a) Belkaoui & Kahl  
(1982) McNally et al.  × 
(1987) Wallace  × 
(1989a) Cooke  
(1989) Cooke & Wallace  
(1991) Cooke  
(1992) Cooke  
(1993) Tan and Tower  × 
(1994) Abu-Nassar & Rutherford   × 
(1994) Wallace et al. × 
(1995) Meek et al.   
(1995) Raffournier  × 
(1995) Wallace & Naser   
(1996) Al-Modahki  
(1996) Soh   
(1998) Owusu-Ansah × 
(1999) Haniffa   
(1999) Mahmood  
(1999) Ahmed & Courtis  
(1999) Craven & Marston × 
(2002) Naser et al.  × 
(2003) Marston JW  EW × 
(2006b) Barako, Hancock, & Izan × 
(2006) McFie × 
(2007) Aljifri & Hussainey × 
(2009) Doaa, Jon & Khaled   
(2011) Kang & Gray   
(2012) Ismail & Ibrahim   × 
                            Key:  Significant, × Not Significant, J W=Japanese website, and EW English website  
      From above this study expects to find that industry type is positively associated 
with transparency and disclosure levels. The eighth, EQ8 was “Does the Banking 
sector provide more T&D in their annual reports than the Insurance sector?” Although 
the evidence to date is inconclusive, it therefore seems appropriate to test whether 
T&D varies between industries. To investigate this question, the study set the 
hypothesis as follows: 
H8Banking sector provides more transparency and disclosure in their annual 
reports than insurance sector. 
      In this study the eighth hypothesis is “Banking sector provides more T&D in their 
annual reports than insurance sector”. At the second and third level of T&D according 
to three categories and twelve subcategories, this study set sub-hypotheses related to 
the eighth hypothesis as follows:   
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Table  4.12  The Sub-hypotheses Related to Eighth Hypothesis 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H8.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
H8.1.1 Transparency of ownership 
H8.1.2 Concentration of ownership  
H8.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures 
H8.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
H8.2.1 Business focus 
H8.2.2 Accounting policy review 
H8.2.3 Accounting policy details  
H8.2.4 Related party structure and transactions 
H8.2.5 Information on auditors 
H8.3 Board and management structure and process 
H8.3.1 Board structure and composition 
H8.3.2 Role of board of directors 
H8.3.3 Director training and composition 
H8.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive 
4.5.6 Audit Peer review 
The homogeneity of auditors’ working rules and international standards are promoted 
by means of audit peer reviews which also tend to guarantee the transparency of 
financial information (Piot, 2001). The literature on agency has developed to 
encompass a number of different solutions to the problem existing in the 
principal/agent relation; which attempt to reduce the inefficiencies prevalent as a 
result of factors relating to information asymmetry, or agency costs, and which results 
from the failure of the principal to perfectly monitor the actions and motivations of the 
agent (Payne, 1995). Harris and Raviv (1979) and Holmstrom (1979) originally put 
forward a solution where they stated that regardless of its perfection a costless monitor 
that provides a positively correlated information concerning an agent’s action or to 
some extent aimed at the overall state of nature can always be employed by the 
principal as a tool of cutting down on the agency expenses which tend to stem out of 
the asymmetry of information. However, in situations where the monitor fails to 
provide essential information, engaging its use could potentially expose the agent to 
risks and lead to a situation of reduced decisions affecting welfare. Furthermore, the 
two writers asserted that where the monitor happens to be costly the benefits derivable 
from its use must be seen to exceed its cost in order to ascertain the improvement in 
the overall societal welfare. The two factors of quality and credibility do have a 
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similar impact in the process of agency conflict minimisation: The variables tend to 
ensure the reliability and credibility of numbers involved in accounting and as a result 
improve the social role of financial reporting in the CG process (Piot, 2001). Fogarty 
(1996) reports that audit peer review became necessary partly because of the weak 
culture of the profession and its unstable knowledge base. According to Payne (1995) 
audit peer review should be perceived as the profession's reaction to the agency 
potential relationship that exists between the buyer of audit services and that of the 
last user of the services provided by the auditor. A manager’s decision could be 
controlled by use of mandated audit peer review through the removal from the market 
the services of the low quality auditor. Essentially, even if it is more costly to the 
management, regulators tend to try to protect the end user of the audited financial 
statement.  
      According to document considered by the OECD Steering Group on CG:  
“The peer reviews will be designed to encourage transparency, consistency and learning. 
The peer-reviews can also address specific cross-cutting issues that will identify key market 
and policy developments that may influence the quality of CG” (OECD, 2009). 
       To the best of my knowledge, no previous study has examined the effect of audit 
peer review on the level of T&D.  This study, to reduce information of asymmetry 
between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals) will investigate whether 
audit peer review has an effect on T&D in companies’ annual reports. 
      However, this study expects to find that audit peer review is statistically 
significant increase on level of transparency and disclosure. The ninth, EQ9 about the 
corporate characteristics asks “Are companies that have audit peer review more likely 
to provide T&D information than companies that do not have audit peer review?” To 
investigate this question, the study set the hypothesis as follows:  
H9- Companies that have audit peer review are more likely to provide greater 
transparency and disclosure information in their annual reports than companies 
that do not have audit peer review. 
      In this study the ninth hypothesis is “Companies that have audit peer review are 
more likely to provide T&D information in their annual reports than companies that 
do not have audit peer review”. At the second and third level of T&D according to 
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three categories and twelve subcategories this study set sub-hypotheses related the 
ninth hypothesis as follows:   
                    Table  4.13  The Sub-hypotheses Related to Ninth Hypothesis 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H9.1 Ownership structure and investor rights 
H9.1.1 Transparency of ownership 
H9.1.2 Concentration of ownership  
H9.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures 
H9.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
H9.2.1 Business focus 
H9.2.2 Accounting policy review 
H9.2.3 Accounting policy details  
H9.2.4 Related party structure and transactions 
H9.2.5 Information on auditors 
H9.3 Board and management structure and process 
H9.3.1 Board structure and composition 
H9.3.2 Role of board of directors 
H9.3.3 Director training and composition 
H9.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive 
4.6 Transparency and Disclosure Practices and Financial Performance 
Filatotchev and Boyd (2009) report that most empirical literature on CG has been 
rooted in agency theory and is concerned with linking different aspects of CG with 
company performance in order to prevent principal–agent conflicts and maximise 
value for shareholders. Klapper and Love (2004) suggest that good governance 
practices are more important in countries with weak anti director rights and inefficient 
enforcement. This finding has strong policy implications and suggests that 
recommending that companies adopt good governance practices is even more 
important in countries with weak legal systems. Berglof and Claessens (2004) argue 
that enforcement is more than laws-on-the-books and voluntary codes and regulations; 
it is the key to effective CG, at least in transition and developing countries. Thus, 
good CG practices are related to fair and effective enforcement of the legal structure 
to provide investors’ dependability. Nganga et al. (2003) suggests that the key issues 
in evaluating a CG system are effective boards, legal protection of investor rights, 
trustworthy accounting and disclosure standards, and preferably an active market for 
corporate control. 
      Companies that wish to be listed on the LSM must meet a number of CG T&D 
practices set out by both the LSM and the Libyan Securities Commission. Prior to 
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granting the listing, the LSM requires companies to lodge a full set of CG practices 
and complete the application form. T&D practices as one of the CG practices must  
include information about the companies such as details of company objectives; 
details of major share ownership and voting rights; board members, key executives 
and their remuneration; related party transactions; foreseeable material  risk factors; 
material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders; details of governance 
structures and policies, preparation of information; details of audit and disclosure 
according to high standards of accounting; disclosure and audit by external auditors 
with a duty of due professional care; accountable to shareholders; channels for 
disseminating information allowing for fair, timely and cost-efficient access to 
information by the user; and details of CG framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis.  
      Apart from these specific listing requirements, the LSM also requires companies 
to prepare annual audited accounts in accordance with the ISA and Act No 116 for the 
year 1973, the accounting standards and pronouncement of the IAS and financial 
reporting prepared of International Financial Report Standard (IFRS).   
      Shabbir and Padget (2005) used 1,229 CG provisions from the 1998 UK 
Combined Code to develop a non-compliance CG index for a sample of 122 FTSE 
350 companies during the period 2000 to 2003 to investigate the CG – performance 
relationship. Consistent with the US evidence, they report that their non-compliance 
CG index is inversely related to ROE, ROA, and total shareholder return. This implies 
that more compliant UK listed companies enjoy higher ROE, ROA, and total 
shareholder return over the sample period. 
      Aksu and Kosedag (2006) argue that there is a relationship between T&D scores 
and company-level and country-level financial performance. Rogers (2008)finds that 
all the dimensions of financial transparency, disclosure and trust had positive 
relationships with most of the financial performance dimensions in commercial banks 
in Uganda. Jiamsagul (2007) shows that T&D accounting policy review and details 
are significantly and positively related to ROA. Healy and Palepu (2001) found that 
disclosure is associated with stock price performance. Patton and Zelenka (1997) 
found that the number of employees, ROE performance, asset size and financial risk 
(leverage) are significantly correlated with the extent of disclosure. Miyajima (2005) 
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shows that developed information disclosure adds to the cumulative efforts of recent 
CG, and found that information disclosure was significantly associated with better 
financial performance (ROA). 
      Chen et al. (2007), using S&P T&D to examine the effect of CG on equity 
liquidity, find that companies with poor T&D have larger economic costs of equity 
and liquidity. Klapper and Love (2004), using Credit Lyonnais analysts on seven 
categories and 57 binary questions (Y-N), found that 15% is disclosure and 
transparency, with a positive association between CG score and ROA. Cheng et al. 
(2003) argue that strong S&P T&D reduces the company’s cost of equity measured by 
market beta.  
      Duztas (2008) argues that CG is either the sole or most important concept 
affecting company performance. Huang (2010) shows that independent directors have 
a significantly positive impact on financial performance measured by ROA. Reddy et 
al.(2010), show that the presence of a remuneration committee has had a positive 
influence on company performance measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, and market-to-
book ratio. Mishra and Suar (2010) find that the correlation between corporate social 
responsibility and company performance indicated that a more favourable aggregate 
corporate social responsibility towards all the six stakeholders – employees, investors, 
suppliers, community, customers, and environment – resulted in a higher ROA. 
      On the other hand, Al Farooque et al. (2007) find that a non-linear relationship 
exists between board shareholding and financial performance. Rogers (2008) argues 
that credit risk as a measure of disclosure has a negative relationship with financial 
performance. Alsaeed (2005) shows that none of the financial performance-related 
variables (profit margin, return on equity, liquidity) actually lent itself to being an 
explanation of the disclosure level variation. Wallace et al. (1994) find that the 
association between the index of comprehensive disclosure and liquidity was 
significantly negative. Fisher (2007) suggests that there is a limitation on the 
conclusions drawn on the causal relationship between CG and financial performance. 
Drobetz et al. (2004) prove that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with 
company-level CG (general governance commitment, minority rights, transparency, 
board matters, and auditing), if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of 
capital.  
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      Jo and Kim (2007) find that disclosure frequency around the announcement of a 
seasoned equity offering is positively related to the company’s post-issue 
performance. Cheung et al. (2010), by using the transparency index in mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure to examine 100 major Chinese listed companies during 2004-
2007, constructed a comprehensive scorecard, based on the CG Principles (OECD 
2004); in order to assess the transparency, they find that there is a positive and 
significant relation between company transparency and market valuation. On the other 
hand Cheung et al. (2008) developed a CG index to measure the overall quality of CG 
and disclosure practices of the 100 largest Chinese listed companies in 2004, but find 
no statistically significant relation between individual sub-index (T&D index) and 
market valuation. Coulton (2001) find no evidence of transparency being associated 
with the mix of cash and stock-based compensation.  
      From the above it can be concluded that T&D practices is a good measurement to 
examine the relationship between CG and company financial performance.  
4.6.1 The Relationship between Transparency and Disclosure Practices and 
Financial Performance 
This study is a contribution to the growing volume of research that examines the 
relationship between T&D and company financial performance as measured by 
ROCE, ROE, and ROA. 
      The choice of ROCE, ROE, and ROA as indicators of performance has illustrated 
how CG structures can be seen to influence the capital structure of a company which 
in itself could have a significant impact upon the effectiveness of a said governance 
structure to influence company performance.  
      Furthermore, the theory on disclosure suggests that a commitment to improved 
public T&D decreases information asymmetry between insiders and outsider investors 
and among differentially informed investors (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & 
Verrecchia, 1991).  
        According to Chugh et al. (2010, p. 2):   
In the first place, litigation costs may be reduced, since greater transparency of 
governance processes and financial information, and protection of minority shareholder 
rights, may result in fewer conflicts. Secondly, agency costs may be minimized, as 
independent boards can effectively monitor and supervise management. In addition, 
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appropriate incentives may be put in place to enhance managerial performance. Thirdly, 
greater shareholder oriented CG may be regarded as a positive signal by investors and 
analysts. Fourthly, greater transparency may elevate credit ratings, resulting in a lower 
cost of debt. 
      It can be said, agency costs, and thus disclosure, will be higher for companies with 
proportionately more debt, because of the greater than before potential for wealth 
transfers from debt holders to managers and shareholders. The previous research on 
this relation has been mixed, e.g. Bayoud, Kavanagh, & Slaughter (2012b) found a 
significant and positive relationship between social and environmental disclosure and 
ROA, ROE, and revenues. Zhongfu, Jianhui, & Pinglin (2011) find that the 
environment information disclosure has a positive effect on the Tobin Q. Chi (2009) 
found that Tobin Q is positively associated with the quality of corporate disclosure 
practices. Aman & Nguyen find significantly relationship between information 
disclosure and ROA & Tobin Q. Bradbury (1992) found that the relationship between 
disclosure and leverage is positive and significant in New Zealand companies. 
Hossain et al. (1995), found that leverage was marginally significant related to the 
level of financial information voluntarily disclosed by companies listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange. Ferguson et al. (2002), find that the effect of leverage on 
voluntary disclosure is noteworthy. On the other hand, Javid and Iqbal (2011) found 
that T&D has no significant effect on ROA, ROE, and Tobin Q. Haat, Rahman, & 
Mahenthiran (2008) found that Tobin Q is not associated with the level of disclosure 
and timely reporting. Dragomir (2009) found no association between environmental 
disclosure and six companies performance; ROA, ROCE, REPS, Tobin Q, Leverage., 
and Share Returns. Sengupta (1998) finds a negative relationship between leverage 
and analyst disclosure quality ratings in US companies. Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987) find no relationship between leverage and disclosure in Mexican companies. 
However, as discussed above, previous studies have reported mixed results (see 
Appendix 3). 
      Therefore, Bayoud et al. (2011) find there is a significant relationship between 
corporate social responsibility disclosure and financial performance as measured by 
ROA, ROE and revenue. In addition, the level of corporate social responsibility 
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disclosure in annual reports can have an influence on the level of financial 
performance as a result of stakeholder pressure in Libyan companies.       
       However, based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and previous 
empirical studies, there is positive relationship between T&D and companies 
performance, this study expects to find a positive relationship between fourteen 
variables of T&D practices and company financial performance. To the extent that 
higher T&D proxy for better actual CG practices, higher CG practices should translate 
into improved financial performance.  
To investigate EQ10, the study set the hypothesis as follows:  
H10: There is a relationship between transparency and disclosure Practices, and 
financial performance.  
      This study set sub-hypotheses to test the relationship between fourteen variables of 
T&D practices, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE, and ROA as 
follows: 
4.6.1.1 T&D of Financial and Operation Results 
Theory and evidence has been presented that suggests that companies tend to 
voluntarily increase the extent of their voluntary financial disclosure when they 
attempt to attract greater public and investor interest. Hence, allowing companies of 
small interest to investors and the public less burdensome reporting requirements 
appears to be a policy, which is not necessarily contrary to the public interest. The 
basic agency problem resulting from the separation of management and financing is 
that the managers will have incentives to take actions to increase their own utility, but 
not to maximize the returns on capital invested by the financiers (Sloan, 2001). This 
problem may manifest itself in numerous ways, including direct wealth transfers from 
the financiers to the managers, sub-optimal allocation of capital and managerial 
perquisite consumption. The financial accounting system provides an important 
source of information to governance mechanisms that helps alleviate the agency 
problem. Koh, Laplante, & Tong (2006) describe three essential purposes of CG: 
safeguarding financial reporting; ensuring accountability; and increasing value. 
Safeguarding financial reporting ensures the quality of financial disclosure, thereby 
reducing the asymmetry of information between companies and market investors. 
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      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypotheses 10.1 as follows:  
H10.1- There is a relationship between disclosure of financial and operation results, and 
financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA. The sub-hypotheses 
related to hypothesis 10.1 as follows:  
Table  4.14  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.1 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.1.1 Disclosure of financial and operation results, and ROCE 
H10.1.2 Disclosure of financial and operation results, and ROE 
H10.1.3 Disclosure of financial and operation results, and ROA 
4.6.1.2 T&D of Company Objectives 
The literature of agency problems and corporate disclosure can provide an important 
insight into the relation between socially responsible disclosure and long-term 
financial performance. In their seminal work on agency problems, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that outside shareholder monitoring helps reduce the agency 
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control.  
       Bonn and Fisher (2005) report that an integrated approach towards CG and 
business ethics should help organisations to implement high standards of ethical 
behaviour throughout their organisation. Such a proactive approach provides evidence 
of the board’s commitment to good CG and may help to enhance the organisation’s 
reputation and competitiveness. Cadbury’s definition suggests that CG is an 
overarching concept with implications for business ethics, an organisation’s approach 
to corporate social responsibility, and to ensuring that regulatory responsibilities are 
fulfilled (Bonn & Fisher, 2005). Gelb and Strawer (2001) argue that a company 
discloses because it is socially responsible to do so. Therefore, 21st century corporate 
scandals such as Andersen, WorldCom, and Enron have shown that the financial 
transparency and shareholder-driven model of the United States can also have 
liabilities in terms of governance and business ethics (Millar, et al., 2005).  
      Jo and Kim (2008) find that companies  with extensive disclosure are less likely to 
face information problems, and are more likely to lead to active shareholder 
monitoring, and therefore, engage in fewer unethical activities such as aggressive 
earnings manipulation, and have better long-term, post-issue performance. According 
to Margolis and Walsh (2003), corporate social performance has been treated as an 
independent variable, predicting financial performance, in 109 of the 127 studies. In 
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these studies, almost half of the results (54) pointed to a positive relationship between 
corporate social performance and financial performance. Based on disclosure rankings 
provided by the annual Association for Investment Management and Research 
Reports, they suggest that there is a positive relation between disclosure level and 
corporate social responsibility and conclude that increased disclosure is a form of 
socially responsible behaviour. 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.2- There is a relationship between disclosure of company objectives and financial 
performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.2 as follows:  
Table  4.15  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.2 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.2.1 Disclosure of company objectives, and ROCE 
H10.2.2 Disclosure of company objectives, and ROE 
H10.2.3 Disclosure of company objectives, and ROA 
4.6.1.3 T&D of Major Share Ownership and Voting Rights 
There is considerable theoretical and empirical controversy regarding each of the 
approaches, with one set of researchers arguing that CG has an impact on company 
performance, and an opposite camp denying this relationship (Saravia & Chen, 2008). 
      Jackson and Moerke (2005) report that measures to encourage more disclosure and 
foster  transparency were introduced, as well as the adoption of better shareholder 
rights such as removal of voting rights restrictions and availability of derivative suits. 
Furthermore, this emerging literature in argue that companies should have a 
transparent ownership structure, so that the stakes of directors, managers, and 
beneficial owners can be readily identified (Bushman, Piotroski, et al., 2004; 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). 
       To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.3- There is a relationship between disclosure of major share ownership and voting 
rights, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.3 are as follows:  
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Table  4.16  The Sub-hypotheses Related  to H10.3 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.3.1 Disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights, and ROCE 
H10.3.2 Disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights, and ROE 
H10.3.3 Disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights, and ROA 
4.6.1.4 T&D of Board Members and Key Executives and Their Remuneration 
The new conceptual framework is based on agency theory and suggests a negative 
relationship between the value of a company and CEO duality as the board cannot 
control the CEO who is also the leader or Chairman of the board (Rashid, 2008).      
The importance of how compensation arrangements are perceived means that, in the 
executive compensation area, the transparency of disclosure matters. Financial 
economists often focus on the role of disclosure in getting information incorporated 
into market pricing. It is widely believed that information can become reflected in 
stock prices as long as it is known and fully understood by a limited number of market 
professionals. In the executive compensation context, however, the ability of plan 
designers to choose arrangements that favour managers depends on how these 
arrangements are perceived by a much wider group of outsiders. As a result, the 
transparency and salience of disclosure can have a significant effect on CEO 
compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). Pissaris et al. (2010) suggest that agency 
theory endorses CEO compensation as an effective mechanism for aligning the goals 
of principals and agents.  
      The recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992) report on the financial 
aspects of CG were a broad review of CG best practice with a bias (underlined by its 
recommendations) towards the control function of corporate boards. Its five main 
recommendations were that: the role of CEO and Chairman should be separated; 
board monitoring committees should be established to deal with specific areas such as 
setting director remuneration; board monitoring committees should consist primarily 
of non-executive directors; non-executive directors should be independent; and non-
executive directors should have sufficient representation to carry weight at board 
meetings.  
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      However, Core et al. (1999) find that companies with weaker governance 
structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at companies with greater agency 
problems receive greater compensation and perform worse. Armstrong et al. (2010) 
find that CEO pay is higher in companies with weaker CG. 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.4- There is a relationship between the disclosure of board members, key 
executives and their remuneration, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, 
ROE and ROA; The sub-hypothesis related to hypothesis 10.4 as follows:  
Table  4.17  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.4 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.4.1 Disclosure of board members, key executives and their remuneration, and ROCE 
H10.4.2 Disclosure of board members, key executives and their remuneration, and ROE 
H10.4.3 Disclosure of board members, key executives and their remuneration, and ROA 
4.6.1.5 T&D of Related Party Transactions 
Healy and Palepu (1995) hypothesise that investors’ perceptions of a company are 
important to corporate managers expecting to issue public debt or equity or to acquire 
another company in a stock transaction. Consider a company whose managers have 
superior information to outside investors regarding the company’s future prospects. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that if this information asymmetry cannot be 
resolved, such companies will view making public equity or debt offers to be costly 
for existing shareholders. Consequently, managers who anticipate making capital 
market transactions have incentives to provide voluntary disclosure to reduce the 
information asymmetry problem, thereby reducing the company’s cost of external 
financing. Indeed, Williamson (1988) has shown that corporate finance and CG issues 
can be analysed employing transaction cost economics. However, Hart (1995) 
suggests this necessitates the need for CG. That is, CG issues arise wherever contracts 
are incomplete and agency problems exist. Iu and Batten (2001) find that the five 
largest shareholders, combined, own 55% of each company in Asia crisis economies. 
The largest is Indonesia, 67%, and the lowest is Korea, 38%. Thus, with low 
ownership dispersion, the agency problem arises between majority and minority 
shareholders. Furthermore, external disclosure of material information, such as 
related-party transactions, external audit results, and insider transactions, is a hallmark 
of a well-governed company (Cheung, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2006; Fan & Wong, 2005). 
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      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.5- There is a relationship between disclosure of related party transactions, and 
financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.5 are as follows:  
Table  4.18  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.5 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.5.1 Disclosure of related party transactions, and ROCE 
H10.5.2 Disclosure of related party transactions, and ROE 
H10.5.3 Disclosure of related party transactions, and ROA 
4.6.1.6 T&D of Material Foreseeable Risk Factors 
Barry and Brown (1985) and Merton (1987) reach a similar conclusion by modelling 
the premium that investors demand for bearing information risk when there is an 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Managers can 
reduce their cost of capital by reducing information risk through increased voluntary 
disclosure. A corner solution is not possible because of costs associated with credible 
voluntary disclosure.  
      Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that companies with high levels of disclosure, and 
hence low information risk, are likely to have a lower cost of capital than companies 
with low disclosure levels and high information risk. The evidence of Core et al. 
(2006) and Gompers et al. (2003) indicates the implications of good CG in terms of 
lower risk and higher company performance. These results confirm the previous 
study. Verhezen and Morse (2010) report that increased T&D are crucial for effective 
risk management as part of CG. Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph (2000) find 
that investors agree that increased corporate risk disclosure would help their portfolio 
investment decision-making. Furthermore, investors need to have good quality 
information, such as the annual report, to help assess the asset quality and risk of the 
company(Meek, et al., 1995; Singhvi & Desai, 1971) Further, the quality of disclosure 
also reflects the agency conflicts and information asymmetry within the company 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001; Meek, et al., 1995). 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.6- There is a relationship between disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors, 
and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.6 are as follows:  
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Table  4.19  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.6 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.6.1 Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors, and ROCE 
H10.6.2 Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors, and ROE 
H10.6.3 Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors, and ROA 
4.6.1.7 T&D of Material Issues Regarding Employees 
Agency theory suggests that highly leveraged companies disclose more information 
voluntarily in order to satisfy the needs of their creditors (Premuroso & Bhattacharya, 
2008). Youndt et al. (1996) suggest that the company strategy–human resources fit is 
important for enhancing financial performance. Agency theory believes that 
employees are held accountable in their responsibilities and tasks as employees’ must 
constitute a good structure of governance rather than simply providing the need of 
shareholders, which perhaps is challenging the structure of governance. Aksu and 
Kosedag (2006) envision good CG T&D practices as mechanisms of checks and 
balances that have evolved to mitigate these agency problems. In addition, good CG 
T&D mechanisms are set in place to protect the rights of shareholders, creditors and 
other outsiders from extraction of private benefits by insiders based on their superior 
information. This is expected to minimise the informational asymmetry, increase 
investor awareness and trust and, in turn, should reduce the uncertainty of the returns 
to capital suppliers and lead to lower cost of capital and hence higher company value. 
Furthermore, voluntary disclosure reduces company opacity and improves the in 
formativeness of stock price by increasing the amount of company-specific 
information (Haggard, Martin, & Pereira, 2008). 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.7- There is relationship between disclosure of material issues regarding employees 
and other stakeholders, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and 
ROA; 
      The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.7 are as follows:  
Table  4.20  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.7 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.7.1 Disclosure of material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders, and ROCE 
H10.7.2 Disclosure of material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders, and ROE 
H10.7.3 Disclosure of material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders, and ROA 
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4.6.1.8 T&D of Governance Structures and Policies 
Core et al. (1999) report that companies with weaker CG structures have greater 
agency problems; that CEO at companies with greater agency problems receive 
greater compensation; and that companies with greater agency problems perform 
worse. By governance strictures, agency theory means the mechanisms that police that 
explicit and implicit contract between principals and agents. These mechanisms 
include the structure of law governing corporate behaviour and its attendant legal 
apparatus, enforcement mechanisms such as the market for corporate control and 
managerial labour market, and monitoring mechanisms such as the board of directors 
(Fama, 1980). Consequently, a system of CG controls is introduced, which 
discourages managers from pursuing objectives that fail to maximise shareholder 
wealth. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that without governance controls, managers’ 
interests are more likely to deviate from the interests of the shareholders. Core et al. 
(1999) find that ownership and board structure has a negative relationship with 
subsequent company stock return and operating performance. However, the key 
report, Cadbury, recommended that publicly quoted companies should adopt the 
specified internal governance structures contained within a Code of Best Practice 
(Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002). 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.8- There a is relationship between disclosure of governance structures and 
policies, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.8 are as follows:  
Table  4.21  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.8 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.8.1 Disclosure of governance structures and policies, and ROCE 
H10.8.2 Disclosure of governance structures and policies, and ROE 
H10.8.3 Disclosure of governance structures and policies, and ROA 
4.6.1.9 T&D of Preparation of Information and Disclosed 
Ding et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence of links between financial reporting 
standards and the economic, financial and governance institutions in a country. Aksu 
and Kosedag (2006) find that T&D scores and their relationship with agency problems 
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proxies will improve due to the required compliance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards and the Capital Markets Board’s CG Principles. 
       La Porta et al. (1998, p. 1140) elaborate on the role of accounting in CG: 
Accounting plays a potentially crucial role in CG. For investors to know anything about 
the companies they invest in basic accounting standards are needed to render company 
disclosures interpretable. Even more important, contracts between managers and investors 
typically rely on the verifiability in court of some measures firms’ income or assets. 
        According to Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999, p. 11): 
There is a strong case for strict accounting norms. Disclosure alone is not enough to 
implement transparency. Information must be reliable, based on sound principles and 
standards that enabling investors and lenders to make consistent assessments of 
companies’ activities and risk profiles. Accounting standards facilitate the interpretation, 
reliability, and comparability of information across enterprises and make it easier for 
investors to identify worthy companies and evaluate managers. Conversely, lapses in 
accounting norms can provide opportunities for misrepresentation as means to divert 
assets. A prevalent weakness of many accounting systems is the ease with which they can 
be manipulated to mask the discrepancy between the accounting values of assets and their 
real value. Discrepancies typically owe to asset attributes such as risk or profitability, 
which are uncertain or can be misrepresented. 
     Guedhami and Pittman (2006) report that accounting transparency can help 
alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, 
which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of 
corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. However, Nair 
and Frank (1980) undertook a more detailed examination of the relationship between 
accounting and its environment. Their results indicate that accounting measures may 
be influenced by a separate set of environmental factors than accounting disclosure 
practices. 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.9- There is a relationship between disclosure of the preparation of information and 
disclosure, and financial performance as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
      The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.9 are as follows:  
Table  4.22  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.9 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.9.1 Disclosure of preparation of information and disclosed, and ROCE 
H10.9.2 Disclosure of preparation of information and disclosed, and ROE 
H10.9.3 Disclosure of preparation of information and disclosed, and ROA 
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4.6.1.10 T&D of External Audit and Monitoring  
From an agency perspective, auditors can be considered part of the CG mosaic 
because they monitor the quality of the financial reporting process (Beasley & 
Salterio, 2001). Hung (2000) reports that as accounting becomes important in CG, 
there is a corresponding greater need for credible auditing in CG as an enforcement 
mechanism in the verification of accounting data. The argument for internal audit 
report disclosure to external stakeholders focuses on the need to improve governance 
transparency and reduce information asymmetry costs (Archambeault, DeZoort, & 
Holt, 2008). Bushman et al. (2004) define governance transparency as the availability 
and extent of governance-related disclosures. The external audit statements must 
contribute to an improved internal control environment in the company. Francis et al. 
(2003) show that higher quality accounting standards and enforcement of such 
standards through higher quality auditing  are more likely to exist in CG in countries 
with strong investor protection. Han, Kang and Yoo (2011) show that when the 
company hires a Big 4 auditor, auditor size is positively related with T&D around the 
world and that the association is stronger in code law regimes than in common law 
regimes. Basiruddin (2011) find that higher quality auditors are associated with 
effective monitoring, which in turn helps to improve the quality of financial reporting. 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.10- There is a relationship between disclosure of external audit and monitoring, 
and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
      The sub-hypothesis related to hypothesis 10.10 as follows:  
Table  4.23  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.10 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.10.1 Disclosure of external audit and monitoring, and ROCE 
H10.10.2 Disclosure of external audit and monitoring, and ROE 
H10.10.3 Disclosure of external audit and monitoring, and ROA 
4.6.1.11 T&D of External Audit and Audit Committee Role 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) find that audit committee effectiveness is more 
attributable to internal issues than to external issues, such as agency variables. Koh et 
al (2006) argue that audit committee increases T&D to align managerial activities 
with the interest of shareholders, thus increasing company performance. DeFond and 
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Jiambalvo (1991) find that companies with accounting errors are less likely to have 
audit committees. Wild (1994) finds that the market reacted more favourably to 
earnings reports after an audit committee had been established. Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan (2010) find that only the existence of  an audit committee is  positively 
significantly related to the extent of voluntary disclosure on Kuwait companies. 
Anderson et al. (2004) find that companies with entirely independent audit 
committees have lower debt financing costs. On the other hand, Kajola (2008) finds 
no significant relationship between ROE and audit committee. Klein (2002) 
documents a negative relation between audit committee independence and earnings 
management. Klein (1998) shows that neither the presence of an audit committee nor 
its structure had an effect on a range of accounting and market performance measures. 
Nimer et al. (2012) indicated that there is no significant relationship between audit 
committees and both Tobin’s Q and ROA. Agrawal and Chadha (2004) find no 
relation between either audit committee independence or the extent that auditors 
provide non-audit services with the probability a company restates its earnings.  
      Watts and Zimmerman (1983) argue that high quality external auditing will 
undermine the opportunistic behaviour cost (agency cost) introduced by management. 
However, there was widespread support for better disclosure of the relationship 
between the company and the external auditor, including the specific contract, fees 
and other services (non-audit) provided by the audit company (Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 
2005). La Porta et al. (2000, p. 4) view CG as a set of mechanisms including 
accounting and auditing that protect outside investors from expropriation by insiders. 
Desoky (2012) found that there is a significant positive association between the T&D 
and audit company. 
       According to Healy and Palepu’s (2003, p. 15) report:  
Whether the auditors at Andersen had conflicted incentives or whether they lacked the 
expertise to evaluate financial complexities adequately, they failed to exercise sound 
business judgment in reviewing transactions that were clearly designed for financial 
reporting rather than business purposes. When the credit risks at the special purpose 
entities became clear, requiring Enron to take a write-down, the auditors apparently 
succumbed to pressure from Enron’s management and permitted the company to defer 
recognizing the charges. Internal controls at Andersen, designed to protect against 
conflicted incentives of local partners, failed. For example, Andersen’s Houston office, 
which performed the Enron audit, was permitted to overrule critical reviews of Enron’s 
accounting decisions by Andersen’s Practice Partner in Chicago.”  
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       Previous studies of external audit-related CG reports (e.g., Bassett, Koh, & 
Tutticci, 2007) find that the Big Four auditors are associated with a higher level of 
voluntary disclosure on employee stock option and a greater level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Koh et al. (2006) find external audit-related CG 
constrains earnings management more than non-audit-related CG.  
      Brown and Caylor (2004) provide additional evidence on the association between 
audit-related governance factors and financial company performance by showing that 
the companies formal policy on auditor rotation  is relates to ROE positively; 
consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors, thus are 
negatively related to ROE; solely independent audit committees are negatively related 
to ROE; auditors ratified at the most recent annual meeting are unrelated to ROE; a 
company that has a formal policy on auditor rotation is positively related to ROE. On 
other hand, Barako et al. (2006a) reported that the external audit company is not of 
statistical significance to effect  the level of voluntary disclosure. Ashbaugh, Lafond 
and Mayhew (2003) and Larcker and Richardson (2004) dispute their evidence of a 
relation between earnings management and auditor independence (based on audit 
versus non-audit fees). Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) show a negative relation 
between auditor independence (based on audit versus non-audit fees) and earnings 
management. Kinney Jr, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find no relation between 
earnings restatements and fees paid for financial information systems design and 
implementation or internal audit services.  
       Therefore, the audit committee has oversight responsibility over CG external 
audit activities, internal audit function, internal control structure, and the financial 
reporting process.  
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.11- There is relationship between disclosure of external audit and audit committee 
role, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
      The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.11 are as follows:  
Table  4.24  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.11 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.11.1 Disclosure of external audit and audit committee role, and ROCE 
H10.11.2 Disclosure of external audit and audit committee role, and ROE 
H10.11.3 Disclosure of external audit and audit committee role, and ROA 
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4.6.1.12 T&D of External Auditors Duty and Accountable to Shareholders 
Piot (2001) argues that principals hire external auditors who, as agents under contract, 
are expected to be independent of the agents who manage their company. The role of 
the external auditor is to reduce agency costs by cutting information asymmetry in 
financial reporting. Sloan (2001) and Francis et al. (2003) report that audit is an 
important element of efficient equity markets, because audits can enhance the 
credibility of financial information, directly support better CG practices through 
transparent financial reporting. Siew Hong and Wong (1993) show that the quality of 
the external auditor affects the credibility and in formativeness of financial reports. 
Dye (1993) report that large audit companies are more independent of management. 
On the other hand, Wallace and Naser (1995) found a negative significant relationship 
between the level of disclosure and type of audit in Hong Kong companies.  
      Camfferman and Cooke (2002) find a positive and significant relationship 
between disclosure in annual reports of UK companies and type of audit. On the other 
hand, Wallace et al. (1994) find an association between the content of annual reports 
and the audit size in Spanish public companies. 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.12- There is a relationship between disclosure of external auditors accountable to 
shareholders where the external auditor owes a duty of due professional care, and 
financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
      The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.12 are as follows:  
Table  4.25  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.12 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.12.1 Disclosure of external auditors accountable to shareholders where the external 
auditor owes a duty of due professional care, and ROCE 
H10.12.2 Disclosure of external auditors accountable to shareholders where the 
external auditor owes a duty of due professional care, and ROE 
H10.12.3 Disclosure of external auditors accountable to shareholders where the 
external auditor owes a duty of due professional care, and ROA 
4.6.1.13 T&D of Channels for Disseminating Information 
Owusu-Ansah (2000) find that timeliness of financial reporting that is part of the 
annual report is a significant characteristic of accounting information, because stale 
information is of little use to market participants in their investment decision-making 
processes. Spence (1973) states that if information asymmetry exists between a 
137 
 
company’s managers and investors, the company can provide information to the 
investor in order to eliminate the asymmetry. In other words, if information 
asymmetry exists, there is no way for the investor to understand the real situation of 
the company’s operations. Jaggi and Tsui (1999) argue that timely disclosure of 
financial information through audited financial statements plays an important role in 
reducing the asymmetric dissemination of information. Jo and Kim (2007) gave 
evidence that greater disclosure frequency reduces information asymmetry. On the 
other hand Haat, Rahman and Mahenthiran (2008) find that disclosure and timeliness 
are not significant contributing factors in the relationship between CG and market 
performance. Furthermore, companies that use multiple channels to communicate with 
investors, such as through analyst briefings or websites, are ensuring that investors 
receive more frequent and timely information (Ashbaugh, Johnstone, & Warfield, 
1999; Farragher, Kleiman, & Bazaz, 1994; Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 1996).  
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.13- There is a relationship between disclosure of channels for disseminating 
information allowing for fair, timely and cost efficient access to information by users, 
and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA. 
      The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.13 are as follows:  
Table  4.26  The Sub-hypotheses Related  to H10.13 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.13.1 Disclosure of channels for disseminating information allowing for fair, timely, and 
cost efficient access to Information by users, and ROCE 
H10.13.2 Disclosure of channels for disseminating information allowing for fair, timely, and 
cost efficient access to Information by users, and ROE 
H10.13.3 Disclosure of channels for disseminating information allowing for fair, timely, and 
cost efficient access to Information by users, and ROA 
4.6.1.14 T&D of Corporate Governance Framework 
Solomon, et al. (2000) found that since companies privately disclose information to 
analysts and institutional investors that can affect share prices, it is possible that the 
information in financial reports is not sufficiently timely to have a strong effect on 
institutional investors’ day-to-day investment decisions. Cheng (2011) reports that the 
strengthening of information T&D for investors has the most direct impact; 
particularly in the stock markets, investors have to rely on timely and reliable 
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information to make decisions. Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan (2007) found significant 
relationships between financial analysts’ activities and  company T&D. 
      To investigate EQ10, the study set the sub-hypothesis as follows:  
H10.14- There is a relationship between disclosure of corporate governance framework, 
complemented by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of 
analysis, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA. 
      The sub-hypotheses related to hypothesis 10.14 are as follows:  
Table  4.27  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H10.14 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H10.14.1 Disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis, and ROCE 
H10.14.2 Disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis, and ROE 
H10.14.3 Disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis, and ROA 
4.6.2 The Impact of Transparency and Disclosure Practices on Financial 
Performance 
According to Klapper and Love (2004, p. 706), CG may help a company to improve 
performance; however, it is possible that higher performance companies may have 
more incentive to adopt better CG.  
       Bhat (2008) found that disclosure positively moderates the fair value gains and 
losses–returns association, whereas the effect of CG is more subtle, and is evidenced 
indirectly through the medium of disclosure. Bauer et al. (2008) investigate the 
relationship between CG and company performance in Japan. The CG is measured by 
six different categories: financial disclosure and internal control, remuneration, board 
accountability, shareholders rights, market for control, and corporate behaviour. They 
find that only two out of six categories, financial disclosure and internal control and 
remuneration practices, are the most relevant for stock price performance. Ting (2008) 
found that information disclosure does not have a direct influence on company 
performance as measured by ROE,  earnings per share,  market-to-book ratio, ROA. 
Jerab (2011) shows that internal CG mechanisms: disclosure and transparency, 
internal control and audit, ownership structure, management remuneration, and board 
of directors have an effect on corporate performance as measured by ROA and ROE. 
Sami et al. (2011) find that overall quality of CG has a significantly positive 
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association with company performance as measured by ROA, ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Chi (2009) finds initiatives that good corporate disclosure practices play a significant 
role in market measures of financial performance.  
      This study investigates the impact of T&D on company financial performance in 
Libyan financial companies. The study introduces a composite measure of the 
association between T&D practices and Libyan financial companies’ performance, 
because agency theory suggests that companies with better CG practices perform 
better. This study expects a different set of T&D practices to affect the financial 
performance of Libyan financial companies. If there is a relationship between T&D  
practices and financial performance, the study should use regression analysis to find 
out the above variables of T&D practices which may help the company to improve its 
financial performance. The EQ11 asks “Which item of T&D practices (independent 
variable) has the most impact on financial performance (dependent variable)?”  
EQ11
-
“Which independent variable (T&D practices) has the most impact on the 
dependent variable (financial performance)?” 
To investigate the question (EQ11) which variable of CG regarding T&D practices 
has the most impact to company financial performance. The study set the hypothesis 
as follows:  
H11: There is a variable of transparency and disclosure practices that has the 
most impact on company financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE 
and ROA.
      This study set sub-hypotheses to test which variable from 14 T&D practices has 
the most impact on company financial performance as measured by ROCE, as 
follows: 
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Table  4.28  The Sub-hypotheses Related to H11 
No. Sub-hypothesis 
H11.1 Disclosure of financial and operation results has the most impact on company 
financial performance 
H11.2 Disclosure of company objectives has the most impact on company financial 
performance 
H11.3 Disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights has the most impact on 
company financial performance 
H11.4 Disclosure of board members, key executives and their remuneration has the most 
impact on company financial performance 
H11.5 Disclosure of related party transactions has the most impact on company financial 
performance 
H11.6 Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors has the most impact on company 
financial performance 
H11.7 Disclosure of material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders has the 
most impact on company financial performance 
H11.8 Disclosure of governance structures and policies has the most impact on company 
financial performance 
H11.9 Disclosure of preparation of information, audit and disclosure according to high 
standards of accounting, disclosure and audit has the most impact on company 
financial performance 
H11.10 Disclosure of external audit and monitoring has the most impact on company 
financial performance 
H11.11 Disclosure of external audit and audit committee role has the most impact on 
company financial performance 
H11.12 Disclosure of auditors accountable to shareholders where the external auditor owes a 
duty of due professional care has the most impact on company financial performance 
H11.13 Disclosure of channels for disseminating information allowing for fair, timely, and 
cost efficient access to Information by users has the most impact on company 
financial performance 
H11.14 Disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis has the most impact 
on company financial performance 
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter described categories of development of hypotheses to be tested in this 
study. The hypotheses can be classified into three areas: firstly, the extent of the level 
of T&D in Libyan financial companies. This chapter looks at some of the work done 
in the areas of CG testing the extent of T&D. Thus, this study set hypotheses H1 
“There is a different level of S&P T&D in Libyan financial company’s annual report, 
through fiscal years from 2005 to 2008”, H2 “Libyan financial companies provide a 
low level of transparency and disclosure in their annual reports compared to 
companies in other countries”, and H3 “There are significant variations in Libyan 
financial companies’ transparency and disclosure in their annual reports”. 
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       Secondly, the extent of the level of T&D associated with six corporate 
characteristics – listing status, ownership structure, size of the company, company 
age, type of industry and audit peer review – are measured in this study. With regard 
to environmental factors affecting disclosure (internal factors); there has been 
progress in the extent of literature that looks at the level of T&D associated with 
special corporate characteristics. This study is to be tested based on six main 
hypotheses: H4 “Companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market provide more T&D in 
their annual reports than companies not listed”, H5 “Public financial companies 
provide more transparency and disclosure in their annual reports than private 
“individual” companies”, H6 “Companies with greater total assets provide more 
transparency and disclosure in their annual reports than those with fewer total assets”, 
H7 “Older financial companies provide more transparency and disclosure in their 
annual reports than younger companies”, H8 “The Banking sector provides more T&D 
in their annual reports than the insurance sector”, and H9 “Companies that have audit 
peer review are more likely to provide greater transparency and disclosure information 
in their annual reports than companies that do not have audit peer review”. 
       Thirdly, the study examines the relationship between T&D practices and financial 
performance as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA.  This chapter looks at some of 
the work done in the areas of CG specific T&D and company performance. Thus, this 
study sets hypotheses H10 “There is a relationship between T&D practices, and 
financial performance”, and H11 “There is a variable of T&D practices that has most 
impact on company financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE, and ROA”
.  
      In the next chapter, the research design will be set out. Specifically, it will 
describe the research methodology used, how the sample and data were collected, 
wording and layout of methodology, type and format, and validity and reliability.  
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Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the research hypotheses for this study were developed based 
on the literature review (see Chapter 4) and the environment in Libya. The main aim 
in this chapter is to explain the research methodology design to test the hypotheses 
and sub-hypotheses developed for this research. This chapter also outlines the 
research philosophy adopted for this research study. The data was collected by two 
methods: S&P T&D index, and a questionnaire. Thus, the methods and procedures are 
divided into two parts: a) S&P T&D index; b) the questionnaire. The secondary data 
was collected from literature review using the S&P T&D. The company 
characteristics were collected from the annual reports and questionnaire (part two). 
While data of company financial performance was collected from annual reports. 
      The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 provides a reminder of 
the study aim and objectives; section 5.3 outlines the philosophy underpinning the 
methodology used in this study and the choice of method to measure level of T&D in 
Libyan financial companies; section 5.4 reviews the research population and period of 
time for data collection; section 5.5 presents the S&P T&D index design, content and 
measures, data collection, validity and reliability, administration and analysis; section 
5.6 presents measurements of the company characteristics; section 5.7 presents the 
questionnaire design, content and measures, data collection, validity and reliability, 
administration and data analysis; section 5.8 provides company financial performance; 
section 5.9 describes the ethics and confidentiality; and section 6.10 gives the 
summary and conclusion of this chapter.  
5.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the main aim of this research is to investigate the 
levels of T&D in Libyan financial companies, identify the effect of company 
characteristics on T&D, and explore their relationship with company financial 
performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA). This general aim has been divided into six 
objectives, which are:  
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1- To assess the level of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies 
during the years 2005 to 2008 by three levels: overall transparency and disclosure, 
three categories, and twelve subcategories in their annual reports. 
2- To compare the level of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies 
with those in other countries (developed and developing).   
3- To assess whether there are variations between companies in transparency and 
disclosure practices in their annual reports. 
4-  To assess the extent to which transparency and disclosure is associated with listed 
status, ownership, size and age, type of industry and audit peer review in Libyan 
financial companies during the years 2005 to 2008 on three levels: overall 
transparency and disclosure, according to three categories, and according to twelve 
subcategories, in their annual reports. 
5- To determine the relationship between transparency and disclosure practices, and 
company financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA). 
6- To find which variable of transparency and disclosure practices has the most 
impact on company financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA).  
     To meet the above objectives of the study the framework of the study has been 
adopted as given in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1 depicts that the framework is divided into 
three parts. The main part transparency and disclosure is divided into two sections. 
The first section is S&P T&D to meet first, second, and third objectives in this study. 
The second part is company characteristics with the first section in the first part S&P 
T&D to achieve objective four in this study. The second section in the first part is 
combined T&D with the third part financial performance to meet objectives five and 
six in this study. 
Figure  5.1 Framework of this Study 
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      Although there are many variables which have been found in the literature of CG, 
only the following variables are included in this framework. Firstly, six variables of 
company characteristics possible effect on T&D: listing statute, ownership structure, 
company size, age of company, industry type, and audit peer review. Secondly three 
variables of financial performance might have a relationship with fourteen variables of 
overall T&D: ROCE, ROE, and ROA.  
      Therefore, S&P T&D index design will be discussed in section 5.5.Variables of 
company characteristics will be discussed in section 5.6. Questionnaire design will be 
discussed in section 5.7. Company financial performance variables will be discussed 
in section 5.8.  
5.3 Philosophy of Research 
Research methodology is determined by the epistemological and ontological position 
of the researcher, called the research philosophy. The views of the researcher about 
the nature of reality that can be applied to the phenomenon (ontology) have different 
suppositions that play a very important role in the researcher’s knowledge about the 
phenomenon (epistemology). Eventually, obtaining the knowledge has significant 
effects on the research, its methodology, and the methods applied for data collection 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007; Ryan, Scapens, & Theobald, 2002). 
      Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (2002) and Collis and Hussey (2003) point out 
that the most important philosophies or paradigms that the research design can be 
derived from are positivism and phenomenology. The positivistic paradigm involves 
the quantitative, objective, scientific, experimentalist and traditionalist approach, 
while phenomenology refers to the qualitative, subjectivist, humanistic, interpretive 
and social constructionist approach. 
       Different research methodologies and approaches are depicted in Figure 5.2. The 
research methodologies framework has shown the philosophies of research, 
approaches, strategies, choices, time horizons, and techniques and procedures. In 
answering the questions, the research uses part of the research methodology 
framework encapsulated in the “Research Onion” which is shown in Figure 5.2 below. 
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Figure 5.2 The Research ‘Onion’ 
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2007, p. 102) 
      Saunders et al.’s (2007, p. 102) onion model was used as the methodological 
model/design for this study. Subsequently, it was considered by the researcher that the 
positivistic philosophy and deductive approach would be suitable for this study (for 
details see Section 5.3.2). Therefore, the researcher in this study adopted the 
positivism research philosophy, and S&P T&D Index, and a questionnaire was 
designed to collect data from the participants.  
5.3.1 Positivism 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2002, p. 57) the positivistic (quantitative) 
paradigm, unlike the interpretive paradigm, is based on the key idea that “the social 
world exists externally, and its properties should be measured through objective 
methods”, instead of measuring them by deducing subjectively “through sensation, 
reflection or intuition”. In studying the social phenomena within the positivistic 
paradigm, the reality is seen as objective and external. Therefore those who accept this 
approach are more concerned with finding the causes of social phenomena than with 
the subjective state of individuals. They also perceive legislation as a pivotal 
explanatory element of social phenomena, able to predict their occurrence and, thus, 
making it possible to control these. This research design is a positivistic paradigm 
because it involves the quantitative. 
      This study adopts the survey method of research. A number of factors informed 
the decision to adopt this method. In the first place the method makes possible the 
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maintenance of consistency with the research philosophy that has been adopted, as 
well as the ability to attain the research objectives in the form of generalisation, and 
identification of the associations that exist between different research variables. It also 
enables a multivariate analysis to be conducted (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Collis & 
Hussey, 2009; Oppenheim, 2001; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). In the second 
instance, the survey research method affords the opportunity to the researcher to 
analyse a relatively large amount of data. The third reason is to do with the widely 
shared belief that the method has been employed as the prime data collection 
instrument, especially in CG in general and T&D issues in particular (e.g., Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 2012; Aksu & Kosedag, 2006; Balic & Bradley, 2010; Ben Othman, 2012; 
Chen, et al., 2007; Chi, 2009; Godfred & Zangina, 2009; Hemrit & Arab, 2011; 
Khanna, et al., 2004; Murgu, 2009; Patel, et al., 2002; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, 
& Stapleton, 2012; Subramanian & Reddy, 2010; Verriest, et al., 2012; Younas, 
Siddiqi, ur Rehman, & Mehmood, 2011). Finally, this method is necessary as a result 
of the limited time that is available to the researcher. In like manner, an index and 
questionnaire were thus considered to be the most appropriate methods in the process 
of data collection for the study. Notwithstanding its suitability to the present study, the 
positivistic paradigm is usually criticised for a number of flaws. These include: 
a.) They are not very effective in understanding processes or the significance that 
people attach to actions. 
b.) They are not very helpful in generating theories.  
5.3.2 Research Design 
Research design is an important choice and has a major role to play on the whole 
research. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe (2002) Collis and Hussey (2003) and 
Creswell (2003) explain that a researcher must determine the research design at an early 
stage of the research, as it has a central role to play on research activities and has 
significant effects on the whole research process. 
      From the research onion as shown in section 5.3, the following sections related to 
research onion are the issues that are relevant to this research: a) positivism b) 
deductive (see Figure 5.2). 
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      Saunders et al. (2009) explain that the design of research is determined by the extent 
to which the researcher is clear about theory at the beginning of the research, to use 
either the deductive or inductive approach. The deductive approach involves developing 
a theory and hypothesis by designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis. On the 
other hand, with the inductive approach, the researcher would not use any existing 
theory, but collect data and develop theory as a result of his/her data analysis. In 
addition each of these research approaches is linked to the different research 
philosophies or paradigms, where the deductive approach is related more to positivism 
and the inductive approach is interpretive or the phenomenological paradigm. 
Therefore, according to Saunders et al. (2009, p. 160) “research design focuses upon 
turning a research question and objectives into a research project. It considers research 
strategies, choices and time horizons”. 
      According to(Marston & Shrives, 1991, p. 199) “there are four distinct levels of 
measurement. The nominal or classificatory scale, the ordinal or ranking scale, the 
interval scale and the ratio scale”. This study employs S&P T&D scores to find level of 
T&D by ranking scale in Libyan financial companies. S&P T&D scores are quantitative 
in nature rather than qualitative or evaluative (Lee, 2007). S&P T&D scores measure 
whether a particular governance mechanism and financial statement items are disclosed; 
they are not assessing the quality of the T&D itself. The S&P scores form, for that 
reason, a quantitative evaluation of the T&D practices of the corporation. They are not a 
qualitative pointer of the rate of that information (Khanna, et al., 2004).  
       Marston & Shrives (1991) argue that a validity problem arises because usually no 
specific index is preferred by researchers. Majority of the researchers tend to employ 
the use of indices to achieve their personal goals. Abdullah (2007) report that, using the 
index provides some evidence that ‘good’ CG is associated with better company 
performance. There could be some caveats to these studies. There is some ambiguity 
about what the index is proxy for CG or probability of takeover. Another problem is 
potential survivorship bias. In addition, the construction of the index might be 
influenced by known company performance introducing bias into the results. For 
example, some companies elect for inclusion in the database so that a ‘self-selection’ 
bias is possible. In addition, time specificity might also be a problem. Also, using the 
annual reports as data source does not reveal all the information required for rating CG 
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(Javid & Iqbal, 2011). For the above reasons this study employed a questionnaire 
consistent with the literature review and the requirements of the Libya environment to 
determine the relationship between T&D and financial performance.    
This study is an explanatory research, deductive in nature, in which closed ended 
questions are used.  
Figure  5.3 Show the research methodology that has been followed to conduct the 
study: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Research Population 
The banks and insurances sector play an important role in developing the stock 
market. Demirgiic-Kunt and Levine (1996) show that across countries the level of 
stock market development is highly correlated with the development of banks, 
nonbank financial corporations, and insurance companies and private pension funds. 
This study investigates T&D practices in Libyan financial companies.  
      This study has chosen financial companies for specific reasons. First, the 
importance of financial companies is considered because of their initial sales of shares 
in the stock market. Second, financial companies tend to be more vulnerable to 
financial crises. Third, when the reform of the financial sector is carried out it 
ultimately affects or leads to reform in other sectors. Fourth, the differences between 
the sectors could lead to misleading results and thus the financial sector was chosen to 
make the comparison between the two types of financial industry (banking and 
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insurance). Fifth, one of the objectives of the study is to assess the extent to which 
T&D is determined by listing in LSM. Until the period of data collection, of the 
companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market, eight out of ten were finance companies 
listed in LSM (80%), one cement company, and one LSM Company. Sixth, the 
historical Libyan culture of CG is poor, especially in non-financial companies, which 
may have misleading results. Seventh, Libya is currently in transition from the public 
sector to the private sector, and most state-owned enterprises, except the financial 
sector, oil and gas sector and strategic industries are going through a re-evaluation for 
the purpose of privatization, and hence the difficulty in obtaining annual reports from 
companies on this topic. 
      The sample includes all listed financial companies in Libya (banks and insurance) 
whose main activity had not commenced by the beginning of 2008. This is based on 
the list of Libyan companies provided by the department of Libyan companies at the 
Ministry of Economy and using the established company as a criterion 
30companies(21 banks and 9 insurance).Only 27 companies were found to meet this 
criterion, and  excluded three companies two insurance and one bank because they 
were not active until 2009.  
       The reason for selecting these companies is as follows: 
• The data collection period was from November 2009 to January 2010, using data 
available from the annual report of 2008. 
• This research used annual reports from 2005 to 2008, because although in June 
2006 the Libyan Stock Market was established it actually started working in 2007. 
This research used the 2005 annual reports a year before the establishment of LSM. 
5.5 Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Design 
The instrument of research used in measuring the level of information reported in a 
certain vehicle of disclosure by a certain entity based on specific items of information 
is referred to as disclosure index (Hassan & Marston, 2010). This section reviews the 
first method measuring T&D practices in annual report by using the S&P index. The 
S&P T&D index considering the research objectives (1, 2, 3 and 4), empirical 
questions and test hypotheses (from 1 to 9) and framework in this study (see Section 
5.2 above). Appendix 5 shows the review studies using S&P T&D index. The study’s 
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method was developed from S&P’s earlier labour in the region of a CG score (Patel, 
et al., 2002). In the S&P methodology greater T&D are connected, covering greater 
amounts of information from a checklist of items defined by S&P as being useful to 
decision makers (Choi & Meek, 2008). 
According to Patel et al. (2002): 
The agency problem in CG can be mitigated in practice in several ways:  by a timely and 
adequate disclosure of financial information by a vigilant board of directors and possibly 
by a transparent ownership clarifying the conflict of interests in allowing majority 
shareholders or large creditors to manage the company. S&P T&D has introduced a 
methodology to assess the level of T&D along these three dimensions.  
      The S&P index has been adopted in this study. The S&P T&D index covers a set 
of huge public corporations selected by S&P. In this study data were collected by 
using S&P T&D index; the S&P T&D covered both developed and developing 
countries. Although there are two major indices using in developed and developing 
countries (S&P and Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia), it is considered by the 
researcher that S&P index is more suitable for the present study. The fundamental 
difference between the two indices is that whereas the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
index comprises 57 parameters of T&Ds, the S&P index consists of 98 T&D 
parameters. Hence, the S&P index provides an adequate basis on which the level of 
T&Ds within a given economy can be determined. In addition the advantage with 
S&P index is that it covers not just financial transparency and information disclosures, 
but also the disclosures related to ownership rights and board practices. Furthermore, 
Direct comparison with previous works is possible by way of employing the use of 
existing index (Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
      The literature review showed that the S&P T&D index had not been used in the 
past, and it is believed that the current research project will be the first one in Libya 
that has used the S&P T&D index. 
5.5.1 Design, Wording and Layout 
The S&P T&D study was designed to help investors to better understand differences 
in the level of reporting across markets, sectors and capitalisation (Tsamenyi, 
Enninful-Adu, & Onumah, 2007). The organisation S&P introduced their T&D index 
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in 2002. S&P developed their study of T&D as the branch of a proposal to afford CG 
information and analytical services to stock market participants. 
S&P has introduced a method to measure the extent of T&D along these three 
dimensions: overall T&D; three categories; and twelve subcategories.  
The method, as described briefly in Table 5.1, is to explore the company’s annual 
reports for the T&D attributes. The T&D study classified into three broad categories in 
Table 5.1 as follows: 
Table  5.1 S&P Items 
Statement questions 
Standard & Poor (three categories and divided into twelve subcategories) 98 / 98 
Ownership structure and investor rights (included three subcategories) 28 / 98 
Financial transparency and information disclosure (included five  subcategories) 35 / 98 
Board and management structure and process (included four subcategories) 35 / 98 
5.5.2 Type and Format 
S&P T&D closed-ended questions are used and answers were written in binary Y/N 
form. The type of question is associated with the paradigm adopted in the research, 
with closed-ended questions in a positivistic research approach (see Appendix 1).   
      The study involved measurement/assessment of 98 disclosure attributes that are 
divided into three categories. Firstly, ownership structure and investor rights (28 
attributes), namely three subcategories: transparency of ownership (11 questions); 
concentration of ownership (8 questions); and voting and shareholder meeting 
procedures (9 questions). Secondly, financial transparency and information disclosure 
(35 attributes) comprise five subcategories: business focus (15 questions); accounting 
policy review (9 questions); accounting policy details (3 questions); related party 
structure and transactions (4 questions); and information on auditors (4 questions). 
Thirdly, board and management structure and process (35 attributes) comprise four 
subcategories: board structure and composition (8 questions); role of the board (12 
questions); director training and compensation (6 questions); and executive 
compensation and evaluation (9 questions). These three categories represent domains 
of disclosure that S&P routinely assesses as part of their own CG scoring process 
(Patel & Dallas, 2002). A T&D score is developed for all corporations from an 
objective and binary assessment of the number of traits in the annual report (Patel & 
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Dallas, 2002). Jiamsagul (2007) reports that S&P T&D is one of the most popular 
indexes which investors use for evaluating a company's CG. Its un-weighted score is 
more appropriate than the weighted score as it is less subjective and easier for a user's 
to interpret. The un-weighted score assumes that each question is equally important. 
This can obviate the necessity of making judgment as the relative importance of each 
question. Therefore, previous studies shows that the equal weighting system is 
superior to the different weighing systems (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975). 
5.5.3 Contents and Measures 
The T&D index can be useful as a financial performance yardstick in a country such 
as Libya. The measure for equity and fixed income investors, analysts, brokers, and 
regulators to determine the disclosure practices of public companies. Companies in 
Libya with more transparent disclosure practices enable shareholders, creditors and 
other interested parties to more effectively monitor the actions of management and the 
operating and financial performance of the company. 
      These rankings tend to provide an objective quantitative assessment of corporate 
disclosure practices. However the rankings are expected to help investors better 
understand differences in the level of reporting across markets, sectors and 
capitalization. For instance in Libya the T&D index could be useful by way of 
providing additional data point for the enhancement of investor scrutiny and 
assessment and comparison of investment risks across markets. 
      There is a growing body of evidence that supports the view that high standards of 
T&D can have a material impact on the cost of capital. Several researchers and 
practitioners agree that there is a link between CG and a company’s financial 
performance. For a country like Libya T&D index can provide a meaningful 
monitoring tool for local regulators and multilateral institutions. The results yield 
interesting conclusions both at the individual company level and also in looking at 
patterns of disclosure among countries on a global basis. 
      Moreover disclosure index cannot control for the quality of accounting practices 
or fraudulent accounting data. Marston and Shrives (1991, p. 195) pointed out that 
calculating an index score for a particular company can give a measure of the extent 
of disclosure but that this will not necessarily reveal the quality of disclosure. 
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      S&P analyses the three parts and their twelve sub sub-categories to assess the T&D 
standards of individual corporations are as follows:  
Table  5.2 S&P’s Transparency and Disclosure 
Variables Measurement Qs 
Total T&D Sum of T&D in ownership structure and investor rights, financial 
transparency & information disclosure, and T&D in board and management 
structure and process (S&P T&D questions relating to information of 
ownership structure and rights, financial information, and board and 
management). 
98 
Ownership structure 
and investors rights 
Sum of transparency of ownership, concentration of ownership, and voting 
and shareholder meeting procedures (S&P T&D questions focusing on 
transparency of ownership structure, concentration, and shareholder 
meetings). 
28/
98 
Transparency of 
ownership 
S&P T&D questions relating to share classes, shareholder types, and voting 
rights. 
11/ 
28 
Concentration of 
ownership 
S&P T&D questions focusing on top or large shareholders and cross-
ownership. 
8/ 
28 
Voting & shareholder 
meeting procedures 
S&P T&D questions focusing on issues regarding meetings of shareholders 
and so on. 
9/ 
28 
Financial transparency 
and information 
disclosure 
Sum of (financial) business focus, accounting policy review, accounting 
policy details, related-party structure and transaction, and information on 
auditors (S&P T&D questions about business focus, accounting policy 
review and details, related party transactions, and auditors). 
35/ 
98 
Business focus S&P T&D questions dealing with strategy, market analysis, efficiency 
indicators, and forward-looking information. 
15/ 
35 
Accounting policy 
review 
S&P T&D questions relating to frequency of financial reports, discussion of 
accounting policies and procedures, and so on. 
9/ 
35 
Accounting policy 
details 
S&P T&D questions focusing on issues regarding assets valuation, 
depreciation, and consolidation policies. 
3/ 
35 
Related party structure 
& transactions 
S&P T&D questions dealing with the related party structure and 
transactions. 
4/ 
35 
Information on 
auditors 
S&P T&D questions regarding name of audit company, duplication of audit 
reports, as well as audit and non- audit fees paid. 
4/ 
35 
Board and 
management structure 
and process 
Sum of board structure and composition, role of the board, director training 
and compensation, and the executive compensation and evaluation (S&P 
T&D questions relating to board structure, board role, board training and 
compensation, and executive compensation and evaluation). 
35/ 
98 
Board structure and 
composition 
S&P T&D questions dealing with the identity, tenure and other backgrounds 
of directors. 
8/ 
35 
Role of the board S&P T&D questions regarding the decision rights of the board the make-up 
of committees, and so on. 
12/ 
35 
Director training & 
compensations 
S&P T&D questions regarding the training, ownership interests and 
compensation of directors. 
6/ 
35 
Compensation & 
evaluation of executive 
S&P T&D questions about background, ownership interests and 
compensation of non-director senior managers. 
9/ 
35 
  Source: Patel & Dallas (2002, pp. 19-21) 
 
5.5.4 Data Collecting 
This study use time-series data and quantitative information from listed financial 
companies in Libya. Data were collected from the company annual reports of 
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companies in two industries (bank and insurances), across the study period January 
2005 to December 2008. These data were subjected to a period of one year before 
starting the Libyan Stock Market, and three years with the emergence of them. This 
study used the annual reports of 27 companies, available in this period for financial 
years 2005 to 2008.  
5.5.5 Validity and Reliability 
Once the technique for collecting data is selected; it should always be examined 
critically to assess to what extent it will probably be reliable and valid. The researcher 
has to ensure that the measure that he/she has decided to use is sensibly appropriate. 
In terms of the validity of the survey, two major issues originate: measurement 
validity and reliability. Measurement validity refers to whether the ‘thing’ that is 
purported to be measured actually is being measured, whereas measurement reliability 
refers to how well the construct of interest is measured. Concern here is with stable 
measures and the accuracy of measurement.  
      According to Bryman and Cramer (2001, p. 66) the question of validity draws 
attention to how far a measure really measures the concept that it purports to measure. 
Researchers use this term to describe how well an instrument that is developed can 
measure the particular concept it is supposed to measure. In other words, validity is 
concerned with whether the researchers are measuring the right concept or not 
(Cooper & Emory, 1995).      
       Four types of instrument validity are frequently cited. The first type is construct 
validity. It is the most difficult type of validity to understand, assess and report. It 
shows how well the test instrument scale links up with a set of theoretical assumptions 
about an abstract construct. It is usually assessed by tracking the performance of the 
instrument scale over years in different settings and populations (Litwin, 1995; 
Oppenheim, 2001). The second type is content validity, which is considered as being 
the most important type of validity. It measures the extent to which the measurement 
scale reflects what is assumed to be measured (Shannon & Davenport, 2001). The 
third type of validity is face validity whereby the respondents assess the measurement 
instrument. If the respondents see a measurement instrument as being valid, it can be 
argued that it has face validity (Shannon & Davenport, 2001). Similarly, face validity 
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can be assessed by passing the questionnaire to untrained persons in order to get 
feedback relating to whether the items appear satisfactory to them (Litwin, 1995). The 
fourth type of validity is concurrent validity. It refers to the extent to which a 
measurement scale relates to other measures or ‘gold standard’. It is assessed in terms 
of the extent to which results obtained from this scale are consistent with the results of 
other scales that are designed to measure the same thing or object (Litwin, 1995; 
Oppenheim, 2001; Shannon & Davenport, 2001). A related type of validity is 
predictive validity, which refers to the ability of an instrument scale to predict future 
performance, events, behaviour and attitude (Litwin, 1995; Shannon & Davenport, 
2001).  
      Reliability is a term, which refers to the consistency and dependability of a 
research instrument (Kosaiyakanont, 2011). According to Kidder and Judd (1986, p. 
29), reliability means that if the study was repeated by a different researcher the same 
results would be achieved. Basically, reliability concerns the degree to which a 
measuring procedure produces the same conclusions on frequent tests while validity 
interests the decisive relationship between notion and index. One interpretation of the 
reliability standard is the domestic consistency of an examination. In this sense, 
reliability refers to the degree of accuracy of a measuring device or volume, to ensure 
it is free from error, and thus will yield consistent results (Peterson, 1994). The other 
type of indication of reliability is consistency, which is concerned with whether or not 
the items that make up the scale measuring a concept are consistent; in other words, 
whether or not the respondent’s score on any one item tends to be related to the scores 
on the other items (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
      The most popular test of internal consistency or homogeneity among the items is 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Saunders, et al., 2007; Sekaran, 
2003). Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of squared correlation between observed scores 
and true scores. Put another way, reliability is measured in terms of the ratio of true 
score variance to observed score variance. The theory behind it is that the observed 
score is equal to the true score plus the measurement error. Cronbach’s alpha 
estimates reliability by determining the internal consistency of a test or the average 
correlation of items (variables) within the test. A high score indicates that there is 
similarity (or homogeneity) among the items. The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha can 
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range from 0 (if no variance is consistent) to 1 (if all variance is consistent). The 
recommended minimum acceptable level of reliability for Cronbach’s alpha is 0.60. 
According to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black’s (1998) criterion, the reliability 
should be greater than 0.50. Nunnally’s (1978) report that criterion alpha coefficients 
of 0.5–0.6 are acceptable for exploratory research. According to George and Mallery 
(2003) research conducted on research methodology. They provide a set of rules of 
thumb for Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and have categorised these under the 
following: 
- the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.9 Excellent 
- the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.8 Good 
- the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.7 Acceptable 
- the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.6 Questionable 
- the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient >.5 Poor 
- the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient <.5 Unacceptable 
      Therefore, this study employed Cronbach’s coefficient alpha to assess reliability 
for S&P T&D Index and questionnaires. Furthermore, validity and reliability for S&P 
T&D Index are discussed in the following sections, and validity and reliability for 
questionnaires discussed in subsection 5.7.6. 
5.5.5.1 Validity of S&P T&D Index 
In accordance to the disclosure index, the validity of the scores concerning the 
disclosure refers to whether the research instruments measures the actual level of 
disclosure (Kosaiyakanont, 2011).   S&P T&D index is the most well-known financial 
services company in the world; 1,700 companies within 40 countries have used the 
S&P index and it has the biggest index of 98 items. Chen et al. (2007) argue that S&P 
T&D rankings can supply a good portrayal of disclosure practices of companies, by 
higher T&D rankings that will have better disclosure practices, accompanied by better 
CG practice and lesser asymmetric information risk. S&P T&D has undertaken to 
assess the T&D practices of hundreds of companies throughout the world (Frost, et 
al., 2005). The S&P T&D index was developed from the analysis of the latest annual 
reports, and evaluates the rank of T&D of companies in emerging markets such as 
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Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Africa, as well as developed 
markets such as the US, Western Europe, and developed Asia (Patel & Dallas, 2002). 
These works cover a total period of four years. The study examined in a methodical 
way in which the item of T&D in an annual report was acknowledged only if the item 
was expressed in a clear and easily understood way which was easy to judge. The 
outcome of the examination process was a computer spread sheet which tabulated all 
the result. These results were checked before final scores were arrived at. Although 
the data might have been subjected to collector’s decision, all T&D data were 
collected from annual reports to justify the index. However, in order to ensure the 
consistency of data, each section of the annual report for all companies was read and 
double-checked by the researcher. 
5.5.5.2 Reliability of S&P T&D Index 
This study assesses the internal consistency of S&P T&D measurement scheme with 
Cronbach's coefficient alpha. Cronbach's coefficient alpha assesses the degree to 
which correlation among S&P T&D items is attenuated due to random error. In the 
software used the result indicates that Cronbach's coefficient alpha, for the data from 
four years annual reports 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 were between good and 
excellent (.90, .87, .91 and .91) respectively, demonstrating high level of reliability. 
Thus, coefficients alpha suggest that random measurement error could not reduce the 
power of the empirical test. 
5.5.6 Administration 
The researcher collected the name and address of each bank and insurance company 
from the Department of Control of Banks in the Libyan Central Bank, and the 
Superintendents of Insurance Companies in the Ministry of Economy and Trade, 
respectively, and obtained from them a copy of their annual reports for the years 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2008, by hard copy or electronically or from their website. It should 
furthermore be noted that the annual reports were in Arabic language, and included 
some annual reports in both languages, Arabic and English. 
5.5.7 Statistical Analysis 
This section attempts to provide a descriptive analysis the items on T&D provided by 
the sampled companies. The study is to explore of the T&D policy of Libyan financial 
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companies to explain the different levels of T&D over four years, from 2005 to 2008. 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 15 (SPSS) program for 
statistical analysis was used to analyse the study data. The data was subjected to 
several tests including inferential statistical analysis in particular, means and standard 
deviations of attributes of T&D.   
       The following statistical techniques were used in analysing the data and achieving 
research objectives 1, 2 and 3: One-way ANOVA4, Paired T-Test5, Friedman Test 
Statistics6, and Wilcoxon Signed Rank7were used to find the mean and standard 
deviation of T&D.  
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A T&D index will then be computed by using the following formula for each measure 
(see Appendix 6).Figure 5.4 shows the analysis of S&P T&D data as follows:  
Figure  5.4 Test of Normality Diagram of Statistic Test Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
4One-way ANOVA, that is, whether the different conditions have resulted in significantly different 
scores. Single ANOVA is the parametric method, the test used to know whether the condition 1 is 
significantly different from condition…, etc. 
5The paired t-test is used when comparing the means of two sets of observations from the same 
individuals or from pairs of individuals. 
6The Friedman test is the nonparametric equivalent of a one-sample repeated measures design or a two-
way analysis of variance with one observation per cell. 
7The Wilcoxon test is a non-parametric test that compares two paired groups. It calculates the 
difference between each set of pairs, and analyses that list of differences. 
When the test of normality was Sig. .05 the data is normality, when the test of normality was Sig. < .05 the data is non-normality.  
When, the data normality used ANOVA repeated measure for compared more than pair (four years, from 2005 to 2008). 
  Independent group   Independent group Dependent group Dependent group 
No Yes 
Two groups Two groups Two groups Two groups More two groups More two groups More two groups More two groups 
Non-Parametric 
Method 
Parametric 
Method 
Mann-
Whitney  
Kruskal & 
Willas  Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test  
Friedman 
Test   
T-test ANOVA 
Two-way  
Paired   
T-Test 
ANOVA 
Repeated 
Measure   
Normality  
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5.6 Company Characteristics Variables 
This study, using S&P T&D and six company characteristics variables involved 
considering the fourth research objective, empirical questions and test hypotheses 
(from 4 to 9) and framework in this study (see Section 5.2 above). The company 
characteristics data was collected from companies annual reports. To the best of my 
knowledge, no previous study has examined the effect of corporate characteristics on 
the level of T&D in Libyan companies (see Appendix 4).   
According to Cooke and Wallace (1990), there are three factors affecting disclosure: 
international, external, and internal environmental factors. Internal factors include two 
parts, personal characteristics, and corporate characteristics (see Chapter 3). The study 
measured corporate characteristics. 
      Marston and Shrives (1991) reviewed that first study used the disclosure index by 
Cerf in 1961. They noted that corporate size, listing status, leverage, profitability, and 
size of Audit Company were the most common corporate characteristics examined 
with regard to disclosure level. Appendix 4 showed previous studies use corporate 
characteristics. 
      This study considers six potential explanatory variables grouped for convenience 
into two categories: structural-related variables (company size, ownership structure, 
and company age) and market-related variables (listing status, industry type, and audit 
peer review). The following shows the company characteristics measure in the study: 
5.6.1 Listing in the Libya Stock Market 
The measure of listing company in LSM is considered in this study. There is reason to 
suspect that the extent of disclosure is associated with listing status. When a company 
wishes to have its stock traded, it must first file a listing application. This application 
calls for the inclusion of an extensive amount of information pertaining to the 
company’s affairs. Also, the contents of the original listing application must be 
periodically updated. Cooke’s (1989a) disclosure is very variable where there is a 
significant association between the extent of disclosure and listing status. An effective 
listing company in LSM was used in testing the hypothesis. To test for listing status, 
companies were categorised into LLSM and NLLSM. Table 5.3 shows listing status 
variables as follows: 
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Table  5.3 Listing Status Variables 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Companies LLSM LSM not 
established yet 
3 5 8 
Companies NLLSM 20 20 19 
5.6.2 Company Ownership 
Effective company’ ownership of the companies was used in testing hypotheses. To 
test for ownership, companies were categorised into two groups, public and private 
sector. Table 5.4 shows listing status variables as follows: 
Table  5.4 Company Ownership Variables 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Public companies 14 14 14 14 
Private companies 9 9 11 13 
5.6.3 Company Size 
The measure of size considered in this study is total assets in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2008. The reason for using total assets is that the variable is applicable to all financial 
companies’ annual reports, and total assets is based on historical cost, which is in line 
with International Accounting Standards. The size ‘total assets’ of the company is 
used in this study. To test for size, companies were categorised into three groups, 
small, middle, and large. In this study the three sizes of total assets were categorised 
as follows: small size companies have total assets of 100 million D.L or less; middle 
size companies have total assets of more than 100 million D.L to 500 million D.L; and 
large size companies have total assets more than 500 million D.L. Table 5.5 shows 
companies size variables as follows: 
Table  5.5 Company Size Variables 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Small companies  10 9 9 10 
Middle companies  5 5 7 8 
Large companies  8 9 9 9 
5.6.4 Company Age 
The actual listing age of the companies was used in testing the hypotheses. However, 
Libya does not have a long history in the financial sector (see Chapter 2). It is 
important to consider these groups in the context of the Libyan environment rather 
than the general literature T&D. In the current study, the age of companies was 
categorised into three groups as follows: the younger companies were age 10 years or 
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less; the medium companies were more than 10 to 25 years old; and older companies 
were more than 25 years old. The company age variable is measured on a yearly basis 
since the beginning of the company's activity to the financial year ending in 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2008. Table 5.6 shows companies age variables as follows: 
Table  5.6 Company Age Variables 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Younger companies  9 8 9 10 
Medium companies  5 6 7 8 
Older companies  9 9 9 9 
5.6.5 Industry Type 
The classification of Libyan financial listed companies at the time the research was 
conducted comprised three groups: bank, insurance and financial services companies. 
However, in this study, financial services companies will not be considered, because 
all of them started after the beginning of 2008 and were very small limited companies. 
Two industry groups are to be tested under the industry membership hypothesis (bank 
and insurance), to discover factors that influence the corporate reporting culture of 
companies. Table 5.7 shows industry type variables as follows: 
Table  5.7 Industry Type Variables 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bank companies 18 18 19 20 
Insurance companies 5 5 6 7 
5.6.6 Audit Peer Review 
The companies were categorized into two groups; a) companies that had gone through 
the audit peer review process and b) companies that had not gone through the audit 
peer review process. Table 5.8 shows audit peer review variables as follows: 
Table  5.8 Audit Peer Review Variables 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Companies have  14 14 15 16 
Companies not have  9 9 10 11 
 
       The next section will elaborate on the questionnaire design and format, 
questionnaire piloting, questionnaire contents and measures. 
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5.7 Questionnaire Design 
This section reviews the second method measuring all T&D practices by using the 
questionnaire in all different types of company disclosure that may exist e.g., annual 
report, website, bulletins, periodicals, document and other methods. The designing of 
the questionnaire entirely depended on the T&D practices in Libya and on the related 
literature T&D. The design of a questionnaire involved considering the research 
objectives, empirical questions and test hypotheses (10 and 11) and framework in this 
study (see Section 5.2 above). 
      The results of the questionnaire were used to determine the relationship between 
T&D and companies’ financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA) which were 
collected from the annual report (see Section 5.8 below).  
The questionnaire in this study was designed with the aim of eliciting data to 
understand and evaluate the current T&D in Libyan companies. The questionnaire in 
this study included 91 questions in three parts: part one (four questions) about the 
respondent; part two, information about the company (six questions, e.g., relationship 
between the company and the Libyan Stock Market; type of industry; and company 
shareholding); and part three with 14 sections (81 questions, e.g., the company’s 
public financial statements to enable appropriate monitoring to take place, and to 
provide the basis to value securities; disclosure of the company’s commercial 
objectives; and information when the chairman and members of the board purchase or 
sell shares in the company; disclosure of the company’s CG practices; adoption of a 
high quality accounting standard and internationally recognised standards that serve to 
improve transparency; inclusion of the company’s independent audit committee of the 
board) (see Appendix 2). 
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      The T&D study by questionnaire classified into fourteen broad sections in Table 
5.9as follows: 
Table  5.9 The Questionnaire Design 
 
      In this study, the questionnaire covered questions that were not asked in the index, 
but some of these questions were important in the Libyan context. The Libyan stock 
market adopted the OECD principles 2004, and the variables included in the 
principles were also included in the questionnaire.  
 The S&P index includes four questions about T&D of the top 1, 3, 5, and 10 
shareholders and three questions about shareholders owning more than 3%, 5% and 
10%, while the questionnaire asked about disclosures of shareholders owning of 
minimum 5% total shares in accordance with the provisions of the Libyan 
Commercial Law.  
 The S&P index includes questions about provision of efficiency indicators ROA 
and ROE, while the relations between 14 variables in the questionnaire with ROCE, 
ROE and ROA were investigated.  
 The S&P index includes three questions on disclosures of balance sheets, income 
statement and cash flow, while one question in the questionnaire (using a tick box) 
Section Disclosure Variables Qs 
Part three Questionnaire (fourteen sub-categories) 81 / 81 
1 The financial and operating results of the company 9 / 81 
2 Company objectives  5/ 81 
3 Major share ownership and voting right  9/ 81 
4 Board members, key executive and their remuneration 10  / 81 
5 Related party transactions 5/ 81 
6 Material foreseeable risk factors  6/ 81 
7 Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders  7/ 81 
8 Governance structures and policies  7/ 81 
9 Preparation of  information audit and disclose according to high 
standards of accounting, disclosure and audit 3/ 81 
10 External audit and monitoring 4  / 81 
11 External audit and audit committee role 6  / 81 
12 External  auditors accountable  to shareholders, and external auditors 
owe a duty of due professional care 3/ 81 
13 Channels for dissemination of information allowing for fair, timely, 
and cost efficient access to information by user 2/ 81 
14 Corporate governance framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis 5/ 81 
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asked whether the company had annual reports as follows: Income statement; Balance 
sheet; Dividend data; Cash flow statement; Chairman’s Report; CEO statement; 
Display segmental data; Shareholders’ equity statement; Detection of significant 
accounting policies; Environmental policies disclosed; Employee information; Audit 
report; and Quarterly financial statement.  
 The questionnaire asked for disclosure of company objectives including: structure 
and activities of enterprises; implementing commercial objectives; business ethics; 
policies and performance with respect to the environment; and policies relating to 
communities. It is evident that these items were not included in the index. 
 The questionnaire asked for disclosure of whether the external auditor’s review was 
limited to a quarterly review, this question was also not asked in the index. 
 The questionnaire asked whether the chair of the board is an executive director, this 
information is not present in the index. 
 The questionnaire asked whether the company had introduced provisions of 
disclosure including periodic disclosure, continuous and material development 
reporting; these provisions were not available in the index, therefore it was asked in 
the questionnaire. 
 The questionnaire asked whether the company produces reports on time for all 
shareholders without prejudice to a party but this was not included in the index. 
 The questionnaire asked whether the company gives full disclosure about conflicts 
of interests including: how the company deals with the conflicts of interests; whether 
it provides information for investors to judge risk including potential bias in the 
analysis, advice and available information, and when mandating certain approaches to 
the analysis and consulting; how the entity structures the incentives of its employees 
in order to eliminate potential conflicts of interest, while all these  issues related to 
conflicts and interests were not addressed in the index.  
 The questionnaire asked about discloses of material risks including: whether risk 
management policies exist; any risks that are specific to the industry and geographical 
areas in which the company operates; financial market risks; risk related to derivatives 
and off-balance sheet transactions; and risks related to environmental liabilities. No 
questions were asked about risk in the index. 
165 
 
  The questionnaire asked about discloses of the relationship between the 
management and stakeholders (employees, retention rates of employees, employee 
share ownership plans, creditors, suppliers, local communities, and human resources,) 
that may materially affect the performance of the company, while management and 
stakeholders were not identified in the index. 
5.7.1 Design, Wording and Layout 
Consequently, several drafts were written and pre-tested before designing the first 
version of the questionnaire, to increase measures of reliability and validity and 
confirm that the question wording is clear and understood by the participants. The 
recommendations, as discussed earlier, were also considered. For the purpose of this, 
the University of Huddersfield’s logo was printed on the cover sheet of the 
questionnaire to encourage the participants, and showing the authenticity of the 
research that it is intended for academic purposes. Furthermore, anonymity and 
confidentiality of the participants was guaranteed by stating in the cover sheet that 
participants’ identity will be kept confidential. In order to ensure their informed 
consent and enhance response rate, participants were informed about the purpose of 
the study and the questionnaire. Both were designed in very simple and clear language 
for the convenience of the participants respectively. Finally the questionnaire was pre-
tested on the students in the Business Schools, academics professionals working in the 
area of CG at Tripoli University, and control section in the Control Department in the 
LSM; the department of Supervision of Banks in the Libyan Central Bank; the Control 
Authority Insurance Companies in the Libyan Ministry of Economy and Trade; the 
Libyan Union of Accountants and Auditors to reduce ambiguities and 
misunderstanding of the questions (see Subsection 3.7.3 and 5.7.6 below). 
5.7.2 Type and Format 
The type of questionnaire differs according to the method of its distribution; on-line 
questionnaire, post/mail questionnaire; telephone questionnaire, and individual 
distribution/self-administered questionnaire; each has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Considering each type of questionnaire, and the nature of the research 
population, a self-administered questionnaire was chosen as it was considered as the 
most suitable to meet the objectives 5 and 6 of this research.  
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      According to Oppenheim (1992), there are two types of questions to be used in 
constructing a questionnaire; open and closed questions. An open question is not 
followed by any kind of choice, and the answers have to be recorded fully, whereas 
closed question offer the respondents a choice of alternative replies to choose from.       
The choice of open or closed questions is related to the aim of the research. In 
exploratory research, researchers generally use open questions as they give as much 
information as possible (Van Der, Wilhelmus, & Neil, 2004). On the other hand, in 
analytical or explanatory research, closed questions are often used. In addition, the 
type of questions used is associated with the paradigm adopted in the research, with 
closed questions used in a positivistic research approach (Collis & Hussey, 2003). 
       According to Saunders et al. (2007) there are six types of closed questions: 
1. List question: this offers the respondent a list of responses to choose from. 
2. Category question: this is designed in a way where each respondent’s answer fits 
only one category. 
3. Ranking question: this asks the respondent to place things in rank order to find out 
their relative importance to the respondent. 
4. Rating question: this is often used to collect opinions; they most frequently use 
Likert-style rating, usually on a four, five, six, or seven-point rating scale. 
5. Quantity question: in which the respondent is asked to provide a number, giving the 
amount of characteristics on behaviour or attribute. 
6. Grid question: this enables the respondent to record two or more similar questions 
at the same time. 
      To meet the research objectives, three types of closed questions were used. First, 
almost all question types used were rating questions in the form of Likert-scale (five-
point), which is the most commonly used type, as it is quicker to answer, does not 
require much space, is easy to understand, and enables a variety of statistical 
techniques to be used (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2002; Oppenheim, 1992; Saunders, et 
al., 2007; Sekaran, 2003). Elmore and Beggs (1975) indicate that a five-point scale is 
just as good as any, and that an increase from five to seven or nine points on a rating 
scale does not improve the reliability of the ratings.  
      Thus, first a five-point Likert scale was used throughout the questionnaire to 
measure  the main research variables in questions Section 1-2, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
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13, and 14. Participants were asked to tick one of five choices on a sliding scale of 
agreement. Questions by Likert-type scale are each  awarded a score of ‘5’ if they 
appear to have strongly agreed, ‘4’ if they appear to have agreed, ‘3’ if they appear 
neutral, ‘2’ if they appear to disagree, ‘1’ if they appear to strongly disagree.  
Second, some questions used were Y-N questions, through the questionnaire to 
measure the main research variables in questions Section 4, 11, and 12, participants 
were asked to tick one of Y or N of agreement. Question with Yes or No answer are 
‘1’ if Yes and ‘0’ if No.  
      Finally, questions by tick box were used in Section 1.1, participants were asked to 
tick box if they agree. Questions by tick box have a score of ‘1’ if they appear to have 
disclosed the concerned issue and ‘0’ otherwise (see Appendix 2).   
5.7.3 Interpretation and Piloting 
To confirm the interpretation and the translation of the questionnaire from English to 
Arabic language, at first 15 questionnaires were disseminated/ distributed to Libyan 
PhD students in the business school at the University of Huddersfield and other 
universities in the UK. Some minor modifications to satisfy the expected academics’ 
comments were made before translation of the questionnaire. Second, both versions of 
the questionnaires were distributed to an Arabic language expert for corrections, 
reviewer accuracy language and translation (English and Arabic) and then compared 
to check the accuracy of language and translation. Then the final version of the 
questionnaire was given to the experts to review the questions of the questionnaires 
(see Subsection 5.7.6.1 below).      
5.7.4 Contents and Measures 
The final draft of the questionnaire (see Appendix 2) consists of three parts: Part 1 to 
obtain information regarding respondent; part 2 information about the companies (see 
section 5.7 above); and part 3 with 14 sections to obtain information regarding overall 
T&D. The measures of the questionnaire regarding the T&D are shown in Table 5.10 
as follows:   
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Table  5.10 Contents and Measures: Questionnaire 
Disclosure Variables Measurement Qs 
The financial and 
operating results of the 
company (FORC) 
Questions about financial statements to enable appropriate 
monitoring to take place and  to provide the basis to value 
securities, quality internationally recognised standards, 
disclose information about contingent liabilities, off-balance 
sheet transactions,  and  a section devoted to CG principles and 
implementations 
9/ 
81 
Company objectives 
(CO) 
Questions about structure and activities of enterprises, 
commercial objectives, business ethics, corporate policies and 
performance, policies relating to society   
5/ 
81 
Major share ownership 
and voting right 
(MSOVR) 
Questions about the rights of investors related to the ownership 
structure of the enterprise, right vis-à-vis, ownership data, 
major shareholders, blocks of shares, special voting rights, 
shareholder agreements,  shareholding relationships and cross 
guarantees, and significant change in ownership. 
9/ 
81 
Board members, key 
executive and their 
remuneration(BMKER) 
Questions about combining the functions the chair and CEO, 
and members of the board, membership of other board, share 
ownership, independent member, remuneration, how select, 
and   executive director’s remuneration.  
10/ 
81 
Related party 
transactions(RPT) 
Questions regarding material related party transactions to the 
market, either individually, executed at arm’s-length, normal 
market terms, owners of minimum 5% total shares, and 
curriculum vitae at the chair and members of the board of 
directors and executive managers. 
5/ 
81 
Material foreseeable risk 
factors (MFRF) 
Questions related to risk management, risk industry, risk 
geographical areas financial market risks, risk to derivatives 
and off-balance sheet transactions, and risk environmental 
liabilities.  
6/ 
81 
Material issues regarding 
employees and other 
stakeholders (MIRES) 
Questions related to the management and employees, 
information about the relationship between the management 
and creditors and suppliers and local communities that may 
affect materially the company’s performance and information 
about human resource development and training, employees 
communicating and share ownership plans.  
7/ 
81 
Governance structures 
and policies (GSP) 
Questions related to CG practices, proposal and perceptions, 
structure, ensure a transparency of company governance 
structure, division of authority between shareholders, 
management and board members, shareholders meeting votes, 
and information which are not consistent with the standards of 
CG. 
7/ 
81 
Preparation of  
information audit and 
disclosed according to 
high standard of 
accounting, disclosure 
and audit(PIAD) 
Questions related to the reliability of reporting, and quality of 
accounting standards to improve the transparency  and  
comparability of financial reporting  
3/ 
81 
External audit and 
monitoring (EAM) 
Questions related to external audit and internal control 
environment and T&D, role of CG in monitoring an auditor’s 
independence, and role and functions audit committee. 
4/ 
81 
External audit and audit Questions about external auditor certifying the financial 6/ 
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committee role (EAACR) statements prepared and presented and external auditor’s 
review of the   quarterly financial report. 
81 
External  auditors 
accountable  to 
shareholders (EAAS) 
Questions related to audit committee and the external auditor’s 
duty, external auditor and shareholders’ meeting accountable, 
and peer review when audited by the external auditor. 
3/ 
81 
Channels for 
dissemination 
information allow for 
fair, timely, and cost 
efficient access to 
information by user 
(CDI) 
Questions related to periodic disclosure, continuous or current 
disclosure, and reports on time.  
2/ 
81 
Corporate governance 
framework, 
complemented by 
effective approach that 
addresses and promotes 
the provision of 
analysis(CGF) 
Questions related to conflict of interests, CG practices, and 
analysis. 
5/ 
81 
 
5.7.5 Data Collecting 
The main advantages of a self-completion questionnaire are that it may ensure a high 
response rate, give the benefits of a degree of personal contact, target very precisely 
the most appropriate sample and overcome a sample bias problem if any exists 
(Oppenheim, 1992; Collis and Hussey, 2003). According to Sekaran (2003) and 
Saunders et al. (2009), when using the self-administered questionnaire, there is the 
opportunity to introduce the research topic, to motivate the respondents to give their 
answer honestly, to clarify any ambiguous questions and to collect the responses. 
      In this study questionnaires were distributed personally to the participants, 
explaining the research aim and objectives, and the participants were then left to 
complete the questionnaire. 
      The study used 27 companies’ questionnaires and 25 usable questionnaires were 
returned, giving a response rate of 93 %. A total of two questionnaires (7%) were not 
returned, with the main reasons given for non-completion being lack of time and work 
pressure. The SPSS 15 program for statistical analysis tests included inferential 
statistical analysis: Personal Correlation and Multiple Linear Regression (see 
Subsection 5.7.8 below). 
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5.7.6 Validity and Reliability of Questionnaires 
5.7.6.1 Validity  
The validity of a questionnaire refers to the success of the measurement scale or 
instrument in measuring what it is designed to measure and yield the type of 
information required. Therefore, the differences between individuals’ scores can be 
considered as being true differences in the characteristic or variable under study 
(Kerlinger, 1986; Moser & Kalton, 1989; Oppenheim, 2001; Shannon & Davenport, 
2001). 
      Questionnaires were distributed among academics and regularly returned with 
some modification. To confirm the validity of the questionnaire, the questionnaire 
addresses all the requirements of environmental T&D practices. First twenty 
accountants, economists and financial academics, professionals in the region of CG at 
Tripoli University, reviewed it. These techniques, procedures and requirements’ on 
T&D practices confirmed that the questionnaire was reasonable, and covered the 
required T&D in Libyan companies and that the questions were suitable for the 
participants. The second was a review by the institutions, the regulatory and control 
section, and then the questionnaire was sent to each of the following for some 
comments along with an official letter: the Control Department in the LSM; the 
department of Supervision of banks in the Libyan Central Bank; the Control Authority 
insurance companies in the Libyan Ministry of Economy and Trade; the Libyan Union 
of Accountants and Auditors. Some minor modifications to satisfy the expert 
academics’ and institutions’ regulatory and control comments were made before the 
last draft questionnaire. 
5.7.6.2 Reliability  
This study to test the reliability was carried out with 21 questionnaires using a number 
of respondents in a company (Chairman of the Board, Member of the Board, CEO, 
Financial Manager, Head of Accounting Department, Chairman of the Audit 
Committee, and Member of the Audit Committee); 17 responses were received out of 
21 and after two weeks the 17 questionnaires were distributed to compare the 
responses. After some discussion with non-respondents about some questions, the 
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response was that, without the CEO, some questions were outside the scope of their 
responses. Although the CEO gave a complete and compatible response on both 
occasions because the CEO does not only have the best knowledge of the company 
and its CG, but also works full time in the company and has contact with all 
departments. 
      In this study, the Cronbach’s alpha value for the variable environmental 
uncertainty (Section 1) was as low as 0.360, which is not acceptable. Using the option 
“scale if the item deleted” in the software used shows that if the eighth question 
(Section 1) is deleted, the variable coefficient alpha will be 0.556, which is still low 
but acceptable. Thus, this item was deleted since the coefficient alpha was improved. 
Table 5.11 provides the results obtained from the analysis of reliability test by 
Cronbach’s alpha.  
Table  5.11 Reliability Test Results by Cronbach’s alpha 
5.7.7 Administration 
The CEOs have the best knowledge in CG issues in the Libyan financial companies 
(see Subsection 5.7.6.2 above). Each CEO was given a sealed envelope including a 
covering letter, the questionnaire and supporting letters. Due to the small sample size, 
the intention of the researcher was to get maximum response rate (filled 
questionnaire) from the respondents. The CEOs were contacted personally and the 
purpose of the research was explained to them and appointments were sought to 
provide further details and to deliver the questionnaire. All this process resulted in 
encouraging the participants to complete the questionnaire, but, eventually, 25 
questionnaires were returned out of 27. 
Variable Question No. of items Alpha 
Financial and operating results  1 8(1 excluded) .57 
Company objectives 2 5 .78 
Major share ownership and voting right 3 9 .85 
Board members, key executives and their remuneration 4 10 .85 
Related party transactions 5 5 .84 
Material foreseeable risk factors 6 6 .81 
Material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders 7 7 .93 
Governance structures and policies 8 7 .86 
Preparation of information and disclosed  9 3 .87 
External audit and monitoring 10 4 .86 
External audit and audit committee 11 6 .56 
External auditors accountable to shareholders 12 3 .72 
Channels for dissemination information allow for fair, timely, and cost  13 2 .93 
Corporate governance framework, and analysis 14 5 .68 
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5.7.8 Statistical Analysis 
The data will be analysed using descriptive options of SPSS version 15.0. Pearson’s 
correlation will be used to find out whether there is a relationship between the 
variables to be measured (i.e. T&D practices, and financial performance). The 
following statistical techniques were used in analysing the data and achieving the 
research objectives 5 and 6.  
5.7.8.1 Correlation and Regression 
Correlation analysis is used to indicate whether a relationship exists between two 
dependent variables, as well as the overall strength of the relationship. Despite this 
analysis being a very useful research tool, it does not determine which of the variables 
is independent and which is dependent. In contrast to correlation analysis, regression 
analysis is used to identify the impact of independent variables on the dependent 
variable. While in simple regression analysis a single independent variable is used to 
predict a single dependent variable, multiple regression analysis uses several 
independent variables to predict a single dependent variable. It also identifies how 
much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by theorizing 
simultaneously the influence of several independent variables. It is regarded as the 
most widely applied data analysis technique for assessing the relationship between 
two or more variables (Hair, et al., 1998). 
      In this study the correlation indicates how closely the variables are related or 
unrelated. Due to the number of variables, first, the study used correlation analysis, 
then if there was a correlation between two variables regression analysis was used to 
find out which independent variable had most impact on the dependent variable, and if 
no correlation was found then the variable was excluded. 
       In addition, this study used Linear Regression (Forward Selection). The Linear 
Regression method chose the largest independent positive or negative correlation with 
the dependent variable. In this study, the positive correlation between two variables 
was identified first, and then only these variables were entered into the equation. In 
this study, Forward Selection was used to find which independent variable (T&D) had 
most impact on the dependent variable (Company finance performance). 
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5.7.8.2 Correlation Analysis 
It is very interesting to measure the degree of correlation between the variables of 
interest via correlation coefficients. Incorporating a simple correlation coefficient 
(r), this study aim to measure the strength of relationship between any two variables. 
The strength of a linear relationship can be measured for quantitative variables by 
using the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient.  
       The relationship is very strong when r reaches −1 (lower limit) or +1 (upper 
limit). If the sign of r is negative, then it indicates a negative relationship; otherwise, 
the relationship is positive. The relationship is said to be very weak as long as r 
becomes very close to zero. Table 5.12 provides a summary of the types of 
relationship and their correlation coefficients as follows: 
Table  5.12Correlation Types and Coefficients 
Correlation Type Correlation Coefficient (r) 
Perfect Positive Correlation r = 1 
Positive 0 <r< 1 
No Correlation r = 0 
Negative -1 <r< 0 
Perfect Negative Correlation r = -1 
 
      Brace, Kemp, and Snelgar (2006):     
The value of Pearson’s (r) indicates the strength of the correlation, and it is the measure 
of effect size. As a rule of thumb, r values of 0 to 0.2 are generally considered weak, 
0.3 to 0.6 moderate, and 0.7 to 1 strong. The strength of the correlation alone is not 
necessarily an indication of whether it is an important correlation: the significant value 
should normally also be considered. 
      The study employed a correlation design by two variables which were measured 
using Personal Correlation. The first variable was T&D practices consisting of 14 
items. The second variable was financial performance measured by three tools of 
financial analysis – ROCE, ROE, and ROA. CG may affect the future performance, 
but future performance does not affect CG (Jiamsagul, 2007). 
5.7.8.3 Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was used to find the influence of the independent variable (T&D 
practices) on the dependent variables (financial performance). Multiple linear 
regression technique is concerned with determining a statistical model between a 
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given variable (dependent variable) and a set of explanatory variable (independent 
variables). Table 5.13 summarises important issues related to statistical regression 
analysis quotations from Hair et al. (2003), as follows:  
Table  5.13 Summary of Important Issues Related to Statistical Regression Analysis 
Code Statement Simple regression  Multiple regression 
F-ratio The result of comparing the amount of 
explained variance to unexplained 
variance. A good model should have 
greater than one at least.   
The larger the F-ratio, it 
more variance in the DV 
is explained by the IV.  
The larger the F-ratio, it 
more variance in the DV 
is explained by the overall 
IVs.  
R The correlation between the dependent 
variable (DV) and Independent Variable 
(IV).   
The R value represents 
the simple correlation 
between the DV and 
IVs.   
The R a measure of the 
multiple correlations 
between the DV and the 
IVs.  
R2 Shows the amount of variation, and the 
goodness of fit of the model. The R2 
ranges from 0 to 1 and, the larger the R2, 
the more the DV is associated with the 
IV/s that is being used to predict it.    
The DV associated with 
one IV.  
The DV associated with 
all of the IV considered 
together.  
t  Statistics to identify which IVs have 
statically significant coefficient and to 
determine the relative influence of each 
of the IVs 
If the t-statistic is significant (p= .05) for the IV, it 
could be concluded that the IV makes a significant 
contribution to the model in prediction the DV 
based on the level of significant.  
If the t-statistic is not significant (p> .05) for the 
particular IV, that variable is not a good predictor of 
the DV.  
B It is worth to distinguish between the 
unstandardized coefficients.  
The value represents the measure of the strength of 
the relationship between an IV and the DV. 
Beta It is worth to distinguish between the 
standardized regressions coefficients.  A 
method of adjustment for different units 
of measure across variables. Thus, using 
beta values makes it easy to compare 
between the IVs to determine which has 
the most influence on the DV.  
 Beta coefficients range from -1 to +1. The larger 
the absolute value of the standardized beta 
coefficient is the more relative importance it has in 
predicting the DV. The positive value of a 
coefficient indicates a positive relationship 
between the DV and the IV, whereas a negative 
coefficient indicates the opposite. 
      The study employed Regression between an independent variable (T&D), and 
dependent variables (financial performance). Since in this study, there are many 
independent variables in the equation (14 variables), Forward Selection was used to 
find which one of 14 independent variables (T&D) had most impact on dependent 
variables (company finance performance). 
      The effect of predictor variable, namely x1, x2 ..., x14, on dependent variable, say 
y, is that by assuming a linear relationship, the linear statistical model (or equation) 
evaluating the effect of the mentioned variables on y is:  
y= a0+a1x1+a2x2+a3x3+a4x4+a5x5+a6x6+a7x7+a8x8+a9x9+a10x10+a11x11+a12x12+a13x13+a14x14+e 
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     Where a0 is the mean value of y  when the other variables are zero, whilea1, a2, a3 
and a14   are called regression coefficients showing the effect of variables on y, and 
they will be estimated from our dataset using the least squares method. Actually, they 
show the expected change in y per one unit change in the variables of the equation.  
Also, from the equation, e is defined as an error or disturbance term. Sometimes, it is 
referred to as the effect of omitted variable or error on the dependent variable.   
      To test the above statements, an F test is conducted for multiple models to see 
whether the linear relationship between the dependent variable and the other variables 
is significant. The results of the F test are summarized in the table of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA).By using a 0.05 level of significance, we reject the null 
hypothesis when the p-value based on the F test is smaller than 0.05.  
      For regression analysis, some variables may or may not be important for making 
predictions about the dependent variable, and hence it is helpful to be capable of 
decreasing the model to retain only the variables that show significant information 
about the dependent variable. Since there are a large number of independent variables 
in the equation, the variable with the most impact will be chosen. 
5.8 Financial Performance Variables 
This study, using overall T&D and financial performance variables involves 
considering the research objectives (5 and 6), empirical questions and test hypotheses 
(10 and 11) and framework in this study (see Section 5.2 above).The financial 
performance data collected from companies annual reports.  
This study aims to test the relationship between T&D practices and future financial 
performance. For four reasons, this study prefers to use future financial performance 
rather than contemporary financial performance as dependent variable. First, CG can 
affect performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). Second, CG 
requires more time before its effects on company performance are reflected. Third, 
many of the CG papers link CG variables to future company performance (see Table 
3.2). Finally, Libyan companies take an average of 155 days to publish their annual 
reports (Dardor, 2009). 
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      As a result, the study has information about four years (2005 to 2008), the year 
starting from 1st January to 31st December, using future financial performance as the 
dependent variables for the years 2007 and 2008.   
       Most of the past literature on financial institutions has used accounting measures 
as a proxy for performance. ROCE, ROE, and ROA are used for performance 
measurement and the data of the last two years are used in the company annual reports 
to have more consistent and reliable performance measures. For three reasons, this 
study uses three widely used accounting-based performance measures, ROCE, ROE, 
and ROA. First, market measures of financial performance cannot be used, because 
70% of the sample in this study is NLLSM. Second, since a single measure such as 
ROCE may be inadequate, the study uses a second and third measure, ROE and ROA, 
to triangulate the important construct of company performance. Third, these three 
performance measures have been widely used in previous studies; specially ROE and 
ROA (see Appendix 3).  
5.8.1 Return on Capital Employed 
ROCE is the rate of return that a business is making on the total capital employed in 
the business. ROCE establishes the relationship between the profit and the capital 
employed. It indicates the percentage of ROCE in the business and it can be used to 
show the overall profitability and efficiency of the business. 
ROCE=  !" # $%%&
(( $%%&)( $%%*)/$
 
 
EBIETE = Earnings before interest expenses and tax expenses  
CE= Capital employed 
Capital employed = Total assets − current liabilities 
5.8.2 Return on Equity 
The amount of net income returned as a percentage of shareholders’ 
equity.ROE measures a corporation’s profitability by revealing how much profit a 
company generates with the money the shareholders have invested, and the net 
income that a company is able to earn from stockholders’ investment. Many analysts 
consider ROE the single most important financial ratio applying to stockholders and 
the best measure of performance by a company’s management. ROE is highly 
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correlated with ROA (Antle & Smith, 1986). Using ROE as a performance measure 
has advantages. ROE is a concept that measures return to the company’s equity 
investors. ROE gives information on how well a company uses its equity to generate 
income.  
ROE= -$%%&
(SE2008+SE2007)/2
 
NI =    Net Income 
SE =    Shareholder’s Equity 
5.8.3 Return on Assets 
ROA has been widely used in T&D research (see Table 3.2). ROA is based on 
earnings before interest and tax expenses divided by book value of total assets. ROA 
measures the company’s performance in terms of its profitability prior to the effects of 
financing. By separating the financing effects from the operating effects, the ROA 
provides a cleaner measure of the true profitability of these assets. ROA is a concept 
that measures return to the company rather than just to equity investors. ROA gives 
information on how well a company uses its assets to generate income. In addition, 
agency costs such as perquisites, stealing of investment opportunity, or inefficient 
investments reflect on both balance sheet and income statement. Thus ROA which is 
calculated from the numbers on the balance sheet and the income statements is also 
suitable for the analysis (Yupana, 2001, p. 333).  
ROA= -$%%&
(4$%%&)4$%%*)/$
 
NI=   Net Income 
TA= Total Assets 
5.9 Ethics and Confidentiality 
The Ethical issues were considered and incorporated in this research study. Consent 
was taken from the Business School Ethics Committee; in addition, a letter was 
obtained from the research supervisor to collect data from Libya. The participants of 
the research were informed in advance about the purpose of this research project; 
moreover, it was explained to them that their names and identity would be kept 
confidential and anonymous. All data collected would be kept in a secure place under 
the control of the researcher. 
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    In Libyan culture, often personal relations and contacts are considered important. 
For this study, the researcher made contact with his colleagues who had good relations 
with the CEO of the companies. The researcher had to visit the participants in other to 
get them to fill out the questionnaire. 
5.10 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter described the philosophical debate of methodology and outlining the 
approach employed in this study. A positivistic, deductive approach was adopted in 
this study to achieve the aims and provide a basis for generalising its results. 
Moreover, this study has adopted a quantitative research method to find empirical 
results to test the hypotheses. 
      The chapter detailed the content analysis methods which will be utilised to present 
the level of transparency and disclosure practices of 27 Libyan financial companies 
from 2005 to 2008. This study used data constructor from S&P T&D when finding out 
significant difference of T&D in annual report during the four years, and data 
constructor from questionnaire when finding out overall T&D. The issues related to 
the validity and reliability of the variables measurement was also discussed. The study 
also described the variables employed in the study which explained company 
characteristics and financial performance. 
      This study is original from three points of view. First, it explores the level of T&D 
in Libyan financial companies, comparable the level of T&D with companies in other 
countries, and shows whether there is a variation in Libyan financial companies’ T&D 
in their annual reports. Second, the level of T&D is associated with six corporate 
characteristics. Third, it examines the relationship between T&D practices and 
company financial performance. 
      Table 5.14 explains this study objective, how the data were collected, the 
empirical questions set, which hypotheses were used to examine the empirical 
questions, and the statically analyses used. 
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Table  5.14 Statistical Methods Used for Hypothesis Testing 
Obj. Data 
collection 
EQ Hypothesis Main test 
used 
1 
S&P 
T&D 
score 
EQ1
 
H1: There is a significant difference increase in S&P T&D in 
Libyan financial company’s annual report, through fiscal years 
from 2005 to 2008. 
*Parametric 
method 
ANOVA 
Repeated 
Measure 
(more than 
pair years) 
and Paired 
T-test (pair 
years). 
*Non-
parametric 
method T-
test 
“Friedman 
(more than 
pair years) 
and 
Wilcoxon 
(pair 
years)” 
2 
S&P 
T&D & 
Sec. data 
EQ2 
H2: There is a low level of S&P T&D in Libyan financial 
company’s annual report, which is comparable with companies in 
other countries. 
3 S&P T&D  EQ3 
H3: There are significant variations in Libyan financial companies’ 
transparency and disclosure in their annual reports.   
4 
S&P 
T&D 
 
EQ4
 
H4: Companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market provide more 
T&D in their annual reports than companies not listed. 
EQ5 H5: Public financial companies provide more T&D in their annual 
reports than private “individual” companies. 
EQ6 H6: Companies with greater total assets provide more T&D in their 
annual reports than those with fewer total assets. 
EQ7 H7: Older financial companies provide more T&D in their annual 
reports than younger companies.   
EQ8 H8: Banking sector provides more T&D in their annual reports than insurance sector. 
EQ9 
H9: Companies that have audit peer review are more likely to 
provide T&D information in their annual reports than companies 
that do not have audit peer review. 
5 Q &Sec. EQ10 
H10: There is a relationship between T&D practices, and financial 
performance in Libyan financial companies.  
Correlation 
test 
(Pearson’s 
correlation) 
6 Q &Sec. EQ11 
H11: There is a variable of T&D practices that has the most impact 
on company financial performance. 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis    
(forward 
selection 
method) 
 
      The next chapter gives the results of testing the study hypotheses and findings in 
this study for data collecting by S&P T&D score.  
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Chapter 6 S&P: Transparency and Disclosure 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to record the results of the tests of the hypotheses 
concerning the relative extent of T&D in Libyan financial companies, and the level of 
T&D associations with the company characteristics. This chapter presents the details 
of empirical results from the SPSS 15 program. The descriptive statistics of the data 
are ANOVA One-way, Paired T-test, Friedman Test, and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test.  
      The results presented in this chapter relate to the four objectives of the study as 
shown below: 
1- To assess the level of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies 
during the years 2005 to 2008 on three levels: overall transparency and disclosure, 
three categories, and twelve subcategories in their annual reports. 
2- To compare the level of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies 
with those in other countries (developed and developing).    
3- To assess whether there are variations between companies in transparency and 
disclosure practices in their annual reports. 
4- To assess the extent to which transparency and disclosure is determined by listing 
status, ownership, size, and age, type of industry and audit peer review in Libyan 
financial companies during the years 2005 to 2008 on three levels: overall 
transparency and disclosure, three categories, and twelve subcategories in their annual 
reports. 
      This chapter addresses the empirical research questions, from EQ1 to EQ9, which 
are:  
 EQ1- Have Libyan financial companies improved the level of transparency and 
disclosure in their annual reports since the emergence of the Libyan Stock Market? 
EQ2- Do Libyan financial companies provide a low level of transparency and 
disclosure in their annual reports compared to companies in other countries? 
EQ3
-
Do Libyan financial companies vary in their transparency and disclosure 
practices in their annual reports?   
181 
 
EQ4- Do companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market provide more transparency and 
disclosure in their annual reports than companies not listed? 
EQ5- Do public Libyan financial companies provide more transparency and 
disclosure in their annual reports than private “individual” companies? 
EQ6- Do companies with greater total assets transparency and disclosure disclose 
information to a greater extent than those with fewer total assets? 
EQ7- Do older financial companies in Libya provide more transparency and 
disclosure in their annual reports than younger companies? 
EQ8- Does the Banking sector provide more transparency and disclosure in their 
annual reports than the Insurance sector? 
EQ9- Are companies that have audit peer review more likely to provide transparency 
and disclosure information than companies that do not have audit peer review? 
      This chapter is organised into seven sections as follows: Section 6.2, descriptive 
statistics; Section 6.3 analyses the collected data about the level of transparency and 
disclosure in LFC with the emerging LSM to achieve objective 1, answer EQ1 and 
test H1.Section 6.4 compares the level of transparency and disclosure with companies 
in other countries to achieve objective 2, answer EQ2 and test H2.Section 6.5 is 
followed by T&D variation to achieve objective 3, answer EQ3and test H3. Section 
6.6 includes the analysis of collected data about the level of transparency and 
disclosure in Libyan financial companies associated with company characteristics to 
achieve objective 4, answer EQ4 to EQ9and test H4 to H9. Section 6.7 presents the 
summary and conclusion of the results. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of 27 companies. Exploratory analysis has been conducted to 
discover the initial features of the data of interest using frequency tables and graphs. 
Firstly, the statistical Mean8, Standard Deviation9 and statistically significant 
increase of four years and two years for all companies have been measured. Secondly, 
                                                     
8
 The mean is the sum of the values divided by the number of values. The mean describes the central 
location of data.  
9
 The standard deviation describes the spread. Low standard deviation indicates that data points tend to 
be very close to the mean whereas high standard deviation indicates that the data are spread out of over 
a large range of values.  
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the calculation for Coefficient of Variation10 between companies. Thirdly, the 
statistical Mean, Standard Deviation, and statistically significant increase for 
overall Libyan financial companies, with six company characteristics (listed status, 
ownership, size, age, type of industry, and audit peer review), and statistically 
significant increase for each group by two years (Pair) and four years (More than 
pair). All these statistics are measured at three levels. First is overall T&D. Second are 
three categories: ownership structure and investor rights; financial transparency and 
information disclosure; and board and management structure and process. Third, are 
twelve subcategories: transparency of ownership; concentration of ownership; voting 
and shareholder meeting procedures; business focus; accounting policy review; 
accounting policy details; related party structure and transactions; information on 
auditors; board structure and composition; role of the board; director training and 
compensation; and executive compensation and evaluation.    
6.2.1 Normality Test 
The first tested whether the data distribution is normal or not (by applying Shapiro-
Wilk), for all variables; overall S&P T&D, by three categories, and twelve 
subcategories. The result shows the normality is satisfied as p-value for the Shapiro-
Wilk test is > .05 and non-normality is satisfied as p-value for the Shapiro-Wilk test is 
< .05.Normality test results are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table  6.1 Normality Test Results 
Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total transparency & disclosure .358 .497 .959 .639 
Ownership structure & investor right .010 .010 .010 .010 
Transparency of ownership          .010 .010 .010 .010 
Concentration of ownership          .010 .010 .010 .010 
Voting & shareholder meeting procedures .010 .010 .010 .010 
Financial transparency & information disclosure .150 .354 .154 .072 
Business focus  .311 .562 .102 .059 
Accounting policy review  .010 .025 .010 .010 
Accounting policy details  .010 .010 .010 .010 
Related party structure & transaction  .010 .010 .010 .010 
Information on auditors  .010 .010 .010 .010 
Board and management structure and process .413 .933 .203 .438 
Board structure and composition  .567 .029 .139 .010 
Role of the board  .060 .227 .215 .178 
Director training & compensations  .010 .010 .010 .010 
Executive compensation & evaluation  .010 .010 .010 .010 
                                                     
10
 The coefficient of variation is a normalized measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. It is 
also known as unitized risk or the variation coefficient. The coefficient of variation is a dimensionless 
number. 
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      In the same way the test of normality was used for other variables, companies 
LLSM and NLLSM; ownership structure “public and private”; company size “small, 
medium, and large”; age of the company “younger, medium, and older”; industry type 
“banks and insurance companies”, and audit peer review “companies have and don’t 
have audit peer review”. This study shows that in the statistical results in all tables 
that if data were normally distributed it is represented in italic & was underlined, and 
non-normal distributed data was presented normally. Figure 5.4 shows the statistical 
techniques using for both parametric and non-parametric methods in this study.   
      Therefore, the results indicate that data are mixed, normally (Sig. p-value > .05) 
and non-normally distributed (Sig. p-value < .05), hence, parametric and non-
parametric tests are recommended. 
6.2.2 Statistics Test 
This study discussed aspects of T&D in chapter three. T&D for banks is particularly 
important given the economic significance of the banking and insurance sector in 
general and for growth and development in particular.  
       The following statistical techniques were used in analysing the data and achieving 
the study objectives. ANOVA repeated measure (One-way) and Paired T-test were 
used for the descriptive statistics of the normal distribution assumption (parametric). 
Non-parametric T-test (Friedman and Wilcoxon) were also calculated because of 
possible violations of the normal distribution assumption as indicated in the 
descriptive statistics (see Figure 5.4).  
      In this study of descriptive statistics, mainly means and significant value (p value), 
were used to analyse study objectives one, two and three, answer the EQs and test the 
hypotheses from one to nine. 
6.3 Quality of S&P Transparency and Disclosure in Libyan Companies with the 
Emerging Libyan Stock Market 
This section presents the main level of T&D results according to three stages: overall; 
three categories; and twelve subcategories. Specifically, subsection 6.3.1 will report 
the statistically significant increase results for overall T&D during the four years and 
pair years to test H1. Subsection 6.3.2 will provide the statistically significant increase 
results for three categories of T&D during the four years and pair years to test sub-
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hypotheses H1.1, H1.2, and H1.3. Subsection 6.3.3 will report the statistically significant 
increase results for twelve subcategories T&D during the four years and pair years to 
test sub-hypotheses H1.1.1 to H1.1.3, H1.2.1 to H1.2.5, and H1.3.1 to H1.3.4. Finally, a 
summary of the test hypotheses is presented.           
       S&P survey methodology was used for the descriptive statistics for overall T&D 
for the company (banks and insurance) annual reports. Table 6.2shows that T&D was 
very low in the years from 2005 to 2008, but it improved during this period by 13 
points. This study does show a few changes in T&D levels by 37% in 2008 and 33% 
in 2007, 28% in 2006, and 24% in the year 2005. 
      The level of T&D by three categories improved during the four years but there 
were uneven improvements between the categories; the level of T&D ownership 
structure and investor rights had a small increase of 7 points (see Table 6.2. Pa. B); the 
scores of financial transparency and information disclosure are the highest among the 
three categories, showing extra improvement of 22 points during the four years (see 
Table 6.2. Pa. C); and the level of T&D board and management structures and process 
show only a marginal improvement of 8 points (see Table 6.2. Pa. D).   
      This study shows that for the level of T&D with twelve subcategories there is a 
slight change in the first among three subcategories, whereas there is only a small 
increase by 4, 5, and 3 points for the three subcategories: transparency of ownership, 
concentration of ownership, and voting and shareholder meeting procedures, 
respectively (see Table 6.2 Pa. B1, 2, and 3); while the average voting and shareholder 
meeting scores show a minor increase of 3 points during the four years, the lowest 
level T&D in overall twelve subcategories.  
      The second table (6.2 Pa. C) shows that the best level of T&D in Libyan financial 
companies was 65% in 2008 in financial transparency and information disclosure, and 
it improved by 22 points for the duration of four years. The top score in financial 
T&D subcategory ‘accounting policy details’ was 96% in 2008, which increased by 
30 points for the period of four years (see Table 6.2 Pa. C3). Also the three 
subcategories business focus, accounting policy review, and information on auditors 
showed an improvement of 20, 23, and 13 points respectively (see Table 6.2 Pa. C1, 2, 
and 5). The ‘related party structure and transaction’ revealed fewer scores in the 
185 
 
category, for example, 21% in 2008, that shows an increase by 17 points at some point 
in four years (see Table 6.2 Pa. C4) but it is evident that this increase is still very low.  
       The third had no noteworthy increase in the level of T&D for the four 
subcategories. Board structure and composition were the best subcategories, despite 
showing weakness by 58% in 2008 and improvement only by 15 points during the 
four years (see Table 6.2 Pa. D1). The role of the board, director training and 
compensations, and executive compensation and evaluation were very low at rates of 
32%, 12% and 14% in 2008, and they increased 15, 7 and 5 points respectively (see 
Table 6.2 Pa. D2, 3, and 4). Mean and Standard deviations results are shown in 
Table6.2. 
   23 Co. in 2005 and 2006, 25 Co. in 2007, and 27 Co. in 2008 
      For more details descriptive statistics for the entire sample of all companies are 
presented in Appendix 7-A. 
      The next subsections of this study show the descriptive statistics for overall T&D 
in subsection 6.3.1; in subsection 6.3.2 three categories, and in subsection 6.3.3 twelve 
subcategories are elaborated.    
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D 
Table 6.3shows that, overall increase in T&D was strong with a statistically 
significant increases (F= 30.9, p = .000) during the four years. Also, a  statistically 
Table  6.2 Overall Transparency and Disclosure 
Panel Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A Total transparency & disclosure .242 .094 .287 .079 .339 .086 .374 .098 
B Ownership structure & investor right .047 .001 .065 .044 .095 .085 .116 .105 
B1 Transparency of ownership          .094 .088 .122 .084 .134 .081 .138 .086 
B2 Concentration of ownership .010 .052 .038 .102 .108 .248 .152 .276 
B3 Voting & shareholder meeting 
procedures .001 .038 .001 .001 .024 .057 .043 .119 
C Financial transparency & 
information disclosure .434 .160 .505 .149 .593 .151 .649 .145 
C1 
   Business focus  .507 .207 .556 .162 .652 .210 .707 .211 
C2 Accounting policy review  .440 .278 .516 .287 .632 .228 .686 .221 
C3 Accounting policy details  .666 .402 .840 .360 .956 .208 .956 .208 
C4 Related party structure & transaction  .043 .096 .076 .139 .119 .166 .206 .257 
C5 Information on auditors  .358 .290 .467 .253 .565 .240 .489 .232 
D Board and management structure 
and process .192 .114 .231 .092 .267 .091 .298 .099 
D1 Board structure and composition  .434 .206 .521 .171 .462 .178 .576 .158 
D2 Role of the board  .170 .143 .228 .110 .279 .119 .322 .136 
D3 Director training & compensations  .057 .129 .086 .149 .115 .162 .115 .162 
D4 Executive compensation & evaluation  .096 .077 .125 .077 .024 .066 .135 .088 
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significant increases (t =3.56, p =.002), (t = 6.31, p = .000), (t =6.12, p =.000 ), (t = 
5.33, p = .000 ), (t = 6.01, p = .000), and (t = 3.97, p =.001 ) for the two years 05-06, 
05-07, 05-08, 06-07, 06-08, and 07-08 respectively.  
Table  6.3 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D 
S&P 
TD 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TD 30.9 .000*** 3.56 .002** 6.31 .000 *** 6.12 .000 *** 5.33 .000*** 6.01 .000*** 3.97 .001*** 
Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F&t statistic if 
data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair 
years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001).  
      However, overall T&D had strong statistically significant increase during four and 
two years.     
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics Three Categories of S&P T&D 
Table 6.4 shows that, the three categories – ownership structure and investor right, 
financial transparency and information disclosure, and board and management 
structure and process – had statistically significant increase (X2= 26.5, p = .000), (F= 
25, p = .000), and (F = 22.5, p = .000), respectively for four years. In addition, there is 
a statistically significant increase between two years for all three categories, but 
ownership structure and investor rights had no statistically significant increase for the 
years 07-08 (Z = 1.62, p = .104). However, financial transparency and information 
disclosure were the strongest showing statistically significant increase in three 
categories for the two years 05-06, 05-07, 05-08, 06-07, 06-08, and 07-08. 
Table  6.4 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Three Categories 
S&P 
TD 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
OSIR 26.5 .000 *** 2.26 .024* 2.84 .004** 3.08 .002** 2.22 .026* 2.68 .007 ** 1.62 .104 
FTID 25.0 .000*** 3.12 .005** 5.06 .000*** 5.69 .000*** 4.60 .000*** 5.49 .000*** 3.39 .002** 
BMSP 22.5 .000*** 2.70 .013** 5.19 .000*** 6.21 .000*** 3.24 .004** 4.57 .000*** 3.27 .003** 
Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if 
data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and 
pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
      However, three categories had an increase in statistically significant increase 
during four and two years except the first categories in pair years (2007-2008).     
6.3.3 Descriptive Statistics Twelve Subcategories of S&P T&D 
There were statistically significant increase for 11 out of 12 subcategories during the 
four years, but there were no statistically significant increases (X2 = 5.40, p = .145) for 
voting and shareholder meeting procedures.  
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      There were statistically significant increases for accounting policy review, and the 
role of the board between overall pair years 05-06, 05-07, 05-08, 06-07, 06-08, but 
most of the subcategories varied between a statistically significant increases and no 
statistically significant increase over two years. The level of accounting policy details 
had no statistically significant increase for the years 07-08 because the level of T&D 
was 96% for those years. The director training and compensation showed a 
statistically significant increases just for one pair years 05-07 (Z = 2.0, p = .046) (see 
Table 6.5).      
      However, this study shows a strong statistically significant increase in T&D levels 
for the four years, and for most pair years, while the statistically significant increase 
for the years 05-06 was nearly strong (p= .002). The levels of T&D by three 
categories showed a strong statistically significant increase for four years, while 
financial transparency and information disclosure was almost strong with a 
statistically significant increase for pair years. The level of T&D with eleven 
subcategories showed a statistically significant increase (8 out of 11 with strong 
statistically significant increase), but the subcategories for voting and shareholder 
meeting procedures did not yield statistically significant increase results for four 
years. 
      Therefore, H1 is accepted in the study, which showed a statistically significant 
increase level of S&P transparency & disclosure in Libyan financial company’s 
Table  6.5 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D  by twelve Subcategories 
S&P 
TD 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TO 15 .002** 1.89 .059 2.27 .023* 2.42 .015** 1.34 .180 1.63 .102 1.00 .317 
CO 16.4 .001*** 1.34 .180 2.06 .039 2.41 .016** 2.12 .034** 2.45 .014** 1.06 .285 
VSMP 5.40 .145 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
BF 13.6 .000*** 1.72 .098 3.85 .001** 4.32 .000*** 3.40 .003** 4.20 .000*** 2.20 .038* 
APR 27.6 .000*** 2.04 .041* 2.96 .003** 3.30 .001*** 2.38 .017** 3.07 .002** 2.59 .009** 
APD 20.2 .000 *** 1.54 .124 2.81 .005** 2.81 .005** 1.63 .102 1.63 .102 .000 1.00 
RPST 17.4 .001*** 1.13 .257 1.93 .053 2.58 .010** 2.00 .046* 2.65 .008** 2.27 .023* 
IA 14.2 .003** 1.75 .079 1.97 .048* 2.40 .016** 1.00 .317 1.84 .066 1.84 .066 
BSC 17.9 .000*** .844 .399 2.07 .038* 3.00 .003** 2.23 .026* 2.90 .004** 1.90 .057 
RBD 20.3 .000*** 3.13 .005** 4.96 .000 *** 2.61 .016** 2.61 .016** 3.89 .001*** 2.61 .015** 
DTC 9.42 .024* 1.41 .157 2.00 .046* 1.41 .157 1.41 .157 1.53 .124 .000 1.00 
ECE 48.1 .000*** 1.66 .096 3.09 .002** 1.93 .054 4.58 .000*** 1.00 .317 4.70 .000*** 
Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if 
data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair 
years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001).  
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annual reports through the fiscal years from 2005 to 2008. Table 6.6 shows the test of 
hypothesis as follows: 
Table  6.6 Test of  Hypothesis Level of S&P T&D 
H Hypothesis Result  
Four 
years 
2005-
2006 
2005-
2007 
2005-
2008 
2006- 
2007 
2006-
2008 
2007- 
2008 
H1 There is a statistically significant increase in S&P: 
transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial company’s 
annual reports, through fiscal years from 2005 to 2008 
A A A A A A A 
H1.1 Ownership structure and investor rights A A A A A A R 
H1.1.1 Transparency of ownership A R A A R R R 
H1.1.2 Concentration of ownership   A R R A A A R 
H1.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures  R R R R R R R 
H1.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure A A A A A A A 
H1.2.1 Business focus A R A A A A A 
H1.2.2 Accounting policy review A A A A A A A 
H1.2.3 Accounting policy details  A R A A R R R 
H1.2.4 Related party structure and transactions A R R A A A A 
H1.2.5 Information on auditors A R A A R R R 
H1.3 Board and management structure and process A A A A A A A 
H1.3.1 Board structure and composition A R A A A R R 
H1.3.2 The role of board of directors A A A A A A A 
H1.3.3 Director training and composition A R A R R R R 
H1.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive A R A R A R A 
A= Accepted and R= Rejected 
6.4 Comparison of the Level of Transparency and Disclosure by S&P Scores with 
Companies in Other Countries 
This section presents the mean scores of T&D results accomplished by LFC and 
quoted companies by two stages: overall, and three categories to test H2.  
      The mean scores accomplished by LFC and quoted companies are shown in Table 
6.7 for comparison of the overall S&P T&D and three categories’ mean scores for 
listed companies in other countries. 
Table  6.7 Distribution of T&D Rankings Based on Annual Reports 
Countries Number of 
companies 
Total 
S&P% 
OSVR  
% 
FTID % BMSP  
% 
Libya 27 37  12 65 30 
1France 45 65 60 70 64 
1Germany 32 50 38 74 35 
1Italy 26 50 38 64 45 
1Netherland 25 59 53 65 57 
1Spain 17 50 39 63 44 
1Sweden 18 61 52 72 56 
1Switzerland 17 51 36 70 44 
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1UK 127 69 54 78 71 
1US 500 42 25 66 31 
1Japan 150 61 70 76 37 
1Asia-Pacific 99 48 41 60 42 
1Latin  America 89 31 28 58 18 
1Emerging Asia 253 40 39 54 27 
2Ukrainian 30 14 20 13 9 
3Kenya 47 50 56 70 26 
4Turkish 50 61 64 73 46 
5Russia 76 60 젞땨63 63 50 
1The composite scores in deciles for S&P Europe 350 and other regions (Patel et al., 
2003).2Source: S&P T&D by Ukrainian Bank (2010b).  3Source: McFie (2006), 4Source S&P 
Turkish T&D survey 2008(2008). 5Source: S&P T&D by Russian Companies 2010 (2010a). 
 
      In this study the level of T&D for overall and three categories used comparison 
with S&P scores quoted for companies in other countries around the world based on 
annual reports as has been explained. Figure 6.1 shows the overall T&D percentage 
score for Libyan companies and other companies around the world. Figure 6.2 shows 
comparison for the first category, ownership structure and investor rights. Figure 6.3 
provides comparison for the second category, financial transparency and information 
disclosure. Figure 6.4 presents comparison for the third category, board and 
management structure and process. 
      Figure 6.1 shows the S&P T&D around the world. T&D in Libyan financial 
companies is very low compared to other developed and developing countries except 
for Latin America and Ukraine. 
Figure  6.1 Level of Overall S&P T&D around the World 
 
Note: Libya’s score is for year 2008, and S&P study data are different years. 
      Figure 6.2 shows that, in the “ownership structure and investor rights” category, 
Libyan financial companies’ level score is lower than for those companies in all other 
countries. Although the Libyan Commercial Act (1953) mandates many of the 
69 65 61 61 61 60 59
51 50 50 50 50 48
42 40 37 31
14
Level of T&D %
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disclosure items in this category, e.g., share classes, voting rights, shareholders 
owning more than present, and shareholder meetings, those companies are not bound 
to disclose those items. In fact, they often used some of the items of the 1953 
Commercial Act. Where the 1953 Act does not contain some tasks, such as the 
percentage of cross-ownership, publication of CG charter and code of best practice, 
the level of T&D OSIR registered an improvement during the years 2005-2008, 7%, 
but was still very weak. 
Figure  6.2 Level of S&P OSVR around the World 
 
      The level scores of T&D FTID in LFC were higher than for Italy, Spain, Asia-
Pacific, Latin America, Emerging Asia, Ukraine and Russia. The level of T&D FTID 
was above average at 65%, and improved during the years from 2005 to 2008, 22% 
(see Figure 6.3). 
Figure  6.3 Level of S&P FTID around the World 
 
 
      In the third category, the level of T&D Board and management structure and 
process on Libyan financial companies was higher than those in Latin America, 
70 64 62 60 56 54 53 52
41 39 39 38 38 36
28 25 20
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Level of OSIR%
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Emerging Asia, Ukraine and Kenya. Some of the disclosures items in this category of 
the S&P T&D are not included in the Libyan Commercial Act, e.g., finance 
committee, director training, and performance-related pay for directors and managers. 
The level of T&D BMSP improved during the years from 2005 to 2008, 10%, but was 
still weak (see Figure 6.4). 
Figure  6.4 Level of S&P BMSP around the World 
 
      Overall, Libyan financial companies have relatively lower overall T&D compared 
to other developed and developing countries except for Latin America and Ukraine. 
Therefore, Libya shows weak T&D rankings, particularly with regard to ownership 
structure and investor rights which show the lowest disclosure rankings. 
      However, hypothesis H2 is Partial accepted in the study and there is a low level of 
S&P T&D in Libyan financial company’s annual reports, compared with other 
countries. Table 6.8 shows test of hypothesis as follows: 
Table  6.8 Test of  Hypothesis Compared to the Level of S&P T&D in Other Countries 
H Hypothesis Result 
H2 
There is a low level of S&P T&D in Libyan financial company’s 
annual reports, which is comparable with companies in other 
countries 
Partial Accepted 
H2.1 Ownership structure and investor rights Fully Accepted 
H2.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure Limited Accepted 
H2.3 Board and management structure and process Partly Accepted 
6.5 Transparency and Disclosure Variations 
This section will present the Coefficient of Variation between levels of T&D in 
Libyan financial companies. Table 6.8 presents the distribution of overall T&D, three 
categories, and twelve subcategories by Libyan financial companies. The number of 
companies disclosing information in their annual report for overall T&D on more than 
71
64
57 56
50 46 45 44 44 42
37 35 31 30 27 26
18
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50% of the attributes is 0% in 2005; the attributes are four companies, approximately 
15% of our sample, in 2008.  
      Table 6.9 shows that for the three categories, the first category, ownership 
structure and investors right, the disclosing information on more than 50% of the 
attributes is 0, there is no improvement during the four years, but for the subcategories 
the concentration of ownership and voting and shareholder meeting procedure 
improvement was approximately 7% and 4% respectively during the four years.  
      The second category is financial transparency and information disclosure. The 
number of companies disclosing information in their annual report for this category on 
more than 50% of the attributes is five companies, approximately 22%, in 2005, but 
the attributes are twenty-three companies, approximately 85%, and the attributes are 8 
companies, approximately 30% their level and more than 75% of our sample, in 2008. 
Furthermore, the 3 out of 5 subcategories: business focus; accounting policy review; 
and accounting policy details have disclosing information, approximately more than 
50% of the attributes, for 13, 8, and 13 companies approximately 57%, 35% and 57% 
in 2005, then for 23, 24, and 25 companies approximately 85%, 89% and 93% in 
2008. Also, by those subcategories, disclosing information on more than 75% of the 
attributes are 12, 12 and 25 companies approximately 44%, 44% and 93% 
respectively. Additionally, the subcategory related party structure and transactions 
disclosing information on more than 50% of the attributes is 0% in 2005, then the 
attributes for two companies approximately is 7% of our sample in 2008.  The last 
subcategory information on auditors disclosing information on more than 50% of the 
attributes is four companies, approximately 17%, in 2005, while the attributes are 
twelve companies, approximately 44% of our sample, in 2008.  
      The third category is board and management structure and process. The number of 
companies disclosing information on more than 50% of the attributes is 0% during the 
four years. The four subcategories: board structure and composition companies 
disclosing information on more than 50% of the attributes are one company 
approximately 4%, 0, 0, and 0 in 2005 respectively. Then companies disclosing 
information on more than 50% of the attributes are 15 companies approximately 56%, 
2 companies approximately 7%, 0, and 0 in 2008 respectively.   
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      Although the level of T&D in the Libyan companies is weak, there is some 
improvement during this period. Figure 6:5 shows that there is disparity in the level of 
T&D as well as an uneven increase in the level of T&D during this period in the 
Coefficient of Variation (CV). According to the findings of this study, an average 
56% of companies have low CV – this means that during the four years, the 
companies had a stable index – while an average 31% of companies have high CV – 
this means that for these companies the index is not stable during the four years. As 
the majority of companies have different CVs, the companies do not seem to be 
identical. However, the rate of CV for eight companies has very low T&D, and their 
CV was identified as 10%, thus the level of T&D has weak improvement. However, 
one company’s rate of CV is more than 50; hence there is fast improvement in the 
level of T&D compared to other companies. The figure 6.5 shows the level of T&D in 
their annual reports in LFC, and improvement of CV. 
Figure 6.5 T&D and Coefficient of Variation 
 
Two companies have not CV (coefficient of variation), because the first annual report in 2008. 
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Table 6.9 Companies Disclosing Information 
  2005 (23 Co.) 2006 (23 Co.) 2007 (25 Co.) 2008 (27 Co.) 
Pa. Level of 
T&D 
Less 
26% 
26 to 
50 
51 to 
75% 
75 to 
100% 
Less 
26% 
26 to 
50% 
51 to 
75% 
75 to 
100% 
Less 
26% 
26 to 
50% 
51 to 
75% 
75 to 
100% 
Less 
26% 
26 to 
50% 
51 to 
75% 
76 to 
100% 
A T&D 15 8 0 0 8 15 0 0 6 18 1 0 3 20 4 0 
B OWSIR 23 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 23 2 0 0 23 4 0 0 
B1 TO 23 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 26 1 0 0 
B2 CO 23 0 0 0 22 1 0 0 23 3 0 1 24 1 0 2 
B3 VSMP 23 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 26 0 1 0 
C FTID 1 17 5 0 0 11 11 1 0 8 12 5 0 4 15 8 
C1 BF 2 8 10 3 0 9 10 4 0 6 10 9 0 4 11 12 
C2 APR 7 8 3 5 4 7 6 6 1 5 11 8 1 2 12 12 
C3 APD 3 7 0 13 3 1 0 19 1 1 0 23 1 1 0 25 
C4 PRST 23 0 0 0 22 1 0 0 22 2 1 0 20 5 1 1 
C5 IA 9 10 4 0 5 12 6 0 4 13 8 0 2 13 10 2 
D BMSP 16 7 0 0 13 10 0 0 7 18 0 0 6 21 0 0 
D1 BSC 5 12 5 1 4 10 9 0 3 10 12 0 2 9 15 1 
D2 RB 19 4 0 0 18 5 0 0 12 13 0 0 11 14 2 0 
D3 DTC 19 4 0 0 17 6 0 0 16 9 0 0 16 11 0 0 
D4 ECE 22 1 0 0 21 2 0 0 25 0 0 0 22 5 0 0 
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      The study notes for each company (Banks & Insurances), the mean score for T&D 
was from the lowest 9 %, 14%, 16%, and 19% to the highest 44%, 45%, 55%, and 
57%, for the years of 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 respectively. Figure 6.6 shows that 
there is a wider variation between companies and the level of T&D practices in Libya 
financial companies during these four years. 
Figure 6.6 T&D Variations between Libyan Financial Companies 
 
Company number 11 and 26 started in 2007, and 24, 25 started in 2008 
      However, hypothesis H3 is accepted in the study and there are significant 
variations in Libyan financial companies’ T&D in their annual reports.   
6.6 Quality of S&P Transparency and Disclosure Associated with Company 
Characteristics 
This section presents the main level of T&D results for six company characteristics by 
three stages: overall; three categories; and twelve subcategories. Specifically, 
subsection 6.6.1 will report the results of the first company characteristic, listed and 
not listed in the Libyan Stock Market, to test H4. Subsection 6.6.2 will provide the 
results of the second characteristic, company’s ownership, to test H5. Subsection 6.6.3 
will show the results of the third characteristic, company’s size, to test H6. Subsection 
6.6.4 will present the results of the fourth characteristic, company’s age, to test H7. 
Subsection 6.6.5 will report the results of the fifth characteristic, industry type, to test 
H8. Subsection 6.6.6 will provide the results of the sixth characteristic, companies’ 
audit peer review, to test H9. In addition, a summary of the test hypothesis is presented 
at the end of each subsection. 
      The six company-specific characteristics examined are as follows:  
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6.6.1 Quality of S&P Transparency and Disclosure for Companies Listed and Not Listed 
in Libya Stock Market 
This subsection presents the main level of T&D results for the companies listed and 
not listed in the Libyan Stock Market by three stages: overall; three categories; and 
twelve subcategories. Specifically, subsection 6.6.1.1 will provide the statistically 
significant increase results for overall T&D during three years and pair years to test 
H4. Subsection 6.6.1.2 will present the statistically significant increase results for three 
categories of T&D during three years and pair years to test sub-hypotheses H4.1, H4.2 
and H4.3. Subsection 6.6.1.3 will provide the statistically significant increase results 
for twelve subcategories of T&D during three years and pair years to test sub-
hypotheses H4.1.1 to H4.1.3, H4.2.1 to H4.2.5, and H4.3.1 to H4.3.4. Finally, a summary of 
tested hypotheses is presented.           
      In this subsection, the study analysed the data collected regarding the level of 
T&D between two groups LLSM and NLLSM in their annual reports and the 
statistically significant increase during three years and paired years.  
      The level of overall T&D in LLSM was higher than in NLLSM, 42% and 35% in 
2008. Table 6.9 shows a small improvement in overall T&D level of 10 and 8 points 
during the three years for companies LLSM and NLLSM, respectively; there was a 
small increase difference between the two groups. 
       Moreover, the study shows T&D by three categories: the first, showing a 
marginal improvement in the level of T&D ownership structure and investor right was 
very low for the two groups of companies, LLSM and NLLSM. However, the level of 
scores in companies LLSM was better than that for NLLSM – 5, 4, 7 points during the 
three years (see Table 6.10. Pa. B); the second, financial transparency and information 
disclosure had the best scores for both groups, 71% and 62%, showing an upgrade of 
15 and 14 points during three years for LLSM and NLLSM, respectively (see Table 
6.10 Pa. C); in the third category, the level of board and management structure and 
process was low, at 33% and 28%, showing only a small improvement for both groups 
by 5 and 7 points for LLSM and NLLSM, respectively; whereas the level in 
companies LLSM was better than for NLLSM, the companies in NLLSM were more 
enhanced than those in LLSM (see Table 6.10. Pa. D).  
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      Furthermore, Table 6.10 (Pa. B1, 2, and 3) shows that, for the first category, the 
analysis for three subcategories shows the level scores per two groups remaining very 
weak, with little advance in this category. The average for transparency of ownership, 
concentration of ownership, and voting and shareholder meeting procedures shows a 
small improvement for assemblages 5, 20 and 9 for companies LLSM, and 2, 7 and 0 
for companies NLLSM during three years. Moreover, the study shows no change for 
three years in voting and shareholder meeting procedures for companies NLLSM.  
      In the second category, for the next five subcategories there was a different level 
of “business focus” between two groups, 73% and 69% in 2008, and an explicit 
improvement of 16 and 14 points for companies LLSM and NLLSM, respectively (see 
Table 6.10.Pa.C1). The levels of accounting policy review expansion for companies 
LLSM and NLLSM are 12 and 11 points respectively (see Table 6.10.Pa.C2). This 
study shows that the specifics of the best level for five subcategories was accounting 
policy details, where almost all the companies LLSM had 100% in 2007 and 2008 and 
improvement of 12 points for the period of three years, and the level was high in the 
companies NLLSM, 93% in 2008 and improvement of 11 points for the three-year 
period (see Table 6.10.Pa.C3). Thus, the level of related party structure and transaction 
is the lowest level of the category for two groups, and there is a different explicit level 
between the two groups, 41% and 10% in 2008 per 25 and 7 points for companies 
LLSM and NLLSM respectively (see Table 6.10.Pa.C4). The level of final 
subcategory in financial transparency and information disclosure is information 
auditors with a good 10 points for companies LLSM and NLLSM during the three 
years; however, the level in these subcategories was a small step up for companies 
LLSM and NLLSM (see Table 6.10.Pa.C5).  
      In the third category, analysis of T&D shows that the best level in this subcategory 
for both groups was board structure and composition, 63% and 55% in 2008 and an 
improvement by 10 and 12 points, and there was a small difference level between the 
two groups LLSM and NLLSM, respectively (see Table 6.10.Pa.D1). Whilst the range 
of subcategories is very low, the level of the role of the board was 32% in 2008 and 
shows an improvement of 6 and 11 points for companies LLSM and NLLSM, 
respectively, with no difference level between the two groups (see Table 6.10.Pa.D2) ; 
the level of director training compensation was 16% and 9% in 2008 with an 
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improvement of 0 and 5 points for companies LLSM and NLLSM, respectively, with a 
small difference level between the two groups (see Table 6.10.Pa.D3); the level of 
executive compensation and evaluation was 16% and 12% in 2008 and unstable for 
three years for companies LLSM and NLLSM, respectively (see Table 6.10.Pa.D4). 
Mean and Standard deviations results are shown in Table 6.10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      For more details descriptive statistics for the entire sample of all companies are 
presented in Appendix 7-B.     
      The next subsections of this study show descriptive statistics for overall T&D in 
subsection 6.6.1.1; in subsection 6.6.1.2 three categories, and in subsection 6.6.1.3 
twelve subcategories are elaborated. 
Table  6.10 Transparency and Disclosure for Companies LLSM and NLLSM 
Panel Variable Chare. 2006 2007 2008 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A Total transparency & disclosure Listed Not listed 
.324 .083 .359 .064 .419 .112 
.266 .071 .328 .096 .348 .089 
B Ownership structure & investor right Listed Not listed 
.084 .026 .111 .064 .174 .112 
.056 .049 .086 .096 .084 .089 
B1 Transparency of ownership Listed Not listed 
.136 .084 .180 .033 .193 .032 
.090 .090 .109 .092 .109 .092 
B2 Concentration of ownership Listed Not listed 
.031 .088 .093 .186 .234 .316 
.041 .112 .116 .281 .108 .253 
B3 Voting & shareholder meeting procedures 
Listed 
Not listed 
.013 .039 .041 .082 .097 .191 
.014 .039 .014 .039 .014 .039 
C Financial transparency & information disclosure 
Listed 
Not listed 
.560 .149 .628 .136 .707 .143 
.476 .146 .575 .159 619 .142 
C1 Business focus Listed Not listed 
.566 .178 .650 .210 .733 .244 
.551 .160 .653 .218 .693 .199 
C2 Accounting policy review 
 
Listed 
Not listed 
.638 .220 .694 .175 .736 .196 
.451 .304 .600 .251 .659 .235 
C3 Accounting policy details 
 
Listed 
Not listed 
.875 .353 1.00 .000 1.00 .000 
.822 .375 .933 .258 .933 .258 
C4 Related party structure & transaction Listed Not listed 
.156 .186 .218 .208 .406 .325 
.033 .087 .066 .114 .100 1.26 
C5 Information on auditors Listed Not listed 
.531 .247 .531 .247 .625 .189 
.433 .258 .466 .228 .533 .265 
D Board and management structure and process 
Listed 
Not listed 
.278 .098 .289 .086 .328 .094 
.205 .081 .255 .090 .281 .104 
D1 Board structure and composition Listed Not listed 
.515 .169 .562 .178 .625 .099 
.433 .182 .500 .170 .550 .181 
D2 Role of the board Listed Not listed 
.260 .113 .260 .121 .322 .136 
.211 .108 .288 .121 .322 .140 
D3 Director training & compensations Listed Not listed 
.166 .178 .166 .178 .166 .178 
.044 .117 .088 .152 .088 .152 
D4 Executive compensation & evaluation Listed Not listed 
.166 .118 .069 .101 .166 .118 
.103 .028 .140 .089 .118 .065 
23 Co. Not listed in 2005, 3 listed and 20 Not listed in 2006, 5 listed and 20 Not listed in 2007, and 8 listed and 19 Not listed in 2008 
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6.6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D (Companies LLSM and NLLSM)  
Table 6.11shows that, overall, S&P T&D in companies LLSM and NLLSM had a 
strong statistically significant increase (F = 10.72, p = .000) (F = 16.89, p = .000) 
respectively between the three years (from 06 to 08). The T&D in companies LLSM 
showed a statistically significant increased, (t = 2.96, p = .021), (t = 2.96, p = .021), 
and (t = 2.43, p =.045) for two years 06-07, 06-08, and 07-08 respectively. In addition, 
the T&D in companies NLLSM had a strong statistically significant increased (t = 
4.59, p = .000), (t = 5.42, p = .000), and (t = 4.44, p =.000) for the two years 06-07, 
06-08, and 07-08 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
       However, overall T&D in companies LLSM and NLLSM have statistically 
significant increase during three years and pair years. 
6.6.1.2 Descriptive statistics Three Categories of S&P T&D  
Overall, companies LLSM and NLLSM showed a strong statistically significant 
increase, for three categories, ownership structure and investor right (×2= 21, p = 
.000), (×2= 36.9, p = .000); financial transparency and information disclosure (F= 
10.7, p = .000) (F = 16.8, p = .000); and board and management structure and process 
(F= 8.51, p = .000) (F= 14.8, p = .000) respectively. Almost all the companies listed 
and not listed for financial transparency and information disclosure, and companies 
not listed for board and management structure and process, was significantly different 
increase between two years (pair). In addition, the category, ownership structure and 
investor rights, for companies LLSM had a statistically significant increase between 
the years 06 and 08, while the companies NLLSM had no statistically significant 
increase between three pairs (see Table 6.12). 
 
Table  6.11 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D on Companies 
Listed in LSM and not Listed 
S&P 
TD Co. 
Three years 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TD 
L 10.72 .000*** 2.96 .021* 2.96 .021* 2.43 .045* 
N 16.89 .000*** 4.59 .000*** 5.42 .000*** 4.44 .000*** 
L=Company listed in LSM, N=Company unlisted in LSM, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant 
value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t 
statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not 
normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, 
**Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
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      However, three categories had strong statistically significant increase during the 
four years with both groups. The first category only had statistically significant 
increase with companies LLSM in pair years 06-07.     
6.6.1.3 Descriptive Statistics for Twelve Subcategories of S&P T&D  (Companies 
LLSM and NLLSM)   
With twelve subcategories, for companies’ NLLSM, more items (9 out of 12) were 
significantly different increase than companies’ LLSM (7 out of 12) between the three 
years. The role of the board of companies’ NLLSM showed statistically significant 
increase between all pair years. Companies LLSM and NLLSM showed no 
statistically significant increase for the subcategories voting and shareholder meeting 
procedures, information on auditors, and director training and compensation for four 
years (see Table 6.13).  
Table  6.12 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Three Categories 
S&P 
TD 
 
Co. 
Three years 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
OSIR L 21.0 .000*** 1.34 .180 2.03 .042* 1.82 .063 
N 36.9 .000*** 1.84 .066 1.84 .066 1.00 .317 
FT ID L 10.7 .000*** 2.96 .021* 2.70 .030* 1.79 .116 
N 16.8 .000*** 3.68 .002** 4.82 .000*** 3.24 .005** 
BMSP L 8.51 .001*** .893 .402 2.82 .026* 2.58 .036* 
N 14.8 .000*** 3.32 .005** 3.73 .002** 2.19 .044* 
L= Company listed in LSM, N= Company unlisted in LSM, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally 
distributed, whereas Chi-Square & Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and 
pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
Table  6.13 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Twelve Subcategories 
S&P 
TD 
 
Co. 
Tree years 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TO L 6.33 .096 - - - - - - N 9.42 .024* 1.34 .180 1.34 .180 .000 1.00 
CO L 9.20 .027* 1.41 .157 1.89 .059 1.34 .180 N 8.53 .036* 1.63 .102 1.63 .102 1.00 .317 
VSMP L 5.40 .145 - - - - - - N .000 1.00 - - - - - - 
BF L 4.24 .017** 1.78 .118 2.14 .069 1.23 .257 N 11.7 .001*** 2.82 .013** 3.70 .002** 2.02 .060 
APR L 15.8 .001*** 1.34 .180 1.89 .059 1.73 .083 N 15.7 .001*** 2.06 .039* 2.52 .012* 2.07 .038* 
APD L 12.0 .017** 1.00 .317 1.00 .317 .000 1.00 N 51.8 .000*** 1.34 .180 1.34 .180 .000 1.00 
RPST L 8.75 .033* 1.41 .157 1.84 .066 1.85 .063 N 9.42 .024* 1.41 .157 2.00 .046* 1.41 .157 
IA L 7.00 .072 - - - - - - N 7.80 .052 - - - - - - 
BSC L 2.66 .075 - - - - - - N 5.58 .003** 2.08 .056 3.10 .008** 1.68 .111 
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      However, the level of T&D had statistically significant increase for both groups 
during the four years. 
      The level of T&D in companies LLSM was higher than for those not listed, and 
had increased statistically significant at the level of 0.05% during three years. From 
the above, hypothesis H4 is accepted. Table 6.14 presents a summary of the test of 
sub-hypothesis H4 as follows: 
Table  6.14 Test of  Hypothesis  Level of S&P T&D 
H 
Hypothesis 
Result  
Three 
years 
2006- 
2007 
2006-
2008 
2007- 
2008 
H4 Companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market provide more 
T&D in their annual reports than companies not listed. A A A A 
H4.1 Ownership structure and investor rights A A A A 
H4.1.1 Transparency of ownership R R R R 
H4.1.2 Concentration of ownership   A R R R 
H4.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures  R R R R 
H4.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure A A A A 
H4.2.1 Business focus A R R R 
H4.2.2 Accounting policy review A R R R 
H4.2.3 Accounting policy details  A R R R 
H4.2.4 Related party structure and transactions A R R R 
H4.2.5 Information on auditors R R R R 
H4.3 Board and management structure and process A R A A 
H4.3.1 Board structure and composition R R R R 
H4.3.2 The role of board of directors R R R R 
H4.3.3 Director training and composition R R R R 
H4.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive A A R A 
A=Accepted (Has been significant increase and high level), R=Rejected (Not has been significant increase), and R=Rejected 
(Significant increase, but not high mean). 
6.6.2 Quality of S&P Transparency and Disclosure for Company’s Ownership 
This subsection presents the main level of T&D results for the public and private 
sector in their annual reports and whether there is a statistically significant increase 
during the four years and paired years, by three stages: overall; three categories; and 
twelve subcategories. Specifically, subsection 6.6.2.1 will report the statistically 
RBD L 5.06 .009** .000 1.00 1.42 .197 1.52 .170 N 16.7 .000*** 2.95 .010** 3.83 .002** 2.40 .029* 
DTC L 6.00 .112 - - - - - - N 6.00 .112 - - - - - - 
ECE L 15.2 .002** 2.64 .008** .000 1.00 2.64 .008** N 34.5 .000*** 3.74 .000** 1.00 .317 3.90 .000*** 
L= Company listed in LSM, N= Company unlisted in LSM, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant 
value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t
statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not 
normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, 
**Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
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significant increase results for overall T&D during the four years and pair years to test 
H5. Subsection 6.6.2.2 will provide the statistically significant increase results for 
three categories of T&D during the four years and pair years to test sub-hypotheses 
H5.1, H5.2 and H5.3. Subsection 6.6.2.3 will present the statistically significant increase 
results for twelve subcategories of T&D during the four years and pair years to test 
sub-hypotheses H5.1.1 to H5.1.3, H5.2.1 to H5.2.5 and H5.3.1 to H5.3.4. Finally, a summary of 
the test hypotheses will be presented.                 
      The level of overall T&D in public sector companies was higher than in private 
sector companies, 38% and 37% in 2008, and an improvement of 15 and 10 points for 
four years respectively. 
       Furthermore, the study shows that with a marginal improvement in the first 
category, ownership structure and investor rights, the level of T&D was very low, 
13% and 10% in 2008 and improvement of 8 and 6 points for the two groups, public 
and private, respectively. In the second category, the level of T&D financial 
transparency and information disclosure in the public sector gave more information 
than the private sector during the years from 05 to 08 –69% and 62% – and 
improvement of 25 and 17 points for the public and private sector respectively. In the 
third category, the level of T&D board and management structure and process in the 
public sector was 30%, giving more information than the private sector, which was 
only 29% in 2008, and improvement was 12 and 8 points for four years, respectively. 
However, for three categories the public sector level of T&D was better than the 
private sector in 2008 (see Table 6.15 Pa. A). 
      Table 6.15 (Pa. B1, 2, and 3) illustrates that the level of T&D by three 
subcategories was very low for two sectors, with only a small improvement for four 
years, but the public sector showed a higher level of T&D for two subcategories 
(concentration of ownership, and voting and shareholder meeting procedures) than the 
private sector; however, the private sector showed a higher level of T&D transparency 
of ownership than the public sector. 
      The second, referring to the fifth subcategory showed a marked improvement 
especially in the level of T&D accounting policy details, an improvement by 38 points 
in the public sector during the four years. However, in the public sector T&D was 
better than in the private sector for three subcategories in 2008 (business focus, 
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accounting policy review, and related party structure and transaction), but the private 
sector showed a better T&D than the public sector for two subcategories (accounting 
policy details, and information on auditors) (see Table 6.15 Pa. C1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
       Thirdly, for four subcategories there was an improvement in the level of T&D, 
but it was still low. In those subcategories the T&D of the private sector was better 
than that of the public sector for three subcategories (board structure and composition, 
director training and compensations, and executive compensation and evaluation), but 
in the public sector T&D was better than that of the private sector for the role of the 
board (see Table 6.15 Pa. D1, 2, 3, and 4). Mean and Standard deviations results are 
shown in Table 6.15.   
      For more details descriptive statistics for the entire sample of all companies are 
presented in Appendix 7-C.        
Table  6.15 Transparency and Disclosure for Company’s Ownership 
Panel Variable Chare. 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
  A Total transparency & disclosure Public 
Private 
.230 .078 .281 .074 .335 .081 .382 .098 
.265 .120 .299 .091 .348 .098 .374 .102 
B Ownership structure & investor 
right 
Public 
Private 
.048 .036 .066 .052 .094 .101 .125 .127 
.044 .041 .066 .029 .098 .053 .102 .052 
B1 Transparency of ownership Public Private 
.103  .093 .116  .090 .116  .090 .123  .098 
.080  .084 .131  .080 .161  .060 .161  .060 
B2 Concentration of ownership Public Private 
.000  .000  .044  .116 .125  .290 .196  .324 
.027  .083 .027  .083 .083  .176 .083  .176 
B3 Voting & shareholder meeting procedures 
Public 
Private 
.023  .047 .023  .047 .039  .070 .063  .149 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .011  .033 .012  .037 
C Financial transparency & information disclosure 
Public 
Private 
.424 .160 .510 .139 .602 .144 .669 .140 
.450 .170 .498 .173 .581 .169 .619 .157 
C1    Business focus Public Private 
.542 .190 .590 .127 .709 .166 .766 .173 
.451 .232 .503 .203 .563 .249 .614 .242 
C2 Accounting policy review Public Private 
.428 .291 .523 .315 .627 .248 .766 .173 
.469 .270 .506 .255 .642 .206 .614 .242 
C3 Accounting policy details Public Private 
.547 .425 .857 .363 .928 .267 .928 .267 
.851 .294 .814 .376 .939 .200 .948 .184 
C4 Related party structure & transaction 
Public 
Private 
.071 .117 .071 .117 .107 .161 .232 .285 
.000 .000 .083 .176 .138 .181 .166 .216 
C5 Information on auditors Public Private 
.232 .249 .357 .254 .392 .234 .517 .285 
.555 .243 .638 .131 .638 .131 .638 .131 
D Board and management structure 
and process 
Public 
Private 
.179 .083 .222 .093 .259 .089 .302 .104 
.212 .155 .244 .095 .279 .097 .292 .096 
D1 Board structure and composition Public Private 
.154 .117 .208 .102 .267 .114 315 .139 
.194 .181 .259 .121 .296 .132 .333 .138 
D2 Role of the board Public Private 
.428 .144 .473 .178 .526 .191 .616 .158 
.444 .287 .444 .188 .513 .145 .513 .145 
D3 Director training & compensations Public Private 
.023 .089 .071 .141 095 .156 .095 .156 
.111 .166 .111 .166 .148 .175 .148 .175 
D4 Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Public 
Private 
.095 .059 .119 .081 .023 .064 .134 .099 
.098 .103 .135 .074 .024 .074 .135 .074 
14 Co. public and 9 private in 2005 and 2006,  14 public and 11 private in 2007 , 14 public and 13private in 2008  
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      The next subsections of this study shows descriptive statistics for overall T&D in 
subsection 6.6.2.1, while in subsection 6.6.2.2 three categories, and in subsection 
6.6.2.3 twelve subcategories are elaborated.  
6.6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D  (Company’s Ownership)      
Table 6.16 shows that S&P T&D in companies in the public and private sector had 
strong statistically significant increase (F = 19.5, p = .000) (F = 12.5, p = .000), 
respectively, among the four years. In addition, T&D in companies in the public 
sector were significantly different (t =2.80, p =.015), (t = 4.79, p = .000), (t =4.98, p 
=.000), (t = 3.74, p = .002), (t = 4.78, p = .000), and (t = 3.30, p =.006); while in 
companies in the private sector they were significantly different (t = 2.38, p = .048), (t 
=4.47, p =.003 ), (t = 4.51, p = .003), (t = 4.05, p = .004), (t = 3.89, p =.005), and (t = 
2.85, p =.017) for the years 05-06, 05-07, 05-08, 06-07, 06-08, and 07-08 respectively. 
          However, overall T&D in both groups had statistically significant increase 
during four and all pair years.  
6.6.2.2 Descriptive statistics Three Categories of S&P T&D (Company’s Ownership)      
Table 6.17 shows that, overall, companies in the public and private sector were 
significantly different for three categories, ownership structure and investor right (×2= 
26.1, p = .000), (×2= 23.8, p = .000), financial transparency and information 
disclosure (F= 13.8, p = .000) (F= 15.8, p = .000), board and management structure 
and process (F = 17.2, p = .000) (F = 5.51, p = .028), respectively, for the four years. 
Company’s public sector financial transparency and information disclosure, and board 
and management structure and process were significantly different between all two 
years (pair). 
 
 
 
Table  6.16 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D (Ownership Structure) 
S&P 
TD 
 
Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TD Pu 19.5 .000*** 2.80 .015* 4.79 .000*** 4.98 .000*** 3.74 .002** 4.78 .000*** 3.30 .006** Pr 12.5 .003** 2.38 .048* 4.47 .003** 4.51 .003** 4.05 .004** 3.89 .005** 2.85 .017* 
Pu= Public sector, Pr= Private sector, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not 
Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not 
normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and 
***Significant at 0.001). 
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       However, first and second categories had strong statistically significant increases 
for both groups and third category for the public sector during the four years. In 
addition, second and third categories had statistically significant increase for both 
groups in all pair years. 
6.6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics Twelve Subcategories of S&P T&D (Company’s 
Ownership)     
Table 6.18 illustrates that by twelve subcategories the company’s public sector had 
more items (9 out of 12), showing a statistically significant increase than the private 
sector for the years (from 05 to 08). In addition, companies in both the public and 
private sector had no statistically significant increase for subcategories’ voting and 
shareholder meeting procedures, and director training and compensation for four 
years. The role of the board, and executive compensation and evaluation for both 
sectors was significantly different during the four years. The role of the board for 
companies’ in the private sector was significantly different (five pairs out of six). The 
private sector company’s related party structure and transactions showed a statistically 
significant increase for four years, but no statistically significant increase existed for 
all pairs (two years).   
     However, two subcategories, voting and shareholder meeting procedures and 
director training and compensation had no statistically significant increase with both 
groups during the four years. Subcategory transparency of ownership had no 
statistically significant increase with the public sector during the four years, while 
accounting policy details was uneven, and information on auditors had no statistically 
significant increase with the private sector during the four years. 
 
Table  6.17 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Three Categories (Ownership structure) 
S&P 
TD 
 
Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
OSI
R 
Pu 26.1 .000*** 1.60 .102 1.84 .066 2.02 .043* 1.60 .109 2.03 .042* 1.46 .144 
Pr 23.8 .000*** 1.63 .102 2.26 .024** 2.41 .016** 1.63 .102 1.84 .066 1.00 .317 
FTI
D 
Pu 13.8 .000*** 2.37 .034* 3.61 .003** 4.25 .001*** 3.17 .007** 4.31 .001*** 2.65 .020* 
Pr 15.8 .000*** 3.33 .010** 5.06 .001*** 4.92 .001** 3.83 .005** 3.36 .010* 2.08 .064 
BMS
P 
Pu 17.2 .000*** 2.21 .045* 5.09 .000*** 6.13 .000*** 2.43 .030* 3.78 .002** 3.00 .010** 
Pr 5.51 .028* 1.47 .179 2.33 .048* 2.67 .028* 2.05 .074 2.67 .028* 2.39 .038* 
Pu= Public sector, Pr= Private sector, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not 
Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not 
normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and 
***Significant at 0.001).  
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      The extent of T&D was generally greater for companies in the public sector as 
opposed to companies in the private sector, with the statistically significant increase in 
T&D relative to the necessary information subset. Furthermore, the study shows that 
for both sectors, T&D for overall and three categories, there were statistically 
significant increases between four years for almost all subcategories, specifically 
company’s public sector. 
      The level of T&D in the public sector was more than in the private, and had 
increased statistically significant at the level of 0.05% during the four years. From the 
above, the hypothesis H5 is accepted. The table 6.19 presents a summary of the test of 
sub-hypothesis H5 as follows: 
 
 
Table  6.18 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Twelve Subcategories (Ownership 
Structure) 
S&P 
TD 
 
Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TO Pu 4.00 .261 - - - - - - - - - - - - Pr 11.8 .008** 1.63 .102 2.07 .038* 2.07 .038* 1.34 .180 1.34 .180 .000 1.00 
CO Pu 10.8 .013* 1.34 .180 1.60 .109 2.04 .041* 1.63 .102 2.06 .039* 1.06 .285 Pr 6.00 .112 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
VS
MP 
Pu 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Pr 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
BF Pu 8.45 .000*** 1.05 .309 2.89 .012* 3.22 .007* 3.10 .008* 3.86 .002** 1.47 .165 Pr 5.46 .005** 2.13 .065 3.01 .017* 3.19 .013* 1.51 .169 1.89 .095 1.69 .121 
AP
R 
Pu 14.2 .003** 1.62 .104 2.21 .027* 2.49 .013* 1.60 .109 2.38 .017* 2.12 .034* 
Pr 14.2 .003** 1.34 .180 2.03 .042* 2.20 .027* 1.84 .066 2.02 .043* 1.63 .102 
AP
D 
Pu 18.5 .000*** 2.33 .020* 2.46 .014** 2.46 .014** 1.00 .317 1.00 .317 .000 1.00 
Pr 4.80 .187 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RPS
T 
Pu 11.5 .010* .000 1.00 .816 .414 1.93 .054 1.41 .157 2.26 .024* 2.07 .038* 
Pr 9.20 .027* 1.34 .180 1.89 .059 1.85 .063 1.41 .157 1.34 .180 1.00 .317 
IA Pu 10.2 .016* 1.41 .157 1.66 .096 2.15 .031* 1.00 .317 1.84 .066 1.84 .066 Pr 6.00 .112 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
BSC Pu 9.17 .000*** 1.16 .266 2.34 .035* 5.50 .000*** 2.12 .054 3.47 .004** 2.11 .055 Pr 1.12 .334 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RB
D 
Pu 11.6 .000*** 2.09 .057 3.97 .002** 5.68 .000*** 2.11 .055 2.93 .012* 1.84 .088 
Pr 8.65 .000*** 2.40 .043* 2.81 .023* 3.78 .005** 1.51 .169 2.87 .021* 2.39 .038* 
DT
C 
Pu 7.20 .066 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Pr 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
EC
E 
Pu 27.0 .000*** .816 .414 2.13 .033* 1.28 .197 3.46 .001** 1.00 .317 3.35 .001*** 
Pr 21.6 .000*** 1.73 .083 2.44 .014* 1.73 .083 3.00 .003** .000 1.00 3.31 .001*** 
Pu= Public sector, Pr= Private sector, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not 
Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not 
normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and 
***Significant at 0.001).  
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Table  6.19 Test of  Hypothesis Level of S&P T&D (Company’s Ownership) 
H 
Hypothesis 
Result  
Four 
years 
2005-
2006 
2005-
2007 
2005-
2008 
2006- 
2007 
2006-
2008 
2007- 
2008 
H5 Public financial companies provide more T&D in their 
annual reports than private “individual” companies. A A A A A A A 
H5.1 Ownership structure and investor rights A R R A R A R 
H5.1.1 Transparency of ownership R R R R R R R 
H5.1.2 Concentration of ownership   A R R A R A R 
H5.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures  R R R R R R R 
H5.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure A A A A A A A 
H5.2.1 Business focus A R A A A A R 
H5.2.2 Accounting policy review A R A A R A A 
H5.2.3 Accounting policy details  R R R R R R R 
H5.2.4 Related party structure and transactions A R R R R A A 
H5.2.5 Information on auditors R R R R R R R 
H5.3 Board and management structure and process A A A A A A A 
H5.3.1 Board structure and composition R R R R R R R 
H5.3.2 The role of board of directors A R A A R A R 
H5.3.3 Director training and composition R R R R R R R 
H5.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive R R R R R R R 
A=Accepted (Has been significant increase and high mean), R=Rejected (Not has been significant increase), and R=Rejected 
(Significant increase, but not high mean).   
6.6.3 Quality of S&P Transparency and Disclosure by Company Size 
This subsection presents the main level of T&D results for small, middle and large 
companies in their annual reports and whether there is statistically significant increase 
during the four years and pair years, by three stages: overall; three categories; and 
twelve subcategories. Specifically, subsection 6.6.3.1 will provide the statistically 
significant increase results for overall T&D during the four years and pair years to test 
H6. Subsection 6.6.3.2 will report the statistically significant increase results for three 
categories of T&D during the four years and pair years to test sub-hypotheses H6.1, 
H6.2, and H6.3. Subsection 6.6.3.3 will present the statistically significant increase 
results for twelve subcategories of T&D during the four years and pair years to test 
sub-hypotheses H6.1.1 to H6.1.3, H6.2.1 to H6.2.5, and H6.3.1 to H6.3.4. Finally, a summary of 
the test hypotheses will be presented.       
      The study shows that overall improvement of the T&D level was at 10, 17, and 17 
points during the four years for small, middle and large companies respectively; 
however, difference level T&D was small between the groups, with middle and large 
companies showing more improvement in their T&D than small companies during the 
four years (see Table 6.20 Pa. A). 
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       Furthermore, the study shows a negligible improvement in the first category, 
ownership structure and investor right, where the level of T&D is very low at 12%, 
12% and 10% in 2008 for the three groups small, middle and large companies, 
respectively (see Table 6.20 Pa. B). In the second category the level of financial 
transparency and information disclosure was greater in large companies giving more 
information than small and middle companies, where T&D improvement level was at 
15, 28, and 30 points for the small, middle and large companies respectively (see 
Table 6.20 Pa. C). In the third category the level of T&D board and management 
structure was low during the four years, showing an improvement of 4, 14 and 10 
points for the small, middle and large companies respectively (see Table 6.20 Pa. D).  
Table (6.20 Pa. B1, 2, and 3) presents first that the level of T&D by the three 
subcategories was very low for the three groups, showing a small improvement for 
four years. The small companies were at the best level of T&D for transparency of 
ownership, the middle companies were at the best level of T&D for concentration of 
ownership, and the large companies were at the best level of T&D for voting and 
shareholder meeting procedures in 2008. With the second, by the five subcategories, 
the level of T&D accounting policy details was very high for three groups showing 
100% for large companies in 2008, and improvement of 42 points during the four 
years. The level of T&D was high by three subcategories for three groups (business 
focus, accounting policy review, and information on auditors), but the related party 
structure and transaction was low for three groups at 19%, 25% and 19% for small, 
middle and large companies, respectively. However, the large companies were at the 
best level of T&D for three subcategories (business focus 80%, accounting policy 
details 100%, and information on auditors 63%), the small companies were at the best 
level of T&D for two subcategories (accounting policy review, 67%, and information 
on auditors, 63%) and the middle companies were at the best level of T&D for related 
party structure transaction at 25% (see Table 6.20 Pa. C1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
      In the third, the level of T&D for four subcategories was medium in the board 
structure and composition, but very low in three subcategories. Small companies had 
the best level of T&D in three subcategories (role of the board, 35%, director training 
and compensations, 17%, and executive compensation and evaluation, 9%), and the 
middle companies had the best level of T&D in board structure and composition, 66% 
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(see Table 6.20 Pa. D1, 2, 3, and 4). Mean and Standard deviations results are shown 
in Table 6.20. 
Table  6.20 Transparency and Disclosure for Company Size 
Panel Variable Chare. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A 
Total transparency & disclosure Small 
Middle 
Large 
.282 .109 .310 .083 .358 .095 .376 .103 
.202 .054 .275 .077 .330 .066 .374 .079 
.204 .070 .244 .066 .303 .096 .367 .137 
B Ownership structure & investor 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.051 .040 .077 .044 .116 .093 .116 .083 
.045 .033 .066 .043 .076 .066 .122 .112 
.035 .041 .035 .041 .071 .101 .107 .170 
B1 Transparency of ownership 
 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.090  .000 .128  .081 .151  .070 .151  .070 
.103  .097 .129  .088 .129  .088 .129  .088 
.090  .105 .090  .105 .090  .105 .113  .136 
B2 Concentration of ownership 
 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.020  .072 .052  .124 .145  .310 .135  .279 
.000  .000  .035  .094 .071  .189 .232  .341 
.000  .000  .000  .000  .062  .125 .062  .125 
B3 
Voting & shareholder meeting 
procedures 
 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.018  .043 .018  .043 .018  .043 .027  .050 
.015  .042 .015  .042 .015  .042 .015  .042 
.000  .000  .000  .000  .055  .111 .138  .277 
C Financial transparency & information disclosure 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.485 .165 .521 .161 .592 .161 .635 .145 
.371 .110 .485 .148 .608 .156 .649 .169 
.392 .205 .492 .151 .571 .149 .692 .130 
C1   Business focus 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.505 .228 .544 .196 .600 .239 .638 .228 
.523 .208 .561 .138 .742 .146 .771 .162 
.483 .191 .583 .113 650 .206 .800 .210 
C2 Accounting policy review 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.518 .277 .546 .261 .648 .216 .713 .167 
.333 .256 .507 .356 .603 .278 .650 .310 
.416 .319 .444 .300 .642 .227 .666 .240 
C3 Accounting policy details 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.888 .259 .861 .332 .952 .178 .958 .166 
.333 .333 .714 .488 .857 .378 .857 .378 
.583 .500 1.00 .000 1.00 .000 1.00 .000 
C4 Related party structure & transaction 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.020 .072 .083 .162 .125 .168 .187 .216 
.071 .122 .071 .122 .142 .196 .250 .353 
.062 .125 .062 .125 .062 .125 .187 .239 
C5 Information on auditors 
 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.500 .072 .562 .162 .604 .168 .625 .216 
.214 .122 .392 .122 .392 .196 .428 .353 
.187 .125 .312 .125 .312 .125 .625 .239 
D Board and management 
structure and process 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.226 .138 .252 .088 .288 .087 .311 .097 
.159 .067 .232 .089 .257 .075 .302 .073 
.150 .088 .164 .102 .221 .130 .250 .151 
D1 Board structure and composition 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.479 .254 .468  .177 .531 .151 .552 .145 
.410  .118 .464  .156 .500  .161 .660 .094 
.343  .157 .437  .260 .531  .277 .500  .250 
D2 Role of the board 
 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.208  .160 .270  .107 .305 .114 .347 .127 
.119  .116 .214  .081 .261  .089 .285  .106 
.145  .125 .125  .107 .229  .184 .312  .219 
D3 Director training & 
compensations 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.111  .164 .111  .164 .166  .174 .166  .174 
.000  .000 .095  .162 .095  .162 .095  .162 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
D4 Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Small 
Middle 
Large 
.101  .088 .129  .064 .018  .064 .148 .086 
.095  .076 .142  .105 .047  .087 .142  .105 
.083  .055 .083  .055 .083  .055 .083  .055 
10 Co. small, 5 middle and 8 large in 2005, 9 Co. small, 5 middle and 9 large in 2006, 9 Co. small, 7 middle and 9 large in 2007 
and 10 small, 8 middle and 9 large in 2008  
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       For more details descriptive statistics for the entire sample of all companies are 
presented in Appendix 7-D. 
      The next subsections of this study show descriptive statistics for overall T&D in 
subsection 6.6.3.1; while in subsection 6.6.3.2 three categories and in subsection 
6.6.3.3 twelve subcategories are elaborated. 
6.6.3.1  Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D  (Company Size)         
Table 6.21 shows that S&P T&D on companies size (small and middle), had a 
statistically significant increase (F = 17.6, p = .000), and (F = 12.9, p = .000), 
respectively, during the four years. Also, overall T&D on small companies had a 
statistically significant increase (t =2.63, p =.025), (t = 4.66, p = .001), (t =4.93, p 
=.001), (t = 3.91, p = .002), (t = 4.21, p = .001), and (t = 3.71, p =.003) between for 
pair years (see Table 6.20). However, large companies had not statistically significant 
during the four years (F = 4.12, p = .115). 
      However, overall T&D of small companies had a strong statistically significant 
increase during the four years and a strong statistically significant increased for all 
pair years. While, large companies had no statistically significant increase during the 
four years.     
6.6.3.2   Descriptive statistics Three Categories of S&P T&D (Company Size)         
 For small companies overall, three categories had a statistically significant increase 
during the four years, ownership structure and investor rights (×2= 17.4, p = .001), 
financial transparency and information disclosure (F = 18.2, p = .000), and board and 
management structure and process (F= 11.4, p = .000). For small companies, financial 
transparency and information disclosure had a statistically significant increase by each 
pair. The ownership structure and investor rights for middle and large companies had 
no statistically significant increase for the four years. The financial transparency and 
Table  6.21 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D (Company Size) 
S&P 
TD Co.
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TD 
S 17.6 .000*** 2.63 .025* 4.66 .001*** 4.93 .001*** 3.91 .002** 4.21 .001*** 3.71 .003** 
M 12.9 .000*** 2.17 .073 3.83 .009** 4.19 .006** 2.52 .045* 4.17 .006** 3.95 .008** 
L 4.12 .115 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
S= Small Companies, M = Middle Companies, L= Large Companies, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas 
Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). 
(*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001).  
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information disclosure, and board and management structure and process for large 
companies had no statistically significant increase for the four years (see Table 6.22).  
      However, three categories had an increase in statistically significant increase only 
for small companies during the four years; while large companies had no statistically 
significant increase in the three categories. 
6.6.3.3 Descriptive Statistics Twelve Subcategories of S&P T&D (Company Size)  
 With the twelve subcategories, small companies had more items (7 out of 12) showing a 
statistically significant increase than the middle and large companies for the four years. Most 
of the twelve subcategories for pair years had no statistically significant increase. The 
executive compensation and evaluation had a statistically significant increase for the three 
groups for the four years (see Table 6.23).        
Table  6.22 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Three Categories (Company Size) 
S&P 
TD Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
OS
IR 
S 17.4 .001*** 1.84 .066 2.41 .016** 1.00 .391 2.03 .042* 1.84 .066 .000 1.00 
M 7.37 .061 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
L 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
FT
ID 
S 18.2 .000*** 2.91 .014 ** 4.48 .001*** 5.36 .000*** 3.80 .003** 4.12 .002 ** 2.70 .018* 
M 9.14 .008** 1.72 .135 3.17 .019** 3.47 .013** 2.84 .029* 3.36 .015 ** 2.97 .025* 
L 3.61 .058 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
BM
SP 
S 7.47 .001*** 1.42 .183 2.86 .015* 3.48 .005 2.61 .024* 2.62 .023* 1.68 .117 
M 11.4 .000*** 2.31 .060 3.94 .008** 5.00 .002** 1.11 .308 2.71 .035* 3.66 .010** 
L 4.85 .061 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
S= Small Companies, M = Middle Companies, L= Large Companies, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, 
whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). 
(*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
Table  6.23 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Twelve Subcategories (Company Size) 
S&P 
TD Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TO 
S 11.8 .008** 1.63 .102 2.07 .038 * 2.07 .038 1.34 .180 1.34 .180 .000 1.00 
M 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
L 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CO 
S 8.53 .036* 1.00 .317 1.63 .102 1.63 .102 1.63 .102 1.63 .102 1.00 .317 
M 7.00 .072 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
L 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
VS
MP 
S 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 0.00 1.00 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
L 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
BF 
S 6.09 .002** 2.02 .067 3.13 .009** 3.18 .009** 1.82 .096 2.08 .61 1.63 .102 
M 5.91 .005** .450 .668 2.11 .079 2.66 .037* 3.63 .011 4.46 .004 1.13 .257 
L 2.55 .121 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
AP
R 
S 15.9 .001*** 1.34 .180 2.03 .042* 2.38 .017** 1.84 .066 2.20 .027* 1.89 .059 
M 7.22 .065 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
L 5.66 .129 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
AP
D 
S 4.80 .187 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 12.7 .005** 2.00 .046* 2.12 .034* 2.12 .034* 1.00 .317 1.00 .317 .000 1.00 
L 6.00 .112 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
RPS
T 
S 12.3 .006** 1.34 .180 1.89 .059 2.27 .023* 1.41 .157 1.89 .059 1.73 .083 
M 4.20 .241 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
L 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
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      However, three categories had increased statistically significant only with small 
companies during the four years; while subcategories had increased statistically 
significant for 7, 5, and 1 out of 12 for small, middle and large companies, respectively. 
Furthermore, large companies had statistically significant increase only with subcategory 
Compensation and evaluation of executive during the four years.  
      The T&D in large companies had no statistically significant increase; therefore, in 
this study hypothesis H6 is rejected. The results for the sub-hypotheses are summarised in 
Table 6.24 as follows: 
Table  6.24 Test of  Hypothesis Level of S&P T&D (Company Size) 
H 
Hypothesis 
Result  
Four 
years 
2005-
2006 
2005-
2007 
2005-
2008 
2006- 
2007 
2006-
2008 
2007- 
2008 
H6 Companies with greater total assets provide more T&D in 
their annual reports than those with fewer total assets. R R R R R R R 
H6.1 Ownership structure and investor rights R R R R R R R 
H6.1.1 Transparency of ownership R R R R R R R 
H6.1.2 Concentration of ownership   R R R R R R R 
H6.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures  R R R R R R R 
H6.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure R R R R R R R 
H6.2.1 Business focus R R R R R R R 
H6.2.2 Accounting policy review R R R R R R R 
H6.2.3 Accounting policy details  R R R R R R R 
H6.2.4 Related party structure and transactions R R R R R R R 
H6.2.5 Information on auditors R R R R R R R 
H6.3 Board and management structure and process R R R R R R R 
H6.3.1 Board structure and composition R R R R R R R 
H6.3.2 The role of board of directors R R R R R R R 
H6.3.3 Director training and composition R R R R R R R 
H6.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive R R R R R R R 
A=Accepted (Has been significant increase and high level), R=Rejected (Not has been significant increase). 
IA 
S 7.00 .072 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
L 6.33 .096 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
BSC 
S 1.67 .192 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 9.41 .001*** 1.44 .200 1.98 .094 5.29 .002 1.00 .356 3.26 .017** 2.46 .049* 
L 2.73 .151 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
RB
D 
S 11.3 .000*** 2.69 .021* 3.38 .006 4.43 .001*** 1.82 .096 2.93 .014** 2.48 .028* 
M 7.26 .002 ** 2.48 .047 * 4.07 .007 4.09 .006** 1.08 .321 1.44 .200 1.54 .172 
L 3.44 .104 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
DT
C 
S 6.00 .112 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 6.00 .112 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
L 0.00 1.00 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
EC
E 
S 29.2 .000*** 1.73 .083 3.00 .003** 1.89 .059 3.46 .001*** 3.46 .001*** 3.63 .000*** 
M 11.0 .011** .816 .414 .828 .408 .816 .414 2.44 .014** .000 1.00 2.44 .014** 
L 9.00 .029* .000 1.00 1.73 .083 .000 1.00 1.73 .083 .000 1.00 1.73 .083 
S= Small Companies, M = Middle Companies, L= Large Companies, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas 
Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant 
at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001).  
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6.6.4 Quality of S&P Transparency and Disclosure for Company Age 
This subsection presents the main level of T&D results for younger, medium and 
older companies in their annual reports and whether there is statistically significant 
increase during the four years and paired years, by three stages: overall; three 
categories; and twelve subcategories. Specifically, subsection 6.6.4.1 will report the 
statistically significant increase results for overall T&D during the four years and pair 
years to test H7. Subsection 6.6.4.2 will provide the statistically significant increase 
results for three categories of T&D during the four years and pair years to test sub-
hypotheses H7.1, H7.2 and H7.3. Subsection 6.6.4.3 will present the statistically 
significant increase results for twelve subcategories of T&D during the four years and 
pair years to test sub-hypotheses H7.1.1 to H7.1.3, H7.2.1 to H7.2.5, and H7.3.1 to H7.3.4. 
Finally a summary of the test hypotheses will be presented.       
       The study shows that overall improvement of T&D level was at 9, 13 and 17 
points during the four years for younger, medium, and older companies, respectively; 
however, the older companies were at the best level of T&D improvement during the 
four years, while the younger companies were still at the best level of overall T&D 
with 38% in 2008 (see Table 6.25 Pa. A).  
      In Table 6.25 (Pa. B, C, and D), the results obtained from the preliminary analysis 
of the first categories ownership structure and investor rights, the level of T&D was 
very low during the four years, while the older companies were at the best level of 
T&D with 13% in 2008. In the second category of financial transparency and 
information disclosure, the level of T&D was above average and close together for the 
three groups. In the third category of board and management structure and process for 
the three groups the level of T&D was low, but the medium companies had the best 
level of T&D with 32% in 2008.     
      Therefore, on the level of T&D for twelve subcategories measured by age of the 
company, the study shows that the first, the level of T&D by the three subcategories 
was very low for three groups with a small improvement during the four years. The 
older companies were at the best level of T&D for two subcategories (concentration of 
ownership, 21%, and voting and shareholder meeting procedures, 7%) in 2008, and 
the medium companies were at the best level of T&D transparency of ownership with 
15% in 2008 (see Table 6.25 Pa. B1, 2, and 3).  
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      For more details descriptive statistics for the entire sample of all companies are 
presented in Appendix 7-E. 
Table  6.25 Transparency and Disclosure for Company Age 
Panel Variable Chare. 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A 
Total transparency & 
disclosure 
 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.287 .117 .317 .086 .363 .090 .380 .086 
.248 .098 .272 .084 .348 .091 .375 .111 
.204 .059 .274 .072 .315 .082 .368 .108 
B Ownership structure & investor 
and rights 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.056 .034 .071 .020 .096 .060 .102 .059 
.041 .047 .071 .067 .113 .124 .107 .110 
.043 .034 .059 .043 .083 .079 .134 .134 
B1 Transparency of ownership 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.090 .084 .125 .083 .136 .084 .136 .084 
.090 .099 .121 .093 .151 .074 .151 .074 
.101 .095 .121 .090 .121 .090 .131 .102 
B2 Concentration of ownership 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.031 .088 .031 .088 .093 .186 .093 .186 
.000 .000 .062 .153 .166 .408 .145 .357 
.000 .000 .027 .083 .083 .176 .208 .306 
B3 Voting & shareholder meeting procedures 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.013 .039 .013 .039 .013 . 039 .027 .051 
.018 .045 .018 .045 .018 .045 .018 .045 
.012 .037 .012 .037 .037 .078 .074 .184 
C 
Financial transparency & 
information disclosure 
 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.485 .164 .532 .166 .607 .162 .657 .111 
.447 .176 .476 .156 .604 .153 .642 .182 
.381 .147 .501 .144 .574 .156 .647 .163 
C1 Business focus 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.525 .203 .558 .188 .641 .236 .683 .184 
.500 .241 .533 .188 .633 .272 .677 .311 
.496 .213 .570 .137 .674 .161 .748 .172 
C2 Accounting policy review 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.541 .268 .541 .268 .652 .217 .763 .110 
.425 .340 .481 .327 .648 .191 .648 .036 
.370 .248 .518 .309 .604 .278 .642 .303 
C3 Accounting policy details 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.750 .345 .916 .235 .933 .210 .944 .192 
.833 .408 .666 .516 1.00 .000 1.00 .000 
.481 .412 .888 .333 .888 .333 .888 .333 
4 Related party structure & transaction 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.000 .000 .062 .176 .093 .186 .125 .189 
.041 .102 .083 .129 .125 .136 .250 .223 
.083 .125 .083 .125 .138 .181 .250 .330 
C5 Information on auditors 
 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.500 .231 .593 .129 .593 .129 .593 .129 
.416 .341 .500 .273 .583 .129 .625 .136 
.194 .243 .333 .279 .333 .279 .500 .353 
D Board and management 
structure and process 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.217 .163 .246 .109 .285 .102 .303 .096 
.214 .078 .228 .059 .281 .061 .323 .087 
.155 .079 .219 .103 .241 .101 .276 .114 
D1 Board structure and composition 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.437 .291 .437 .200 .484 .155 .531 .173 
.500 .158 .479 .122 .583 .129 .625 .079 
.388 .145 .472 .205 .513 .211 .583 .187 
D2 Role of the board 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.197 .183 .260 .143 .322 .121 .343 .129 
.194 .113 .236 .062 .291 .102 .361 .136 
.129 .125 .194 .102 .231 .123 .277 .144 
D3 Director training & 
compensations 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.125 .172 .125 .172 .166 .178 .166 .178 
.055 .136 .055 .136 .111 .172 .111 .172 
.000 .000 .074 .147 .074 .147 .074 .147 
D4 Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Younger 
Medium 
Older 
.111 .102 .138 .078 .044 .093 .138 .078 
.092 .045 .111 .000 .111 .000 .148 .090 
.086 .074 .123 .103 .037 .078 .123 .103 
9 Co. young, 5 medium, and 9 older in 2005, 8 young, 6 medium, and 9 older in 2006, 9 young, 7 medium, and 9 older in 
2007and 10 young, 8 medium, and 9 older in 2008. 
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      The second, the level of T&D by the five subcategories, was very high in 
accounting policy details for three groups, and the medium companies were the best 
group with 100% in 2008. The business focus, accounting policy review was higher 
than average and at the best level of T&D for older and younger companies, 75% and 
76% in 2008, respectively. The level of T&D information on auditors was medium, 
and the best Level of T&D was in the medium companies with 63% in 2008. The 
level of T&D related party structure transaction was very low, and the best group was 
the medium and older companies with 25% in 2008 (see Table 6.25 Pa. C1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5).  
       The third, the level of T&D for four subcategories was medium in the board 
structure and composition, role of the board was low, and the best group was the 
medium companies showing 63 and 36% respectively. In addition, the level of T&D 
for two subcategories was very low (director training and compensations, and 
executive compensation and evaluation), while the best groups were the younger, 
17%, and the older companies, 10%, respectively (see Table 6.25 Pa. D1, 2, 3 and 
4).Mean and Standard deviations results are shown in Table 6.25. 
      The next subsections of this study show descriptive statistics for overall T&D in 
subsection 6.5.4.1; while in subsection 6.5.4.2, three categories, and in subsection 
6.5.4.3, twelve subcategories are elaborated. 
6.6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D  (Company Age) 
Table 6.26 presents the S&P T&D on the age of the companies (younger, medium, 
and older), which had statistically significant increase (F = 13.9, p = .000),  (F= 10.1, 
p = .018) and (F= 11.7, p = .002), respectively for the four years; also overall T&D for 
older companies had statistically significant increase (t =2.65, p =.029),(t = 3.73, p = 
.006), (t =3.75, p =.006 ), (t = 3.20, p = .012), (t = 3.50, p = .008), and (t = 2.36, 
p=.046) between the pair years.  
Table  6.26 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D (Company Age) 
S&P 
TD Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TD 
Y 13.9 .000*** 2.07 .084 3.93 .008** 4.70 .003** 3.46 .011** 4.10 .005** 3.33 .009** 
M 10.1 .018** 2.09 .091 3.50 .017** 3.52 .017** 2.83 .036* 2.91 .033* 2.79 .038* 
O 11.7 .002** 2.65 .029* 3.73 .006** 3.75 .006** 3.20 .012** 3.50 .008** 2.36 .046* 
Y=Younger companies, M= Medium companies, and O= Older companies, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined 
= Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z
statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 
0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
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      However, overall T&D had statistically significant increase for three groups 
during the four years. While only older companies had statistically significant 
increases for all pair years. 
6.6.4.2 Descriptive Statistics Three Categories of S&P T&D (Company Age) 
Ownership structure and investor rights of younger companies had a statistically significant 
increase, (F = 4.73, p = .013), but there was not a statistically significant increase for medium 
and older companies. 
       Financial transparency and information disclosure for three groups (younger, 
medium, and older) had a statistically significant increase (F = 15.12, p = .000), (F = 
6.74, p = .004), and (F = 8.51, p = .000); also board and management structure and 
process showed a statistically significant increase (F= 5.74, p = .005), (F = 5.42, p = 
.010), and (F = 11.3, p = .000) for the four years respectively.  In additional younger 
companies with financial transparency and information disclosure revealed a 
statistically significant increase with all pair years (see Table 6.27). 
      Three categories had increased statistically significant only with younger 
companies during the four years. The second category had increased statistically 
significant only with younger companies during all pair years. 
6.6.4.3 Descriptive Statistics Twelve Subcategories of S&P T&D (Company Age) 
It can be seen from the data in table 6.28 for the twelve subcategories, older 
companies with more items had more statistically significant increase than the 
younger and medium companies during the four years and pair years. The role of the 
board, and executive compensation and evaluation showed statistically significant 
Table  6.27 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Three Categories (Company Age) 
S&P 
TD Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
OSI
R 
Y 4.73 .013** 1.44 .200 2.48 .047* 3.05 .022* 1.48 .180 1.82 .112 1.00 .343 
M 2.42 .176 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 3.78 .072 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
FTI
D 
Y 15.1 .000*** 2.87 .024** 3.99 .005** 5.79 .000*** 3.11 .017** 3.71 .008** 2.34 .043* 
M 6.74 .004** 2.23 .076 2.62 .047* 2.65 .045* 2.52 .053 2.56 .050* 2.39 .062 
O 8.51 .000*** 2.27 .052 2.91 .019** 3.31 .010 *** 2.48 .038* 3.17 .013** 1.87 .098 
BM
SP 
Y 5.74 .005** 1.18 .275 2.42 .046* 2.80 .026* 2.43 .045* 2.73 .029* 1.62 .138 
M 5.42 .010** .696 .518 2.36 .065 3.20 .024* 2.01 .100 2.22 .077 1.62 .165 
O 11.3 .000*** 2.48 .038* 3.92 .004** 4.42 .002** 1.21 .259 3.20 .012** 2.47 .038* 
Y=Younger companies, M= Medium companies, and O= Older companies, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value,(Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas 
Chi-Square & Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). 
(*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001).  
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increase for all groups, but transparency of ownership, voting and shareholder meeting 
procedures, information on auditors, and director training and compensation had no 
statistically significant increase for all groups. 
      However, two subcategories, role of the board, and executive compensation and 
evaluation had increased statistically significant for three groups during the four years. In 
addition, 4, 4, and 7 out of 12 subcategories had increased statistically significant for 
younger, medium and older companies respectively. 
      As can be seen from the above, table the level of T&D revealed an increase in 
statistically significant in three groups. The hypothesis H7 is rejected because the younger 
Table  6.28 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Twelve Subcategories (Company Age) 
S&P 
TD Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TO 
Y 7.20 .066 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 4.71 .194 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 4.00 .261 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CO 
Y 6.00 .112 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 3. .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 9.20 .027* .000 1.00 1.41 .157 1.41 .157 1.41 .157 1.41 .157 .000 1.00 
VS
MP 
Y 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M .000 1.00 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
BF 
Y 5.12 .008** 1.87 .104 2.41 .047 3.05 .018* 1.72 .129 2.25 .059 1.35 .209 
M 3.84 .093 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 4.85 .009** 1.06 .319 2.15 .063 2.52 .036* 2.25 .054 3.07 .015* 1.25 .247 
AP
R 
Y 5.31 .033* --- --- 1.52 .170 2.82 .025* 1.52 .170 2.82 .025* 2.53 .032* 
M 3.46 .114 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 5.61 .022* 1.88 .096 2.73 .026* 2.71 .026* 1.49 .174 1.97 .084 2.00 .081 
AP
D 
Y 7.20 .066 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 4.71 .194 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 15.0 .002** 2.12 .034* 2.12 .034* 2.12 .034* .000 1.00 .000 1.00 .000 1.00 
RP
ST 
Y 6.00 .112 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 8.77 .032 * 1.00 .317 1.41 .157 1.89 .059 1.00 .317 1.63 .102 1.73 .083 
O 4.20 .241 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
IA 
Y 6.00 .112 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 4.60 .204 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 6.38 .094 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
BS
C 
Y 1.07 .381 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 2.65 .138 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 6.37 .002** 1.78 .111 2.68 .028* 4.60 .002* 1.41 .195 2.10 .069 1.34 .214 
RB
D 
Y 11.0 .000*** 2.04 .080 * 3.96 .005** 4.24 .004** 2.39 .048* 3.05 .018* 1.50 .168 
M 4.82 .015* 1.46 .203 1.94 .110 2.92 .033* 1.19 .286 2.08 .091 2.71 .042* 
O 5.59 .005** 1.79 .111 2.63 .030* 4.43 .002** 1.07 .312 1.89 .094 1.25 .247 
DT
C 
Y 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
M 3.00 .392 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
O 6.00 .112 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
EC
E 
Y 19.8 .000*** 1.41 .157 2.44 .014* 1.41 .157 2.82 .005** .000 1.00 3.16 .002** 
M 15.0 .002** 1.00 .317 2.23 .025* 1.34 .180 2.44 .014* 1.00 .317 2.33 .020* 
O 13.6 .003** .816 .414 1.08 .279 .816 .414 2.64 .008 .000 1.00 2.64 .008** 
Y=Younger companies, M= Medium companies, and O= Older companies, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas 
Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant 
at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001).  
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companies disclose more T&D than medium and older companies. The answers for the 
sub-hypotheses are summarised in table 6.29 as follows: 
Table  6.29 Test of  Hypothesis Level of S&P T&D (Company Age) 
H Hypothesis 
Result  
Four 
years 
2005-
2006 
2005-
2007 
2005-
2008 
2006- 
2007 
2006-
2008 
2007- 
2008 
H7 
Older financial companies provide more T&D 
in their annual reports than younger companies.  
R R R R R R R 
H7.1 Ownership structure and investor rights R R R R R R R 
H7.1.1 Transparency of ownership R R R R R R R 
H7.1.2 Concentration of ownership   R R R R R R R 
H7.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures  R R R R R R R 
H7.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure R R R R R R R 
H7.2.1 Business focus A R R A R A R 
H7.2.2 Accounting policy review A R A A R R R 
H7.2.3 Accounting policy details  A A A A R R R 
H7.2.4 Related party structure and transactions R R R R R R R 
H7.2.5 Information on auditors R R R R R R R 
H7.3 Board and management structure and process R R R R R R R 
H7.3.1 Board structure and composition A R A A R R R 
H7.3.2 The role of board of directors R R R R R R R 
H7.3.3 Director training and composition R R R R R R R 
H7.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive R R R R R R R 
A=Accepted (Has been significant increase and high level), R=Rejected (Not has been significant increase), and R=Rejected 
(Significant increase, but not high mean). 
6.6.5 Quality of S&P Transparency and Disclosure for Industry Type 
This subsection presents the main level of T&D results for industry type (Bank and 
Insurance) companies in their annual report and whether there is statistically 
significant increase during the four years and paired years, by three stages: overall; 
three categories; and twelve subcategories. Specifically, subsection 6.6.5.1 will report 
the statistically significant increase results for overall T&D during the four years and 
pair years to test H8. Subsection 6.6.5.2 will present the statistically significant 
increase results for three categories of T&D during the four years and pair years to test 
sub-hypotheses H8.1, H8.2 and H8.3. Subsection 6.6.5.3 will provide the statistically 
significant increase results for twelve subcategories of T&D during the four years and 
pair years to test sub-hypotheses H8.1.1 to H8.1.3, H8.2.1 to H8.2.5, and H8.3.1 to H8.3.4. 
Finally, a summary of test hypotheses will be presented.       
       The study shows no further improvement in the overall level of T&D during the 
four years for bank and insurance companies; however, the bank sector was better 
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T&D than the insurance sector at 41% and 34% in 2008, and upgrading 17 and 10 
points during the four years respectively (see Table 6.30 Pa. A). 
      Furthermore, the study shows a marginal improvement in ownership structure and 
investor right, where the level of T&D is very low for the two groups, bank sector and 
insurance sector; however, the level of T&D scores in the bank is better than the level 
of the insurance sector, and upgrading 8 and 6 points during the four years 
respectively (see Table 6.30 Pa. B). Moreover, for T&D by three categories, financial 
transparency and information disclosure were the best scores for both groups, 66% 
and 64% in 2008, and upgrading 24 and 18 points during the four years for banks and 
insurance, respectively (see Table 6.30 Pa. C). Therefore, board and management 
structure and process is low with 31% and 28% in 2008 and a small improvement for 
both groups at 12 and 9 points, and the level of T&D in the bank sector is better than 
the insurance sector. (See Table 6.30 Pa. D)  
       However, Table 6.30 (Pa. B1, 2, and 3) presents that the first, analysis for three 
subcategories, shows that the level of T&D scores per the two groups remains very 
weak and no change is obvious in this category. The average for transparency of 
ownership, concentration of ownership, and voting and shareholder meeting 
procedures shows a small improvement for assemblages at 4, 15 and 3 for the bank 
sector, and 5, 12 and 1 for the insurance sector during four years. Moreover, the study 
shows a very small change over four years in voting and shareholder meeting 
procedures for two sectors. Mean and Standard deviations results are shown in Table 
6.30.    
      The second, specifics of the best level for five subcategories, are the accounting 
policy details; almost all the companies for the two groups have a high level of T&D 
during the four years (See table 6.30 Pa. C3). Therefore the level of T&D for the three 
subcategories was above average (business focus, accounting policy review, and 
information on auditors) for the two groups, but the level of T&D related party 
structure and transaction was very low. However, the bank sector was better in the 
level of T&D than the insurance sector for four subcategories (accounting policy 
review, accounting policy details, related party structure and transaction, and 
information on auditors), but the insurance sector had a better level of T&D business 
focus than the bank sector (see Table 6.30 Pa. C1, 2, 4, 5). The third, analysis of T&D 
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shows that the best level T&D in the subcategory for the bank and insurance sector 
was board structure and composition, 61% and 53% in 2008, and improvement of 15 
and 13 points, respectively (see Table 6.30 Pa. D1). While almost all ranges of 
subcategories are very low, the level of T&D role of the board bank and insurance 
sector was 32% and 33% in 2008 and an improvement of 17 and 14 points, 
respectively (see Table 6.30 Pa. D2); the level of T&D director training compensation 
was very low at 14% and with 7% in 2008 and improvement of 7 and 4 points (see 
Table 6.30.Pa. D3). Also the level of T&D of executive compensation and evaluation 
was very low at 15% and 11% in 2008, respectively, with a small improvement, for 
the four years (see Table 6.30 Pa. D4). 
 
Table  6.30 Transparency and Disclosure for Industry Type 
Panel Variable Chare. 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A Total transparency & disclosure 
Banks 
Insurances 
.241 .075 .290 .069 .345 .069 .409 .092 
.244 .122 .283 .097 .331 .110 .342 .099 
B Ownership structure & investor 
right 
Banks 
Insurances 
.052 .034 .074 .049 .100 .097 .129 .107 
.039 .041 .055 .036 .067 .062 .099 .105 
B1 Transparency of ownership Banks Insurances 
.110 .088 .129 .085 .142 .077 .149 .084 
.070 .088 .111 .088 .121 .090 .121 .090 
B2 Concentration of ownership Banks Insurances 
.000 .000 .044 .116 .289 .289 .151 .260 
.027 .083 .027 .083 .055 .166 .152 .317 
B3 Voting & shareholder meeting procedures 
Banks 
Insurances 
.015 .040 .015 .040 .031 .067 .055 .149 
.012 .037 .012 .037 .012 .037 .024 .049 
C Financial transparency & information disclosure 
Banks 
Insurances 
.418 .151 .485 .136 .579 .141 .655 .138 
.460 .181 .536 .172 .615 .172 .641 .164 
C1 Business focus Banks Insurances 
.481 .222 .533 .167 .619 .233 .695 .232 
.548 .187 .592 .157 .703 .170 .725 .186 
C2 Accounting policy review Banks Insurances 
.428 .257 .500 .245 .619 .172 .698 .140 
.469 .322 .543 .357 .654 .306 .666 .319 
C3 Accounting policy details Banks Insurances 
.642 .380 .809 .386 .955 .172 .958 .166 
.703 .454 .888 .333 .888 .333 .888 .333 
C4 Related party structure & transaction 
Banks 
Insurances 
.035 .090 .053 .106 .107 .161 .232 .285 
.055 .110 .111. .181 .138 .181 .166 .216 
C5 Information on auditors Banks Insurances 
.375 .306 .464. .274 .500 .240 .571 .228 
.333 .279 .472 .232 .472 .232 .555 .273 
D Board and management 
structure and process 
Banks 
Insurances 
.191 .075 .242 .068 .273 .049 .312 .071 
.193 .164 .212 .123 .257 .137 .276 .134 
D1 Board structure and composition Banks Insurances 
.455 .143 .491 .166 .544 .135 .607 .108 
.402 .284 .416 .197 .486 .220 .527 .214 
D2 Role of the board Banks Insurances 
.154 .107 .220 .070 .261 .079 .315 .109 
.194 .190 .240 .158 .305 .166 .333 .176 
D3 Director training & 
compensations 
Banks 
Insurances 
.071 .141 .119 .165 .142 .171 .142 .171 
.037 .111 .037 .111 .074 .147 .074 .147 
D4 Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Banks 
Insurances 
.087 .047 .134 .064 .023 .064 .150 .082 
.111 .111 .111 .096 .024 .074 .111 .096 
              18 Co. bank and 5 insurance  in 2005 and 2006, 19 bank and 6 insurance  in 2007, and  20 bank and 7 insurance  in 2008 
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       For more details descriptive statistics for the entire sample of all companies are 
presented in Appendix 7-F. 
The next subsections of this study show descriptive statistics for overall T&D in 
subsection 6.3.1; while in subsection 6.3.2 three categories and in subsection 6.3.3 
twelve subcategories are elaborated. 
6.6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D  (Industry Type)           
It can be seen from the data in Table 6.31that overall S&P  T&D on industry type  
(Banks and Insurance companies) were significantly different (F = 18.5, p = .000 and 
F = 12, p = .003, respectively) during the four years; also the overall T&D on banks 
companies had a statistically significant increase (t =2.74, p =.018), (t = 5.36, p = 
.000), (t =4.79, p =.000 ), (t = 4.20, p = .001), (t = 4.54, p = .001), and (t = 3.13, p 
=.007) between the pair years.  
       However, for overall T&D, the banking sector had increased statistically 
significant during four and all pair years; while the insurance sector had increased 
statistically significant during the four years and pair years except pair years 05-06.   
6.6.5.2  Descriptive statistics Three Categories of S&P T&D (Industry Type)     
Overall, three categories for two groups showed a statistically significant increase in 
ownership structure and investor right (×2= 18.2, p = .000), and (×2= 8.79, p = .032); 
financial transparency and information disclosure (F = 15.9, p = .000), and (F = 8.95, 
p = .009);  board and management structure and process (F = 14.9, p = .000), and (F = 
7.44, p = .008) respectively, for banks and insurances for the four years. Also, overall 
two pairs had a statistically significant increase for financial transparency and 
information disclosure, and board and management structure and process (see Table 
6.32); however, the bank sector was very statistically significant with three categories.  
 
Table  6.31 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D (Industry Type) 
S&P 
TD Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TD B 
18.5 .000*** 2.74 .018** 5.36 .000*** 4.79 .000*** 4.20 .001*** 4.54 .001*** 3.13 .007** 
I 12 .003** 2.20 .059 3.34 .010** 3.76 .006** 3.11 .014** 4.43 .002** 2.93 .017** 
B= Banks, I= Insurances, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), 
(Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square & Z statistic if data are not normally 
distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 
0.001). 
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      Yet, the banking and insurance sectors for three categories had statistically 
significant increases during the four years. The insurance sector had no statistically 
significant increase with first category during all pair years; while banking and 
insurance sectors for the second and third categories had statistically significant 
increase during all pair years.  
6.6.5.3 Descriptive Statistics Twelve Subcategories of S&P T&D (Industry Type)            
As can be seen from Table 6.32, with twelve subcategories the banks sector had more 
items showing a statistically significant increase than the insurance sector by four 
years 9 out of 12 and 4 out of 12 respectively. The subcategories’ business focus, role 
of the board, and executive compensation and evaluation were significantly different 
according to two groups, but the subcategories’ voting and shareholder meeting 
procedures, and director training and compensation showed no statistically significant 
increase by two groups. Insurance sector’s information on auditors, and bank sector’s 
board structure and composition were significantly different for the four years, but 
without any statistically significant increase for all two years. 
Table  6.32 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Three Categories (Industry Type) 
S&P 
TD Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
OSI
R 
B 18.2 .000*** 1.84 .066 2.38 .017** 2.55 .011** 2.06 .039* 2.26 .024* 1.06 .285 
I 8.79 .032* 1.41 .157 1.63 .102 1.82 .068 1.00 .317 1.60 .109 1.34 .180 
FTI
D 
B 15.9 .000*** 2.06 .059 4.05 .001** 4.47 .001*** 3.93 .002** 4.68 .000*** 2.90 .012** 
I 8.95 .009** 2.53 .035* 2.87 .021* 3.49 .008** 2.36 .046* 2.99 .017** 2.53 .032* 
BM
SP 
B 14.9 .000*** 2.62 .021* 4.48 .001** 5.46 .000*** 2.15 .050* 3.19 .007** 2.62 .020* 
I 7.44 .008** .970 .360 2.62 .030* 3.14 .014* 2.40 .043* 3.59 .007** 2.71 .024* 
B= Banks, I= Insurances, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), 
(Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed 
for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
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      Therefore, the study shows that there was a statistically significant increase during 
the four years for the banking and insurances sector. In this study, hypothesis H8 is 
accepted because the level of T&D in the banking sector is higher than insurance. The 
results of the sub-hypotheses are summarised in Table 6.34as follows: 
Table  6.34 Test of  Hypothesis Level of S&P T&D (Industry Type) 
H Hypothesis 
Result  
Four 
years 
2005-
2006 
2005-
2007 
2005-
2008 
2006- 
2007 
2006-
2008 
2007- 
2008 
H8 
Banking sector provides more T&D in their annual 
reports than insurance sector. A A A A A A A 
H8.1 Ownership structure and investor rights A R A A A A R 
H8.1.1 Transparency of ownership A R R R R R R 
H8.1.2 Concentration of ownership   R R R R R R R 
H8.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures  R R R R R R R 
H8.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure A R A A A A A 
H8.2.1 Business focus R R R R R R R 
H8.2.2 Accounting policy review R R R R R R R 
H8.2.3 Accounting policy details  A R A A R R R 
H8.2.4 Related party structure and transactions A R R A R A A 
H8.2.5 Information on auditors R R R R R R R 
H8.3 Board and management structure and process A A A A A A A 
H8.3.1 Board structure and composition A R R A R A R 
H8.3.2 The role of board of directors R R R R R R R 
H8.3.3 Director training and composition R R R R R R R 
H8.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive A R A R A R A 
A=Accepted (Has been significant increase and high level), R=Rejected (Not has been statistically significant increase), and 
R=Rejected   (Statistically significant increase, but not high mean). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  6.33 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Twelve Subcategories (Industry Type) 
S&P 
TD 
 
Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TO B 8.07 .044* 1.34 .180 1.63 .102 1.85 .063 1.00 .317 1.34 .180 1.00 .317 I 7.20 .066 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CO B 12.2 .007** 1.34 .180 1.84 .066 2.06 .039* 1.89 .059 2.12 .034* .447 .655 I 4.71 .194 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
VS
MP 
B 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
I 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
BF B 7.05 .001** 1.16 .264 2.56 .024* 3.07 .009** 2.48 .028* 3.31 .006** 1.76 .100 I 7.53 .013** 1.78 .111 3.05 .016** 3.41 .009** 2.23 .056 2.44 .040* 1.62 .138 
AP
R 
B 22.4 .000*** 1.84 .066 2.38 .017** 2.82 .005** 1.82 .068 2.52 .012** 2.42 .015** 
I 6.52 .089 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
AP
D 
B 15.2 .002** 1.00 .317 2.53 .011* 2.53 .011* 1.63 .102 1.63 .102 .000 1.00 
I 6.00 .112 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RPS
T 
B 13.6 .003** .577 .564 1.41 .157 2.30 .021* 1.73 .083 2.45 .014** 2.07 .038* 
I 4.60 .204 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
IA B 6.64 .084 - - - - - - - - - - - - I 9.00 .029* 1.63 .102 1.63 .102 1.84 .066 .000 1.00 1.00 .317 1.00 .317 
BSC B 5.18 .004** .939 .365 1.93 .075 3.63 .003* 1.71 .111 2.50 .026* 1.52 .150 I 2.74 .065 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RB
D 
B 11.0 .000*** 2.47 .028* 3.47 .004** 5.68 .000*** 1.61 .131 2.73 .017** 2.07 .057 
I 9.31 .000*** 1.89 .095 3.57 .007** 3.78 .005** 2.13 .065 2.85 .021* 1.96 .031* 
DT
C 
B 3 .066 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
I 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
EC
E 
B 32.1 .000*** 1.89 .059 2.13 .033* 2.06 .039* 3.74 .000*** 1.00 .317 3.77 .000*** 
I 17.0 .001*** .000 1.00 2.33 .020* .000 1.00 2.64 .008** .000 1.00 2.82 .005** 
B= Banks, I= Insurances, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic &Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & 
t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair 
years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
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6.6.6 Quality of S&P Transparency and Disclosure for Companies that Have Audit Peer 
Review and those that Do not Have Audit Peer Review 
This subsection presents the main level of T&D results for Companies that have audit 
peer review and those that do not have audit peer review in companies’ annual reports, 
and whether there is a statistically significant increase during the four years and paired 
two years, by three stages: overall; three categories; and twelve subcategories. 
Specifically, subsection 6.6.6.1 will provide the statistically significant increase 
results for overall T&D during the four years and pair years to test H9. Subsection 
6.6.6.2 will report the statistically significant increase results for three categories of 
T&D during the four years and pair years to test sub-hypotheses H9.1, H9.2 and H9.3. 
Subsection 6.6.6.3 will present the statistically significant increase results for twelve 
subcategories of T&D during the four years and pair years to test sub-hypotheses 
H9.1.1 to H9.1.3, H9.2.1 to H9.2.5, and H9.3.1 to H9.3.4. Finally a summary of test hypotheses 
will be presented.       
      The study shows no further improvement in overall T&D level 14 and 13 points 
during three years for companies that have audit peer review and those that do not 
have audit peer review, respectively; however, there was a small difference between 
the groups (see Table 6.35 Pa. A). 
      Furthermore, the study shows that the level of T&D by three categories was, for 
the first, a minor improvement in ownership structure and investor right; the level of 
T&D is very low for companies that have audit peer review and those that do not have 
audit peer review, 10% and 11%, respectively (see Table 6.35. Pa. B). The second, 
T&D financial transparency and information disclosure had the best scores for both 
groups, 65% and 64%, and upgrading 18 and 22 points during the four years for 
companies that have audit peer review and those that do not, respectively (see Table 
6.35 Pa. C). The third, board and management structure and process is low, 31% and 
28% in 2008, with improvement for both groups of 12 and 8 points; the level in 
companies that have audit peer review was better than for companies that do not have 
audit peer review, and the companies with audit peer review have more enhanced 
T&D than companies without (see Table 6.35. Pa. D).Mean and Standard deviations 
results are shown in Table 6.35. 
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      For more details descriptive statistics for the entire sample of all companies are 
presented in Appendix 7-G. 
However, from above Table 6.35 (Pa. B1, 2, and 3) shows that the first, analysis for 
three subcategories shows the level scores per two groups remain very weak and slight 
in those subcategories. The average for transparency of ownership, concentration of 
ownership, and voting and shareholder meeting procedures are unimportant for 
assemblages 12, 5, and 0 for companies that have audit peer review, and 5, 3 and 1 for 
companies that do not during the four years.  
      The second, for five subcategories, the level of T&D accounting policy details, 
most for the two groups in 2006, 2007 and 2008 was high (see Table 6.35. Pa. C3). 
Also for two subcategories, the level of T&D was above medium (business focus, and 
accounting policy review), but for two subcategories (related party structure and 
Table  6.35  Transparency and Disclosure for Companies that Have Audit  Peer Review and those 
that Do not Have Audit Peer Review 
Panel Variable Chare. 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A Total transparency & disclosure 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.252 .072 .302 .059 .346 .069 .386 .090 
.227 .123 .266 .101 .328 .109 .357 .105 
B Ownership structure & investor 
right 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.005 .031 .079 .044 .120 .090 .134 .102 
.031 .041 .047 .039 .059 .066 .091 .110 
B1 Transparency of ownership Peer review Not Peer review 
.123 .084 .142 .077 .155 .066 .162 .072 
.050 .080 .090 .090 .101 .095 .101 .095 
B2 Concentration of ownership Peer review Not Peer review 
.000 .000 .044 .116 .142 .289 .151 .260 
.027 .083 .027 .083 .055 .166 .152 .317 
B3 Voting & shareholder meeting procedures 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.015 .010 .015 .040 .031 .067 .055 .149 
.012 .037 .012 .037 .012 .037 .024 .049 
C Financial transparency & information disclosure 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.446 .155 .514 .139 .581 .142 .653 .137 
.415 .175 .492 .172 .612 .170 .644 .166 
C1 Business focus Peer review Not Peer review 
.481 .222 .542 .175 .609 .227 .681 .222 
.548 .187 .577 .149 .718 .172 .748 .199 
C2 Accounting policy review 
 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.492 .253 .563 .219 .634 .187 .714 .149 
.370 .314 .444 .372 .629 .294 .642 .308 
C3 Accounting policy details 
 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.714 .342 .881 .309 .955 .172 .958 .166 
.592 .493 .777 .441 .888 .333 .888 .333 
C4 Related party structure & transaction 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.053 .106 .071 .117 .125 .010 .232 .010 
.027 .083 .176 .176 .111 .181 .166 .216 
C5 Information on auditors Peer review Not Peer review 
.410 .287 .464 .274 .500 .240 .571 .228 
.278 .291 .472 .232 .472 .232 .556 .273 
D Board and management 
structure and process 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.190 .076 .241 .071 .271 .048 .308 .071 
.197 .163 .215 1.49 .260 .138 .283 .135 
D1 Board structure and composition Peer review Not Peer review 
.455 .143 .491 .166 .544 .135 .607 .108 
.402 .284 .416 .197 .486 .220 .527 .214 
D2 Role of the board Peer review Not Peer review 
.148 .109 .214 .078 .256 .069 .303 .095 
.203 .186 .250 .150 .314 .170 .351 .185 
D3 Director training & 
compensations 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.071 .141 .119 .165 .142 .171 .142 .171 
.037 .111 .037 .111 .074 .147 .074 .147 
D4 Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Peer review 
Not Peer review 
.087 .047 .134 .064 .023 .064 .150 .082 
.111 .096 .111 .096 .024 .074 .111 .096 
14 Co. have get audit peer review, and 9 have not  in 2005 and  2006, 15 have get audit peer review, and 10 have not  in 
2007, and  16 have get audit  peer review, and 11 have not  in 2008  
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transaction, and information on auditors) the level was very low. However, the 
companies with audit peer review had better level of T&D than those without for four 
subcategories (business focus, accounting policy review, accounting policy review, 
and related party structure and transaction), but the companies without audit peer 
review had a better level of T&D information on auditors than  those with audit peer 
review. 
      The third, the level of T&D for four subcategories was medium for board structure 
and composition for the two groups, and the best group was companies that have audit 
peer review. The level of T&D for role of the board was low, and the best level of 
T&D was in companies without audit peer review. In addition, the level of T&D for 
two subcategories was very low (director training and compensations, and executive 
compensation and evaluation), and the best group was companies without audit peer 
review. 
      The next subsections of this study show descriptive statistics for overall T&D in 
subsection 6.6.6.1; while in subsection 6.6.6.2 three categories and in subsection 
6.6.6.3 twelve subcategories are elaborated. 
6.6.6.1 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D (Audit Peer Review)   
Table 6.36 shows that, S&P overall T&D, on companies with audit peer review and 
companies without audit peer review, were statistically significant increase (F = 16.7, 
p = .000), and (F = 13.1, p = .002), respectively between the four years; also, all T&D 
on companies that have audit peer review was a statistically significant increase (t 
=2.74, p =.018),(t = 5.17, p = .000), (t =4.45, p =.001 ), (t = 4.80, p = .000), (t = 4.33, 
p = .001), and (t = 2.95, p =.011) between the pair years.  
Table  6.36 Descriptive Statistics Overall S&P T&D (Audit Peer Review) 
S&
P 
TD 
 
Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TD P 16.7 .000*** 2.74 .018** 5.17 .000*** 4.45 .001 ** 4.80 .000*** 4.33 .001** 2.95 .011** N 13.1 .002** 2.20 .059 3.58 .007** 4.04 .004 ** 3.02 .017** 4.06 .004** 3.30 .009* 
P= Companies have audit peer review, N= Companies have not audit peer review, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-
Square & Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, 
**Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
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      Overall T&D, for the two groups had increased statistically significant during the 
four years; while companies with audit peer review had increased statistically 
significant during all pair years. 
6.6.6.2 Descriptive Statistics Three Categories of S&P T&D (Audit Peer Review)           
Over all three categories for the two kinds of companies there was a statistically 
significant increase for ownership structure and investor right, (×2= 18.2, p = .000), 
and (×2 = 8.79, p = .032); financial transparency and information disclosure (F= 13.3, 
p = .000), and (F = 11.4, p = .004);  board and management structure & process (F = 
14.6, p = .000) (F = 7.50, p = .009) respectively for the four years. In addition, over all 
for pair years, there was a statistically significant increase for financial transparency 
and information disclosure for companies without audit peer review, and board and 
management structure and process for companies with audit peer review (see Table 
6.37). 
Table  6.37 Descriptive Statistics S&P T&D by Three Categories (Audit Peer Review) 
      Both groups with three categories had statistically significant increase during the 
four years. Companies with no audit peer review had a statistically significant increase 
with the second category during all pair years; while companies with audit peer 
review had a statistically significant increase with the third category during all pair 
years. 
6.6.6.3 Descriptive Statistics Twelve Subcategories of S&P T&D (Audit Peer Review)           
For the twelve subcategories, companies with audit peer review had more items of 
statistically significant increase than companies without audit peer review for the four 
years, and pair years.  
 
 
S&P 
TD 
 
Co. 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
OSI
R 
P 18.2 .000*** 1.84 .066 2.38 .017** 2.55 .011 ** 2.06 .039* 2.26 .024* 1.06 .285 
N 8.79 .032* 1.41 .157 1.63 .102 1.82 .068 1.00 .317 1.60 .109 1.34 .180 
FTI
D 
P 13.3 .000*** 2.06 .059 3.71 .033* 4.06 .001 ** 4.20 .001** 4.34 .001** 2.73 .016** 
N 11.4 .004** 2.53 .035* 3.41 .009** 3.88 .005 ** 2.91 .020** 3.21 .012** 2.71 .024* 
BM
SP 
P 14.6 .000*** 2.62 .021* 4.48 .001** 5.43 .000*** 2.15 .050* 3.19 .007** 2.44 .028* 
N 7.50 .009** .970 .360 2.62 .030* 3.13 .014 ** 2.40 .043* 3.39 .009** 3.28 .010** 
P= Companies have audit peer review, N= Companies have not audit peer review, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas Chi-
Square & Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 0.05, 
**Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
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       The study shows that there were statistically significant increases between years 
for both groups. Therefore, this study showed that the companies that have audit peer 
review had greater T&D in their annual reports than those that did not (see Table 
6.38).  
      In this study, the hypothesis H9 is accepted because the level of T&D in the 
companies that had audit peer review was more than the other groups and had 
increased statistically significant at the level of 0.05 % during four years. Table 6.39 
summarise the test of the sub-hypotheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  6.38 Descriptive Statistics Twelve Subcategories of S&P T&D 
S&P 
TD 
Co. 
 
Four years 2005-2006 2005-2007 2005-2008 2006-2007 2006-2008 2007-2008 
Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  Stat  
TO P 8.07 .044* 1.34 .180 1.63 .102 1.85 .063 1.00 .317 1.34 .180 1.00 .317 N 7.20 .066 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CO P 12.2 .007** 1.34 .180 1.84 .066 2.06 .039* 1.89 .059 2.12 .034* .447 .655 N 4.71 .194 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
VSM
P 
P 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
N 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
BF P 5.89 .002** 1.37 .192 2.38 .033* 2.89 .013 ** 1.90 .079 2.86 .013** 1.66 .119 N 10.3 .005** 1.31 .225 3.41 .009** 3.67 .006 ** 3.12 .014** 3.06 .016** 1.76 .111 
APR P 20.2 .000*** 1.84 .066 2.22 .026* 2.68 .007 ** 1.60 .007** 2.37 .018* 2.42 .015** N 9.18 .027* 1.06 .285 1.99 .046* 2.00 .045 * 1.84 .066 2.04 .041* 1.00 .317 
APD P 13.0 .004** 1.00 .317 2.44 .014** 2.44 .014 ** 1.34 .180 1.34 .180 .000 1.00 N 7.0 .066 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RPST P 11.3 .010** .557 .564 1.41 .157 2.12 .034 * 1.73 .083 2.26 .024* 1.85 .063 N 6.42 .093 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
IA P 5.25 .154 - - - - - - - - - - - - N 11.8 .008** 1.89 .059 1.89 .059 2.06 .039 * .000 1.00 1.00 .317 1.00 .317 
BSC P 5.18 .004** .939 .365 1.93 .075 3.63 .003 ** 1.71 .111 2.50 .026* 1.52 .150 N 2.74 .065 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
RBD 
P 18.0 .000*** 1.63 .102 2.26 .024* 2.23 .026 * 1.84 .066 2.06 .039* 2.00 .046* 
N 15.3 .002** 1.63 .102 2.26 .024* 2.23 .026 * 1.84 .066 2.06 .039* 2.00 .046* 
DTC P 7.20 .066 - - - - - - - - - - - - N 3.00 .392 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ECE P 32.1 .000*** 1.89 .059 2.13 .033* 2.06 .039* 3.74 .000*** 1.00 .317 3.77 .000*** N 17.0 .001** .000 1.00 2.33 .020* .000 1.00 2.64 .008** .000 1.00 2.82 .005** 
P= Companies have audit peer review, N= Companies have not audit peer review, Stat= Statistic, p= Significant value, (Italic 
&Underlined = Normal distribution), (- Not Significant), (Statistics = F & t statistic if data are normally distributed, whereas 
Chi-Square &Z statistic if data are not normally distributed for comparing 4 years and pair years respectively). (*Significant at 
0.05, **Significant at 0.01, and ***Significant at 0.001). 
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Table  6.39 Test of  Hypothesis Level of S&P T&D (Audit Peer Review) 
H Hypothesis 
Result  
Four 
years 
2005-
2006 
2005-
2007 
2005-
2008 
2006- 
2007 
2006-
2008 
2007- 
2008 
H9 
Companies that have audit peer review are more likely 
to provide T&D information in their annual reports 
than companies that do not have audit peer review. 
A A A A A A A 
H9.1 Ownership structure and investor rights A R A A A A R 
H9.1.1 Transparency of ownership A R R R R R R 
H9.1.2 Concentration of ownership   R R R R R R R 
H9.1.3 Voting and shareholder meeting procedures  R R R R R R R 
H9.2 Financial transparency and information disclosure A R A A A A A 
H9.2.1 Business focus R R R R R R R 
H9.2.2 Accounting policy review A R A A A A A 
H9.2.3 Accounting policy details  A R A A R R R 
H9.2.4 Related party structure and transactions A R R A R A R 
H9.2.5 Information on auditors R R R R R R R 
H9.3 Board and management structure and process A A A A A A R 
H9.3.1 Board structure and composition A R R A R A R 
H9.3.2 The role of board of directors R R R R R R R 
H9.3.3 Director training and composition R R R R R R R 
H9.3.4 Compensation and evaluation of executive A R A A A R A 
A=Accepted (Has been statistically significant increase and high level), R=Rejected (Not has been statistically significant 
increase), and R=Rejected (Statistically significant increase, but not high mean). 
6.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on presenting the empirical results regarding the level of 
T&D in Libyan financial companies. In addition, it presented the comparable level of 
T&D with companies in other developing and developed countries, and level of T&D 
was variations between companies. Further, the effects of six companies’ 
characteristics on T&D were discussed. Specifically, the chapter attempted to achieve 
the aim and four main objectives of the research.  
      Nine hypotheses and sub-hypotheses were mainly set and tested by using one-way 
between-groups analyses of variance (ANOVA) “more than two group” and Paired T-
Test “two group” (parametric method), and Friedman Test “more than two group” and 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test “two group” (non-parametric method). Moreover, in this 
study, at the end of each subsection a summary of the hypotheses and sub-hypotheses 
results was provided.   
      The findings of the S&P T&D revealed the meaning of “the level of the extent of 
T&D in Libyan financial companies” and the “the level of T&D associated with 
company characteristics”. However, the level of T&D is very low indicating there is 
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information asymmetry between users of information inside and outside, with no 
possibility of comparison between companies, due to the statistically significant 
increase in the level of T&D over the four years. As the mean of average of T&D 
during the four years was different, where the best mean level of T&D was 37% in 
2008, and the lowest level was 24% in 2005. There is a statistically significant 
increase for overall T&D, with three categories, and eleven subcategories for four 
years. Only the variable voting and shareholder meeting procedures is not a 
statistically significant increase. There is a statistically significant increase for overall 
T&D, with three categories, and most subcategories for two years “pair years” (05-06, 
05-07, 05-08, 06-07, 06-08, and 07-08). Therefore, there is a statistically significant 
increase level of S&P T&D in Libyan financial company’s annual reports, with the 
emerging Libyan Stock Market, to get the comparable information, and reduce 
information asymmetry, through the fiscal years from 2005 to 2008. Therefore, in this 
study H1 is accepted.  
      The T&D score was weak in Libyan financial companies. When the average of 
T&D was compared with that of other countries the study found that there was a low 
level of T&D in Libyan financial companies. However, the level of T&D was better 
than that of Latin America. Therefore, H2is supported but partial in this study, H2.1 is 
supported, H2.2 is limited supported, and H2.3issupported but partially. In addition, this 
study found that there are wider variations between companies in T&D practices. In 
addition, H3 is accepted in this study. 
      The results obtained suggest that the extent of T&D in annual reports is a 
significantly different increase for almost all the company characteristics, and not 
statistically significant increase according to the large size of a company’s total assets. 
However, small and medium size companies were statistically significant increase, 
whereas the large companies did not have a statistically significant increase. 
Therefore, H4, H5, H8 and H9 are accepted in this study, while H6 and H7 are rejected. 
In addition, all sub-H5 are rejected and sub-H4, sub-H5, sub-H7, sub-H8 and sub-H9 
vary between accepted and rejected (see Table 7, 14, 19, 24, 29, 34, and 39). 
However, the eight chapters are devoted to discussing in depth and interpreting these 
results. Table 6.40 summarises the statistical analysis (four years) for the companies’ 
characteristics as follows:  
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Table  6.40 Statistically Analysis for Companies Characteristics   
S&P 
 
 
Companies’ characteristics 
Listing 
statue 
Ownership 
structure 
Companies size Company age Industry type Audit Peer 
review 
T&D 
Listed Unlisted Public Private Small Middle Large Younger Medium Older Bank Insurance Do Not do 
      ×        
OSIR      × ×  × ×     
TO ×  ×   × × × × ×    × 
CO    ×  × × × ×   ×  × 
VSMP × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
FTID       ×        
BF       ×  ×      
APR      × ×  ×   ×   
APD    × ×  × × ×   ×  × 
RPST      × × ×  ×  ×  × 
IA × ×  × × × × × × × ×  ×  
BMSP       ×        
BSC ×   × ×  × × ×   ×  × 
RBD       ×        
DTC × × × × × × × × × × × × × × 
ECE               
 Statistically significant increased during the four years, × No statistically significant increase 
 
      This study uses multiple data collection methods, including questionnaire data 
across the study period November 2009 to January 2010. Quantitative data were 
analysed using the SPSS program. Data from the determination of the three 
accounting profit ratios, ROCE, ROE and ROA were used. The next chapter gives the 
results, tests the study hypotheses and the findings of this study for data collecting by 
questionnaire. 
 
231 
 
Chapter 7 The relationship between transparency and disclosure and 
financial performance 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to achieve the fifth and sixth objectives of the research. The fifth 
objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between T&D practices and 
the accounting-based measure of financial performance. The T&D practices are 
measured by fourteen variables, and company financial performance is measured by 
three variables: ROCE; ROE; and ROA. The sixth objective is to find which 
independent variable of T&D practices has the most impact on the dependent variable 
and company financial performance (see Section 4.6). 
This chapter addresses the tenth and eleventh empirical research questions, which are: 
“Is there a relationship between T&D practices and financial performance?” and 
“Which independent variable (T&D practices) has the most impact on the dependent 
variable (financial performance)?” 
       The main aim of this chapter is to record the results of the tests of hypotheses of 
the relative relationships between T&D practices and financial performance. This 
chapter presents the details of the empirical results from the SPSS 15 program. The 
descriptive statistics of the data are presented first, followed by the parametric test of 
correlation (Pearson’s Correlation) to test H10. A second regression model using 
forward selection will be used to test H11. 
 The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 gives the descriptive 
statistics. Examination of the data using Partial Correlation analysis and presenting the 
results will take place in section 7.3. Section 7.4 analyses data by using Regression 
analysis and presents the finding. The main summary and conclusion of the chapter are 
summarised in section 7.5. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of 25 financial companies listed in Libya. The main variable is 
T&D practices used in examining the relationship between T&D practices and 
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financial performance. It includes fourteen variables, as has been discussed in chapter 
four (see 4.6.1). This variable is an aggregation of 14 comprehensive sets of T&D 
practices provisions contained in literature, CG Principals 2004, and T&D practices 
requirements in Libya.  
      Financial performance in this study is measured by three variables, ROCE, ROE 
and ROA. Much of the prior literature used these measurements, some using one and 
some using more than one of these  measurement (e.g., Bayoud, et al., 2012b; Cheung, 
et al., 2011; Dawkins & Fraas, 2011; Dinga, 2011; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011; Jerab, 
2011; Jian, Tingting, & Shengchao, 2011; Mahmood & Abbas, 2011; Price, Roman, 
& Rountree, 2011; Sami, et al., 2011; Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2011; Valenti, 
Rebecca, & Clifton, 2011; Wu, et al., 2011; Xin & Xiao, 2011) (see Appendix 3).  
7.2.1 Normality Test 
The regression analysis is based on the assumption of residual normality, and as the 
result the test of normality using Shapiro-Wilk test will conducted for the residuals of 
each fitted regression model. The most common normality test Shapiro-Wilk will be 
used for the dependent variable. The experimented distribution of each variable of 
interest was found to be approximately normally distributed. 
The assumption of normality for ROCE regression model is examined using Shapiro-
Wilk test. In table 7.1 the result shows the normality is satisfied as p-value for the 
Shapiro-Wilk test is 0.311. 
 
Table  7.1  Test of Normality for ROCE 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Standardized Residual .145 25 .185 .948 25 .311 
 
       The assumption of normality for ROE regression model is examined using 
Shapiro test. In table7.2 result shows the normality is satisfied as p-value for the 
Shapiro-Wilk test is 0.408. 
Table  7.2 Test of Normality for ROE 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Standardized Residual .126 25 .200 .956 25 .408 
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      The assumption of normality for ROA regression model is examined using 
Shapiro test. In table 7.3 result shows the normality is satisfied as p-value for the 
Shapiro-Wilk test is 0.619. 
      The results indicate that data are normally distributed (Sig. p-value> .05), thus, 
parametric tests is recommended. 
7.2.2 Statistics Test 
The following statistical techniques were applied to analyse the research data and to 
accomplish the objectives of this study. Firstly, Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (r) 
was used to determine the relationship between two dependent variables. The first 
variable was T&D practices consisting of fourteen items. The second variable was 
financial performance measured by three tools of financial analysis - ROCE, ROE and 
ROA. In this study of descriptive statistics, the value of Pearson's (r) and Significant 
Value (p-value) were used to investigate study objective five, answer EQ and test 
hypothesis ten. 
      The second statistical technique used was Multiple Linear Regression. This 
method is concerned with determining a statistical model between a given variable 
(dependent variable) and a set of explanatory variables (independent variables). In the 
study of descriptive statistics, Adjusted R2, Beta () and Significant value (p-value) 
were used to examine study objective six and answer EQ and test hypothesis eleven 
(see subsection 5.7.8). 
7.3 Correlation Analysis 
This section presents the main Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient results. Specifically, 
subsections from 7.3.1 to 7.3.14 will report the correlation results among 14 variables 
of T&D and three company financial performances to test hypothesis H10. In addition, 
a summary of the tests of the hypotheses is presented at the end of the section. 
      In the social and natural sciences, researchers seek to understand and describe the 
nature of causal relations between phenomena. The phenomena are operationalised 
Table  7.3  Test of Normality for ROA 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Standardized Residual .111 25 .200 .969 25 .619 
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into measureable relationships that are tested or observed. Thus, correlations serve as 
practical indications of possible relationships between variables. 
       This study finds that there were some significant correlations between the three 
financial performances and several of the T&D practices. However the correlation 
coefficients, were stronger than 0.8 between ROCE and ROE, but were moderately less 
than 0.4 between ROCE and ROA, and moderately less than 0.5 between ROE and ROA. 
The addition of these variables in the same equation will cause a serious multi-co 
linearity problem. 
In this section, the study used Pearson’s Correlation analysis to answer the EQ10, 
“whether there is a relationship between T&D practices, and financial 
performance?”, and to test the H10“There is a relationship between T&D practices, 
and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA”. The study set the 
Sub-hypotheses to testH10 as follows: 
H10.1- There is a relationship between disclosure of financial and operation results, and 
financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.2- There is a relationship between disclosure of company objectives, and financial 
performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.3- There is a relationship between disclosure of major share ownership and voting 
rights, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.4- There is a relationship between disclosure of board members, key executives 
and their remuneration, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and 
ROA; 
H10.5- There is a relationship between disclosure of related party transactions, and 
financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.6- There is a relationship between disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors, 
and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.7- There is a relationship between disclosure of material issues regarding 
employees and other stakeholders; 
H10.8- There is a relationship between disclosure of governance structures and 
policies, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.9- There a is relationship between disclosure of preparation of information and 
disclosure and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
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H10.10- There is a relationship between disclosure of annual external audit and 
monitoring, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.11- There is a relationship between disclosure of external audit and audit 
committee role, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.12- There is a relationship between disclosure of external auditors accountable to 
shareholders where the external auditor owes a duty of due professional care, and 
financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; 
H10.13- There is a relationship between disclosure of channels for disseminating 
information allowing for fair, timely and cost efficient access to information by users, 
and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA; and 
H10.14- There is a relationship between disclosure of corporate governance framework, 
complemented by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of 
analysis, and financial performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA. 
      Each of these sub-hypotheses is measured by three accounting financial 
performances.  
      In this study, the first question in the questionnaire asked about the type of annual 
reports the company has. The study finds that all Libyan financial companies have the 
following reports: the Chief board’s report; CEOs statement; Income statement; 
Balance sheet; Audit report (Published in annual report without any attachments for 
the purpose of disclosure). Most Libyan financial companies have the following 
reports: Shareholders’ equity statement (96%); Detection of significant accounting 
policies (92%); Cash flow statement (84%); Display segmental data (80%); Dividend 
data (76%). Some of Libyan financial companies have the following reports: 
Employee’s information (16%); Environmental policies disclosed (8%). However, 
through the annual reports for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 used in this study 
to measure the level of T&D a lack of detailed information on most of these topic 
reports was observed. In addition, for some of companies the information above is 
available in the annual reports. In addition, a few of the companies in the Libyan 
financial sector have quarterly reports.  
      The results of the correlation analysis between 14 variables of T&D, and three 
companies’ financial performance variables are reported in Table 7.4. The next 
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subsections show the correlation analysis results between the 14 variables and three 
financial performances as follows:         
7.3.1 T&D of Financial and Operation Results 
The results obtained from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s Correlation are shown 
in Table 7.4; the variable disclosure of financial and operation results are positive and 
not significant with three financial variables ROCE (r= .252, p=.225), ROE (r= .325, 
p=.113), and ROA (r= .345, p=.092). 
      From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
correlation between disclosure of financial and operation results and ROCE, ROE and 
ROA are not significant (p>.05). Hence, disclosure of financial and operation results 
do not seem to be strongly correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 0.05 alpha 
levels).  
      The value of Pearson’s (r) indicates the strength of the correlation for the variable 
disclosure of financial and operation results with ROCE was weak correlation 
(approximately 0.2), and ROE and ROA were considered moderate correlation 
(approximately 0.3), but the p value were not significant. Therefore, H10.1 is rejected 
in this study. 
7.3.2 T&D of Company Objectives 
In sum, the results in Table 7.4 show that the variable disclosure of company 
objectives is positive but no significance is related with the three financial variables 
ROCE (r= .144, p=.491), ROE (r= .191, p=.361) and ROA (r= .305, p=.138). 
      From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
correlation between disclosure of company objectives and ROCE, ROE and ROA are 
not significant (p>.05). Hence, disclosure of a company objective does not seem to be 
strongly correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 0.05 alpha levels).  
The value of Pearson’s (r) indicates the strength of the correlation for the variable 
disclosure of company objectives with ROCE and ROE were weak correlation 
(approximately 0.1), and with ROA was considered moderate correlation 
(approximately 0.3), but the p value were not significant. Therefore, H10.2 is rejected in 
this study. 
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7.3.3 T&D of Major Share Ownership and Voting Rights 
Table 7.4 provides the results obtained from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s 
correlation; the variable disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights are 
positive and significantly related with ROCE at the 5% level (r= .455, p= .022), 
positive and significantly related with ROE at level of 5% (r= .587, p= .002), and 
positive and not significantly related with ROA (r= .215, p=. 302).  
      From Table 7.4, column 1 and 2, it can be seen that the coefficient of correlation 
between disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights and ROCE and ROE 
are significant (p<.05). Hence, disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights 
does seem to be correlated with ROCE and ROE (at 0.05 alpha levels). Disclosure of 
major share ownership and voting rights and ROA is not a significant relationship. 
From Table 7.4, column 3, it is obvious that the coefficient of correlation between 
company objectives and ROA is not significant. Hence, disclosure of major share 
ownership and voting rights does not seem to be strongly correlated with ROA.  
      The correlation value for disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights, 
and ROCE and ROE were considered moderate correlation (approximately 0.5) and 
significant, and while was weak correlation and not significant with ROA. However, 
H10.3 is partly accepted, hence H10.3.1 and H10.3.2 are accepted, and H10.3.2 is rejected in 
this study. 
7.3.4 T&D of Board Members, Key Executives and Their Remuneration 
Table 7.4 compares the results obtained from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s 
correlation: the variable disclosure of board members, key executives and their 
remuneration are positive and significantly related with ROCE at a level of 5% (r= 
.417, p=. 038), positive and not significantly related with ROE (r= .278, p=. 178) and 
ROA (r= .226, p= .276).  
      From Table 7.4, column 1, it can be seen that the coefficient of correlation 
between disclosure of board members, key executives and their remuneration and 
ROCE is significant (p<.05). Hence, disclosure of board members, key executives and 
their remuneration does seem to be correlated with ROCE (at 0.05 alpha levels). In 
addition, in column 2 and 3, it is obvious that the coefficient of correlation between 
disclosures of board members, key executives and their remuneration, and ROE and 
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ROA are not significant. Hence, disclosure of board members, key executives and 
their remuneration does not seem to be strongly correlated with ROA.  
     The correlation value for disclosure of board members, key executives and their 
remuneration, and ROCE is moderately correlated (approximately 0.4) and 
significant, while disclosure of board members, key executives and their 
remuneration, does not have a significant relationship and weak correlation with ROE 
and ROA. However, H10.4 is limited accepted, hence H10.4.1 is accepted, whereas H10.4.2 
and H10.4.3 are rejected in this study. 
7.3.5 T&D of Related Party Transactions 
The results obtained from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s Correlation are shown 
in Table 7.4: the variable disclosure of related party transactions is positive and not 
significant with the three financial variables ROCE (r= .051, p= .808), ROE (r= .305, 
p=.138) and ROA (r= .357, p= .079).  
     From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of correlation 
between disclosure of related party transactions and ROCE, ROE and ROA are not 
significant (p>.05). Hence, it is obvious that disclosure of a related party transaction 
does not seem to be a strongly correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 0.05 alpha 
levels).  
       The correlation value between disclosure of related party transactions and ROCE 
and ROA is of weak correlation and not significant, and although correlation value 
with ROE was moderate but not significant. However, H10.5 is rejected in this study. 
7.3.6 T&D of Material Foreseeable Risk Factors 
Table 7.4 provides the results obtained from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s 
Correlation: the variable disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors are positive 
and significant at a level of 5% related with ROCE (r= .467, p= .019), ROE (r= .509, p= 
.009), and ROA (r= .399, p= .048).  
      From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
correlation between disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors, and ROCE, ROE 
and ROA are significant (p<.05). Hence, disclosure of material foreseeable risk 
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factors does seem to be significant correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 0.05 
alpha levels).  
     The correlation value for disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors and ROCE, 
ROE and ROA is moderate correlation (between 0.4 to 0.5) and significant. Thus, 
H10.6 is accepted in this study. 
7.3.7 T&D of Material Issues Regarding Employees and Other Stakeholders 
In summary, the results in table 7.4 show that the variable disclosure of material 
issues regarding employees and other stakeholders are positive and not significant 
with the three financial variables ROCE (r= .202, p= .332), ROE (r= .385, p= .058) 
and ROA (r= .390, p= .054).  
     From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of correlation 
between disclosure of material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders and 
ROCE, ROE and ROA are not significant (p>.05). Hence, disclosure of material 
issues regarding employees and other stakeholders does not seem to be strongly 
correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 0.05 alpha levels).  
      The correlation value between disclosure of material issues regarding employees 
and other stakeholders, and ROCE is weak correlation and not significant, and 
although correlation value with ROE and ROE were moderate correlation 
(approximately 0.4) but not significant. Therefore, H10.7 is rejected in this study. 
7.3.8 T&D of Governance Structures and Policies 
The results suggest from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s Correlation that the 
variable disclosure of governance structures and policies is positive and not significant 
with two financial variables ROCE (r= .392, p= .053) and ROE (r= .362, p= .076), 
and positive and significantly related with ROA at the 5% level (r= .427, p= .033).  
      From Table 7.4, column 1 and 2, it can be seen that the coefficient of correlation 
between disclosure of governance structures and policies and ROCE and ROE are not 
significant (p>.05). Hence, disclosure of governance structures and policies does not 
seem to be strongly correlated with ROCE and ROE (at 0.05 alpha levels). Column 3, 
it can be seen that the coefficient of correlation between disclosure of governance 
structures and policies and ROA is significant (p
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governance structures and policies does not seem to be correlated with ROCE and 
ROE (at 0.05 alpha levels). 
      Although correlation value between variable of disclosure of governance 
structures and policies with ROCE, ROE and ROE were moderate correlation 
(approximately 0.4) and it was significant with ROA, but not significant with ROCE 
and ROE. However, H10.8 is limited accepted, hence H10.8.1 and H10.8.2 are rejected, 
whereas H10.8.3 is accepted in this study. 
7.3.9 T&D of Preparation of Information, Audit, and Disclosure According to 
High Standards of Accounting, Disclosure and Audit 
Table 7.4 provides the results obtained from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s 
Correlation: the variable disclosure of preparation of information, audit and disclosure 
according to high standards of accounting, disclosure and audit are positive and not 
significant with the three financial variables ROCE (r= .308, p= .134), ROE (r= .325, p= 
.113) and ROA (r= .286, p= .166).  
      From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
correlation between disclosure of preparation of information, audit and disclosure 
according to high standards of accounting, disclosure and audit and ROCE, ROE and 
ROA are not significant (p>.05). Then, it can be argued that disclosure of preparation 
of information, audit and disclosure according to high standards of accounting, 
disclosure and audit does not seem to be strongly correlated with ROCE, ROE and 
ROA (at 0.05 alpha level).   
      In this study, correlation value between variable of disclosure of preparation of 
information, audit and disclosure according to high standards of accounting, 
disclosure and audit, with ROCE, ROE and ROE were moderate correlation 
(approximately 0.4) but not significant. Therefore, H10.9 is rejected. 
7.3.10 T&D of External Audit and Monitoring 
Table 7.4 compares the results obtained from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s 
Correlation: the variable disclosure of external audit and monitoring is positive and 
not significant with the three dependent variables ROCE (r= .298, p= .148), ROE (r= 
.340, p= .096) and ROA (r= .170, p= .417).  
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      From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficients of 
correlation between disclosure of external audit and monitoring and ROCE, ROE and 
ROA are not significant (p>.05). Hence, disclosure of external audit and monitoring 
does not seem to be strongly correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 0.05 alpha 
levels).   
      In this study, the correlation value between variable of disclosure of annual 
external audit and monitoring with ROCE and ROE were moderate correlation 
(approximately 0.4) and weak correlation with ROA (less than 0.2) and not 
significant. Thus, H10.10 is rejected. 
7.3.11 T&D of External Audit and Audit Committee 
The results are present in Table 7.4 with the Pearson coefficients: the variable 
disclosure of external audit and audit committee is negative and not significant with 
the variable ROCE (r=-.047, p= .823), and positive and not significant with the two 
financial variables ROE (r= .127, p= .544) and ROA (r= .018, p= .933).  
      From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
correlation between disclosure of external audit and audit committee and ROCE, ROE 
and ROA are not significant (p>.05). Hence, disclosure of external audit and audit 
committee does not seem to be strongly correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 
0.05 alpha levels).   
       In this study, the correlation value between variable of disclosure of external audit 
and audit committee with ROCE, ROE and ROA were weak correlation and not 
significant. Hence, H10.11 is rejected. 
7.3.12 T&D of External Auditors Accountable to Shareholders, and Owes a Duty 
of Due Professional Care 
The results suggest that, from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s correlation as 
shown in Table 7.4, the variables disclosure of external auditors accountable to 
shareholders, and owes a duty of due professional care are negative and not 
significantly related with the variables ROCE (r= -.093, p= .658) and ROA (r= .-037, p= 
.860), positive and not significantly related with the variable ROE (r= .140, p= .505.  
      From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of 
correlation between disclosure of external auditors accountable to shareholders, and 
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owes a duty of due professional care and ROCE, ROE and ROA are not significant 
(p>.05). Hence, disclosure of external auditors accountable to shareholders, and 
external auditor owes a duty of due professional care do not seem to be strongly 
correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 0.05 alpha level).   
      The correlation values for disclosure of external auditors accountable to 
shareholders, and owes a duty of due professional care, and ROCE, ROE and ROA 
were weak correlation and not significant. Hence, H10.12 is rejected in this study. 
7.3.13 T&D of Channels for Disseminating Information Allow for Fair, Timely, 
and Cost Efficient Access to Information by User 
In summary, the results in Table 7.4 show that the variable disclosure of channels for 
disseminating information allowing for fair, timely, and cost-efficient access to 
information by users are positive and not significant related with  the three financial 
variables ROCE (r= .334, p= .102), ROE (r= .349, p= .087), and ROA (r= .352, p= .085).  
      From Table 7.4, column 1, 2 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficients of 
correlation between disclosure of channels for disseminating information allow for 
fair, timely, and cost-efficient access to information by users and ROCE, ROE and 
ROA are not significant (p>.05). Then, disclosure of channels for disseminating 
information allowing for fair, timely and cost-efficient access to information by users 
does not seem to be strongly correlated with ROCE, ROE and ROA (at 0.05 alpha 
level).   
      In this study, the correlation value between variable of disclosure of channels for 
disseminating information allowing for fair, timely and cost-efficient access to 
information by users, and ROCE, ROE and ROA were moderate correlation (between 
0.3 to 0.4), but not significant. Thus, H10.13 is rejected in this study. 
7.3.14 T&D of Corporate Governance Framework, Complemented by an 
Effective Approach That Addresses and Promotes the Provision of Analysis 
Table 7.4 provides the results obtained from the preliminary analysis of Pearson’s 
Correlation: the variable disclosure of corporate governance framework, 
complemented by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of 
analysis is positive and significantly related with ROCE at a level of 5% (r= .519, 
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p=.008), positive and not significantly related with ROE (r= .361, p= .077), and positive 
and significantly related with ROA at the 5% level (r= .445, p= .026).  
      From Table 7.4, column 1 and 3, it can be seen that the coefficient of correlation 
between disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an 
effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis and ROCE 
and ROA are significant (p<.05). Hence, disclosure of corporate governance 
framework, complemented by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the 
provision of analysis does seem to be strongly correlated with ROCE and ROA (at 
0.05 alpha level), while, not a significant relationship with ROE, (p>.05).  
The value of Pearson’s (r) indicates the strength of the correlation for the variable 
disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis with ROCE, ROE and 
ROA were moderate correlation (.5, .3 and .4) respectively, but p value were 
significant with ROCE and ROA, while not significant with ROE. Thus, H10.14 is 
partly accepted, hence  H10.14.1 and H10.14.3 are accepted, whileH10.14.2  is rejected in this 
study. Significant value (p) and value of Pearson’s (r) results are shown in Table 7.4. 
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Table  7.4 The Correlation between T&D and Financial Performance 
 
 
ROCE 
r(p) 
ROE 
r(p) 
ROA 
r(p) 
FORC 
r(p) 
CO  
r(p) 
MSOV
Rr(p) 
BMKE
Rr(p) 
RPT 
r(p) 
MFRF 
r(p) 
MIRES 
r(p) 
GSP 
r(p) 
PIAD 
r(p) 
AEASr(
p) 
EAACRr
(p) 
EAAS 
r(p) 
CDI 
r(p) 
CGF 
r(p) 
ROCE 1.00                 
ROE .845** 
(.000) 
1.00                
ROA .393 
(.052) 
.548** 
(.005) 
1.00               
FORC .252 
(.225) 
.325 
(.113) 
.345 
(.092) 
1.00              
CO .144 
(.491) 
.191 
(.361) 
.305 
(.138) 
.570** 
(.003) 
1.00             
MSOVR .455* 
(.022) 
.587** 
(.002) 
.215 
(.302) 
.643** 
(.001) 
.475* 
(.016) 
1.00            
BMKER .417* 
(.038) 
.278 
(.178) 
.226 
(.276) 
.604** 
(.001) 
.320 
(.119) 
.492* 
(.012) 
1.00           
RPT .051 
(.808) 
.305 
(.138) 
.357 
(.079) 
.602** 
(.001) 
.626** 
(.001) 
.617** 
(.001) 
.388 
(.055) 
1.00          
MFRF .467* 
(.019) 
.509** 
(.009) 
.399* 
(.048) 
.709** 
(.000) 
.734** 
(.000) 
.665** 
(.000) 
.365 
(.073) 
.505* 
(.010) 
1.00         
MIRES .202 
(.332) 
.385 
(.058) 
.390 
(.054) 
.709** 
(.000) 
.794** 
(.000) 
.694** 
(.000) 
.391 
(.054) 
.766** 
(.000) 
.692** 
(.000) 
1.00        
GSP .392 
(.053) 
.362 
(.076) 
.427* 
(.033) 
.508** 
(.010) 
.710** 
(.000) 
.486* 
(.014) 
.511** 
(.009) 
.532** 
(.006) 
.624** 
(.001) 
.642** 
(.001) 
1.00       
PIAD .308 
(.134) 
.325 
(.113) 
.286 
(.166) 
.235 
(.258) 
.475* 
(.016) 
.383 
(.059) 
.190 
(.364) 
.575** 
(.003) 
.398* 
(.049) 
.458* 
(.021) 
.600** 
(.002) 
1.00      
AEAS .298 
(.148) 
.340 
(.096) 
.170 
(.417) 
.566** 
(.003) 
.729** 
(.000) 
.509** 
(.009) 
.306 
(.137) 
.485* 
(.014) 
.548** 
(.005) 
.597** 
(.002) 
.583** 
(.002) 
.557** 
(.004) 
1.00     
EAACR -.047 
(.823) 
.127 
(.544) 
.018 
(.933) 
.640** 
(.001) 
.679** 
(.000) 
.414* 
(.039) 
.236 
(.256) 
.591** 
(.002) 
.515** 
(.008) 
.613** 
(.001) 
.451* 
(.024) 
.290 
(.159) 
.756** 
(.000) 
1.00    
EAAS -.093 
(.658) 
.140 
(.505) 
-.037 
(.860) 
.100 
(.633) 
-.308 
(.135) 
-.106 
(.615) 
.022 
(.918) 
.092 
(.663) 
-.271 
(.190) 
-.152 
(.467) 
-.275 
(.184) 
.015 
(.944) 
.003 
(.988) 
.094 
(.657) 
1.00   
CDI .334 
(.102) 
.349 
(.087) 
.352 
(.085) 
.546** 
(.005) 
.701** 
(.000) 
.490* 
(.013) 
.536** 
(.006) 
.586** 
(.002) 
.638** 
(.001) 
.631* 
(.001) 
.578** 
(.002) 
.531** 
(.006) 
.622** 
(.001) 
.424* 
(.035) 
-.018 
(.933) 
1.00  
CGF .519** 
(.008) 
.361 
(.077) 
.445* 
(.026) 
.522** 
(.007) 
.489* 
(.014) 
.499* 
(.011) 
.537** 
(.006) 
.253 
(.222) 
.684** 
(.000) 
.414* 
(.040) 
.491* 
(.013) 
.300 
(.146) 
.468* 
(.018) 
.247 
(.234) 
-.367 
(.071) 
.544** 
(.005) 
1.00 
Number of the company 25, **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), and *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 (2-tailed).r=Correlation Coefficient and 
p=significant.  
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      Although table 7.4 shows that strong correlation (r= .845) and positive significant 
(p= .000) between ROE and ROCE, and correlation (r= .548) and positive significant 
(p= .005) between ROE and ROA. The results of this study are consistent with Antle 
and Smith (1986), ROA is an accounting-based financial performance measure that is 
highly correlated with other accounting performance measures such as ROE. 
      Hypothesis H10 is “There is a relationship between T&D practices, and financial 
performance, as measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA”. However H10 had limited 
acceptance, hence only H10.6 was fully accepted, H10.3 and H10.14 were partly accepted, 
and H10.4 and 10.8were limited accepted. The other remaining sub-hypotheses were 
rejected. Table 7.5 shows the test of sub-hypotheses related to H10.  
Table  7.5 Test of the Sub-hypotheses 
H Sub-hypotheses Result  
ROCE ROE ROA 
H10 There is relationship between T&D practices, and financial performance, 
as measured by ROCE, ROE, and ROA H10(..).1 H10(..).2 H10(..).3 
H10.1. Disclosure of financial and operation results × × × 
H10.2.  Disclosure of company objectives × × × 
H10.3.  Disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights   × 
H10.4. Disclosure of board members, key executives and their remuneration   × × 
H10.5. Disclosure of related party transactions × × × 
H10.6. Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors    
H10.7. Disclosure of material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders × × × 
H10.8. Disclosure of governance structures and policies × ×  
H10.9. Disclosure of preparation of information, audit, and disclosure according 
to high standards of accounting, disclosure and audit 
× × × 
H10.10 Disclosure of external audit and monitoring × × × 
H10.11 Disclosure of external audit and audit committee role  × × × 
H10.12
.
 
Disclosure of external auditors accountable to shareholders, and external 
auditor owes a duty of due professional care 
× × × 
H10.13
.
 
Disclosure of channels for disseminating information allow for fair, 
timely, and cost efficient access to Information by user 
× × × 
H10.14
.
 
Disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an 
effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis  
 ×  
 there is accepted, × there is rejected.  
 
 
       Table 7.4 shows that ROCE and ROE were positive significant with variables 
disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights, and disclosure of material 
foreseeable risk factors. While, ROCE and ROA were positive significant with 
disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis, but with ROE was not 
significant.  
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       Table 7.4 presents the Pearson’s Correlation results of the variables. This study of 
Pearson’s Correlation results shows positive significance between some T&D 
variables and financial performance variables. To explore the impact of variables of 
T&D on financial performance, a regression model should be used. The next 
subsection concerns the regression analysis. 
7.4 Regression Analysis 
This section presents the main regression results. Specifically, subsection 7.4.2, 3, and 
4 will report the regression results between T&D (independent variables), and three-
company financial performance (dependent variables) to test hypothesis eleven.      
       This study examines the impact of T&D practices on financial performance as 
measured by three dependent variables: ROCE; ROE; and ROA.   
7.4.1 The Impact of Variables of Transparency and Disclosure Practices on 
Variables of Financial Performance 
The main independent variable used in examining the impact of T&D practices and 
financial performance included 14 variables, as has been discussed in chapter four 
(see Section 4.6.2). The main independent variable is an aggregation of 14 
comprehensive sets of T&D practices provisions contained in literature, and T&D 
practices requirements in Libya.  
       The dependent variable in this study is company financial performance. Three 
measurements, namely ROCE, ROE, and ROA are used as measures of financial 
performance.  
      In this section the study used regression analysis to answer EQ11 “Which 
independent variable (T&D practices) has the most impact on the dependent variable 
(financial performance)?”, and testing H11: “There is a variable of T&D practices that 
has the most impact on company financial performance”.
      Each of three sub-hypotheses is measured by 14 independent variables and three 
of accounting financial performance.  
H.11.1- Disclosure of financial and operation results has the most impact on financial 
performance.  
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H.11.2- Disclosure of company objectives has the most impact on financial 
performance. 
H.11.3- Disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights has the most impact on 
financial performance. 
H.11.4- Disclosure of board members, key executives and their remuneration has the 
most impact on financial performance. 
H.11.5- Disclosure of related party transactions has the most impact on financial 
performance. 
H.11.6- Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors has the most impact on financial 
performance. 
H.11.7- Disclosure of material issues regarding employees and other stakeholders has 
the most impact on financial performance. 
H.11.8- Disclosure of governance structures and policies has the most impact on 
financial performance. 
H.11.9- Disclosure of preparation of information, audit, and disclosure according to 
high standards of accounting, disclosure and audit has the most impact on financial 
performance. 
H.11.10- Disclosure of annual external audit and monitoring has the most impact on 
financial performance. 
H.11.11- Disclosure of external audit and audit committee role has the most impact on 
financial performance. 
H.11.12- Disclosure of external auditors accountable to shareholders, and external 
auditor owes a duty of due professional care has the most impact on financial 
performance. 
H.11.13- Disclosure of channels for disseminating information allow for fair, timely, 
and cost efficient access to Information by user has the most impact on financial 
performance. 
H.11.14- Disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis has the most impact on 
financial performance. 
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      In this section the next three subsections compare the results obtained from the 
preliminary analysis of regression by forward selection method between 
independent variables and dependent variables.   
      From the results in section 7.3 the hypotheses H11.1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 are 
rejected, because these independent variables do not have a relationship with 
dependent variables financial performance. 
7.4.2 Regression between Independent Variables (T&D), and Dependent 
Variable (ROCE) 
In section 7.3 the study finds that there was a relationship between four items for 
T&D practices (independent variables) and ROCE (dependent variable). In this 
section, the study used regression analysis to find which variable of T&D practices 
has the most impact to ROCE. From the results in section 7.3 the four independent 
variables have a positive relationship with the dependent variable ROCE as follows:  
- Disclosure of major share ownership and voting right.  
- Disclosure of board member, key executives and their remuneration. 
- Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors. 
- Disclosure of corporate governance framework complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis.    
      The study, after checking for the model fit, seeks to ascertain the relative 
importance of each independent variable in predicting the dependent variable. The 
unstandardized (B) coefficients are the coefficients of the estimated regression model. 
      Table 7.6 shows that the resulting model using forward selection procedure 
indicates that the disclosure of corporate governance framework was the best 
independent variable which had the most impact on the dependent variable ROCE.  
The models explain 26.9 % of the variance (Adjusted R2= .269). The p value 
significant level is 0.008 (p<.05). Hence, p value suggests that disclosure of corporate 
governance framework (predictor variable) is having a large impact on the ROCE 
(criterion variable). This means that an increase in disclosure of corporate governance 
framework is usually associated with an increase in ROCE and vice versa. Thus, if 
disclosure of corporate governance framework increases by 1 standard deviations 
ROCE will increase by .519. 
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      The coefficient of disclosure of corporate governance framework is positively and 
significantly related with ROCE at the significant level of 5%. This shows that the 
greater the disclosure of corporate governance framework, the higher the value of 
ROCE.  
 The table 7.6 shows the best variable of T&D practices related with ROCE is the 
CGF.  
 Table  7.6 Regression between Corporate Governance Framework and ROCE 
Model Unstandardized Coefficient (B)11 
Standardized 
Coefficient (Beta) 12 t P-Value
13
 
Constant -6.164  -0.726 0.475 
Disclosure of corporate 
governance framework  
7.883 .519 2.911 0.008 
R2 x 100             26.9 %14 
          If there is one independent variable, the value of F (P-value) = t (P-value) 
 
7.4.3 Regression between Independent Variables (T&D), and Dependent 
Variable (ROE) 
In section 7.3, the study finds that there was a relationship between two items for 
T&D practices (independent variables) and ROE (dependent variable). In this section, 
the study used regression analysis to find which of the variables among T&D practices 
has the most impact on return on equity. However, the two independent variables have 
a relationship with the dependent variable ROE as follows:  
- Disclosure of major share ownership and voting right.  
- Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors.  
       The study after checking for the model fit, seeks to ascertain the relative 
importance of each independent variable in predicting the dependent variable. The 
unstandardized (B) coefficients are the coefficients of the estimated regression model. 
      By the forward selection method, the major share ownership and voting right was 
the best independent variable, which had an impact on the dependent variable ROE. 
                                                     
11
 B for each predictor variable shows the predicted increase in the value of the criterion variable for a 1 
unit increase in that predictor (while controlling for the other predictors).  
12
  is the predicted change in standard deviations of the criterion variable, for a change of 1 in standard 
deviations in the predictor (while controlling for the other predictors).   
13P values give a rough indication of impact of each predictor variable.  
14
 R2makes clear how the power of model changes with the addition or removal of a predictor variable 
from the model.  
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      Table 7.7 shows that the resulting model using forward selection procedure 
indicates that the disclosure of major share ownership and voting right was the best 
independent variable which had the most impact on the dependent variable ROE.  
       The models explains 34.4 % of the variance (Adjusted R2= .344). The p value 
significant level is 0.002 (p<.005). Hence, p value suggests that disclosure of major 
share ownership and voting right (predictor variable) is having a large impact on the 
ROE (criterion variable). This means that an increase in disclosure of major share 
ownership and voting right is usually associated with an increase in ROE and vice 
versa. Thus, if disclosures of major share ownership and voting right increases by 1 
standard deviations ROCE will increase by .587. 
      The table 7.7 presents the best variable of T&D practices related with ROE is 
major share ownership and voting right. 
Table  7.7 Regression between Major Share Ownership & Voting Right, and ROE 
Model Unstandardized Coefficient (B) 
Standardized 
Coefficient (Beta)  t P-Value 
Constant -6.379  -1.238 0.228 
Disclosure of major share 
ownership & voting right 
5.197 .587 3.474 0.002 
R2 x 100                         34.4 % 
If there is one independent variable, the value of F (P-value) = t (P-value)  
 
7.4.4 Regression between Independent Variables (T&D), and Dependent 
Variable (ROA) 
In section 7.3 the study finds that there is a relationship between three items for T&D 
practices (independent variables) and ROA (dependent variable). In this section the 
study used regression analysis to find which variable of T&D practices has the most 
impact on ROA. However, the three independent variables have a relationship with 
the dependent variable ROA as follows:  
- Disclosure of Material foreseeable risk factors. 
- Disclosure of Governance structures and policies.  
- Disclosure of corporate governance framework complemented by an effective 
approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis.   
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      The study after checking for the model fit, seeks to ascertain the relative 
importance of each independent variable in predicting the dependent variable. The 
unstandardized (B) coefficients are the coefficients of the estimated regression model. 
      By the forward selection method, the CGF was the best independent variable that 
had an impact on the dependent variable ROA.  
      Table 7.8 shows that the resulting model using forward selection procedure 
indicates that the disclosure of corporate governance framework was the best 
independent variable which had the most impact on the dependent variable ROA.  
       The models explains 19.8 % of the variance (Adjusted R2= .198). The p value 
significant level is 0.02 (p<.05). Hence, p value suggests that disclosure of corporate 
governance framework (predictor variable) is having a large impact on the ROA 
(criterion variable). This means that an increase in disclosure of corporate governance 
framework is usually associated with an increase in ROA and vice versa. Thus, if 
disclosure of corporate governance framework increases by 1 standard deviations 
ROCE will increase by .445. 
      The table 7.8 provides the best variable of T&D practices related with ROA is 
disclosure of corporate governance framework. 
Table  7.8 Regression between Corporate Governance Framework, and ROA 
Model Unstandardized Coefficient (B) 
Standardized 
Coefficient (Beta)  t P-Value 
Constant -2.039  -1.112 0.273 
Disclosure of corporate 
governance framework 1.380 .445 2.383 0.026 
R2 x 100 19.8 % 
If there is one independent variable, the value of F (P-value) = t (P-value)  
 
      Table 7.9 shows that the coefficients of disclosure of corporate governance 
framework are the best independent variables positively and significantly related with 
two dependent variables (ROCE, and ROA), which are positively and significantly 
related to ROCE, and ROA at a significant level of 0.05. Hence, companies with 
higher T&D practices on disclosure of corporate governance framework have higher 
company financial performance (ROCE, and ROA). While disclosure of major share 
ownership and voting rights is the best independent variable positively and 
significantly related with one dependent variable ROE. Hence, companies with higher 
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T&D practices on major share ownership and voting right have higher company 
financial performance (ROE). The hypothesis H11 is “there is variable of T&D 
practices have the most impact on company financial performance”. However, H11 
 is partly accepted in this study. 
      Table 7.9 shows the best independent variable positively significantly related with 
dependent variables. 
Table  7.9 Test of the Hypothesis H11 
H Sub-hypothesis Result  
ROCE ROE  ROA  
H11 There is variable of T&D practices have the most  impact on 
company financial performance 
   
H11.3 Disclosure of major share ownership and voting rights  *  
H11.4 Disclosure of board members, key executives and their 
remuneration 
   
H11.6 Disclosure of material foreseeable risk factors    
H11.8 Disclosure of governance structures and policies    
H11.14 Disclosure of corporate governance framework, complemented 
by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the 
provision of analysis  
*  * 
*The best independent variable positively significantly related with dependent variables  
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on presenting and discussing the empirical results regarding 
the link between T&D practices and company financial performance. Specifically, the 
chapter attempted to achieve two main objectives. First, it attempted to examine the 
relationship between the 14 variables of T&D practices and three company financial 
performances, as measured by ROCE, ROE, and ROA. Second, it sought to 
investigate which independent variable of T&D practices has the most impact on 
company financial performance. 
      The main aim of the study is to investigate the levels of T&D in Libyan financial 
companies, and explore their relationship with company financial performance 
(ROCE, ROE and ROA). This general aim has been divided into six objectives, the 
fifth and sixth of which are: 
-To determine the relationship between T&D practices, and company financial 
performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA). 
       The study showed that H10 has limited acceptance in this study. These five 
variables of T&D have a relationship with financial performance as follows:   
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1-The variable of material foreseeable risk factors has a significant correlation with 
three financial performance measures (ROCE, ROE, and ROA);  
2-The variable of major share ownership and voting right has a significant correlation 
with two financial performance measures (ROCE, and ROE). 
3 The variable of CGF has a significant correlation with two financial performance 
measures (ROCE, and ROA). 
4-The variable of board members, key executives and their remuneration has a 
significant correlation with one financial performance measure (ROCE). 
5-The variable of governance structures and policies has a significant correlation with 
one financial performance measure (ROA). 
- To find which variable of T&D practices has the most impact on company financial 
performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA). 
      Therefore, the study showed that H11 is partly accepted in this study, concerning 
which variable of T&D practices was best related to company financial performance. 
The corporate governance framework complemented by an effective approach that 
addresses and promotes the provision of analysis was the best variable of T&D 
practices, with the most impact on financial performance ROCE, and ROA. The major 
share ownership and voting right was the best variable of T&D practices with the 
most impact on financial performance ROE.  
       The next chapter will provide a discussion of the research, specifically; it will 
provide an overview of this study and the main results. 
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Chapter 8 Discussion and Interpretation of Key Findings 
8.1 Introduction 
The main aims in this chapter are to summarises and discuss the empirical findings 
presented in chapters 6 and 7 respectively to research the questions and hypotheses 
relating to literature. One purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of 
the level of T&D association with the emergence of the LSM. This study also makes a 
comparison between the situation in Libyan companies in the area of T&D and that in 
other companies located in other countries. In addition, to assessing whether there are 
variations between companies in T&D practices in their annual reports. The chapter 
will endeavour to establish whether company characteristics determine the extent of 
T&D. It will also determine the relationship between T&D practices and financial 
performance. The chapter also aims to discuss and interpret the results and to identify 
and argue the study’s contribution to knowledge. 
       This chapter is organised as follows:  the main research results and dissection 
related EQ 1, 2 and 3 are in section 8.2. The main research results and discussion 
connected EQ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are in section 8.3. The main research results and 
dissection linked EQ 10 are in section 8.4. The main research results and dissection 
related EQ 11 is in section 8.5. Section 8.6 presents the summary and conclusion. 
8.2 Transparency and disclosure in Libyan Financial Companies 
In this section, findings are explained according to the research questions at the 
beginning of this study. Under each question raised, an interpretation is given as stated 
below. 
      Since shareholder are unable to see inside companies directly, they rely on the 
annual report, website, bulletins, periodicals, document...etc. The present study posits 
that the level of T&D improved since the emergence of the LSM in their annual 
reports. There are six corporate characteristics effecting T&D, and three have 
relationships between fourteen variables of T&D and three variables of financial 
performance.  
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      This section presents discussions about the empirical findings regarding T&D as 
follows: the subsection 8.2.1 presents and discusses the results for the first empirical 
analysis; the subsection 8.2.2 presents and also discusses the results for the second 
empirical research question; and the subsection 8.2.3 presents and discusses the results 
for the third empirical research question as follows: 
8.2.1 The Extent of the Level of Transparency and Disclosure in Libyan 
Financial Companies in the Emerging LSM 
This subsection discusses the result obtained as recorded in chapter six of this study. 
Here the work discusses the extent of T&D obtained in Libyan financial companies. 
According to CG principles’ III (OECD, 2004, p. 20) “The corporate governance 
framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including 
minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress for violation of their rights”. However, the lower T&D of 
diversified companies in emerging markets results in a higher level of asymmetric 
information that may allow managers or controlling shareholders to more easily take 
advantage of minority shareholders. Bushman and Smith (2001) suggest that a high 
level of T&D contributes to the establishment of confidence in capital markets and 
encourages a better flow of foreign direct investment into a country.  
      The first empirical research question is: Have Libyan financial companies 
improved the level of T&D in their annual reports since the emergence of the Libyan 
Stock Market? 
      The purpose of this study is to investigate the levels of T&D in Libyan financial 
companies during the years 2005 to 2008. The S&P T&D index is being developed to 
measure the levels of T&D at three levels: total T&D; three categories of T&D; 
twelve subcategories of T&D. Moreover, four statistical tests were performed to 
assess whether there is a statistically significant increase in T&D or not over four 
years and pair years. 
      For Libyan financial companies, there are statistically significant increases in the 
amount of T&D provided in annual reports during the four years. With regard to the 
27 Libyan financial companies included in the T&D study, the major findings are:    
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      At the first level, the results in this study show that for total T&D there was a 
strong statistically significant increase in T&D during the four years and all pair years. 
Furthermore, the study found that no annual report of financial companies listed in 
Libya achieved a high level of T&D (see Figure 6.5). The level of T&D in Libyan 
financial companies’ annual reports was still low in 2008 (37%) and the information 
did not equate with comparable information, and has not reduced information 
asymmetry between inside and outside stakeholders (see Section 6.3). This study is 
consistent with Larbsh (2010) who find that creating a stock market has improved the 
practice of CG in Libya. Although, the results in this study find that despite the 
obvious weaknesses in the level of T&D in Libyan financial companies, the statistics 
show a clear strong statistically significant increase during the four years and most of 
the pair years. 
      At the second level, TOTAL S&P T&D is a sum of three categories of T&D, 
which present three different aspects of T&D. These are the ownership structure and 
investor rights; the financial transparency and information disclosure; the board and 
management structure and process. The study concludes that the quality of Libyan 
financial companies is the most moderate with the highest and lowest scores observed 
in the financial transparency and information disclosure and ownership structure and 
investor rights categories, respectively. The finding in this study shows that 
effectiveness of governance measures is very weak in Libyan financial companies 
when ownership structures are not transparent. This possibly shows that there was a 
strong statistically significant increase in financial transparency and information 
disclosure during the four years, and in each of the pair years from 2005 to 2008.  
      The results in this study show that the level of financial transparency and 
information disclosure, between 43% in 2005 and 65% in 2008, concedes with  
Ellabbar’s (2007) study, which finds that accounting disclosure had a rate between 
40% and 60% in Libyan companies. Therefore Saleh (2001) argues that UK and US 
accounting practices have been transferred to Libya through oil companies. Hence, the 
oil companies have influenced other business economies. Thus, foreign influence 
disclosure practice is encouraged in Libyan companies through the oil companies.  
       At the third level, TOTAL S&P T&D is a sum of twelve subcategories of T&D. 
There were statistically significant increases for eleven out of twelve subcategories.  
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For voting and shareholder meeting procedures there was no statistically significant 
increase during the four years, while there were statistically significant increases for 
most of the pair years. Thus Libyan financial companies show poor CG, because those 
companies with better CG quality reveal more information about T&D. Therefore, the 
results of this study find that Libyan financial companies conceal some information, 
which results in a higher degree of information asymmetry, in turn leading to slower 
growth in their companies and less efficient capital allocation. In addition, lower 
quality of T&D, will raise the cost of capital by affecting the market’s allocation of 
capital.  
      Recent research in corporate disclosure addresses that, T&D are affected by the 
legal and political infrastructure (Ball, 2001; Khanna, et al., 2004). Magrus (2012) 
argues that CG in Libya is in its early stages of development and is characterised by a 
weak legal environment. Laws and regulations requiring T&D in the ownership 
structure and the board of director’s structure maybe modified in order to achieve 
more T&D in Libyan financial companies. However, the Commercial Law 1953 is not 
easy to apply, since there is no clear definition of annual reports, forcing some 
companies to deploy sufficient numbers belonging to the balance sheet, income 
statement and cash flow statement as well as for the analysis of those numbers. The 
failure of many of these companies to publish any information that may reflect the 
reality of financial and non-financial activity, legislation may be involved in the 
failure of companies, because companies find themselves obliged to disclose, except 
for financial disclosure required by the External Auditor.  This study is consistent with 
Larbsh (2010), report that the interviewees remarked that: there is compliance with the 
mandatory requirements, such as Balance Sheet, Income Statement, and External 
Auditor Report, there is low compliance in other requirements of disclosure such as: 
Ownership Structure, Key Executives and their Remuneration, Cash Flow Statement, 
Directors’ Report. Dardor (2009) argues that there are nine qualitative characteristics 
of useful information; it shows statistically significant increase in the mean ranking of 
predictive value, disclosure, faithful representation, confirmatory value, free from 
material error, prudence, neutrality, and consistency. Bribesh (2006) argues that the 
level of voluntary disclosure in published corporate annual reports is low compared 
with mandatory disclosure in Libyan companies. 
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      These results suggest that the T&D available in the annual reports of Libyan 
financial companies are not enough in terms of quality to build the confidence of 
lenders and underwriters, to attract foreign and local investors, and reduce the 
asymmetry information and agency problems. Moreover, Libyan financial companies 
are in need of improving their T&D quality categories on ownership structure and 
investor right, and board and management structure and process. In addition, the 
subcategories of T&D, name of external audit, disclosures on auditors’ report, audit 
fees and non-audit fees, are in need of improving. 
      Therefore, Libyan financial companies should increase their overall T&D 
practices which lead to better CG, largely because the disclosure practices of a 
company can be viewed as an efficient mechanism for the protection of the rights of 
outsiders. Black et al. (2006b) and Botosan (1997) argue that better CG leads to 
higher standards of T&D. 
      The research hypothesis regarding the statistically significant increase in S&P 
transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies’ annual reports, through 
fiscal years from 2005 to 2008 (H1) would be accepted (see Table 6.6). Table 6.6 
show that sub-hypotheses for the first hypothesis can be accepted. These three sub-
hypotheses relate to the T&D from the disclosure index ownership structure and 
investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board and 
management structure and process. 
      This study found that the level of T&D in Libya financial companies showed 
statistically significant increases during the four years. As such it lead to better 
performance and increased foreign direct investment. The level of T&D increased by 
13% from 2005 to 2008, which generated a corresponding increases in foreign direct 
investment by 220% within the same period (AIECGC, 2008). This suggests that 
T&D greatly increases the level of foreign direct investment.  
      Generally, these results for the first hypothesis are consistent with previous study 
by Larbsh (2010). This lends support to the stock market that has improved the 
practice of CG in Libya. Aksu & Kosedag (2006) report that high T&D increases the 
company’s performance and the market’s access to both domestic and foreign 
investment and hence leads to greater levels of growth. In addition Chiang & Chia 
(2005) found that T&D had a significant relationship with operating performance. 
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Lang & Lundholm (1993) find that analyst scores of disclosure are significant with 
company performance. Chen et al (2007) argue that companies with lowly T&D 
practices have more economic costs of equity liquidity. Chi (2009) ascertain that high 
level of T&D practices leading to good corporate performance. 
8.2.2 The Level of Transparency and Disclosure of Libyan Financial Companies 
Compared with Other Counties 
Chapter six contained the empirical research results of this study. Here a discussion is 
carried out on the extent of T&D between Libyan financial institutions with those in 
other economies. 
      The second empirical research question: Do Libyan financial companies provide a 
low level of T&D in their annual reports compared to companies in other countries? 
       The T&D literature shows that a company’s commitment to disclosure reduces 
information asymmetries between investors, which, in turn, increase the liquidity of 
the equity markets (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000, 2005; Verrecchia, 2001). Also previous 
empirical studies suggest that disclosure or information quality metrics are negatively 
associated with the company’s cost of capital, measuring the latter as the discount 
factor implied by market prices and forecasts of future cash flows (Botosan, 1997; 
Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Francis, et al., 2003; Hail, 2003). Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2005) show that higher information quality will lower the cost of capital by affecting 
the market’s allocation of capital. 
      This study shows that total T&D in annual reports of Libyan financial companies 
is low compared to that of companies in other countries around the world (see Section 
6.4). All companies have higher levels of T&D than Libyan financial companies 
except for Latin American and Ukrainian companies (see Figure 6.1). Of the three 
categories, the first, level of T&D of ownership structure and investor rights was the 
weakest level (12%) in this comparison (see Figure 6.2). The second, level of 
financial transparency and information disclosure was the same (65%) as the 
Netherlands and better than for Italy, Spain, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Emerging 
Asia, Ukraine and Russia (see Figure 6.3). The third, level of board and management 
structure and processes was low (30%); however, the aggregate level was better than 
for Latin America, Emerging Asia and Ukraine (see Figure 6.4). Better T&D practices 
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can help shareholders to gain better understanding of the companies’ management 
practices, thus, helping to reduce the information asymmetry encountered by 
investors. On the other hand, companies with poor T&D face more serious asymmetry 
of information. The study shows that the low level of T&D compared with companies 
in other countries has a negative effect on attracting foreign investors.  
      This study is consistent with Creane et al. (2004) in saying that the Libyan 
environment needs to improve its financial regulation and supervision, as well as its 
legal system, which are related to business, especially with respect to CG practices. 
Larbsh (2010) argues that enforcement of the legal system will remain a major 
challenge to developing the framework of CG in Libya. In this respect, Aksu (2006) 
found that the levels of S&P T&D scores in 2004 were significantly higher than those 
in 2003 and enhanced by the promulgation of a set of local CG principles in the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange. Bushman et al. (2004) argue that the governance 
transparency factor is primarily related to a country’s legal regime, whereas the 
financial transparency factor is primarily related to political economies. 
      However, this finding may not be surprising; companies in more developed 
markets tend to have better T&D information than companies in less developed 
markets such as the Libyan market. Therefore, all competent authorities should be 
seeking to increase the level of T&D in Libyan listed companies, where a high level 
of T&D comparable with companies in other countries is more important for 
emerging markets such as Libya, because the emerging market is in dire need of 
external capital and increased foreign investment for their economy. In addition, a 
high level of T&D leads to improved investment efficiency and increased growth by 
alleviating information asymmetry between management and other stakeholders. 
       The research hypothesis regarding the Libyan financial companies have a low 
level of transparency and disclosure in their annual reports compared to companies in 
other countries (H2) would be partial accepted (see Table 6.8). This study specifically 
cited an insufficient T&D related ownership structure and investor right, and board 
and management structure and process for Libyan financial companies as two major 
governance disclosure shortcomings. 
      Overall the results for the second hypothesis are consistent with previous studies, 
Magrus (2012) Libyan companies do not meet the requirements of T&D information. 
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8.2.3 Transparency and Disclosure Variations 
Chapter six contained the empirical research results of this study. Here a discussion is 
carried out on the variations between companies in T&D practices. 
      The third empirical research question is: Do Libyan financial companies vary in 
their transparency and disclosure practices in their annual reports?   
The Libyan financial companies have weaker rules and wider variations between 
companies in T&D practices (see Chapter 2). This study is consistent with Mallin & 
Jelic (2000) in saying that transition economies often have weaker rules and wider 
variations between companies in CG practices. Klapper and Love (2004) find that 
company-level CG and performance is lower in countries with weak legal 
environments, suggesting that improving the legal system should remain a priority for 
policymakers. Gupta, Nair, & Gogula  (2003) found variations in the CG reporting 
practices in Indian companies. Ho & Wong (2001) report that there were large 
variations in voluntary disclosure practices among companies in Hong Kong. Collett 
& Hrasky (2005) found that the degree of T&D were varied from company to 
company. 
      In this study, the research hypothesis found that there are significant variations in 
Libyan financial companies T&D in their annual reports, (H3) can be accepted and 
was found to be a significant positive. 
      Overall, these results for the third hypothesis are consistent with previous studies 
(Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Mallin & Jelic, 2000). This lends support to the transition 
economies often have weaker rules and wider variations from company to company-in 
T&D practices. 
      From the above (in Section 8.2) this study suggest that might the reasons about 
various of the level of T&D between categories and between subcategories, and 
weakness of T&D, and wider variations between companies in T&D practices as 
follows:  
 Weaknesses in the T&D practice and quality of information might be ascribed to 
the absence of accountability in Libyan companies. In the index of Transparency 
International, Libya ranked 168 out of 183 countries in 2011. Gray, Owen, & Adams  
(1996) agree that increasing the level of accountability leads to more transparency. 
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 S&P T&D index questions were answered by Yes/No: if the company discloses 
information about the T&D related to the question, it receives one point or zero if it 
does not disclose the information. Some questions especially in the first subcategory 
“Transparency of ownership” are not relevant; for example, most Libyan companies 
do not have preferred stock. In addition, according to the Libyan Commercial Act, it is 
not binding to disclose most of the second subcategory, namely the one, three, five 
and ten top shareholders – it is only binding to disclose any shareholders owning more 
than 5%. Thus, companies not disclosing information about the question get zero. For 
this reason, many Libyan financial companies get low points for total T&D, especially 
in the first category “Ownership structure and investor rights”. The researcher 
believes that in the case of adoption of the LSM as the index for CG, or developing a 
visual index of S&P T&D, as some other countries such as Russia, Taiwan and 
Thailand have done, the results obtained by Libya could be more realistic.  
 The reason may be the size, its composition and the selection of experienced 
directors, because a study conducted in UAE by Adawi & Rwegasira in (2011) 
investigated that the main factors were size, composition and the selection of 
experienced directors, which increased the effectiveness of a corporate board in 
voluntarily promoting good practice in disclosure. In the annual report of Libyan 
financial companies there was no information that showed the foundation that has 
been on its impact on selection CEO and key of directors. 
 This implies that the low levels of T&D affect company value in terms of 
investment opportunity. This may be because the lower the information in T&D, the 
higher the asymmetry of information between management and shareholder, and the 
higher the cost of capital. When companies have a higher cost of capital, their values 
are lower.  
 Weaknesses in the T&D practice and quality of information might be ascribed to 
the absence of a comprehensive framework for CG, financial, accounting and auditing 
standards, the weakness of the Union of the business environment in Libya, and the 
inappropriateness of the curricula to the needs of the economy.  
Larbsh (2010) in saying that the Libyan disclosure framework is quite weak; the 
reasons for the weakness in disclosure are the absence of the legal requirements for 
disclosure and the absence of accounting standards. Street and Bryant’s (2000) 
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findings reveal that the overall level of disclosure is higher for companies with US 
listings, and higher disclosure is associated with an accounting policy. Patel et al. 
(2002) find that the level of T&D of Indian companies improved by 8% points during 
the years 1998-2000, highlighting the positive effect of the new regulatory 
requirements on CG code. Bailey et al. (2006) find that the increased volume and 
volatility reactions around earnings announcements are concentrated in those that 
have voluntarily aligned their reporting with International Accounting Standards and 
in the cross-listing companies with greater transparency and  disclosure. Financial 
markets are more developed in countries with strong investor protection laws. The 
first reason is that outsider investors have greater legal protection against 
expropriation by insiders, which reduces investment risk and should lead to higher 
equity valuation. The second reason is a more credible basis for contracting as a result 
of higher quality accounting and auditing, and less information asymmetry between 
insiders and outside investors (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). 
Kelton and Yang (2008) suggest that new regulatory guidance in CG leads to 
improved T&D by internet financial reports.  
 According to Levitt (2000): 
If a country does not have a reputation for strong CG practices, capital will flow elsewhere. 
If investors are not confident with the level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a 
country opts for lax accounting and reporting standards, capital will flow elsewhere. All 
enterprises in that country -- regardless of how steadfast a particular company’s practices 
may be suffer the consequences. 
 
      According to Wong et al. (2010) where there is no corporate disclosure, and where 
there are realities of absence of legal norms or social norms towards corporate 
disclosure, there is a likelihood of insider trading, unless it falls under trade secrets or 
rules which result in market disorder by premature disclosure as set out in the stock 
market listing requirements. Brennan and Solomon (2008) argue that the CG variables 
are predicated to influence T&D. The variables also vary from external governance 
mechanisms in the form of legal systems for the country-level studies to internal 
mechanisms of CG relating to the board of directors, board independence, board 
committees, the quality of auditors, share ownership by directors and managers and 
ownership concentration among large shareholders. Renders, Gaeremynck and Sercu 
(2010) show that soft laws lead to companies improving their CG.  
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 Weaknesses in the T&D practices and quality of information might be ascribed to 
weak laws. La Porta et al. (1997), argue that legal environment-as described by both 
legal rules and their enforcement-matters for the size and extent of a country’s capital 
markets. Because a good legal environment protects the potential financiers against 
expropriation by entrepreneurs, it raises their willingness to surrender funds in 
exchange for securities, and hence expands the scope of capital markets. 
The legal system in Libya shows weakness; in Libyan law there is mandatory 
reporting such as income statement, balance sheet and audit report, but there are many 
important reports, for example, environmental policies disclosed report and quarterly 
financial statement, that this study found Libyan financial companies do not have, 
which impacts negatively on the level of T&D (see Section 7.3). Therefore, quarterly 
reports are important for impact T&D especially when reviewed by an external 
auditor. According to Khanna et al. (2004), China and Malaysia recently introduced 
mandatory quarterly reporting in their overhaul of governance and disclosure 
requirements. However, Fresard and Salva (2007) found that the legal constraints will 
improve not only governance, but also reputational bonding brought by increasing the 
market transparency. Therefore, T&D requirements in Libya must be reviewed 
regularly. However, Mashat et al. (2005) found that the legislation is viewed as the 
key source of establishing such responsibilities rather than professional guidelines 
related to reporting and disclosure of social and environmental policies in Libya.  
Elmogla (2009) reports that the banks made some social disclosure without the legal 
pressure. Therefore, the Commercial Law should include an article about the formality 
of the annual report. However, the Libyan government should augment their 
mandatory T&D requirements via enacting new laws and regulations.  
 The other reason for weaknesses in the T&D practices in Libya listing companies 
might be that, the culture and knowledge have an impact on environmental disclosure. 
According to Bayoud et al. (2012a) 23% of managers in Libyan companies think that 
the company’s reputation cannot be affected by environmental disclosure in the 
annual reports, for a number of reasons. First, financial disclosure is more interesting 
for some stakeholders. Second, stakeholders are not aware of the importance of 
environmental disclosure for the company and community, and its impact on a 
company’s reputation. Most stakeholders (81%) believe that the level of community 
265 
 
disclosure does affect a company’s reputation. Third, the culture of stakeholders is 
considered one of the most important factors that can influence a company’s 
reputation. However, Libya being a developing country, stakeholders are not aware of 
the importance of environmental disclosure for companies and the community, which 
could be a possible explanation for lack of environmental disclosure within Libyan 
companies. Magrus (2012) argues that weak investment awareness among investors 
was one of the biggest obstacles to CG practices in Libya. 
 The other reason for low levels of T&D practices might be, the weak role of audit 
committees in Libyan listing companies. In a sample of this study, companies did not 
disclose information about the role of audit committee, for example the relationship 
with external and internal auditors. Barako et.al (2006a) and Ho & Wong (2001)found 
that the audit committee was a significant factor associated with level of disclosure. 
 The other reason of weak T&D might be due to the absence of big audit companies 
in Libya. Fan & Wong, (2005) argue that external auditors play a CG role in East 
Asia. Aksu, Onder, & Saatcioglu (2007), Craswell and Taylor (1992) and Inchausti 
(1997) found a significant positive relationship Between T&D practices and type of 
audit company. 
 The other reason is that foreign investment may be weak. Foreign investment in 
Libya is weak (see Subsection 2.3.5). Sueyoshi et al. (2010) find that foreign 
investment develops the operational performance in Japanese companies until the 
ratio of shares held by foreign shareholders becomes 19.49%. The low level of foreign 
investment, which might lead to weakness, is experienced by directors in Libyan 
companies. Adawi and Rwegasira (2011) find that increased effectiveness of a 
corporate board in voluntarily promoting good practice in disclosure depend on its 
size, its composition and the selection of experienced directors in the UAE companies. 
Xiao et al. (2004) find  that foreign ownership is a significant determining factor for 
disclosures. Barako et al. (2006a) establish that the levels of institutional and foreign 
ownership have a significant positive impact on voluntary disclosures. Doaa, Jon and 
Khaled (2009) find that foreign listing has been a determinant of the amount and 
presentation formatting of information disclosed on Egyptian companies’ websites. 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) report that disclosure, audit committee 
independence, institutional share ownership and proportion of non-executive directors 
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are all positively and significantly associated with foreign share ownership. Also, they 
demonstrate that market capitalization, liquidity ratios and ROE are significantly 
associated with foreign share ownership. Bokpin and Isshaq (2009) show that there is 
a statistically significant interaction between corporate disclosures and foreign share 
ownership on the Ghana Stock Exchange. Younas et al. (2011) suggest that disclosure 
on financial information transparency disclosures and ownership structure of the 
company are more significant disclosures of corporate policy, which bring the default 
risk/lower credit rating. Alfergani (2010) proposes that the Libyan policy environment 
is still a hindrance to attracting foreign direct investment. Ullmann (1985) suggests 
that disclosure is affected by political factors which grant shareholders power.    
 In addition, the shares of Libyan companies are not traded in the international stock 
market, which is one determining factor of weak T&D. According to Zhou et al. 
(2011), companies have to be subject to more stringent local laws and market 
regulations in the foreign stock market, which will improve external CG. Subramanian 
and Reddy (2010) report that when a company gets cross-listed in a foreign market, it 
has to follow the disclosure norms of the host country depending upon the type of 
depository receipts. The stock markets in developed countries usually have more T&D 
requirements in those developed markets that are typically more demanding. Thus the 
companies listed in the foreign stock markets have more T&D than is mandatory in 
the domestic capital market. Cooke (1992) finds that multiple listed corporations 
disclose more information in their annual reports than corporations listed only on one 
stock market. Multiple listed corporations are much more in the public eye than other 
corporations are; pressures for adequate levels of disclosure are placed upon them by 
investors and their agents and other users. Shen and Cannella (2002) suggest that, 
listing on a more stringent stock market, the expected cost of capital will reduce which 
will result in corporate premiums and strong investor protection, and thus improve 
company performance. However, Broberg et al. (2010) found that international listing 
and foreign ownership have a positive effect on the content of information in 
voluntary disclosures. 
      Therefore, any CG system will be the result of the interplay of political, legal, 
economic, historical and cultural factors. To entrench CG principle and good 
practices, stringent legislation and regulation alone are not sufficient. It has to be a 
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combination of a strong culture of ethics, honesty and good sense, based on the 
principles of trust, transparency, accountability and fairness.  
       Finally, the results of this study can be useful for the investment community to 
assist in gauging the level of T&D of listed Libyan companies.  
8.3 Corporate Characteristics and the Level of Transparency and Disclosure 
 Previous studies have shown that there is also considerable within-country variation 
in T&D driven by company characteristics. Doidge et al. (2007), use three indices: 
S&P T&D, Institutional Shareholder Services governance scores, and Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia CG; they find that company characteristics such as asset size, 
investment opportunities, and ownership matter more for companies from developing 
countries that have access to global markets.  
      The purpose of this study has been to investigate the levels of T&D among the 
characteristics of CG. The S&P T&D index was developed to measure T&D quality. 
Six research questions (4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) examine the association between company 
characteristics and T&D. 
      This study measured the association between six company characteristics and the 
level of quality of T&D. The six company characteristics are represented by listing 
status (listed or unlisted in LSM), ownership structure (public and private sector), 
company size (total assets), and age of the company (years), industry type (bank and 
insurance) and audit peer review (have and have not). In the subsection (6.6), the 
study examined whether there is a statistically significant increase between the level 
of T&D and the company characteristics, using statistical analysis. The investigation 
of the association between company characteristics and the level of T&D extends and 
confirms our understanding of those factors affecting variability in the level of T&D. 
The study found a statistically significant increase association between T&D levels 
and each of the above variables, except company size.  
      The six corporate characteristics were measured as follows:    
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8.3.1 The Level of Transparency and Disclosure of Libyan Financial Companies 
Listed and Unlisted In the Libya Stock Market 
The result of the listed and unlisted Libyan companies as shown in chapter six of this 
study is discussed in this subsection as it relates to the relationship between listing 
status of the company against T&D. Turgut (2009) argues that listing status is one of 
the most important company characteristics of Turkish companies affecting their 
compliance with the EU disclosure requirements. 
      Cooke (1989a) who claims that companies listed in the stock market disclose more 
information than those not listed. Cooke (1993) found that Japanese companies’ 
disclosure in the Commercial Code accounts for companies unlisted and domestically 
listed is very limited, being restricted in the main to mandatory items. Bremer (2012) 
found that listed companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange provided better 
disclosure of key governance. Qu and Leung (2006) found that information relating to 
employees’ issues and stakeholder interest are found to be more frequently disclosed 
by listed companies than those that were regarded as sensitive in their annual report. 
Zhou et al. (2011) suggest that cross-listing will develop internationalization of capital 
in financing and improve CG structure and corporate performance. Wojcik et al. 
(2004) show that companies cross-listed in the US have higher CG ratings disclosure, 
and board structure and function. Lang et al. (2003) show that companies cross-listed 
on the US stock market have a broader coverage of analysts and higher forecast 
accuracy. Hail and Leuz (2006) find that cross-listing can reduce the cost of capital. 
      The fourth EQ is stated as follows: Do companies listed in the Libyan Stock 
Market provide more T&D in their annual reports than companies not listed? 
      The S&P T&D index was developed to measure T&D level. The research question 
(EQ4) examines the association between listing status and T&D. 
      The research set out to examine whether the extent of T&D by Libyan financial 
companies in their annual reports, which are published domestically, is associated 
with whether or not they are listed in the stock market. It was found that both groups 
listed and unlisted in LSM showed a strong statistically significant increase in total 
T&D (see Subsection 6.5.1), but T&D in companies LLSM was higher than NLLSM, 
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42% and 35% in 2008 respectively, and both groups showed a statistically significant 
increase for all pair years.  
      At the level of T&D for the three categories: a strong statistically significant 
increase for ownership structure and investor rights of both groups and companies 
LLSM showed a statistically significant increase for one pair years; financial 
transparency and information disclosure, and board and management structure and 
process, showed a strong statistically significant increase in both groups, while 
companies LLSM showed a statistically significant increase for two categories (2 out 
of 3 pairs) and NLLSM (3 out of 3 pairs). 
      At the level of T&D for the twelve subcategories: companies LLSM and NLLSM 
had a significantly different increase by 7 out of 12 and 9 out of 12 subcategories, 
respectively, for four years, and showed statistically significant increase for some pair 
years.  
      Therefore, this study found that listed companies in the LSM provided better T&D 
of key CG related information, although on average, it was still found to be lagging 
behind international standards. The results of this study include statistically significant 
increase findings that are consistent with many former studies, such as Cerf (1961), 
Singhvi and Desai (1971), Firth (1979), Malone et al. (1993) and Hossain et al. 
(1994). 
      It is worth noting that those companies listed in the LSM are much more in the 
public eye than other companies are; thus, pressures for adequate levels of T&D are 
placed upon them by investors, their agents and other stockholders. The study finding 
also provides some implications for listed companies about the importance for CG of 
T&D. Improving T&D eventually leads to better CG and can reduce asymmetric 
information between management and shareholders, thus leading to higher company 
value.  
      The research hypothesis regarding the companies listed in the Libyan Stock 
Market provide more T&D in their annual reports than companies not listed, (H4) is 
totally accepted (see Table 6.14). Table 6.14 show that sub-hypotheses for the fourth 
hypothesis can be accepted. These three sub-hypotheses relate to the T&D from the 
disclosure index ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency and 
information disclosure, and board and management structure and processes. 
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      Based on the results, the fourth hypothesis is consistent with previous studies 
(Bremer, 2012; Cerf, 1961; Cooke, 1989a; Firth, 1979; Hossain, et al., 1994; Malone, 
et al., 1993; Singhvi & Desai, 1971). This lends support to companies listed in the 
stock market disclose more information than those not listed. 
8.3.2 The Level of Transparency and Disclosure in Libyan Financial Companies 
and Companies Ownership 
The result of companies’ ownership as shown in chapter six of this study is discussed 
in this subsection as it relates to the relationship between ownership of the company 
associated to T&D.  
      The fifth EQ is stated as follows: Do public financial companies provide more 
T&D in their annual reports than private “individual” companies? 
       The S&P T&D index was developed to measure T&D level. The research 
question (EQ5) investigates the association between ownership structure and T&D 
(see Subsection 6.5.2). 
      The research set out to investigate whether the extent of T&D by Libyan financial 
companies in their annual reports which are published domestically, is associated with 
ownership structure (public and private). This study found that both groups, public 
and private showed a statistically significant increase in total T&D (see Table 6.15), 
while the level of T&D for the public group was 38% in 2008, with 37% for the 
private group. Furthermore, both groups showed statistically significant increase for 
all pair years.  
      The level of T&D for all three categories found that: ownership structure and 
investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and board and 
management structure and process were significantly different for both groups; public 
sector had a statistically significant increase for most two pair years. 
At the level of T&D for the twelve subcategories:  the public and private sectors 
showed a statistically significant increase for 9 out of 12 and 6 out of 12 subcategories 
respectively, over four years, and a statistically significant increase for some pair 
years.  
       From the annual report, this study found that public sector companies are subject 
to supervision from the Superintendents of the Finance and Administrative Control 
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Authority. The external auditor’s report is subject to review under the supervision of 
the Superintendents of Finance. The supervision might bring about an improvement to 
the level of T&D. Additionally, there is a higher number of shareholders in the public 
sector than in the private sector; for example, the number of shareholders in 
Aljmhorya Bank is 7,123, whereas in Alsraia Bank it is 2,530. A previous study by 
Cerf (1961) argues that there is a positive association between disclosure scores and 
number of shareholders. Also Cooke (1989c) find that the number of shareholders is 
more likely to explain the variability in voluntary disclosure indexes. Ferguson et al. 
(2002) find that the company State-owned People’s Republic of China has more 
significant disclosure than other companies listed in Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
Eng and Mak (2003) find that lower managerial ownership and significant 
government ownership was associated with increased disclosure.  
      Nevertheless, the research hypothesis regarding Public financial companies 
provide more T&D  in their annual reports than private “individual” companies (H5) 
can be accepted (see Table 6.19). Table 6.19 show that sub-hypotheses for the fifth 
hypothesis can be accepted. These three sub-hypotheses relate to the T&D from the 
disclosure index ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency and 
information disclosure, and board and management structure and processes 
      In a nutshell, these results for the fifth hypothesis are consistent with previous 
study Ferguson et al (2002) company State-owned People’s Republic has significantly 
more T&D than other companies. 
8.3.3 The Level of Transparency and Disclosure in Libyan Financial Companies 
and Companies’ Size 
The result of the companies size as shown in chapter six of this study is discussed in 
this subsection as it relates to the relationship between the company sizes associated to 
T&D.  
      The sixth EQ is stated as follows: Do companies with greater total assets provide 
more T&D in their annual reports than those with fewer total assets? 
      The S&P T&D index was developed to measure T&D level. The research question 
(EQ6) examines the association between companies’ size and T&D. This study finds 
272 
 
that small companies are more likely to disclose more information to the users of their 
annual reports (see Subsection 6.6.3). 
      In this study, total assets measure corporate size. At the first level: two groups, 
small and middle size found statistically significant increase, whereas there was no 
statistically significant increase for large companies; small companies all pair years 
showed statistically significant increase, while for middle-size companies almost all 
pair years showed statistically significant increase, but for the pair years 05–06 no 
statistically significant increase was shown (see Table 6.20).  
      At the second level: the category ownership structure and investor rights only 
small companies’ size showed a statistically significant increase, and a statistically 
significant increase for two pair years – 05–07 and 06–07; small and middle 
companies’ size showed a statistically significant increase for two categories – 
financial transparency and information disclosure, and board and management 
structure and process – over four years, and for most of the pair years.  
       At the third level of twelve subcategories, the empirical evidence based on the 
four statistical analyses indicates that the small companies showed a statistically 
significant increase for seven subcategories, the middle companies for five 
subcategories, and the large companies for only one subcategory over the four years.  
      Agency theory predicts that larger companies will disclose more information in 
their accounts to alleviate the potential for wealth transfers from suppliers of outside 
capital to managers. However, it would be expected that “high level T&D” would 
have to be found to be associated with company size, which is not in keeping with 
agency theory  and many other T&D researches (e.g., Cerf, 1961; Cooke, 1992; 
Haniffa, 1999; Hossain, 2008b; Ismail & Ibrahim, 2012; McFie, 2006; Singhvi, 
1968a). 
      On the other hand, some studies found that there was no association between 
companies’ size and T&D (e.g., Salamon & Dhaliwal, 1980; Saudagaran, 1988; 
Sepideh, Gin, & Ewere, 2007; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Zarzeski, 1996b)measured 
company size by total assets and market values of equity shares, and present evidence 
suggests that the direct cost of complying with the US SECS 10-K filing requirements 
is relatively less for large companies than for small companies. Thus, this could imply 
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a tendency for larger companies to disclose more than their smaller counterparts are 
able to.  
      Therefore, small companies tend to provide high levels of T&D information. The 
results of this study provide evidence that does not support the general belief of the 
association between larger companies and T&D level. In addition, there is evidence 
that small companies are likely to improve their T&D annual reports which they seek 
to have listed in the LSM.  
      In this study, the hypothesis regarding the companies with greater total assets 
provide more T&D in their annual reports than those with fewer total assets (H6) 
would be rejected (see Table 6.24). 
      Generally, the results of this study are consistent with (e.g., Ahmed & Nicholls, 
1994; Kang & Kim, 2011; Malone, et al., 1993; McNally, et al., 1982). Furthermore, 
Zubek & Lovegrove (2009) found that the size of company does not influence the 
practice of human resource disclosure in the Libyan oil industry. 
8.3.4 The Level of Transparency and Disclosure in Libyan Financial Companies, 
and Age of Company 
The result of the companies’ age as shown in chapter six of this study is discussed in 
this subsection as it relates to the relationship between ages of the company associated 
to T&D.  
      The seventh EQ is stated as follows: Do older financial companies provide more 
T&D in their annual reports than younger companies? 
      The S&P T&D index is developed to measure T&D level. The research question 
(EQ7) examines the association between listing age and T&D. The study shows that 
statistical analyses found all groups to have a statistically significant increase; it seems 
that company age does not clearly explain the variation of T&D level among Libyan 
financial companies (see Subsection 6.6.4). 
      This study measured the age by number of years established. At the first level, 
found that: there was statistically significant increase in T&D for the three groups – 
younger, medium and older; for the older age all pair years showed statistically 
significant increase, and for the other two groups almost all pair years were 
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significantly different, but for the pair years, 05–06 there was no statistically 
significant increase.  
      At the second level, this study showed that: for the category ownership structure 
and investor rights only the younger age showed a statistically significant increase 
during the four years, and for two pair years, 05–07 and 05–08; three groups showed a 
statistically significant increase for two categories – financial transparency and 
information disclosure, and board and management structure and process – for the 
four years, and most of the pair years.  
      At the third level of twelve subcategories, this study found that the younger age 
showed a statistically significant increase for four subcategories, the medium age for 
three subcategories, while the older age for seven subcategories out of twelve over the 
four years. 
      The results of different analyses that relate T&D among Libyan financial 
companies are presented. The results do not support prior studies which found that age 
does play an important role in determining the degree of T&D by the companies (e.g., 
Owusu-Ansah, (1998); Khalid, (2006) Hossain, (2008b). Bayoud et al. (2012b) 
demonstrate that total social and environmental disclosure has significantly correlated 
with company age in Libya. On the other hand, Barton and Waymire (2004), Alsaeed 
(2005) and McFie (2006) suggest that there is no significant association between age 
of the companies and T&D level. However, it is not possible within the limits of this 
study to reach a conclusion on whether newly established financial companies are 
more transparent and disclose more information or are more compliant than long-
established financial institutions.  
      In this study the hypothesis regarding the older financial companies provide more 
T&D in their annual reports than younger companies (H7) would be rejected (see 
Table 6.29). 
      In a nutshell, the results of this study are consistent with (e.g., Alsaeed, 2005; 
Barton & Waymire, 2004; Bhuiyan & Biswas, 2007; McFie, 2006) they found that 
age does not play an important role in determining the degree of T&D by the 
companies. 
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8.3.5 The Level of Transparency and Disclosure in Libyan Financial Companies, 
and Type of Industry 
The result of the type of industry as shown in chapter six of this study is discussed in 
this subsection as it relates to the relationship between types of industry associated to 
T&D.  
      The eighth EQ is stated as follows: Does the banking sector provide more T&D in 
their annual reports than the insurance sector? 
      The S&P T&D index was developed to measure T&D level. The empirical 
research question (EQ8) examines the association between type of industry and T&D. 
In general, it appears that the Libyan bank sector discloses more information than the 
insurance sector (see Subsection 6.6.5).   
      The research set out to examine whether the extent of T&D by Libyan financial 
companies in their annual reports that are published domestically is associated with 
industry type. The finding in this study showed that: groups, bank and insurance 
sectors, showed a statistically significant increase in total T&D. However, the level of 
T&D of the bank sector gave more information than insurance sector – 41% and 34% 
in 2008 respectively; the bank sector showed statistically significant increase for all 
pair years, and the insurance sector showed statistically significant increase for most 
pair years.  
      For the level of T&D of all the three categories, this study found that: ownership 
structure and investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and 
board and management structure and process showed a significantly different increase 
for both groups, and the bank sector had a significantly different increase for most of 
the pair years.  
At the third level of twelve subcategories, this study found that the bank and insurance 
sector showed a statistically significant increase for 9 out of 12 and 4 out of 12 
subcategories, respectively, for the four years, and a significantly different increase 
for some pair years.  
      To summarise the guidelines for the best T&D practice for each industry, which 
may help to reduce variation in T&D, the government drew up the Bank Act 
No.1/2005. For instance, the Central Bank of Libya set the control and supervision of 
banks, including disclosure rules data to be disseminated, and how to publish them.  
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The level of T&D in the banking sector was higher than for insurance, the level of 
transparency disclosure in the banking sector had a statistically significant increase at 
a level of 0.05 for overall T&D and three categories during the four years. 
      Unfortunately, the law of insurance company’s No. 3 of 2005 did not address the 
rules of CG to increase the level of transparency disclosure in the insurance sector or 
adopt the recommendations of one of the international standard/ committees/ index, 
but only the provisions of Libyan Commercial Law in this regard. 
      However, Mashat et al. (2005) report that the legislation is viewed as the key 
source of establishing such responsibilities,  more than professional guidelines related 
to disclosure and reporting in Libyan companies. Therefore, new and revised laws, 
updated rules and increased regulations have been the outcome of the push for CG to 
increase T&D in the Libyan banking sector. This study suggests that companies do 
not disclose more T&D than that which is minimally required by the regulations.  
      However, Bayoud et al. (2012b) demonstrate that total social and environmental 
disclosure significantly correlate with type of industry in Libya. In particular, the 
conclusion of this study concurs with the findings of, for example Stanga (1976), 
Cooke and Wallace (1989), Cooke (1992), Wallace and Naser (1995), Soh (1996) and 
Haniffa (1999).  
      Furthermore, the research hypothesis which regards the banking sector provides 
more T&D in their annual reports than the insurance sector (H8) is accepted (see Table 
6.34). Table 6.34 show that sub-hypotheses for the eighth hypothesis can be accepted. 
These three sub-hypotheses relate to the T&D from the disclosure index ownership 
structure and investor rights, financial transparency and information disclosure, and 
board and management structure and process. 
      Generally, these results for the eighth hypothesis are consistent with previous 
studies (Cooke, 1989c; Inchausti, 1997; Stanga, 1976). This supports that the type of 
industry has an effect on the level of disclosure. 
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8.3.6 The Level of Transparency and Disclosure of Libyan Financial Companies 
that Have Audit Peer Review and Those that do not 
The result of the audit peer review as shown in chapter six of this study is discussed in 
this subsection as it relates to the relationship between audit peer reviews associated to 
T&D. 
      The ninth EQ is stated as follows: Are companies that have audit peer review 
more likely to provide T&D information than companies that do not have audit peer 
review? 
      The S&P T&D index was developed to measure T&D level. The empirical 
research question (EQ9) examines the association between companies’ audit peer 
review and T&D. In general, it appears that the companies that have audit peer review 
disclose more information than those that do not, although the overall T&D in 
companies that have audit peer review had a stronger statistically significant increase 
at the level of 0.05 than those that did not (see Subsection 6.6.6).  
The finding in this study showed that: both groups’ were a statistically significant 
increase in total T&D, but the level of T&D of the companies that have audit peer 
review gave more information than companies that do not have– 39% and 36% in 
2008, respectively; and companies that have audit peer review showed statistically 
significant increase for all pair years. 
      For the level of T&D of all three categories found that: companies that have audit 
peer review had a strong statistically significant increase at the level of 0.05 with three 
categories.  
      At the third level of twelve subcategories, this study found that the companies 
have audit peer review and do not have statistically significant increases for 10 out of 
12 and 5 out of 12 subcategories, respectively, for the four.  
      Payne (1995) discovered that in markets which tend to rely excessively on costs, 
the information provided by the One-year audit peer review process was seen to have 
led to a drop in the problem of information asymmetry with regards to audit quality 
that increased the quality of audits provided in the market. The finding in this study 
are confirmed with document considered by the OECD (2009) “The peer reviews will 
be designed to encourage transparency". 
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      However, it is clear to see from this study that the companies that have audit peer 
review had greater increased statistically significant T&D than the companies that do 
not have audit peer review.  
      The result in this study found that the audit peer review has an effect on the level 
of T&D in Libyan financial companies. The hypothesis in this case the Companies 
that have audit peer review are more likely to provide T&D information in their 
annual reports than companies that do not have audit peer review (H9) would be 
accepted (see Table 6.39). Table 6.39 show that sub-hypotheses for the ninth 
hypothesis can be accepted. These three sub-hypotheses relate to the T&D from the 
disclosure index ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency and 
information disclosure, and board and management structure and process. 
8.4 The Relationship between Transparency and Disclosure Practices and 
Companies’ Financial Performance 
The result of the relationship between T&D practices and financial performance as 
shown in chapter seven of this study is discussed in this subsection indicating 
comparison between T&D practices and companies’ financial performance. The T&D 
practices are comprised of 14 disclosure and transparency-based measures. The 
financial performance is constructed by three accounting-based measures (ROCE, 
ROE and ROA). This study aims to answer EQ10 and test the tenth hypothesis using 
correlation statistics (Pearson’s parametric).  
      The tenth EQ is stated as follows: Is there a relationship between T&D practices, 
and financial performance? This question is further broken down into the following 
sub-questions: 
EQ10.1- Is there a relationship between T&D practices, and ROCE?    
EQ10.2- Is there a relationship between T&D practices, and ROE?  
EQ10.3- Is there a relationship between T&D practices, and ROA?  
      Most countries generally agree on the need for directors to disclose their own 
relevant interests and to disclose financial performance in an annual report to 
shareholders. T&D practices followed by companies are important components and 
one of the main indicators of the quality of CG (Bokpin & Isshaq, 2009). The purpose 
of this study has been to investigate whether there is a relationship between T&D 
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practices and financial performance. The statistical test used to test the relationship 
between the two variables is Pearson’s Parametric test of correlation analysis.  
      In general, this study shows that the statistics from the Pearson parametric 
correlation tests indicate that some T&D practices are significantly related on 
financial performance.  
      The first statistical Pearson parametric correlation tests found significant positive 
correlation between four T&D variables and ROCE: MSOVR (r= .455, p= .022); 
BMKER (r= .417, p= .038); MFRF (r= .467, p= .019); and CGF (r= .519, p= .008) at the 
significant level of 5%. 
      The second statistical Pearson parametric correlation tests showed that there was 
positive correlation between two T&D variables and ROE: MSOVR (r= .587, p= .002); 
and MFRF (r= .509, p= .009) at the significant level of 5%.  
      The third statistical Pearson parametric correlation tests showed there was positive 
correlation between three T&D variables and ROA at the significant level of 5%: 
MFRF (r= .399, p= .048); GSP (r= .427, p= .033); and CGF (r= .445, p= .026). 
     However, this study finds mixed results between T&D practices and three variables 
of financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA). 
      Prior studies find a positive and significant relation between disclosure and 
financial performance (e.g., Aksu & Kosedag, 2005; Bai, et al., 2004; Callahan & 
Smith, 2004; Chen, et al., 2004; Cheung, et al., 2010; Jiamsagul, 2007; Jiao, 2011; 
Judge, et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004; Li & Tang, 2007; Rogers, 2008; Xu, et al., 
2009). On the other hand, Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that the relationship 
between the profitability performance and extent of company disclosure is unclear. 
Also previous studies found a negative significant relationship between the extent of 
disclosure and financial performance (e.g., Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Haat, et al., 
2008; Huang, et al., 2011). 
      Therefore, the findings of the previous research on the relationship between T&D 
and company performance are mixed. The mixed findings of empirical evidence 
indicate that further evidence is needed on a number of issues. Differences in findings 
might arise from laws and regulations, CG regimes, markets, research methodology 
and design. According to Jerab (2011) whether better CG causes higher company 
performance still remains a valid research question for reasons such as ambiguity 
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regarding the direction of causality. However, this study finds evidence of a 
relationship between some variables of T&D practices and ROCE, ROE and ROA, 
which is consistent with previous studies. 
      Several T&D variables (fourteen) have been hypothesized, and some found to 
have a positive significant or non significant relationship with three variables of 
company financial performance. Nevertheless, the research hypothesis regarding this 
found there is a relationship between T&D practices and financial performance, as 
measured by ROCE, ROE and ROA (H10) can be limited accepted. Only H10.6can be 
fully accepted, H10.3 and H10.14 partly accepted, and H10.4 and H 10.8 limited accepted. 
While the other remaining sub-hypotheses would be rejected (see Table 7.5). 
      From the above (in Section 8.4) this study suggests that might the reasons about 
not significant relationships between the most of variables of T&D and company 
financial performance as follows:  
 The reason might be that Libyan commercial law is weaker. According to Libyan 
commercial law, in Article 572, businesses are obliged to prepare their balance sheet 
and income statement. This study finds that 24% of Libyan financial companies have 
not included their annual report dividend data report (see Section 7.3).  
 The reason might be the weakness of the CG, corporate environmental disclosure, 
and accounting policy in Libyan companies. Strong CG enables the enhanced 
oversight of managerial activities, and effective monitoring and penalising 
capabilities. In addition, accounting policy can affect both risk management and risk 
disclosure choices (Papa, 2010). Zhongfu, Jianhui and Pinglin (2011) show that 
environment information disclosure has a positive effect on the Tobin’s Q of 
economic performance. Bayoud et al. (2012b) find that there is a significant and 
positive relationship between total environmental disclosure and financial 
performance specific with ROA, ROE and revenue. On the other hand, Dragomir 
(2009) shows that no association is found between environmental disclosure and 
contemporaneous company financial performance as measured by ROA, ROE, Share 
Returns, Tobin’s Q, Leverage, and Earnings Per Share. However, Ahmad (2004) 
shows that in Libya corporate environmental disclosure has not been developed yet.  
 The reason might be the low investor protection rights in Libya; for example, 
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) find that in countries with high investor 
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protection rights only, board independence and voluntary disclosure have a  positive 
association.  
 The reason might be the very weak T&D in ownership structure and investor rights 
in Libyan financial companies. However, this study finds that by S&P T&D (see 
Table 6.1 Pa. B) the level of category T&D in ownership structure and investor rights 
was 12% in 2008, and subcategory concentration of ownership was 15% in 2008 (see 
Table 6.1 Pa. B2), the subcategory voting and shareholder meeting procedures was 
lowest of the 12 subcategories at 4% in 2008. The other reason is that block 
ownership may be higher. Htay et al. (2012) found that lower institutional and lower 
block ownership (5%) have higher social and environmental information disclosure.  
 The reason might be that, this study finds that the annual report in Libyan financial 
companies is poor regarding employees’ information. The questionnaire in this study 
(part 3 Section 1 Q1) asked about the company’s annual report. The finding is that 
some companies do not have a special employees’ report in their annual report, but the 
information is available in the general annual reports.  
 The reason might be the weakness of the CG structures in Libyan financial 
companies. However, stringent CG structures can lead to higher levels and quality of 
T&D (Papa, 2010). Chang and Sun (2010) show that the information role of 
accounting earnings increases after the mandated disclosure of CG structures, which 
has strengthened the link between financial reporting and CG. 
 The reason might be that, the Union of Accountants and Auditors in Libya must 
adopt the accounting and auditing standard relevant to the Libya environment. Hove 
(1986) contends that accountants in developing countries must be made aware of the 
fact that accounting practised in developed countries might not be relevant to their 
environment.  
 The reason might be that, the level of T&D in information disclosure and financial 
transparency was the best category between three categories, but the level of T&D in 
subcategories of information on auditors was the lowest level between five 
subcategories in Libyan financial companies (see Table 6.1 Pa. C). One of the most 
important roles of the audit committee is helping the board to meet its statutory and 
fiduciary responsibilities by improving the relation between the board and the internal 
and external auditors. Also, audit committees should improve the credibility of 
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financial statements that benefit stakeholders and users of the information, and quality 
of the financial management of the company and hence its performance through 
improving the internal governance mechanism.  
 This may be due to the lack of effective audit committees; this study found that 
most annual reports do not include the Auditing Committee reports.  Article 22 from 
Law No. 21 states “...the functions of the Audit Committee to report to the General 
Assembly of Shareholders, and shall be sent to the General People’s Committee for 
the economy mirror images of the minutes of its meetings and reports, during the week 
of the date of signature”. In addition, through the annual reports it is not clear that the 
audit committees had any role in commissioning, isolating or paying an external 
auditor, including non-audit services provided by the auditor to the company, or 
monitoring internal audit activities.  
 The reason might be that, in this study the relationships between disclosure of 
annual external audit, external audit, and external auditors accountable to shareholders 
and financial performance are not significant in Libyan financial companies. In 
addition, El-Firjani (2010) shows that the external auditors in Libya had no significant 
influence on the adoption of International Accounting Standards. 
       The finding in this study (8.3.4.10, 11, and 12) differs from that which has been 
emphasised in the recent literature. The reason might be the absence of binding 
accounting and auditing standards applicable in Libya. In addition, data collected for 
the study of accounting and audit companies were from small and local companies. 
      Mitton (2002) suggests that the quality of audit is also one aspect of good CG; it is 
expected that companies which are audited by one of the Big Four audit companies 
will have better market performance as well as greater transparency than Non-Big 
Four audit companies. According to Shareia (2010) three of the Big Four international 
accounting companies (Price Waterhouse and Coopers, 2010; Ernst and Young, 2010; 
Deloitte, 2010; and KPMG, 2010) have established a  presence in Libya since its 
economy has opened up, a development that will drive Libya’s accounting and 
auditing  profession further towards a Western model, typified by the US and UK 
influence already identified. On the other hand, Chan et al. (2011), found no 
significant difference in company performance measure by ROA among two 
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difference types of auditor changes when looking at auditor changes between and 
among Big Four and non-Big Four audit companies.   
 The reason might be that there is weakness of company performance. The delay 
period for Libyan companies to publish their annual reports is far too long. Dardor 
(2009) shows that Libyan companies take an average of 155 days to publish their 
annual reports. The maximum is 384 days and the minimum is 78 days. Begley & 
Fischer (1998), Chambers and Penman (1984), and Haw, In-Mu, Qi, Daqing, & Wu 
(2000) found that good news companies release their annual reports earlier than bad 
news companies, and loss companies release their annual reports the latest. 
 Finally T&D might affect market based measures more than accounting based 
measures of financial performance. 
      However, the findings of this study are mixed and limited for supporting agency 
theory. 
8.5 The Impact of Transparency and Disclosure Practices on Financial 
Performance 
EQ11- Which of the independent variables (T&D practices) has the most impact on 
the dependent variable (financial performance)?   
One of the purposes of this thesis is to explore the impact of T&D practices on 
company financial performance. In fact, and as has been reviewed in subsection 3.5 of 
chapter three, a considerable number of studies document a significant impact of CG 
structures on financial performance. 
       This study carries forward CG research as a measure by T&D practices that 
explores the impact of independent variables such as share ownership and voting 
right, material foreseeable risk factors, governance structures and policies, and CG 
framework; and various dependent variables such as financial performance.  
      This study uses a multiple linear regression technique that is concerned with 
determining a statistical model between a given dependent variable (financial 
performance) and a set of predictor independent variables (CG T&D practices); the 
simple model is based on the forward selection method.  
      This study answered the EQ11 and tested the eleven hypothesis using regression 
statistics (multiple linear). The study shows that the independent variable CGF had the 
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most impact on the dependent variables ROCE and ROA (p=.008 and p=.026 
respectively). Furthermore, major share ownership and voting right had the most 
impact on ROE (p=.002). 
      The reason might be that the Libyan economic transaction to a market economy 
and the fact that the LSM has been established less than four years. Another reason 
may be that the historical Libyan culture of CG is poor. The first publication of the 
article covered the practice of CG in the bank sector in 2005. Jerab (2011) finds that 
CG affects company performance highly in the medium- to long-term runs but in the 
short term company performance does not necessarily depend on CG. 
      Finally, the results of this study also support that T&D of the CGF is one of the 
most important indicators for evaluating company financial performance.   
      The research hypothesis regarding that there are variables of T&D practices have 
the most impact on company financial performance “ROCE, ROE and ROA” (H11) 
can be partly accepted, therefore only sub-hypothesis H11.14 can be partly accepted and 
H11.3 limited accepted. While the other remaining sub-hypotheses would be rejected 
(see Table 7.9). 
8.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on discussing the empirical results regarding, first, the extent 
of T&D in Libyan financial companies; second, the level of T&D associated with 
special companies’ characteristics; third, the relationship between T&D practices and 
companies financial performance. This chapter has discussed the findings of this study 
(chapters 6 and 7) with respect to the research aims. 
      There has been little research relating CG attributes specifically for Libya. To the 
best of our knowledge, no prior empirical studies have examined the extent of T&D in 
Libyan companies, and there is a need for more evidence concerning T&D. This study 
used Libyan financial companies’ data to determine: whether companies are more 
likely to offer high T&D, to have a level of T&D comparable with companies in other 
countries, and whether there are variations between companies in T&D practices in 
their annual reports; a level of T&D related to corporate characteristics; and a T&D 
practices association with financial performance.  
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      The results show first that the level of T&D in companies’ annual reports was low, 
especially ownership structure and investor rights, which was very low, compared to 
companies in other countries.  In addition, this study found that the levels of T&D in 
Libyan financial companies increased. Therefore, the first main conclusion of this 
study is that T&D levels improved during the emerging of the Libyan Stock Market. 
The second main conclusion of this study is that the level of T&D is very low in 
Libyan financial companies.  
      Second, the results of the company characteristics had uneven statistically 
significant increase in T&D between all groups except the characteristics of company 
size: the large size of companies measured by total assets shows no statistically 
significant increase level of T&D during the four years. However, the companies 
LLSM had a higher level of T&D than companies NLLSM, the public sector had 
higher T&D than the private sector, small companies had more T&D than middle size 
companies, younger companies had more T&D than medium and older companies, the 
banking sector had more T&D than the insurance sector, and companies that have 
audit peer review had more T&D than companies without audit peer review. Further, 
in an effort to examine the effect of company characteristics on transparency and 
disclosure, the study revealed that listed status, ownership structure, type of industry, 
and audit peer review were found to be significantly increase associated with the level 
of transparency and disclosure. The other remaining company characteristics (size and 
age) were found not to be significantly associated with the level of T&D. 
       Third, the Pearson correlation analysis showed that there was a relationship 
between first financial performance (ROCE) and the following independent variables:   
- Major share ownership and voting right,  
- Board members, key executives and their remuneration, 
- Material foreseeable risk factors, and 
- Corporate governance framework. 
       Furthermore, there was a relationship between second financial performance 
(ROE) and the following independent variables:  
- Major share ownership and voting right, and  
- Material foreseeable risk factors. 
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      In addition, there was a relationship between third financial performance (ROA) 
and the following independent variables:  
- Material foreseeable risk factors,  
- Governance structures and policies, and 
- Corporate governance framework. 
      Therefore, the fourth main conclusion of this study is that some CG T&D has a 
relationship with financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA).  
      Fourth, the multiple linear regression technique (forward selection method) 
showed that the corporate governance framework (independent variable) had the most 
impact on ROEC and ROA (dependent variables), while major share ownership and 
voting right (independent variable) had the most impact on ROE (dependent variable). 
      The next chapter will provide the conclusions of the research. Specifically, it will 
provide an overview of this study, summary research methodology, aim and objective, 
policy implications, contribution, recommendation, limitations, and potential avenues 
for further studies and conclusion. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion, Contributions, and Recommendations 
9.1 Introduction 
The study presented in chapter 2 looked at the case of the Libyan economy as it 
relates to regulations and compliance among the financial institutions. The literature 
review in this study was presented in chapter 3. The empirical study and the 
developed hypotheses were presented in chapter 4. The research methodology was 
discussed in chapter 5. The data on T&D as collected by S&P was examined using 
four statistical techniques in chapter 6. The data collected by questionnaire was 
examined using two statistical techniques, and a report of the results presented in 
chapter 7. In chapter 8 the key findings of the current study were discussed. 
      The results in chapter six showed that, there are statistically significant increase of 
T&D associated since emergence LSM, but it still low compared with companies in 
other countries, and the degree of T&D were varied from company to company.  
  The results of the different analyses that relate T&D and company characteristics as 
presented in chapter six are, overall, mixed. There are statistically significant 
increases of T&D associated with company characteristics: listed status, ownership 
structure, age, type of industry and audit peer review.  
       In addition, the empirical research focuses on the relationship between T&D and 
company performance as presented in chapter seven. This study examined the 
relationship between T&D practices as measured by 14 variables and financial 
performance. The measures of company performance used in the research are ROCE, 
ROE, and ROA. This study finds that there is a relationship between four T&D 
variables and ROCE; two T&D variables and ROE; and three T&D variables and 
ROA. In addition, this study also looked at the possibility that the independent 
variable “T&D practices” has the most impact on the dependent variable “financial 
performance”. Finally, this study finds that the variable CGF had the most impact on 
ROCE and ROA, and the variable major share ownership and voting right had the 
most impact on ROE. 
      This chapter summarises and discusses the overall results of the study. The 
overview of this study is in section 9.2. Section 9.3 presents the aims and objectives. 
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The summary of research methodology is in section 9.4. The implications are in 
section 9.5. Section 9.6 is devoted to contributions. Recommendations are given in 
section 9.7, while the limitations are in section 9.8. The chapter concludes with 
possibilities for future research in section 9.9.  Section 9.10 presents the summary and 
conclusion. 
9.2 Overview of this Study 
The principles of CG have been actively promoted in Libya. However, there is limited 
evidence to support the effects of CG on company financial performance. The main 
purpose of this study is to test first, whether T&D in Libyan financial annual reports 
improved since the emergence of the Libyan Stock Market. Second, to see whether 
there is a statistically significant increase in levels of T&D with different corporate 
characteristics among Libyan financial companies during the financial years 2005 to 
2008. Third, whether there is a relationship between T&D practices and financial 
performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA). Fourth, to find out which variable of T&D 
practices impacts financial performance the most.  
9.3 Aims and Objectives 
The general research objective, as presented in section 1.2, is to investigate the levels 
of T&D in Libyan financial companies, identify the effect of company characteristics 
on T&D, and explore their relationship with company financial performance (ROCE, 
ROE and ROA). The general aim has been divided into six objectives, as follow:  
1- To assess the level of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies 
during the years 2005 to 2008 by three levels: overall transparency and disclosure, 
three categories, and twelve subcategories in their annual reports. 
2- To compare the level of transparency and disclosure in Libyan financial companies 
with those in other countries (developed and developing).   
3- To assess whether there are variations between companies in transparency and 
disclosure practices in their annual reports. 
4- To assess the extent to which transparency and disclosure is associated with listed 
status, ownership, size, and age, type of industry and audit peer review in Libyan 
financial companies during the years 2005 to 2008 on three levels: overall 
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transparency and disclosure, according to three categories, and according to twelve 
subcategories, in their annual reports. 
5- To determine the relationship between transparency and disclosure practices, and 
company financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA).     
6- To find which variable of transparency and disclosure practices has the most 
impact on company financial performance (ROCE, ROE and ROA). 
9.4 Summary of Research Methodology 
Using the research framework (see Figure  5.1), this study explores the level of T&D 
in the Libyan financial companies, the effect of six company characteristics on T&D, 
and the impact  of T&D on financial performance. This study therefore made use of 
quantitative method and primary and secondary data. First, S&P T&D index based on 
annual report disclosure was developed to rate the level of companies T&D, using 
three levels: overall T&D; three categories and twelve subcategories. Then these were 
compared with secondary data collected from using the S&P T&D index which were 
the literature review. Second, the effect of six company characteristics on T&D as 
well by three levels. Third, a questionnaire was developed and used; a review of the 
relevant literature identified fourteen categories of T&D. The data for companies’ 
financial performance were collected from annual reports (see Chapter 5). 
      This data was analysed for a sample of 27 Libyan financial companies (banking 
and insurance). The study covers the period of four financial years from 2005 to 2008. 
A set of eleven hypotheses and sub-hypotheses were tested using One-way ANOVA, 
Paired T-Test, Friedman Test statistics, Wilcoxon Signed Rank, Pearson’s 
Correlation, and Multiple Regression analysis (see Table 5.14). 
9.5 Implications 
This research assesses the extent of T&D that exists in the Libyan financial companies 
during the four years under review, compared to companies in other countries, and 
shows whether there are variations between companies in T&D practices. Thus, here 
this study looks at the existing literature on the effect of corporate characteristics on 
the level of T&D, and how this impact on CG; as well as the impact of T&D on 
financial performance. Thus, the implications for this study as follows: 
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 The findings of this study should be of potential interest to policy makers, 
professionals, company’s board of directors and the academia. The contributions of 
this work focus more on issues relating to CG practices in general and T&D in 
particular. 
 This study reveals findings that allows the Supervision of Banks by the Libyan 
Central Bank, the Central Authority Insurance Companies and the Control Department 
by the Libyan Stock Market; all in order to know the level of T&D termed as "high or 
low" when reported in the annual financial statements of Libyan companies as well as 
for the purpose of developing the necessary solutions to increase the level of T&D. 
 This study reveals findings that highlight the effect of company characteristic on 
the level of T&D.  
 This study findings allow shareholders and potential investors to obtain 
information about which variable of T&D has the most impact on financial 
performance. 
 The study has practical implications for corporations' needs to satisfy shareholders 
and other stakeholders. By measuring the impact of monitoring systems such as T&D 
the work allows shareholders and other stakeholders to evaluate the role of these 
monitoring systems in enhancing shareholders' perception of the quality of financial 
and non-financial information. The more stakeholders are able to obtain reliable 
information about corporate performance, the stronger the investor decision ability, 
and the more efficient the allocation of assets becomes. Hence their financial 
decisions can become more accurate and effective. It follows that the company has to 
ensure that agency problems between the manager and shareholder, as well as 
between stakeholders are minimized because the company’s business reduces 
asymmetry of information between shareholders and managers; and the company’s 
business reduces the agency cost and serve to keep management in check. 
 This study reveals findings which facilitate an effective contribution of CG 
practices towards improvement of financial performance. Furthermore the 
organization of supervisory and regulatory training in Libya may be of immense help 
by regularly conducting training workshops and conferences about CG. 
 This study reveals findings that will enable investors and stock market participants 
to improve their process of decision-making. Measuring the different aspects of CG in 
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general and T&D in particular allows investors to be mindful of management's 
capacity to manipulate conflict of interest for opportunistic purposes, as well as to 
evaluate the reliability of financial and non-financial information. 
 The authorities in Libya can use this study as empirical support of the CG 
principles consistent with the economy. The authorities of the Libyan Stock Market 
can also employ the result of this study to evaluate the current disclosure requirements 
of CG practices. Principals of CG regulations and codes should be based on evidence 
from empirical studies such as evidence offered by this research. 
 Finally, this study contributes to the CG research by providing comprehensive 
statistics on the issue of T&D in the Libyan financial compliance. 
9.6 Contribution 
This study has contributed to the literature of CG in general and to T&D in particular. 
The work will have very good implications for researchers and practitioners as well. 
As an overall impact, the findings reported under this study provide a number of 
important contributions towards understanding the extent of T&D among the Libyan 
financial companies; the extent of T&D association with company-specific 
characteristics; the relationship between CG practices as measured by fourteen 
independent variables of T&D; as well as company financial performances as 
measured by the three dependent variables (ROCE, ROE, and ROA).  
 In this study more than eighty empirical studies regarding effect of company 
characteristics on T&D conducted between 1961 and 2012 were reviewed (see 
Appendix 4). This in turn contributes to the literature on T&D by updating and 
renewing the eighty-one company characteristics variables (see Section 3.8).  
 In this study more than one hundred and eight empirical studies regarding 
relationship between CG and financial performance conducted between 1985 and 
2012 were reviewed (see Appendix 3). This contributes to the literature of CG in 
general and to T&D particular; that is by updating and renewing forty-one financial 
performance variables (sees Section 3.2). 
 Studies concerning CG in general and T&D in particular among developing 
countries have received little attention and still are very rare when compared with 
those that have been done in developed countries. Therefore, one of the major 
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contributions of this research is studying T&D in one of the developing countries that 
is a transition economy such as Libya to contribute literature in this area. 
 The study also provides a foundation for future research on the T&D, in order to 
meet national and international requirements for establishing a CG Code in Libya. 
 The questionnaire used in this study was designed by literature review and fitted 
the Libyan requirement of T&D. This has contributed to the literature of T&D in that 
they can be used for future research in other developing countries, especially Arabic 
countries who share similar characteristics with Libya. 
 The history of Libya shows that culture of CG is poor (see Section 2.4). Therefore, 
this study makes some important contributions to examining CG as measured by T&D 
in developing countries such as Libya. 
 This work aims to give a clear picture of the level of T&D in financial companies 
with the beginning of the LSM and compares the results with companies in other 
countries by using S&P T&D index. 
 This research conducted a comprehensive survey of the requirements of T&D in 
the Libyan environment, which includes the academia, financial regulators and 
supervisors, as well as in relation to CG. The academics, financial regulators and 
professionals working at Tripoli University, and control section in the Control 
Department in the LSM; the department of Supervision of Banks in the Libyan 
Central Bank; the Control Authority Insurance Companies in the Libyan Ministry of 
Economy and Trade; the Libyan Union of Accountants and Auditors. Thus, for the 
purpose of preparing the questionnaire, this work might be the first step towards the 
preparation of a code of CG in Libya. 
 This study makes several new contributions as well as extensions to the existing 
CG literature. It offers for the first time direct evidence on the relationship between 
T&D practices and company financial performance in Libya.  
  This study makes some important contributions to examining T&D in developing 
countries such as Libya. The unique contribution of this study is that it is the first 
study to use S&P T&D index in Libya. 
 Previous research used T&D data collected directly from one year of company 
annual reports, while this study uses four years of company annual reports to examine 
the statistically significant increase between four years and pair years. 
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 The use of time-series data represents a significant contribution to the literature of 
T&D. The study conducts in-depth assessments of specific aspects of T&D practices 
over the study period. With S&P T&D, the levels of T&D practices of LFC can be 
quantified. 
 The results of this study supports previous researches and show that the level of 
T&D is statistically significant which increases with the emergence of the stock 
market. The level of T&D is however different between countries. Transition 
economies often have weaker rules and wider variations between companies in T&D 
practices. Hence, the study has added new evidence to the literature. 
 By investigating some of the companies’ characteristics and financial performance  
that have been identified in the area of T&D, this study has increased the limited body 
of knowledge of T&D and provided both academics and practitioners with useful 
information about issues in T&D in general and within the Libyan context in 
particular. 
 This study intends to provide an extension to existing as well as previous research 
literature especially regarding T&D as well as the effect of company characteristics on 
T&D in a developing economy. Previously, several variables of company 
characteristics have been found to have different effects on T&D. This study has 
found the different effects of company characteristics on T&D. Therefore this 
research work contributes to our understanding of how corporate characteristics affect 
the extent of the level of T&D in Libyan financial companies. Thus, the study has 
added new evidence to the T&D literature. 
 Previous researchers examined the association of T&D with auditor size, auditor 
fees, the audit committee number and audit committee meeting, whilst this study 
investigates T&D’s association with auditing by audit peer review. Therefore, the 
study to the T&D literature has added new evidence variable of corporate 
characteristics “audit peer review” affect the extent of the level of T&D. 
 Although, this study showed several effect of company characteristics such as 
listing status, ownership structure, industry type, audit peer review on T&D, company 
size and age have been found to have no effect on T&D. This confirms that the effect 
of company characteristics might be varied depending on the research area.  
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 This study contributes to the transparency and disclosure literature by providing 
evidence, showing the impact of transparency and disclosure on company financial 
performance in a developing country. 
 Previous research used one or more CG factors and focused only on the 
relationship of the overall CG variables or overall on one or more variables of CG and 
financial performance. Thus, the study is more comprehensive than many previous 
empirical studies. This study however, while also using one factor of CG “T&D” 
included “fourteen variables” to find the relationship between each of the fourteen 
T&D variables and three financial accounting performance measures. 
 Previous studies have found a mixed relationship between T&D and financial 
performance, this study has found the relationship between five out of fourteen 
variables of T&D and three financial performances.  However, the results of this study 
highly supports how past research CG practices impact of company performance 
particularly in the medium- to long-term periods, although in the short term company 
performance does not necessarily depend on CG.    
 This thesis outlines which of the independent variables T&D practices most impact 
on the dependent variable company performance as measured by three financial 
performances (ROCE, ROE and ROA).   
Moreover, the study could be useful for developing T&D in companies listing Libyan 
market. 
9.7 Recommendation to Libyan Corporations and Government Authorities 
Institutional transparency is closely related to the information that is disclosed to a 
company’s stakeholders who are in turn affected by the structure of corporate 
ownership. Information disclosure, thus transparency, is affected by the institutional 
arrangements typical for a certain type of business system, among which is the 
effectiveness of legal institutions that set boundaries between mandatory and 
voluntary information disclosure. Francis et al. (2003) find that countries with 
stronger investor protection have national accounting standards that are more accrual 
based, greater financial transparency through public information disclosure and 
enforcement of such standards through higher quality auditing.   
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      The Libyan legislative and executive authority should enhance T&D to consider 
the priority policy issues. They should develop a) institutional infrastructure 
gradually; b) relatively simple regulations without complexity; c) standards for CG, 
accounting, auditing, and financial reporting practices, while improving incentives for 
T&D that distinguishes among its desirable characteristics, timeliness, relevance, 
fairness, cost efficiency, access and quality. 
Therefore, broader imperatives to improve T&D in CG should implement freedom of 
information legislation and invest in information infrastructure to improve the 
gathering, analysis and sharing of information through specialised institutions in this 
area.  
      Reese Jr and Weisbach (2002) report that companies in countries with weak 
investor protection and disclosure standards may choose to cross-list in countries with 
stronger standards and requirements, with the aim of attracting and protecting 
additional minority shareholders. On the other hand, Millar et al. (2005), report that 
the political, socio-cultural and economic effects of local market institutions can have 
positive or negative influences on the capabilities and competitive advantages of 
companies. For emerging economies such as Libya, it will be necessary to develop a 
business system that is relevant to their economic, political, legal and social 
environment, and then, in order to ensure its successful implementation, suitable 
education and training should be provided to best serve the economic development 
plans in Libya. Also, La Porta et al. (2002) document that company valuation is higher 
in countries in which the legal environment is conducive to the development of higher 
quality national accounting standards and enforcement through higher quality 
auditing. 
      As Rajan and Zingales (2001, p. 480) put it: 
From a policy perspective, it would appear that a country intent on economic development 
should fix its financial plumbing – specifically its accounting and disclosure system and its 
legal and bankruptcy codes … Once the plumbing is fixed, the appropriate institutions and 
markets will emerge. 
      Therefore, as Libya is a developing economy and has an emerging stock market 
where the CG is a fertile field of all stakeholders. On the basis of the empirical results 
in this study, the researcher provides recommendations to the regulators in Libya.  
296 
 
 The historical Libyan culture of CG is poor; more effort should be made to 
encourage an awareness of CG in the Libyan business environment through 
publications, conferences and seminars. 
 The economic reform policy should be continued, since policy has a positive effect 
on company performance in Libyan listed companies.  
 The establishment of an independent body with adequate resources should be 
established to prepare, supervise, monitor and evaluate implementation of corporate 
governance practice in Libya, obliged by law to implement the code. 
 The legislation of the Libyan market should encourage the level of T&D, through 
the issuance of laws and regulations, which would help shareholders and other 
stakeholders in their decision making. 
 The legislation of the Libyan market should encourage and attract more investment 
in Libya, because those investments will affect the increase in the level of T&D 
practices. 
 The legislation of the Libyan market should encourage controls that reduce 
variations in the T&D in their annual reports. 
 The legislation should encourage companies to Listing in LSM. At the date of 
conducting this study the number of listed companies did not exceed 10 companies. 
 The Control Department in LSM should undertake more duties to increase the 
quality of T&D, through designed index or the development of some index for 
example S&P T&D, that takes into account the laws and regulations in force in Libya, 
such as in other developing countries in the world, to measure the level of T&D for 
both listed companies and those that seek to be listed. 
 The legislation of the Libyan market should benefit from the choice of alternative 
accounting treatment of IFRSs which are suitable for the Libyan environment while 
keeping the comparability of financial reporting. Some studies found that even 
modified IFRSs had a positive impact on the economies of developing countries (e.g., 
Larson, 1993). 
 Companies listing in Libyan market to improve the quality of corporate reporting 
should be guided by the recommendations set by professional accounting bodies and 
standard setters such as Global Reporting Initiative. 
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 Regulators in Libyan companies to improve corporate governance practices should 
be guided by the recommendations of Cadbury Committee and International 
Organisation of the Securities Commission such as Public Disclosure of Trading and 
Derivatives Activities of Banks and Securities Companies; Analyst Conflicts of 
Interest; Auditor Independence and the Role of Corporate Governance in Monitoring 
an Auditor’s Independence. 
Furthermore, most codes of best practices emphasize improving CG practices in five 
main parts: shareholders rights; board structure; executive compensation; market for 
control; and audit and financial controls (Fombrun, 2006). To get the best CG 
practices in Libya should be taking into account some of important points about the 
code of corporate governance which are suitable for the Libyan environment. These 
recommendations lead us to a set of questions. Additionally these questions might be 
examined in the future by the academic and professional researchers, these questions 
as following: 
• Which of the CG principles is consistent with the Libyan economy? 
• Which regulatory system is most appropriate for fledgling markets such as Libya? 
• What are the most cost-effective regulatory first steps with resources that are 
extremely rare?  
• Which of the regulatory structures to their best ability tailor supervision and 
enforcement means to local capabilities and circumstances? Which of the relatively 
simple regulations is consistent with the Libyan economy? 
• Which of the accounting standards, audit standards and financial report standards 
are consistent with the Libyan economy and are able to be employed as international 
standards in the future? 
• How does the private sector effect provision of information, analysis, and 
accounting services? 
• What is the best field of mandatory disclosure? 
• Why is there a need for regulation of T&D in the Libyan environment? What types 
of T&D should be regulated and which should not in annual reports? 
• How effective are T&D in facilitating credible communication between managers 
and outside stakeholders? What factors determine their effectiveness?  
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• Which mandated T&D should be recognized directly in the financial statements 
and which should be included as supplemental T&D? 
• How does T&D affect analysts’ coverage of companies’ annual reports? 
• What factors affect management’s T&D choices?  
• What is the relation between CG and management incentives?  
• What role do boards and audit committees play in the T&D process in annual 
reports and other channels? 
• How effective are auditors in enhancing the credibility of annual reports? What 
factors influence auditors’ effectiveness? 
• How effective is the role of T&D practices in improving financial performance in 
Libyan companies? 
• How do T&D practices affect resource allocation in the economy of Libya? 
Libya is a macroeconomic country which might influence the overall T&D practices 
of the national political and economic system.  
Libya should not consider the Western economy as a model to be emulated. Rather, it 
should endeavour to legislate, act and approve laws and regulations that comply with 
its own environment and culture and reflect its idiosyncratic identity.  
9.8 Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations. The population, which included a sample size 
of 27 observations, is one such limitation and is composed of banks and listed 
insurance companies in Libya and thus may not be representative of the population of 
Libyan companies. The number of companies listed in Libya began operation 
followed by 30 companies, 21 banks and 9 insurance companies in January 2010.   
The number of companies LLSM is very small; only ten companies in all: five banks 
and three insurance companies, one cement company, and one LSM Company, up to 1 
January 2010. Furthermore, the LSM is only a few years old, not exceeding four years 
when the data was collected for this study. In addition, the results of this study might 
have been different if the sample had included another industry, such as oil and gas 
sector.  
      A total of three companies did not provide information on the value and number of 
shares in their annual reports, but there was information about total value of shares, 
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without elaborating, thus missing the information  on the inability to account earnings 
per share to measure the relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
variables in this study. In addition, Tobin’s Q is a very widely used measure of 
corporate performance. It is defined as the ratio of market value of the company to 
replacement value of the assets. Unfortunately, due to the absence of the necessary 
information for this analysis, this topic was excluded from the study.  
      The data was collected during the period 1 November 2009 to 31 January 2010. 
Owing to the delay in the annual reports, the researcher was unable to include the year 
2009 within the years studied. Furthermore, the arithmetic average for the years 2007 
and 2008 was used when calculating financial ratios, owing to the lack of 2009 
financial reporting. 
      Many previous studies’ arguments are related to CG and audit committees; for 
example, audit committee meetings. The Libyan Commercial Act includes an item 
stating that the company must have an audit committee. Through the annual reports 
available for this study, it was noted that all companies had audit committees, but the 
information available did not exceed general information about the chair and members 
in terms of name, qualifications and numbers. With reference to the law, the number 
would be either three or five or seven according to the size of the company and the 
law selecting the conditions to be provided and their functions. This points out the 
review of the article in the General Assembly meeting as information on this topic is 
not available in annual reports. In addition, some researchers examined the 
relationship between CG and audit size. Furthermore, in the Libyan Commercial Act 
it is stated that the company must have an external audit. However, from the reports 
available to the researcher, it was found that all companies incorporated external 
auditors’ reports – not from within the international audit companies, but from all 
local and small-sized offices. These researcher variables were among the study 
variables that this topic did not address. In addition, previous studies have measured 
the relationship between T&D and number of board meetings; therefore, there is no 
information in the annual reports about the number of board meetings.    
      There are conceptual problems when T&D is measured by using a T&D score. 
The quality of T&D is equated to the quantity of disclosure on the basis that more is 
better.  
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9.9 Future Research 
The finding of this study points to several future research opportunities. Future 
research may be extended to other types of companies beyond companies listed in 
Libya, and to different time periods. Therefore, it may include other different types of 
industry T&D such as company websites or annual reports that employ other CG 
variables. 
      This study should be extended to other industries to provide regulators with a clear 
picture of how Libyan companies react to the LSM T&D requirements and how these 
requirements reduce asymmetry information, help investors with investment decision 
making, encourage foreign investment in Libya, and support companies to complete 
the registration procedure in the Libyan Stock Market. 
      Future research to address the importance of T&D among stakeholder groups must 
use data collected from interviews with actors’ supervision, control and regulation, 
managers, auditors and investors. Furthermore, this will help stakeholders understand 
which T&D must be reviewed. 
      Previous studies employed more than forty variables of financial performance 
related corporate governance (see Table 3.1). It would be interesting to examine the 
relationship between T&D practices and financial performances, such as accounting 
measures earnings per share and stock return, market measure Tobin’s Q.  
Researchers used more than eighty variables effect of transparency and disclosure (see 
Table 3.2). This study tested the differences in T&D and six corporate characteristics, 
while future research might use, for example, profitability, type of auditors, auditors’ 
size, audit committee meetings, shares owned by the top 10 shareholders, and 
ownership structure by number of shareholders. 
       There are three environmental factors affecting disclosure: international factors 
including 1) economic and international trade relations, 2) political relations, 3) 
international, 4) and 5) accounting bodies; external factors including 1) economy, 2) 
capital market, 3) political and legal system, 4) accounting profession, 5) trans-
national corporations, and 6) culture; and internal factors including 1) personal 
characteristics and 2) corporate characteristics. This study considered internal factors, 
especially corporate characteristics. Future research may examine the relationship 
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between T&D and other international factors and external factors that have an effect 
on environmental T&D. Those variables might help us to understand the degree of 
their impact and which of them has the greatest influence on T&D.  
       Future research might use the S&P T&D score after developing it for the Libyan 
environment. Future research may also use other scores, for example the CG index. 
However, when the researcher uses S&P T&D, it is not possible to discern between 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. For future research, the solution for 
this issue would be to do a reconstruction of S&P items to discriminate between 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure.  Mandatory items of information are 
those items that should be disclosed legally in annual reports by the respective Acts 
and Ordinances governing the Libyan companies. Voluntary disclosure is measured 
by the amount and detail of non-mandatory requirements by Acts and Ordinances 
governing the Libyan companies. In addition, future research should aim to clarify the 
picture about mandatory and voluntary T&D, separately.  
      Future research could address the relationship between T&D and specific elements 
of company financial performance (e.g. competitive strategy, corporate culture or 
business ethics). It might be that T&D has a significant impact with specific elements 
of company performance rather than performance itself. 
      This study is only confined to public and private when measured effect of 
ownership structure on transparency and disclosure. Future research might use other 
ownership structure such as foreign investors or institutions like banks, non-bank 
financial institutions, non-financial institutions, and family. 
      Libya is a developing economy shaped by Islamic religion and Arabic traditions. 
Effect of culture and education on environmental transparency and disclosure in Libya 
might be a fertile field of future research. 
      The Big 4 International Accounting companies have established a presence in 
Libya since 2010. Future research could address the effect of International Accounting 
companies on the level of T&D in Libyan listing companies’ their annual reports.  
       In 2010 Libyan government established new law such as Commercial Law Act 
No. 23, Income Tax Law Ac No. 7, and Foreign Investment Law Act No. 9. Future 
research could address the effect of new regulation on T&D in Libyan listing 
companies.     
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       Finally, it is recommended that future research should use, instead of single 
period analyses, panel data analyses in empirical T&D research to measure the 
influence of changes in T&D on company financial performance measures by both 
accounting and the market. 
9.10 Summary and Conclusion 
This final chapter presents the overview, summary and conclusion of the three 
empirical investigations that have been examined in this study. The first investigation 
looked at the level of T&D and  practices with the emergence of the Libyan Stock 
Market during four years, compared with companies in other countries(developed and 
developing), and assessing variations between companies in T&D practices in their 
annual reports. Whilst the second examined the effect of six company characteristics 
to T&D. While the third to determine the relationship between fourteen variables of 
T&D on financial performance and find which variable of T&D has the most impact 
on three variables of financial performance as measured. The three empirical 
investigations within one of the developing countries that is a transition economy, 
namely Libya. Overall, this study has made a contribution in the area of CG in general 
and T&D in particular. This study has achieved its aims and has made policy 
recommendations. 
      Moreover, this chapter presented several contributions to knowledge that this 
study has made: these include updating and renewing the literature of T&D; used S&P 
T&D index in new emerging countries; several explanations and interpretations were 
made regarding the association of the level of T&D practices; found a new variable 
(audit peer review) had effect to level of T&D; showing a relationship between 
fourteen variables of T&D on three variables of financial performance; and adding 
additional results to the literature of T&D. 
      Finally, implications of this study, recommendation to Libyan corporations and 
government authorities, some limitations of the investigations were discussed in 
several areas and as well as suggestions for future research. 
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Appendix 1 S&P T&D Data Collected 
 Standard & Poor’s transparency and disclosure   
No: Ownership Structure and Investor Right (28 Point)                                                 Yes No 
* Transparency of Ownership   
1 Provide a description of share classes? 
  
2 Provide a review of shareholders by type? 
  
3 Provide the number of issued and authorized ordinary shares? 
  
4 Provide the number of authorized but non-issued ordinary shares? 
  
5 Provide the par value of issued and authorized ordinary shares? 
  
6 Provide the par value of authorized but non-issued ordinary shares? 
  
7 Provide the number of issued and authorized of preferred, nonvoting, and other 
classes?  
  
8 Provide the number of authorized but non-issued shares of preferred, nonvoting, 
and other classes?  
  
9 Provide the par value of issued and authorized of preferred, nonvoting, and other 
classes?  
  
10 Provide the par value of authorized but non-issued shares of preferred, nonvoting, 
and other classes?  
  
11 Does the company disclose the voting rights for each class of shares? 
  
 Total Transparency of Ownership   
* Concentration of Ownership   
12 Top 1 shareholder(s) disclosed? 
  
13 Top 3 shareholders disclosed? 
  
14 Top 5 shareholders disclosed? 
  
15 Top 10 shareholders disclosed? 
  
16 Shareholders owning more than 10% are disclosed? 
  
17 Shareholders owning more than 5% are disclosed? 
  
18 Shareholders owning more than 3% are disclosed? 
  
19 Does the company disclose percentage of cross-ownership? 
  
 Total Concentration of Ownership   
* Voting and Shareholder Meeting Procedures   
20 Is there a calendar of important shareholder dates? 
  
21 Review of shareholder meetings (could be minutes)? 
  
22 Describe procedure for proposals at shareholder meetings? 
  
23 How shareholders convene an extraordinary general meeting? 
  
24 How shareholders nominate directors to board? 
  
25 Describe the process of putting inquiry to board? 
  
26 Does the annual report refer to or publish Corporate Governance Charter? 
  
27 Does the annual report refer to or publish Code of Best Practice? 
  
28 Are the Articles of Association or Charter Articles of Incorporation published?  
  
 Total Voting and Shareholder Meeting Procedures   
 Total Ownership Structure and Investor Rights    Yes No 
 Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure (35 Points)   
* Business Focus   
1 Is there a discussion of corporate strategy? 
  
2 Report details of the kind of business it is in? 
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3 Does the company give an overview of trends in its industry? 
  
No.  
  
4 Report details of the products or services produced/provided? 
  
5 Provide a segment analysis, broken down by business line? 
  
6 Does the company disclose its market share for any or all of its businesses?  
  
7 Does the company report basic earnings forecast of any kind?  
  
8 Does the company report basic earnings forecast of any kind in detail? 
  
9 Disclose output in physical terms? 
  
10 Does the company give an output forecast of any kind? 
  
11 Does the company give characteristics of assets employed? 
  
12 Does the company provide efficiency indicators (ROA, ROE, etc.)? 
  
13 Does the company provide any industry-specific ratios? 
  
14 Does the company disclose its plans for investment in the coming years? 
  
15 Does the company disclose details of its investment plans in the coming years?  
  
 Total Business Focus   
* Accounting Policy Review   
16 Provide financial information on a quarterly basis? 
  
17 Does the company discuss its accounting policy? 
  
18 Does the company disclose accounting standards it uses for its accounts? 
  
19 Does the company provide accounts according to the local accounting standards?  
  
20 Does the company provide accounts in alternate internationally recognized 
accounting methods?  
  
21 Does the company provide each of the balance sheets by internationally recognized 
methods?  
  
22 Does the company provide each of the income statements by internationally 
recognized methods?  
  
23 Does the company provide each of the cash-flow statements by internationally 
recognized methods?  
  
24 Does the company provide a reconciliation of its domestic accounts to 
internationally recognized methods? 
  
 Total Accounting Policy Review   
* Accounting Policy Details   
25 Does the company disclose methods of asset valuation? 
  
26 Does the company disclose information on method of fixed assets depreciation?  
  
27 Does the company produce consolidated financial statements? 
  
 Total Accounting Policy Details   
* Related Party Structure and Transactions   
28 Provide a list of affiliates in which it holds a minority stake? 
  
29 Does the company disclose the ownership structure of affiliates? 
  
30 Is there a list/register of related party transactions? 
  
31 Is there a list/register of group transactions? 
  
 Total Related Party Structure and Transactions   Yes No 
* Information on Auditors   
32 Does the company disclose the name of its auditing firm? 
  
33 Does the company reproduce the auditors’ report?  
  
34 Disclose how much it pays in audit fees to the auditor? 
  
35 Disclose any non-audit fees paid to auditor? 
  
 Total Information on Auditors 
  
 Total Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure   
 Board and Management Structure and Process(35 Points)   
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* Board Structure and Composition   
1 Is there a chairman listed? 
  
No.  
  
2 Detail about the chairman (other than name/title)? 
  
3 Is there a list of board members (names)? 
  
4 Are there details about directors (other than name/title)? 
  
5 Details about current employment/position of directors provided? 
  
6 Are details about previous employment/positions provided? 
  
7 Disclose when each of the directors joined the board? 
  
8 Classifies directors as an executive or an outside director? 
  
 Total Board Structure and Composition   
* Role of the Board   
9 Details about role of the board of directors at the company? 
  
10 Is there disclosed a list of matters reserved for the board? 
  
11 Is there a list of board committees? 
  
12 Review last board meeting (could be minutes)? 
  
13 Is there an audit committee? 
  
14 Disclosure of names on audit committee? 
  
15 Is there a remuneration/compensation committee? 
  
16 Names on remuneration/compensation committee? 
  
17 Is there a nomination committee? 
  
18 Disclosure of names on nomination committee? 
  
19 Other internal audit-function besides audit committee? 
  
20 Is there a strategy/investment/finance committee? 
  
 Total Role of the Board   
* Director Training and Compensation   
21 Disclose whether they provide director training? 
  
22 Disclose the number of shares in the company held by directors? 
  
23 Discuss decision-making process of directors’ pay? 
  
24 Are specific of directors’ salaries disclosed (numbers)? 
  
25 From of directors’ salaries disclosed (cash, shares, etc.)? 
  
26 Specifics disclosed on performance-related pay for directors? 
  
 Total Director Training and Compensation   
* Executive Compensation and Evaluation   
27 List of the senior managers (not on the board of directors)? 
  
28 Backgrounds of senior managers disclosed? 
  
29 Number of shares held by the senior managers disclosed? 
  
30 Disclose the number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers?  
  Yes No 
31 Discuss the decision-making of managers’ (not board) pay  
  
32 Numbers of managers’ (not on board) salaries disclosed? 
  
33 Form of managers’ (not on board) salaries disclosed? 
  
34 Specifics disclosed on performance-related pay for managers? 
  
35 Details of the chief executive officer (CEO) contract disclosed? 
  
 Total Executive Compensation and Evaluation   
 Total Board and Management Structure and Process   
 Total  S&P TD   
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Appendix 2 Questionnaire Data Collected 
 
Osama Ben Mansour 
University of Huddersfield 
Business School 
Queensgate  
Huddersfield HD1 3DH 
UK. 
1st November 2009  
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
RE: Request for Annual Report for Financial years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and a reply to 
this questionnaire.  
I am a Libyan currently undertaking a study leading to a PhD at the University of 
Huddersfield. My research area is Transparency and Disclosure of Corporate Governance 
Practices in Libyan listed companies, which involve analysing the annual reports of 
randomly selected companies. I would be grateful if your company would participate in 
my research.  As such, it is important for me to have the annual reports of your company 
for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. I would also like to collect data on your 
company’s views on Transparency and Disclosure.  Thus, it is important for my research 
that you answer this questionnaire to collect information about your company. 
Your company reports and the answers to this questionnaire will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and no information gained from this survey will be identified with any 
particular person or organisation. 
Yours faithfully 
Osama Ben Mansour 
Tel: 00218912157044/ 00447733429450 
E-mail: u0776044@hud.ac.uk 
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Part 1: Personal information 
1-Position within the Company: Chief Executive Officer Other (please state): 
……………………………............................………………………………. 
2- Qualifications:  Doctorate    Master’s Degree     Bachelor’s Degree     Higher Diploma
      Other (please state)………………………………………………………………… 
3- Please state the field in which your qualification is in ……………………………………… 
4-Business experience (years): less than 5  5 to 10  10 to 15  15 to 20   More than 20  
 
Part 2: Information about the company 
1- Relationship between company and Libyan Stock Market:      Listed          Not listed  
2-Company ownership: Public     Private   Other (please state)……………………………  
3- Company size – total assets (million D.L):From1 to100 100 to1000  More than 1000  
4- Company age – from founding (years): 5or less   5 to 15  15 to 25   More than 25  
5- Type of industry:   Bank       Insurance   
6-Company shareholding: Holding   Affiliated   Investing   Recommendation  Limited  
 
Part 3: Section 1-1 Financial and operating results of the company (Please tick  all 
relevant answers) 
The company has annual reports following:  Income statement       Balance sheet    
Dividend data     Cash flow statement      Chairman's Report      Chief executive officer 
statement Display segmental data    Shareholders’ equity statement        Disclosure of 
significant accounting policies Environmental policies disclosed       Employee information 
        Audit report         Quarterly financial statement  
1-Section 1- 2: General information about the company 
(Please tick  all relevant answers)  
Strongly 
Agree  
Agree  Neutral  Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
2 The company publishes financial statements to enable 
appropriate monitoring to take place. 5 4 3 2 1 
3 The company publish financial statements to provide the basis to value securities.  5 4 3 2 1 
4 
The company discloses that transactions relating to an 
entire group of companies (between related companies) be 
disclosed in line with high quality internationally 
recognised standards. 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 The company publishes financial statements to disclose information about contingent liabilities. 5 4 3 2 1 
6 The company publishes financial statements to disclose information about off-balance sheet transactions. 5 4 3 2 1 
7 The company publishes financial statements to disclose information about special purpose entities. 5 4 3 2 1 
8 The company publishes financial statements to use in its 
current management discussions and analysis. 5 4 3 2 1 
9 
The company publishes financial statements and includes 
a section devoted to corporate governance principles and 
implementations. 
5 4 3 2 1 
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Section 2: Company objectives 
Strongly 
Agree  
Agree  Neutral  Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1 The company’s disclosure helps improve public 
understanding of the structure and activities of enterprises. 5 4 3 2 1 
2 The company discloses steps that the company has taken 
to implement their commercial objectives. 5 4 3 2 1 
3 The company discloses policies relating to business ethics 
to better evaluate the relationship between company and 
the communities in which they operate. 
5 4 3 2 1 
4 The company discloses corporate policies and 
performance with respect to the environment.  5 4 3 2 1 
5 The company discloses policies relating to society to 
better evaluate the relationship between company and the 
communities in which they operate. 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
Section 3: Major share ownership and voting right      
1 The basic right of investors is to be informed about the 
ownership structure of the enterprise. 5 4 3 2 1 
2 The basic rights of investors are upheld vis-à-vis the rights 
of other owners. 5 4 3 2 1 
3 The company discloses ownership data once certain 
thresholds of ownership are passed. 5 4 3 2 1 
4 The company discloses about major shareholders and 
others that, directly or indirectly, control or may control 
the company through the ownership of controlling. 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 The company discloses blocks of shares. 5 4 3 2 1 
6 The company discloses special voting rights. 5 4 3 2 1 
7 The company discloses shareholder agreements. 5 4 3 2 1 
   
8 
The company discloses significant cross-shareholding 
relationships and cross-guarantees. 5 4 3 2 1 
   
9 
The company discloses significant changes in ownership. 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
Section 4: Board members, key executives and their remuneration   
1 Does the company disclose whether the chairman of the board is an executive 
director? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
2 Does the company disclose information about qualification of chairman and 
members of the board? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
3 Does the company disclose whether the chairman and members of the board have 
membership of other boards? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
4 Does the company disclose the chairman’s and members of the board’s share 
ownership in the company? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
5 Does the company disclose whether the chairman and members of the board are 
considered by the board to be independent members, which information might 
enable investors to assess any potential conflicts of interest that might affect their 
judgement? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
6 Does the company disclose the remuneration of the chairman of the board of 
directors and members of the board?  
 Yes 
 
No 
 
7 Does the company disclose the link between remuneration of the chairman and 
members of board, and company performance, so that investors can assess the costs and 
benefits of remuneration plans? 
 Yes 
 
No 
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8 Does the company disclose how the chairman and members of the board are 
selected? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
9 Does the company disclose the executive director’s remuneration?    Yes 
 
No 
 
10 Does the company disclose the link between the executive director’s remuneration 
and company performance? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Section 5: Related party transactions 
 
Strongly 
Agree  
 
Agree  
 
Neutral  
 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 The company fully discloses material related party 
transactions to the market, either individually, or on a 
group basis. 
5 4 3 2 1 
2 The company fully discloses material related party 
transactions to the market, executed at arm’s length. 5 4 3 2 1 
3 The company fully discloses material related party 
transactions to the market, on normal market terms. 5 4 3 2 1 
4 The company discloses about trading of equity owners of 
minimum 5% total shares. 5 4 3 2 1 
5 The company reports the curriculum vitae of the chair and 
members of the board of directors and executive managers 
that could be a potential for conflict of interest. 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
Section 6: Material foreseeable risk factors 
1 The company discloses risk management policies exist.   5 4 3 2 1 
2 The company discloses information on reasonably 
foreseeable material risks, especially risks that are specific 
to the industry in which the company operates. 
5 4 3 2 1 
3 The company discloses information on reasonably 
foreseeable material risks, especially, risks that are 
specific to the geographical areas in which the company 
operates. 
5 4 3 2 1 
4 The company discloses information on reasonably 
foreseeable material risks, especially financial market 
risks including interest rate, and currency risk. 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 The company discloses information on reasonably 
foreseeable material risks, especially risk related to 
derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions. 
5 4 3 2 1 
6 The company discloses information on reasonably 
foreseeable material risks, especially risks related to 
environmental liabilities. 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
Section 7: Material issues regarding employees and other 
stakeholders 
     
1 The company discloses information about the relationship 
between the management and employees that may 
materially affect the performance of the company. 
5 4 3 2 1 
2 The company discloses information about the relationship 
between the management and creditors that may 
materially affect the performance of the company. 
5 4 3 2 1 
3 The company discloses information about the relationship 
between the management and suppliers that may 
materially affect the performance of the company. 
5 4 3 2 1 
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Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
4 The company discloses information about the relationship 
between the management and local communities that may 
materially affect the performance of the company. 
5 4 3 2 1 
5 The company discloses programmes for human resource 
development and training that can communicate important 
information on the competitive strengths of the company. 
5 4 3 2 1 
6 The company discloses retention rates of employees that 
can communicate important information on the 
competitive strengths of company. 
5 4 3 2 1 
7 The company discloses employee share ownership plans 
that can communicate important information on the 
competitive strengths of company.  
5 4 3 2 1 
 
Section 8:  Governance structures and policies 
1 The company reports corporate governance practices. 5 4 3 2 1 
2 The company discloses proposals and perceptions with 
regard to corporate governance. 5 4 3 2 1 
3 The company effects disclosure of the governance 
structure.  5 4 3 2 1 
4 The company has mechanisms in place or being 
considered in the future to ensure transparency of 
company governance structure.  
5 4 3 2 1 
5 The company discloses governance policies, in particular 
the division of authority between shareholders, 
management and board members. 
5 4 3 2 1 
6 The company, as a matter of transparency, ensures the 
procedures for shareholders’ meeting votes have been 
properly counted and recorded and timely announcement 
of the outcome is made. 
5 4 3 2 1 
7 The  company  disclosure of  information are not 
consistent with the standards of corporate governance 5 4 3 2 1 
Section 9: Preparation of information and disclosure  
1 The company application of high quality standards is to 
significantly improve the ability of investors to monitor 
the company by providing increased reliability of 
reporting, and improved insight into company 
performance. 
5 4 3 2 1 
2 The company is adopting high quality accounting 
standards and internationally recognised standards to 
improve transparency. 
5 4 3 2 1 
3 The company has adopted high quality accounting 
standards and internationally recognised standards to 
enable the comparability of financial statements and other 
financial reporting. 
5 4 3 2 1 
Section 10: External audit and monitoring      
1 The company discloses whither the external audit 
statements contribute to an improved internal control 
environment in the company.   
5 4 3 2 1 
2 The external audit statements contribute to an increased 
transparency and disclosure in the company reports. 5 4 3 2 1 
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Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
3 The company disclose information about the role of 
corporate governance in monitoring an auditor’s 
independence. 
5 4 3 2 1 
4 The company discloses information about the role and 
functions of the audit committee. 5 4 3 2 1 
 
Section 11External audit and audit committee role 
1 Does the external auditor certify that the financial statement represents fairly the 
financial position of the company? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
2 Does the audit statement include an opinion on the way in which financial statements 
have been prepared and presented? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
3 Does the company disclose whether the external auditor’s review limited to quarterly 
review? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
4 Does the company disclose whether the audit committee often specified as providing 
oversight of the internal audit activities? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
5 Does the company disclose the audit committee charged with overseeing the overall 
relationship with the external auditor including the nature of non-audit services 
provided by the auditor to the company? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
6 Does the company disclose whether the function of the board of directors or the audit 
committee to change the external auditor? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Section 12:  External auditors accountable to shareholders where the external auditor owes a 
duty of due professional care 
1 Does the company disclose that, the audit committee function to ensure external 
auditor owes duty of due professional care to the company? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
2 Is external auditor at the shareholders’ meeting accountable to the shareholders which 
an increased transparency and disclosure?                                                                          
 Yes 
 
No 
 
3 Does the company perform the process of audit peer review when audited by the 
external auditor to encourage transparency and disclosure? 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
  
  
Section 13:  Channels for dissemination information 
allow for fair, timely, and cost-efficient access to 
information by user 
Strongly 
Agree  
Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree  
1 The company has introduced a provision for disclosure 
including periodic disclosure, continuous or current 
disclosure, and material development reporting disclosure. 
5 4 3 2 1 
2 The company produces reports on time for all 
shareholders without prejudice to a party. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
Section 14: Corporate governance framework, 
complemented by effective approach that addresses and 
promotes the provision of analysis 
     
1 The company gives full disclosure about conflict of 
interests and how the company deals with the 
contradictions of interests. 
5 4 3 2 1 
2 The company discloses the conflicts of interest on the 
crisis, provides information for investors to judge risk 
including conflicts of interest, and the potential bias in the 
analysis, advice, and available information. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
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Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
3 The company discloses the extent to which corporate 
governance practices conform to established standards. 5 4 3 2 1 
4 The company discloses how the entity is structuring the 
incentives of its employees in order to eliminate potential 
conflict of interest.   
5 4 3 2 1 
5 The company discloses of takes into account the conflict 
of interests when mandating certain approaches to the 
analysis, and consulting. 
5 4 3 2 1 
Any notes: 
…………………………………………………………………………………....................................
……………….………………………………………………………………………………………...
……………………………………………...…………………………………………………………
………………………………….……………………………………………………………………...
…………………………………………………………………….…………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………………………...……
………………………………………………………………………………………..……………….
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………….………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………...…………………………………………………………
…………………………………..……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………….…………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………...……
………………………………………………………………………………………..………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
.……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………...……………………………………………………………………………
………………..………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………….……………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix 3 Corporate Governance and Company Performance 
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AC 
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Suvanet 
al. (2012) 
Better CG 
during the 
2008–2009 
financial crisis 
                                        
 Russia 
Lopes & 
Walker 
(2012) 
company-level 
CG 
arrangements 
                                       
 
 Brazil 
Hermes 
& 
Katsigian
ni(2012) 
CG practices 
 
 
   
 
 
                                    Greece  
Connelly 
et al.  
(2012) 
Family 
ownership      
 
                                    
Thaila-
nd 
Zhang 
(2012) 
Ownership 
structure                                          
China 
Board 
subcommittees                                          
Market reforms                                          
Board of directors 
and board of 
supervisors 
  
  
 
                                    
Nimer et 
al. (2012) 
Audit 
committees                                          
Jordan-
ian 
Mahoney 
et al.  
(2008) 
Corporate 
social 
performance 
 
 
 
           
                             
US 
Bayoud et 
al. 
(2012b) 
 Social and 
environmental 
disclosure  
  
   
 
      
                             
Libya 
Zhongfu 
et al. 
(2011) 
Environmental 
information 
disclosure  
    
 
       
                             
China 
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Xin & 
Xiao 
(2011) 
Information 
transparency             
                             
China 
Wu 
(2011) 
CEO  power 
 
   
 
       
                             China 
Valenti 
(2011) 
Board 
composition 
and governance 
structure 
  
       
  
 
                             
US 
Syriopoul
os & 
Tsatsaron
is (2011) 
The presence of 
managerial 
executives 
related to the 
founding family 
  
          
                             
Greek 
and 
Scandin-
avian 
Ownership 
concentration 
by board of 
directors 
members 
  
          
                             
Participation of 
independent 
members in the 
board of 
directors 
  
          
                             
Sami et 
al. (2011) 
Chinese CG 
regime                                          China 
Price et 
al. (2011) 
Corporate 
Practices and 
performance 
and financial 
reporting 
transparency 
 
   
 
                                    Mexico 
Mahmood 
& Abbas 
(2011) 
Number of 
board meetings                                           Pakistan 
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Kang & 
Kim 
(2011) 
Real activity-
based earning 
management  
    
 
                                    Korea 
Jiao 
(2011) 
Investment 
management 
and research 
disclosure 
rankings 
    
 
                                    US 
Jerab 
(2011) 
Ownership 
structure  
  
                                       
Turkey 
Board of 
directors                                           
Managerial 
compensation                                           
Internal control 
and audit                                          
D and T                                          
Javid & 
Iqbal 
(2011) 
Board 
composition                                           
India Shareholding 
and ownership                                           
D and T   
  
 
                                    
Ibrahim 
& Samad 
(2011) 
Family 
ownership                                          
Malaysia Non-family 
ownership                                          
Dinga 
(2011) 
Corporate 
ownership and 
control 
structure 
  
       
 
  
 
                            UK 
Cheung 
(2011) 
Changes in the 
quality of CG 
practices 
 
   
 
      
  
                            
Hong 
Kong 
Trabelsi 
(2010) 
Governance 
structure     
 
                                    Tunisia 
Renders CG ratings                                          European
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(2010) 
Reddy 
(2010) 
Boards of 
directors                                          New 
Zealand Corporate 
ownership                                          
Mishra & 
Suar 
(2010) 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
 
                                        India 
Lantz, 
(2010) 
Activism of 
institutional 
investors on 
shareholder 
wealth  
    
 
                                    France 
Huang 
(2010) 
Independent 
directors                                           Taiwan 
 Ownership 
characteristics                                          
Hu (2010) Ownership 
structure,      ()                                     
China Board of directors     ()                                     
Supervisory 
board     ()                                     
Chugh et 
al. (2010) 
Greater 
shareholders 
rights 
  
 
 
        
 
       
 
                    US 
Chen 
(2010) 
Directors’ and 
officers’ 
liability 
insurance 
  
        
 
                              Taiwan 
Berthelot  
(2010) 
Information 
published 
by an 
information 
intermediary  
    
 
                                    Canada 
 Ntim 
(2009) 
Board 
meetings,                                            
South 
African 
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Establishment 
of board 
committees 
 
   
 
                                    
Board size ()                                         
CEO duality     ()                                     
 Norgate 
(2009) 
Ownership                                          
UK 
Non-financial 
reward                                          
Services 
provided by the 
board 
 
 
 
                                      
Financial 
motivation                                          
Dragomir 
(2009) 
Environmental 
performance                                          
European 
Union 
Environmental 
disclosure                                          
Financial 
performance of 
environmentally 
 
 
   
      
 
   
 
                         
Chi 
(2009) 
Corporate      T 
and D practices                                          Taiwan 
Saleha 
(2008) 
Corporate 
social 
responsibility 
disclosure 
 
   
 
                                    Malaysia 
Omran 
(2008) 
Ownership 
concentration                                          
Arab 
countries 
Lee 
(2008) 
Management 
compensation                                          US 
Kaserer 
(2008) 
Ownership 
 
            
 
  
 
                        
Anglo-
Saxon 
countries 
Kajola 
(2008) 
Board size                                          
Nigerian Board 
composition                                          
CEO status                                           
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Audit 
committee                                          
Jo & kim 
(2008) 
Voluntary 
disclosure                                          US 
Javid 
(2008) 
Ownership 
concentration                                          Pakistan 
Haat et al. 
(2008) 
Audit quality     ()                                     
Malaysi-
an 
Level of 
disclosure                                          
Timely 
reporting                                          
Duztas 
(2008) 
Transparency 
and 
information 
technology on 
board structure 
 
   
 
                                    Turkey 
Aman & 
Nguyen 
(2008) 
Board structure                                          
Japan 
Ownership 
characteristics                                          
Information and 
disclosure                                          
Shabbir 
(2007) 
Level of CEO 
entrenchment 
on the board 
                  
 
                      UK 
Larcker, 
et al 
(2007) 
CG 
quality  
              
 
                         US 
El Mehdi 
(2007) 
Ownership 
structures                                          Tunisia 
Premuros
o & 
Bhattacha
ry (2007) 
Board-level 
technology 
committees                                          US 
Peng 
(2007) 
CEO Duality 
 
 
                  
 
                    China 
Tam Ownership                                          Malaysia 
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&Tan 
(2007) 
types 
Li Et Al. 
(2006) 
Shareholders’ 
behaviours                                          
China 
Board                                           
 Top 
management                                           
Information 
disclosure                                          
Stakeholders’                                           
Supervisors 
committee                                           
Haniffa & 
Hudaib 
(2006) 
Board size   
 
   
 
                                    
Malaysia 
 Top five 
substantial 
shareholdings 
 
   
 
                                    
Gruszczy
nski 
(2006) 
Governance 
rating                                           Poland 
Gonenc & 
Aybar 
(2006) 
Concentrated 
ownership                                            Turkey Business group 
affiliation                                          
Gani & 
Jermias  
(2006) 
board 
independence                                           
Chand & 
Fraser 
(2006) 
Corporate 
social 
performance 
  
   
 
                  
 
                US 
Brown & 
Caylor 
(2006) 
Institutional 
Shareholder 
Services 
  
                                       US 
Anthony 
& 
Nicholas 
Board size                                           
Ghana Board 
Composition                                          
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(2006) 
 CEO duality    
                  
 
                    
Ownership 
structure 
  
                  
 
                    
Abu-
Tapanjeh(
2006) 
Non-executive 
directors                                          Jordan 
Role CEO                                          
Abdullah 
(2006) 
Directors’ 
Remuneration ()                                         Malaysia 
Shabbir 
(2005) 
Compliance 
with the UK 
code of CG 
  
                                       UK 
Sanda 
(2005) 
 boards with a 
higher 
proportion of 
outside 
directors  
  
  
 
    
 
                               
Nigeria 
Companies run 
by expatriate 
CEOs 
  
  
 
    
 
                               
Pallathitta 
Rejie 
(2005) 
Foreign 
ownership                                           India 
Miyajima 
(2005) 
Outside board 
members                                          Japan 
Liu 
(2005) 
Shareholdings 
composition                                          China 
Eisenberg 
Et Al 
(1998) 
Board size 
()                                         Finland 
Kyereboa
h-
Coleman 
& Biekpe 
(2005) 
Board size  
 
                                        
China 
Board 
composition                                          
CEO duality  
                                        
CEO’s tenure ()                                         
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of office 
Ke (2005) Ownership 
concentration                                           China 
Board size    
 
  
                                    
Filatotche
v (2005) 
Institutional 
share 
ownership 
 
 
   
       
 
                            
Taiwan 
Family 
control over 
the executive 
board 
 
 
   
       
 
                            
Independent 
Chairman                                           
Ertugrul 
& Hegde 
(2005) 
Independent 
Directors 
 
 
         
 
 
 
                            
US 
Director 
tenure 
 
         
 
 
 
                            
Percentage of 
independent 
directors in 
the 
committees 
 
         
 
 
 
                            
Director age 
 
 
         
 
 
 
                            
Number of 
directorships 
held by each 
director 
 
         
 
 
 
                            
Independent 
director 
ownership  
 
         
 
 
 
                            
CEO 
Compensate                                          
Earle et 
al. (2005) 
Largest 
blockholder                                           Hungary 
Largest two                                          
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blockholders  
Largest three 
blockholders                                           
All 
blockholders                                          
Dwivedi 
& Jain 
(2005) 
Foreign 
shareholding                                           
India 
Institutional 
shareholders                                           
Board size                                           
Directors’ 
shareholding      ()                                     
Public 
shareholding      ()                                     
Chiang & 
Chia 
(2005) 
Board 
Size                                          
Taiwan 
Board 
ownership                                          
Institution 
ownership                                          
Financial 
transparency                                          
Information 
disclosure                                          
Management 
structure and 
process 
  
 
 
      
 
                              
De 
Andres Et 
Al.  
(2005) 
Board size      ()        ()                             
US Composition 
 
   
 
       
 
                            
 Berger Et 
Al (2005) 
 
                                         
Argent-
ina 
Bebczuk(
2005) 
Role of 
governance                                           Argent-ina Ownership                                           
Klapper Better CG                                          14 
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PS MA
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& Love 
(2004) 
emerging 
markets 
Hutchinso
n & Gul,  
(2004) 
Corporate 
controls                                          Australia 
Craighead
, (2004) 
Mandated 
disclosure                                          
 
Callahan 
& Smith 
(2004) 
Disclosure 
  
                  ()                     
US 
 Governance 
category                                          
 
Executive and 
director 
compensation 
                                         
Brown & 
Caylor  
(2004) 
Audit 
 
 
  
 
            
 
  
 
        
  
          
US 
Board of 
directors                                          
Charter/ 
bylaws                                          
Director 
education                                          
Executive and 
director 
compensation 
 
 
  
 
            
 
  
 
        
  
          
Ownership 
 
 
  
 
            
 
  
 
        
  
          
Progressive 
practices                                          
State of 
incorporation                                          
Bauer 
(2004) 
Governance 
standards                                          Europe 
Alves & 
Mendes 
(2004) 
Code of best 
practice                                          Portug-
uese 
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Yoshikaw
a (2003) 
Foreign 
Ownership 
change 
 
         
 
                              Japan 
Orlitzky 
Et Al. 
(2003) 
Corporate 
social/ 
environmental 
  
 
 
                                     US 
Farrell & 
Whidbee 
(2003) 
CEO turnover 
 
         
 
                               
Anderson 
(2003) 
Founding-
family 
ownership 
 
   
 
                                     
Shen & 
Cannella 
(2002) 
Senior 
executive 
turnover 
 
                                        US 
Randøy & 
Nielsen 
(2002) 
CEO 
compensation                                           Norway 
and 
Sweden 
CEO tenure  
 
 
          
 
                   
 
        
CEO 
compensation                                          
Bhagat 
And 
Black 
(2001) 
Proportion of 
outsider 
Directors                                          US 
Bhagat 
& Black 
(2000) 
Board 
independence                                           US 
Core Et 
Al 
(1999) 
CEO 
compensation                                           US 
Bhagat 
& Black 
(1999) 
Board 
independence 
 
()    ()                        ()      () () ()      
Vafeas 
& 
Theodor
Board structure  
     
 
      
 
                      
 
     UK 
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ou 
(1998) 
Xu & 
Wang 
(1997) 
Ownership 
structure                                           
 Preston & 
O’bannon 
(1997) 
Corporate social 
  
                       
 
               US 
Yermack 
(1996) 
Board size 
    ()                                     US 
Agrawal 
& 
Knoeber 
(1996) 
Inside ownership 
    
 
                                    US 
Kang & 
Shivdasa
ni, 
(1995) 
Role of cg 
mechanisms 
during top 
executive 
turnover 
 
         
 
                            ()  Japan 
Hamid 
(Hamid, 
1995) 
Executive 
compensation 
structure 
 
   
 
                                    US 
Daily & 
Dalton 
(1993) 
Board leadership 
  
        
 
                               
Hermalin 
And 
Weisbac
h (1991) 
Proportion of 
outsider 
Directors                                          US 
Mcconne
ll & 
Servaes 
(1990) 
Holdings of an 
outside 
blockholder                                          US 
Zahra & 
Stanton 
(1988) 
Boards of 
directors                                           
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Murphy 
(1985) 
Executive 
compensation                                           US 
ROE=Return on Equity, ROA= Return on Assets, ROCE=Return on Capital Employed,  REPS=Rates Earning Per Share, Ts Q= Tobin’s Q, R-S.=Revenues-Sales, OPE=Operating Profit / Operating Income, 
TPTC=Total Profit / Total Cost, QR=Quick Assets / Current Liabilities, PER=Price Earnings Ratio, MR= Market Return, Lev.=Leverage, MTBV=Market-To-Book- Value, MTSR=Market-To-Sales Ratio, 
NI=Net Income, SR=Share Returns, SP=Stock Price, PM=Profit Margin, TSR=Total Shareholder Return, CACL=Current Assets Divided by Current Liabilities, SG=Sales Growth, NAPS=Net Assets Per Share, 
TAT=Total Assets Turnover, RTAG=Rate of Total Assets Growth, CFPS=Cash Flow Per Share, RI= Return on Investment, EVAI=Ratio of Economic Value Added  to Invested Capital, EVAC=Economic Value 
Added Capital Ratio, SANE=Real sales/Average Number of Employees, NS=Net Sales, SR=Share Repurchases, ADCR=Average of the Daily Continuous Returns, PS=Performance of Stock, MASPR=Market 
Adjusted Stock Price Returns, TR= Turnover Ratio (Sales/Assets), OM=Operating Margin (Operating Income/Sales), SE= Salary Expenditures, NE=Net sale-to-equity, LP=Log Profits, OI= Operating Income, 
and VSP=Volatility of Stock Prices.  Significant and positive, () Significant and negative  Not significant and positive, and () Not significant and negative. 
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Appendix 4 Corporate Characteristics Examined 
Researcher & 
Year 
Corporate Characteristics examined Type of 
Study 
Country 
Cerf  (1961) Company size, Ownership, Rate of return, Listing status Aggregate US 
Singhvi (1968a) Company size, Audit company, Profitability  Aggregate India  
Singhvi & Desai 
(1971) 
Company size, Number of shareholders, Listing status, Rate 
of return, earnings, and Auditor type 
Aggregate US 
Moore & Buzby  
(1972) 
Rate of return, Company size, Earning margin Aggregate US 
Choi (1973) Company size  and Industry type Aggregate European 
Capital 
Market  
Buzby (1975) Company size, Listing status Aggregate US 
Stanga (1976) Company size, Industry type Aggregate US 
Patell, James M. 
(1976) 
Company size, Industry type, Listing status Aggregate US 
Belkaoui & Kahl 
(1978b) 
Company size, Rate of return, Industry type, Liquidity, and 
Capitalisation ratio  
Aggregate Canada 
Davies & Kelly 
(1979) 
Company size, Audit company Aggregate Australia  
Firth (1979) Company size, Listing status, Auditor type Voluntary UK 
Courtis (1979) Company size, Leverage, Profitability, Audit company Aggregate New 
Zealand 
McNally, Lee & 
Hasseldine (1982) 
Company size, Rate of return, Auditor type, Growth in net 
assets, Industry type 
Voluntary New 
Zealand 
Wallace (1987) Company size, Rate of return, Liquidity, Multinational 
affiliation, Type of manager, Industry type 
Aggregate 
Mandatory 
Nigeria 
Chow & Wong-
Boren (1987) 
Company size, Assets-in-place, Leverage Voluntary Mexico 
Cooke(1989c) Quotation status, Company size, parent company 
relationship, industry type 
Voluntary 
 
Sweden 
Cooke (1989a) Company size, Parent company relationship, Number of 
shareholders, Foreign listing, Industry type, Listing status 
Aggregate  
Voluntary 
Social 
Sweden  
Lev (1990) Company size, Earnings volatilities, Industry composition, 
Market risk 
Voluntary US 
Tai et al (1990) Company size, Audit company Statutory  Hong Kong 
Tan, Kidam & 
Cheong  (1990) 
Company size, Auditor type, Industry type Mandatory Malaysia  
Tong et al. (1990) Company size, Audit company Voluntary Malaysia  
Cooke (1991) Company size Voluntary Japan 
Craswell & Taylor 
(1992) 
Company size, Auditor type, Cash flow risk, Ownership 
structure,  Leverage 
Voluntary Australia  
Cooke (1992) Company size, Listing status, Industry type Aggregate  
Voluntary 
Mandatory 
Japan  
Lau  (1992) Company size, Leverage, Profitability  Voluntary Hong Kong 
Bradbury (1992) Company size, Leverage, Industry type, Earnings volatility, 
Source of financing, Assets-in-place 
Segmental  New 
Zealand 
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McKinnon & 
Dalimunthe (1993) 
Company size, Leverage, Number of shareholders, Number 
of subsidiaries , Leverage of diversification, Industry type 
Segmental  Australia 
Lang & 
Lundholm, 
(1993) 
Company size, Performance variability, Issuing securities. Voluntary US 
Malone, Fries & 
Jones (1993) 
Leverage, Listing status, Auditor type, Number of 
shareholders, Foreign operations, Proportion of outside 
directors, Industry diversification, Profitability 
Aggregate  US  
Wallace, Naser & 
Mora (1994) 
Company size, Leverage, Auditor type, Liquidity, Rate of 
return, Listing status, Profitability, Industry type 
Mandatory Spain 
Solas  (1994) No. of shareholder holders, Earning margin, Rate of return Voluntary Jordan  
Ng & Koh (1994) Leverage, Auditor type, Liquidity, Industry type, 
Profitability, Sales, Operational complexity 
Voluntary Singapore  
Hossain et al.  
(1994) 
Company size, Ownership structure, Leverage, Assets-in-
place, Auditor type, Foreign listing 
Voluntary Malaysia 
Ahmed & 
Nicholls  (1994) 
Company size, Auditor type, Qualification of principal 
accounting officer, Multinational affiliation, Leverage 
Mandatory Bangladesh 
Abu-Nassar & 
Rutherford (1994) 
Company size, Age, Equity ratio, Rate of return, Dividends, 
Ownership distribution, Profitability, Industry type 
Voluntary Jordan 
Raffournier (1995) Company size, Leverage, Profitability, Audit company Voluntary Switzerland 
Wallace & 
Naser(1995) 
Company size, Ownership distribution, Industry type, 
Leverage, Profitability, Liquidity, Official domicile, Audit 
company  
Mandatory Hong Kong 
Raffournier (1995) Company size, Leverage, Ownership structure, Auditor 
type, Assets-in-place, Rate of return, Internationality, 
Industry type 
Voluntary Switzerland 
Hossain, Perera & 
Rahman (1995) 
Company size, Auditor type, Foreign listing, Leverage, 
Assets-in-place, 
Aggregate  
 
New 
Zealand 
Soh  (1996) Company size, Leverage, Ownership, Profitability, Industry 
type 
Voluntary 
Mandatory 
Malaysia 
Ahmed (1996) Company size, Leverage, Audit company Aggregate  Bangladesh 
Al-Modahki (1996) Company size, Auditor type, Foreign investment, Length of 
incorporation, Industry type 
Aggregate 
Voluntary 
Mandatory 
Saudi 
Arabia  
Marston  (1997) Company size Voluntary 
Mandatory 
India  
Inchausti (1997) Company size, Profitability, Audit company, Aggregate Spain 
Zarzeski (1996a) company size, foreign sales, debt ratio, domestic culture Aggregate  
 
France, US 
Germany, 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, UK, 
Norway  
Patton & Zelenka 
(1997) 
Company size, Leverage, Profitability, Audit company Statutory  Czech 
Repub  
Haniffa (1999) 
 
Company size, Assets-in-place, Industry type, Age, 
Complexity of business, Profitability, Level of 
diversification, Multiple listing status, Foreign activates, 
Corporate gearing , Ownership structure, Type of auditors  
Aggregate Malaysia 
Ahmed & Courtis 
(1999) 
Company size, listing status, leverage, profitability, Audit 
company 
Aggregate UK 
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Mahmood (1999) Industry type, Audit company, Commercial law type, and 
listing status 
Voluntary Egypt 
Depoers (2000) Firm size, Foreign activity, Ownership structure, Leverage, 
Auditor company, Labour pressure, and Barriers to entry 
Voluntary France  
Haniffa & Cooke  
(2002) 
Company size, Leverage, Level of diversification, 
Complexity of business, Assets-in-place, Ownership 
structure 
Voluntary 
 
Malaysia  
Naser, et al. (2002) 
 
Number of shareholders, Audit company, Return on equity, 
Liquidity, Profit margin, company size, Type of industry, 
and Foreign & Arab ownership 
Aggregate  Jordan 
Eng & Mak (2003) Ownership structure, Board composition Voluntary Singapore 
Naser & Nuseibeh  
(2003) 
 
Type of information, the effect of Saudi Organization of 
Certified Public Accountants creation on the level of 
accounting disclosure 
Mandatory 
Voluntary 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Khanna, Palepu, & 
Srinivasan, (2004) 
Company size, Performance variability, Country legal origin 
 
Aggregate US 
Mangena & Pike 
(2005) 
Shareholders of audit committee members, Audit committee 
size, Audit committee financial expertise. 
Mandatory 
Voluntary 
UK 
Alsaeed  
(2006) 
 
Company size, debt, Ownership dispersion, Age, 
Profit margin, Return on equity, Liquidity, 
Industry type, Audit company. 
Voluntary Saudi 
Arabia 
Barako et al. 
(2006a) 
Company size , Leverage, Type of audit 
company, Profitability, Liquidity, Industry type 
Voluntary Kenya  
Cheng, Collins, 
& Huang, 
(2006a) 
Company size, Industry type, Risk-adjusted returns 
 
Aggregate US 
Tinalkar, (2006) Company size, leverage, listing status, and Audit company Voluntary US and 
Canada 
Birt, Bilson, Smith, 
& Whaley (2006) 
Ownership structure Voluntary Australia 
McFie (2006) Company size, Number of shareholders, Shareholders 
owned, Age, Leverage, Industry type, Payout ratio, and 
Identity of auditor. 
Aggregate 
Mandatory 
Voluntary 
Kenya 
Sepideh, Gin, & 
Ewere, (2007) 
Profitability, Company size, Industrial type 
 
Voluntary UK 
Mohan (2007) Board size Aggregate US 
Barako,  (2007) 
 
Company size, Leverage, Audit company, Profitability, 
Liquidity 
Voluntary Kenya  
Bhuiyan & Biswas 
(2007) 
Local ownership, Securities and exchange commission 
notification, Company size, Age, Multinational affiliation, 
and Board size 
Aggregate Bangladesh 
Xiao & Yuan 
(2007) 
Ownership structure, Board composition 
 
Voluntary China  
Mathew, Elsie, & 
Joseph (2007) 
Ownership structure, Dispersion of shareholding, Company 
size, leverage 
Aggregate Ghana 
 
Aly & Simon  
(2008) 
Company size, leverage, Profitability, Liquidity, Industrial 
sectors, Audit company, Foreign listing  
Voluntary Egypt  
Ben Ali (2008) Ownership structure, Institutional investor’s ownership, 
Board characteristics 
Aggregate France  
Hossain (2008a) Company size, Profitability, Age, Assets in place, Market 
discipline, Board composition, and Complexity of business 
Aggregate India 
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Iskander (2008) Company size, Profitability, and Industrial membership Voluntary Egypt 
Chi  (2009) Company size, Financial leverage, age Aggregate Taiwan 
Foong Soon et al.  
(2009) 
Company size Voluntary Malaysia 
Curuk (2009) Company size, Listing status and Industry type Mandatory Turkey 
Doaa, Jon, & 
Khaled (2009) 
Profitability, foreign listing, industrial type, Company size, 
leverage, liquidity and Audit company 
Aggregate Egypt 
Cho et al. (2010) Company size  and age Aggregate US 
Kang & Gray 
(2011)  
Company size, foreign listing, Accounting standard 
adopted, and industry type.  
Voluntary Chain 
Mia & Al- Mamun 
(2011) 
Profitability, leverage, change in profitability, change in 
leverage, and  Company size 
Aggregate Australian 
Bremer (2012) Total percentage of shares held by the public sector,  
Ownership stake held by public banks and insurance 
companies, and Listing status. 
Aggregate Egypt 
Wen (2012) Listing status voluntary China  
Ismail & Ibrahim 
(2012) 
Company size, Government ownership and industry type.  Aggregate Jordanian 
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Appendix 5Review Studies using Standard & Poor’s Transparency 
and Disclosure 
Author & 
Year 
Examine  Findings 
Chen, et al.  
(2003) 
The effects of disclosure and 
other CG mechanisms on the cost 
of equity capital in Asia’s 
emerging markets. 
Both disclosure and non-disclosure CG mechanisms 
have a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity 
capital.  
Cheng, et 
al.  (2003) 
Strong S&P: T&D reduces the 
cost of equity measured by 
market beta. Also, it leads to 
increased risk- adjusted abnormal 
return and earnings response 
coefficients around the release of 
the S&P scores. 
 Only disclosure rankings of board and management 
structure and process items can explain the variation in 
the implied cost of capital.  Rankings of ownership 
structure and investment rights items and financial 
transparency and information disclosure items do not 
yield significant results.  
 
Bushee  
(2004) 
 
 Relations between the use of 
U.S. disclosure practices by non-
U.S. companies and the level of 
interaction such companies have 
with U.S.  Market participants. 
The level of interactions a non-U.S. company has with 
the U.S. capital, product, and Labour Markets is 
associated with the use of U.S. disclosure practices. 
Khanna, et 
al. (2004) 
 Relationship between market 
interaction variables and the T&D 
measures for the sample 
companies, after controlling for 
various other variables known to 
affect companies’ disclosure. 
 Positive association between these disclosure scores 
and a variety of market interaction measures, including 
U.S. listing, U.S. investment flows, exports to, and 
operations in the United States. Trade with the United 
States at the country level, has an insignificant 
relationship with the disclosure scores. 
Ashbaugh-
Skaife, 
Collins, & 
LaFond 
(2006) 
 
  Whether companies that possess 
strong CG benefit from higher 
overall credit ratings relative to 
companies with weak 
governance. 
Credit ratings are: negatively associated with the 
number of block holders that own at least a 5% 
ownership in the company; positively related to weaker 
shareholder rights in terms of takeover defences; 
positively related to the degree of 34 financial 
transparency; and positively related to over-all board 
independence, board stock ownership and board 
expertise and negatively related to CEO power on the 
board. 
Anderson, 
et al. (2004) 
Relationship between 
independent directors attributes 
and debt yields. 
The cost of debt is inversely related to board 
independence and board size. Fully independent audit 
committees are associated with a significantly lower 
cost of debt financing. Similarly, yield spreads are also 
negatively related to audit committee size and meeting 
frequency.      
Aksu & 
Kosedag  
(2005) 
 
The relationship between the 
financial performance of a sample 
of large capitalization and liquid 
ISE companies and their 
transparency & disclosure scores. 
The companies with higher scores, especially in the 
category of board and management structures, have 
higher returns and accounting measures of profitability.  
The companies that also use IFRS in the preparation of 
financial statements have higher T&D scores and 
commitment to better disclosure scores. 
Frost, et al.  
(2005) 
 
 
 
Associations between T&D, and 
access to capital in global equity 
markets by emerging market 
companies. 
T&D are positively associated with emerging market 
companies’ global capital market access, after 
controlling for many factors expected to influence 
emerging market companies’ ability to raise capital 
globally. 
Chiang & 
Chia,  
(2005) 
 Relationships among indicators 
of corporate governance, 
including transparency and 
operating performance measures, 
Corporate transparency does have a significant positive 
relationship with operating performance. Companies 
with good CG also have a significant positive 
relationship with operating performance. As such, a 
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Author & 
Year 
Examine  Findings 
and whether or not the indicators 
could be predictors of operating 
performance. 
company may devote resources to improving corporate 
structure in order to improve performance, and 
outsiders can rely on the information provided by the 
company to make their decisions.  
Mohan 
(2007) 
 
 
Relationship between the quality 
of disclosure in companies’ 10-K 
filings and the risk of securities 
class action litigation. 
Companies that use more numbers, past and future 
words and other informative words are less likely to be 
sued, even after controlling for the common 
determinants of lawsuits. 
Ashbaugh-
Skaife, et 
al. (2006) 
 
Whether companies with strong 
CG benefit from higher credit 
rating relative to companies with 
weaker governance. 
company-specific risk characteristics, that credit ratings 
are negatively associated with the number of block 
holders and CEO power, and positively related to 
takeover defences, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, 
board independence, board stock ownership, and board 
expertise. CEOs of companies with speculative-grade 
credit ratings are overcompensated to a greater degree 
than their counterparts at companies with investment-
grade ratings, thus providing one explanation for why 
some companies operate with weak governance. 
Cheng, et 
al (2006b) 
 
Whether shareholder rights and 
disclosures of financial-related 
attributes are associated with 
companies’ costs of equity 
capital. 
Companies with stronger shareholder rights regimes 
and higher levels of financial transparency are 
associated with significantly lower costs of equity 
capital. Greater financial disclosure and stronger rights 
regimes interact in reducing companies’ costs of equity 
capital, such that the effect of a high level of one 
mechanism is minimal when it is combined with a low 
level of the other. 
Black, 
Love, & 
Rachinsky, 
(2006) 
The connection between 
company-level CG and share 
prices is limited to cross-sectional 
data and simple OLS 
specifications.  
There are large differences between OLS and fixed 
effects results. This casts doubt on OLS results, and 
thus on most prior work on the connection between 
governance and company value.  
Aksu 
(2006) 
If the T&D level of a sample of 
Istanbul Stock Exchange 
companies is enhanced by the 
promulgation of a set of local CG 
Principles and by the voluntary 
adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards, an 
international best practice. 
The 2004 T&D scores are significantly higher than 
those of 2003. The companies with higher scores, 
especially in the category of board and management 
structures, have higher returns and accounting measures 
of profitability. Companies that have voluntarily 
adopted IFRS in the preparation of their 2003 and 2004 
financial statements have higher T&D scores and 
commitment to better disclosure.  
Dargenidou
, et al. 
(2006) 
Relation between the cost of 
equity capital and earnings 
expectations when the properties 
of accounting that determine 
earnings vary across different 
regulatory regimes. 
Accounting diversity is likely to be of little importance 
in integrating financial markets. 
Cheng et al. 
(2006a) 
 
Whether S&P: T&D rankings 
provide new information to 
financial markets. 
No relationship between composite rankings and 
abnormal returns. There is a negative relationship 
between abnormal returns and the difference scores 
between S&P: T&D ranking from annual report sources 
alone and composite rankings from annual reports and 
other sources. Only the subcategory of ownership 
structure and investor rights is the driving force of the 
overall results. 
McFie   Association between selected High quality disclosure would have been found to be 
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Examine  Findings 
(2006) corporate characteristics and high 
quality disclosure. 
associated with company size. 
Black, et al. 
(2006b) 
Factors that affect the governance 
choices of companies in emerging 
markets 
Regulatory factors are highly important, largely because 
Korean rules impose special governance requirements 
on large companies. 
Aksu & 
Kosedag 
(2006) 
 The first attempt to create a 
summary T&D index for the 
largest and most liquid companies 
trading on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange. The company-specific 
determinants of the T&Ds. 
The annual reports and websites are weak in terms of 
voluntary disclosure. While size, accounting 
profitability and market-to-book ratio explain the 
differences in the scores in the ownership and board and 
management sub-categories as well as in overall scores, 
leverage remains insignificant in all four models. 
Richard  et 
al. (2007) 
Whether countries matter more 
than companies in explaining 
variance in financial 
transparency. 
Converging accounting practices in the region short-
term will not be easy, although there are strong 
company-level market-based forces driving 
transparency which may assist the convergence process 
long-term.  
Chen, et al. 
(2007) 
 
Effects of CG on equity liquidity.  Companies with poor disclosure and transparency have 
larger economic costs of equity liquidity.  
Lee 
(2007) 
 
 Association between corporate 
voluntary disclosure and the 
separation of ownership and 
control in East Asia. 
The negative association between voluntary disclosure 
and the separation of cash flow rights from control 
rights is less pronounced for companies with greater 
external financing needs. Companies with high 
separation of cash flow rights from control rights, those 
with greater external financing needs undertake higher 
company-level voluntary disclosure to reduce 
information asymmetry.  The negative association 
between voluntary disclosure and the separation of cash 
flow rights from control rights is less pronounced for 
companies that have a large non-management 
shareholder. 
Tsamenyi, 
et al. (2007) 
CG practices of Ghanaian listed 
companies. The dearth of 
literature on CG practices in the 
developing world despite the 
increasing interests in the topic in 
both the developed and the 
developing world. 
The level of disclosure in Ghana is low. Ownership 
structure, dispersion of shareholding, and company size 
measured as total assets and market capitalization all 
have significant effect on disclosure. The correlation 
between disclosure and leverage is insignificant. 
Chen et al. 
(2007) 
 
 
Effects of disclosure, and other 
CG mechanisms, on equity 
liquidity. 
The economic costs of equity liquidity, i.e. the effective 
spread and the quoted half-spread, are greater for those 
companies with poor information T&D practices. 
Imen 
(2007) 
 
Investigate the determinants of 
good governance in the US 
companies. 
Statistically significant and positive associations 
between each governance index (exception to board 
index) and company size, investment opportunities, 
intangible assets and directors and officers ownership. 
Furthermore, institutional ownership and external 
financing needs are positively related to each 
governance index considered. Growth opportunities and 
performance have no significant effect on governance 
quality. 
Ali, et al. 
(2007) 
Compared to non-family 
companies, family companies 
face less severe agency problems 
Family companies report better quality earnings, are 
more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news, 
but make fewer disclosures about their CG practices. 
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due to the separation of 
ownership and management, but 
more severe agency problems that 
arise between controlling and 
non-controlling shareholders. 
These characteristics of family 
companies affect their corporate 
disclosure practices. 
Consistent with family companies making better 
financial disclosures, family companies have larger 
analyst following, more informative analysts’ forecasts, 
and smaller bid-ask spreads. 
Doidge, et 
al. (2007) 
Develops and tests a model of 
how country characteristics, such 
as legal protections for minority 
investors and the level of 
economic and financial 
development, influence  
companies’ costs and benefits in 
implementing measures to 
improve their own governance 
and transparency. 
country characteristics explain much more of the 
variance in governance ratings (ranging from 39% to 
73%) than observable company characteristics (ranging 
from 4% to 22%).characteristics explain almost none of 
the variation in governance ratings in less-developed 
countries and that access to global capital markets 
sharpens companies’ incentives for better governance. 
Hutton 
(2007) 
Contribute to a growing body of 
research on the relation between 
CG and corporate disclosure 
quality. 
Empirical findings are open to alternative 
interpretations and in totality present relatively weak, 
indirect evidence of a relation between CG and the 
quality of corporate disclosure. 
Chuanrom, 
et al.  
(2007) 
Shareholder protection includes 
shareholder rights as well as 
transparency and information 
disclosure. Shareholder rights are 
assessed by using items from CG 
assessment of CLSA and S&P 
The CG practices of Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean 
financial corporations are consistent with international 
best practices. CG as presented in company documents 
probably does not actually reflect real CG practices.  
Huanga & 
Zhang 
(2008) 
Investors’ valuations of corporate 
cash hoardings and dividend 
payout to explicitly isolate the 
monitoring effect from the 
information effect of corporate 
disclosure activity. 
Extensive disclosure enhances external monitoring and 
thus limits insiders’ ability to accumulate cash to 
expropriate minority shareholders. In further support of 
the monitoring effect of strong disclosure, they find that 
dividend payout is valued at a premium in opaque 
companies where cash is more vulnerable to 
consumption of private control benefits. The 
disciplinary role of company-level disclosure policy in 
CG mechanisms. 
Frost, et al.  
(2008) 
 
How five financial reporting and 
disclosure quality proxies are 
related to emerging markets 
companies’ cross-listing choices 
and their access to the global 
capital market.  Five financial 
reporting and disclosure quality 
proxies are transparency of the 
annual report, global vs. local 
auditor, global vs. local GAAP, 
translation of the annual report 
into English, and voluntary 
dissemination of information 
through websites. 
A strong association between each of their five proxies 
and emerging markets companies’ participation in U.S. 
and U.K. capital markets, but the variation in the five 
proxies (plus the controls) explains only about 40% of 
the variation in companies’ cross-listing patterns. The 
reporting and disclosure proxies are not significantly 
correlated with the amount of debt and equity capital 
raised in global markets, after controlling for the effects 
of cross-listing in the U.S. and the U.K. and other 
control variables. 
 
Durnev & 
Fauver 
(2008) 
How predatory government 
policies (expropriation, lack of 
property rights protection, 
corruption, crime) interact with 
Companies located in countries with more predatory 
governments practice weaker governance and disclose 
less information. The previously documented positive 
relation between company governance and company 
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managerial incentives in shaping 
company governance structure 
performance is weaker or disappears altogether when 
governments pursue predatory policies. In countries 
with more predatory governments, company-specific 
characteristics are less important in explaining variation 
in governance and companies have more similar 
governance structures 
DeBoskey 
& Gillett 
(2008) 
 
The impact of corporate 
transparency, conceived in the 
broadest sense, and not limited to 
financial reporting, on US. 
Companies. 
Corporate transparency is neither a unitary concept nor 
merely an ambiguous term for multiple distinct 
concepts: factor analysis of ten corporate transparency 
variables identifies four independent underlying 
dimensions: disclosure information, intermediary 
information, earnings quality information and insider 
information. corporate transparency has significant 
power to explain cross-sectional variation in credit 
rating and cost of capital 
Felo (2009)  How board composition 
(independence and expertise) is 
related to several measures of 
disclosure transparency, and 
analyse the association between 
splitting the roles of CEO and 
chairman of the board and 
disclosure transparency 
Greater insider participation on the board (regardless of 
level of financial expertise) is related to less transparent 
disclosures. Only independent directors with financial 
expertise are related to more transparent disclosures. 
Directors with accounting expertise are related to less 
transparent disclosures in company annual reports. 
Finally, having the same person fill the CEO and 
chairman roles is related to greater disclosure 
transparency. 
Grosman 
(2012) 
The effect of corporate   
governance on financing 
constraints through investment. 
CG significantly impacts capital investment 
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Appendix 6 Transparency and Disclosure Calculated 
 
 
Panel Variable Q 
A Total transparency & disclosure score (Three categories) 
The total transparency & disclosure score for a company is calculated follows: 
                   m 
S&P TDS=   di 
                  i =1 
Where: 
TDS= 1 (if transparency & disclosure item is disclose in the annual report) or = 0 (if transparency & 
disclosure item is not disclose in the annual report) (M  98). 
98 
B Ownership structure and investor right (Three Subcategories) 
S&P OSIR =56"78
9:8;<
X100 
Where:  
OSIRS= Ownership structure and investor right score for each company. 
Mosir  =  Maximum ownership structure and investor right score possible for the company ( 28 
items). 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
B1 Transparency of ownership 
S&P TO =#58
9>:
X100 
Where: 
TOS = Transparency of ownership score for each company. 
Mto  =  Maximum transparency of ownership score possible for the company (  11 items). 
 
 
 
11 
 
B2 Concentration of ownership 
S&P CO =#58
9?:
X100 
Where: 
COS= Concentration of ownership score for each company. 
Mco  =  Maximum concentration of ownership score possible for the company (  8 items). 
 
 
 
8 
 
B3 Voting and shareholder meeting 
S&P VSM =@698
9A8B
X100 
Where: 
VSMS= Voting and shareholder meeting score for each company. 
Mvsm=  Maximum Voting and shareholder meeting score possible for the company (  9 items). 
 
 
 
 
9 
C Financial transparency & information disclosure (Five Subcategories) 
S&P FTID =C#"D8
9E>;F
X100 
FTIDS= Financial transparency & information disclosure score for each company. 
Mftid  =  Maximum financial transparency & information disclosure score possible for the company  
( 35 items). 
35 
C1 Business focus 
S&P BF =!C8
9GE
X100 
BFS= Business focus score for each company. 
Mbf =  Maximum business focus score possible for the company  ( 15 items). 
 
 
15 
 
C2 Accounting policy review 
S&P APR =HI78
9JK<
X100 
APRS= Accounting policy review score for each company. 
Mapr =  Maximum accounting policy review score possible for the company  ( 9 items). 
 
 
 
9 
C3 Accounting policy details 
S&P APD =HID8
9JKF
X100 
APDS= Accounting policy details score for each company. 
Mapd =  Maximum accounting policy details score possible for the company  ( 3 items). 
 
 
3 
 
C4 Related party structure and transactions 
S&P RPST =7I6#8
9<K8>
X100 
RPST = Related party structure and transactions score for each company. 
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Mrpst =  Maximum related party structure and transactions score possible for the company  ( 4 
items). 
4 
 
C5 Information on audit 
S&P IA = "H8
9;J
X100 
IAS= Information on audit score for each company. 
Mia =  Maximum Information on audit score possible for the company  ( 4 items). 
 
4 
 
 
D Board and management structure and process (Four Subcategories) 
S&P BMSP =!96I8
9GB8K
X100 
BMSPS= Board and management structure and process score for each company. 
Mbmsp  =  Maximum board and management structure and process score possible for the company ( 
35 items). 
35 
D1 Board structure and composition 
S&P BSC =!6(8
9G8?
X100 
BSCS= Board structure and composition score for each company. 
Mbsc  =  Maximum board structure and composition score possible for the company ( 8 items). 
 
8 
 
 
 
D2 Role of the board 
S&P RB =7!8
9<G
X100 
RBS= Role of the board score for each company. 
Mrb  =  Maximum role of the board  score possible for the company ( 12 items). 
 
12 
 
 
D3 Director training and compensation 
S&P DTC =D#68
9F>?
X100 
DTCS= Director training and compensation score for each company. 
Mdtc  =  Maximum director training and compensation score possible for the company ( 6 items). 
 
 
 
6 
D4 Executive compensation and evaluation 
S&P ECE = ( 8
9L?L
X100 
ECES= Executive compensation and evaluation score for each company. 
Mece =  Maximum executive compensation and evaluation score possible for the company ( 9 
items). 
9 
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Appendix 7Descriptive Statistics of S&P T&D 
Appendix 7-A Descriptive Statistics of S&P T&D (Overall Companies) 
                     Appendix 7-A-1 Descriptive Statistics of Overall S&P T&D  
Descriptive Statistics 
Year No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew  
2005 23 .242 .09 .44 .35 .239 .094 .576  
2006 23 .287 .16 .45 .29 .270 .079 .430  
2007 25 .339 .16 .50 .34 .346 .086 -.080  
2008 27 .374 .19 .54 .35 .382 .098 -.077  
 
         Appendix 7-A-2 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure &Investor Right  
Descriptive Statistics 
Year No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew  
2005 23 .047 .00 .11 .11 .071 .001 -.160  
2006 23 .065 .00 .18 .18 .071 .044 .444  
2007 25 .095 .00 36 .36 .071 .085 1.644  
2008 27 .116 .00 .36 .36 .071 .105 1.180  
 
 Appendix 7-A-3Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency &Information 
disclosure  
Descriptive Statistics 
Year No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew  
2005 23 .434 .17 .71 .54 .457 .160 .294  
2006 23 .505 .29 .77 .49 .514 .149 .209  
2007 25 .593 .29 .80 .51 .628 .151 -.490  
2008 27 .649 .31 .83 .51 .714 .145 -.721  
 
       Appendix 7-A-4 Descriptive Statistics of Board &Management Structure & Process  
Descriptive Statistics 
Year No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew  
2005 23 .192 .00 .49 .49 .171 .114 .556  
2006 23 .231 .03 .43 .40 .228 .092 -.059  
2007 25 .267 .03 .43 .40 .285 091 -.629  
2008 27 .298 .03 .46 .43 .314 .099 -.636  
 
Appendix 7-A-5 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership structure &Investor Right by Three 
Subcategories 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Transparency of ownership   Concentration of ownership Voting & shareholder 
meeting procedures 
Year No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 23 .094 .00 .18 .088 .010 .00 .25 .052 .001 .00 .11 .038 
2006 23 .122 .00 .18 .084 .038 .00 .38 .102 .001 .00 .11 .001 
2007 25 .134 .00 .18 .081 .108 .00 1.00 .248 .024 .00 .22 .057 
2008 27 .138 .00 .27 .086 .152 .00 .88 .276 .043 .00 .56 .119 
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Appendix 7-A-6 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency &Information Disclosure by Five Subcategories 
 
Appendix 7-A-7 Descriptive Statistics of Board &Management Structure & Process by Four Subcategories 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Business focus  
 
Accounting policy review  Accounting policy details  Related party structure & 
transaction  
Information on auditors  
Year No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 23 .507 .13 .87 .207 .440 .00 .89 .278 .666 .00 1.00 .402 .043 .00 .25 .096 .358 .00 .75 .290 
2006 23 .556 .27 .80 .162 .516 .00 .89 .287 .840 .00 1.00 .360 .076 .00 .50 .139 .467 .00 .75 .253 
2007 25 .652 .27 .93 .210 .632 .00 .89 .228 .956 .00 1.00 .208 .119 .00 .50 .166 .565 .00 .75 .240 
2008 27 .707 .27 1.00 .211 .686 .00 1.00 .221 .956 .00 1.00 .208 .206 .00 1.00 .257 .489 .00 1.00 .232 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Board structure and  
composition  
Role of the board  Director training & 
compensations  
Executive compensation & 
evaluation  
Year No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 23 .434 .00 .88 .206 .170 .00 .50 .143 .057 .00 .33 .129 .096 .00 .33 .077 
2006 23 .521 .13 .75 .171 .228 .00 50 .110 .086 .00 .33 .149 .125 .00 .33 .077 
2007 25 .462 .13 .75 .178 .279 .00 .50 .119 .115 .00 .33 .162 .024 .00 .22 .066 
2008 27 .576 .13 .75 .158 .322 .00 .58 .136 .115 .00 .33 .162 .135 .00 .33 .088 
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            Appendix 7-B Descriptive Statistics of S&P T&D (Listing Status) 
Appendix 7-B-1 Descriptive Statistics of Overall S&P T&D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L=companies listed in Libya Stock Market, and N=companies not listed in Libya Stock Market 
 
           Appendix 7-B-2 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure &Investor Right 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. N Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2006 L 8 .084 .07 .14 .07 .071 .026 1.95 N 15 .056 .00 .18 .18 .071 .049 .912 
2007 L 8 .111 .07 .21 .14 .071 .064 1.30 N 17 .086 .00 .36 .36 .071 .096 1.95 
2008 L 8 .174 .07 .29 .29 .125 .112 .894 N 19 .084 .00 .32 .32 .071 .089 1.73 
L=companies listing in Libya Stock Market, and N=companies not listing in Libya Stock Market 
 
Appendix 7-B-3 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency &Information 
Disclosure  
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. N Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2006 L 8 .560 .34 .77 .43 .571 .149 -.282 N 15 .476 .29 .74 .46 .457 .146 .941 
2007 L 8 .628 .40 .77 .37 .642 .136 -.784 N 17 .575 .29 .80 .51 .571 .159 -.353 
2008 L 8 .707 .40 .83 .43 .742 .143 -1.61 N 19 619 .31 .80 .49. .571 .142 -.564 
L=companies listing in Libya Stock Market, and N=companies not listing in Libya Stock Market 
 
Appendix 7-B-4 Descriptive Statistics of Board Management Structure &Process  
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2006 L 8 .278 .11 .43 .31 .287 .098 -.218 N 15 .205 .03 .34 .31 .228 .081 -.465 
2007 L 8 .289 .11 .43 .31 .300 .086 -.523 N 17 .255 .03 .43 .40 .285 .090 -.828 
2008 L 8 .328 .17 .43 .26 .357 .094 -.947 N 19 .281 .03 .46 .43 .285 .104 -.501 
L=companies listing in Libya Stock Market, and N=companies not listing in Libya Stock Market 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2006 L 
8 .324 .22 .45 .22 .321 .083 .207 
N 15 .266 .16 .42 .26 .265 .071 .505 
2007 L 8 .359 .24 .45 .20 .387 .069 -.591 N 17 .328 .16 .50 .34 .331 .094 .212 
2008 L 
8 .419 .24 .53 .29 .438 .084 -1.23 
N 19 .348 .19 .54 .35 .341 .098 .475 
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Appendix 7-B-5 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure &Investor Right by Three 
Subcategories 
   L=companies listing in Libya Stock Market, and N=companies not listing in Libya Stock Market.
Descriptive Statistics 
  
 
 
Transparency of ownership 
 
Concentration of ownership 
 
Voting & shareholder 
meeting procedures 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2006 L 8 .136 .08 .18 .084 .031 .00 .25 .088 .013 .00 .11 .039 N 15 .090 .00 .18 .090 .041 .00 .38 .112 .014 .00 .11 .039 
2007 L 8 .180 .15 .20 .033 .093 .00 .50 .186 .041 .00 .22 .082 N 17 .109 .00 .18 .092 .116 .00 1.00 .281 .014 .00 .11 .039 
2008 L 8 .193 .18 .27 .032 .234 .00 .88 .316 .097 .00 .56 .191 N 19 .109 .00 .18 .092 .108 .00 .88 .253 .014 .00 .11 .039 
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Appendix 7-B-6 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency &Information Disclosure by Five Subcategories 
L=companies listing in Libya Stock Market, and L=companies not listing in Libya Stock Market. 
 
Appendix 7-B-7 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure &Process by Four Subcategories 
     L=companies listing in Libya Stock Market, and N=companies not listing in Libya Stock Market.         
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Business focus  Accounting policy review  Accounting policy details  Related party structure 
& transaction  
Information on auditors  
Year Co. N Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2006 L 8 .566 .33 .80 .178 .638 .33 .89 .220 .875 .33 1.00 .353 .156 .00 .50 .186 .531 .00 .75 .247 N 15 .551 .27 .80 .160 .451 .00 89 .304 .822 .00 1.00 .375 .033 .00 .25 .087 .433 .00 .75 .258 
2007 L 8 .650 .27 .93 .210 .694 .33 .89 .175 1.00 1.00 1.00 .000 .218 .00 .50 .208 .531 .00 .75 .247 N 17 .653 .27 .93 .218 .600 .00 .89 .251 .933 .00 1.00 .258 .066 .00 .25 .114 .466 .00 .75 .228 
2008 L 8 .733 .27 .100 .244 .736 .33 1.00 .196 1.00 1.00 1.00 .000 .406 .00 1.00 .325 .625 .50 1.00 .189 N 19 .693 .33 .93 .199 .659 .00 .89 .235 .933 .00 1.00 .258 .100 .00 .25 1.26 .533 .00 1.00 .265 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Board structure and 
composition 
Role of the board Director training & 
compensations 
Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Year Co. N Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2006 L 8 .515 .25 .75 .169 .260 .17 .50 .113 .166 .00 .33 .178 .166 .00 .33 .118 N 15 .433 .13 .75 .182 .211 .00 .42 .108 .044 .00 .33 .117 .001 .00 .11 .028 
2007 L 8 .562 .25 .75 .178 .260 .17 .50 .121 .166 .00 .33 .178 .069 .00 .22 .101 N 17 .500 .13 .75 .170 .288 .00 .50 .121 .088 .00 .33 .152 .140 .00 .20 .089 
2008 L 8 .625 .50 .75 .099 .322 .17 .50 .136 .166 .00 .33 .178 .166 .00 .33 .118 N 19 .550 .13 .75 .181 .322 .00 .58 .140 .088 .00 .33 .152 .011 .00 .33 .065 
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        Appendix 7-C Descriptive Statistics of S&P T&D (Companies Ownership) 
                     Appendix 7-C-1 Descriptive Statistics of Overall S&P T&D 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 Pu 14 .230 .15 .35 .20 .305 .078 .326 Pr 9 .265 .14 .30 .16 .260 .120 .090 
2006 Pu 14 .281 .15 .45 .30 .311 .074 -.131 Pr 9 .299 .16 .40 .34 .270 .091 -1.69 
2007 Pu 14 .335 .19 .50 .31 .388 .081 -.872 Pr 11 .348 .18 .40 .22 .330 .098 1.95 
2008 Pu 14 .382 .19 .55 .36 .439 .098 -.588 Pr 13 .374 .24 .40 .26 .340 .102 1.75 
Pu=Public Companies, and Pr=Private Companies. 
 
Appendix 7-C-2 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure &Investor Right 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pu=Public Companies, and Pr=Private Companies 
 
Appendix 7-C-3 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information 
Disclosure 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 Pu 14 .424 .17 .66 .49 .442 .160 .183 Pr 9 .450 .26 .71 .46 .457 .170 .499 
2006 Pu 14 .510 .29 .71 .43 .500 .139 -.061 Pr 9 .498 .29 .77 .49 .514 .173 .545 
2007 Pu 14 .602 .29 .77 .49 .642 .144 -.883 Pr 11 .581 .34 .80 .46 .571 .169 -.076 
2008 Pu 14 .669 .31 .83 .51 .714 .140 -1.27 Pr 13 .619 .40 .80 .40 .571 .157 -.105 
Pu=Public Companies, and Pr=Private Companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 Pu 14 .048 .00 .11 .11 .071 .036 -.332 Pr 9 .044 .00 .11 .11 .053 .041 .090 
2006 Pu 14 .066 .00 .18 .18 .071 .052 .632 Pr 9 .066 .00 .11 .11 .071 .029 -1.69 
2007 Pu 14 .094 .00 .33 .36 .071 .101 1.59 Pr 11 .098 .07 .21 .14 .071 .053 1.95 
2008 Pu 14 .125 .00 .36 .36 .071 .127 .895 Pr 13 .102 .07 .21 .14 .071 .052 1.75 
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Appendix 7-C-4 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure & Process 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 Pu 14 .179 .03 .34 .31 .171 .083 .103 
Pr 9 .212 .00 .49 .49 .228 .155 .343 
2006 Pu 14 .222 .03 .34 .31 .242 .093 -.537 
Pr 9 244 .11 .43 .31 .228 .095 .701 
2007 Pu 14 .259 .03 .37 .34 .285 .089 -1.64 
Pr 11 .279 .14 .43 .29 .257 .097 .581 
2008 Pu 14 .302 .03 .46 .43 .314 .104 -1.36 
Pr 13 .292 .17 .46 .29 .257 .096 .801 
Pu=Public Companies, and Pr=Private Companies 
 
 
Appendix 7-C-5 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right by Three 
Subcategories 
Pu=Public Companies, and Pr=Private Companies 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Transparency of ownership Concentration of ownership Voting & shareholder 
meeting procedures 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 Pu 14 .103 .00 .18 .093 .00 .00 .00 .00 .023 .00 .11 .047 
Pr 9 .080 .00 .18 .084 .027 .00 .25 .083 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2006 Pu 14 .116 .00 .18 .090 .044 .00 .38 .116 .023 .00 .11 .047 
Pr 9 .131 .00 .18 .080 .027 .00 .25 .083 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2007 Pu 14 .116 .00 .18 .090 .125 .00 1.00 .290 .039 .00 .22 .070 
Pr 11 .161 .00 .18 .060 .083 .00 .50 .176 .01 .00 .11 .00 
2008 Pu 14 .123 .00 .27 .098 .196 .00 .88 .324 .063 .00 .56 .149 
Pr 13 .161 .00 .18 .060 .083 .00 .50 .176 .012 .00 .11 .037 
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Appendix 7-C-6 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure by Five Subcategories 
  Pu=Public Companies, and Pr=Private Companies 
 
Appendix 7-C-7 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure and Process by Four Subcategories 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Board structure and 
composition  
Role of the board  Director training & 
compensations  
Executive compensation & 
evaluation  
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 Pu 14 .154 .13 .63 .117 .428 .00 .33 .144 .023 .00 .33 .089 .095 .00 .22 .059 
Pr 9 .194 .00 .88 .181 .444 .00 .50 .287 .111 .00 .33 .166 .098 .00 .33 .103 
2006 Pu 14 .208 .13 .75 .102 .473 .00 .33 .178 .071 .00 .33 .141 .119 .00 .33 .081 
Pr 9 .259 .13 .75 .121 .444 .17 .50 1.88 .111 .00 .33 .166 .135 .11 .33 .074 
2007 Pu 14 .267 .13 .75 .114 .526 .00 .42 .191 .095 .00 .33 .156 .023 .00 .22 .064 
Pr 11 .296 .25 .75 .132 .513 .17 .50 .145 .148 .00 .33 .175 .024 .00 .22 .074 
2008 Pu 14 .315 .13 .75 .139 .616 .00 .50 .158 .095 .00 .33 .156 .134 .00 .33 .099 
Pr 13 .333 .25 .75 .138 .513 .17 .58 .145 .148 .00 .33 .175 .135 .11 .33 .074 
 Pu=Public Companies, and Pr=Private Companies 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Business focus  Accounting policy review  Accounting policy details  Related party structure 
& transaction  
Information on auditors  
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 Pu 14 .542 .20 .87 .190 .428 .00 .89 .291 .547 .00 1.00 .425 .071 .00 .25 .117 .232 .00 .50 .249 
Pr 9 .451 .13 .80 .232 .469 .22 .89 .270 .851 .33 1.00 .294 .00 .00 .00 .00 .555 .00 .75 .243 
2006 Pu 14 .590 .40 .80 .127 .523 .00 .89 .315 .857 .00 1.00 .363 .071 .00 .25 .117 .357 .00 .75 .254 
Pr 9 .503 .27 .80 .203 .506 .22 .89 .255 .814 .00 1.00 .376 .083 .00 .50 .176 .638 .50 .75 .131 
2007 Pu 14 .709 .47 .93 .166 .627 .00 .89 .248 .928 .00 1.00 .267 .107 .00 .50 .161 .392 .00 .75 .234 
Pr 11 .563 .27 .93 .249 .642 .33 .89 .206 .939 .00 1.00 .200 .138 .00 .50 .181 .638 .50 .75 .131 
2008 Pu 14 .766 .53 1.00 .173 .766 .00 1.00 .062 .928 .00 1.00 .267 .232 .00 1.00 .285 .517 .00 1.00 .285 
Pr 13 .614 .27 .93 .242 .614 .33 .89 .182 .948 .00 1.00 .184 .166 .00 .50 .216 .638 .50 .75 .131 
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Appendix 7-D Descriptive Statistics of S&P T&D (Company Size) 
         Appendix 7-D-1 Descriptive Statistics of Overall S&P T&D 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 
S 12 .282 .09 .44 .35 .265 .109 -.151 
M 7 .202 .12 .26 .14 .234 .054 -.534 
L 4 .204 .15 .31 .16 .178 .070 1.65 
2006 
S 12 .310 .20 .45 .25 .306 .083 .338 
M 7 .275 .17 .39 .22 .265 .077 .448 
L 4 .244 .16 .33 .17 .244 .066 .000 
2007 
S 14 .358 .24 .50 .26 .377 .095 .127 
M 7 .330 .21 .41 .20 .346 .066 -.710 
L 4 .303 .16 .37 .21 .341 .096 -1.65 
2008 
S 16 .376 .24 .54 .30 .408 .103 .177 
M 7 .374 .23 .46 .23 .387 .079 -.811 
L 4 .367 .19 .53 .34 .372 .137 -.222 
S=Small Companies, M=Middle Companies, and L=Large Companies. 
Appendix 7-D-2 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 
S 12 .051 .00 .11 .11 .071 .040 -.118 
M 7 .045 .00 .07 .07 .071 .033 -.764 
L 4 .035 .00 .07 .07 .035 .041 .000 
2006 
S 12 .077 .00 .18 .18 .076 .044 .713 
M 7 .066 .00 .14 .14 .071 .043 .366 
L 4 .035 .00 .07 .07 .035 .041 .000 
2007 
S 14 .116 .04 .36 .32 .071 .093 2.06 
M 7 .076 .00 .21 .21 .071 .066 1.65 
L 4 .071 .00 .21 .21 .035 .101 1.41 
2008 
S 16 .116 .04 .32 .28 .071 .083 1.80 
M 7 .122 .00 .32 .32 .118 .112 .964 
L 4 .107 .00 .36 .36 .035 .170 1.77 
S=Small Companies, M=Middle Companies, and L=Large Companies. 
 
Appendix 7-D-3 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 S 12 .485 .26 .71 .45 .457 .165 .017 
M 7 .371 .26 .49 .23 .342 .110 .145 
L 4 .392 .17 .66 .49 .371 .205 .553 
2006 S 12 .521 .29 .77 .49 .528 .161 .148 
M 7 .485 .29 .69 .40 .542 .148 -.239 
L 4 .492 .37 .71 .34 .442 .151 1.66 
2007 
S 14 .592 .34 .80 .46 .614 .161 -.185 
M 7 .608 .29 .77 .48 .628 .156 -1.70 
L 4 .571 .43 .71 .28 .571 .149 .000 
2008 
S 16 .635 .40 .80 .40 .628 .145 -.288 
M 7 .649 .31 .83 .52 .714 .169 -1.44 
L 4 .692 .51 .83 .32 .714 .130 -.949 
S=Small Companies, M=Middle Companies, and L=Large Companies. 
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Appendix 7-D-4 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure & Process 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 
S 12 .226 .00 .49 .49 .242 .138 .073 
M 7 .159 .06 .29 .23 .142 .067 .716 
L 4 .150 .03 .23 .20 .171 .088 -.1.13 
2006 
S 12 .252 .11 .43 .32 .242 .088 .428 
M 7 .232 .11 .34 .23 .257 .089 -.184 
L 4 .164 .03 .26 .23 .185 .102 -.889 
2007 
S 14 .288 .14 .43 .29 .285 .087 .317 
M 7 .257 .11 .31 .20 .285 .075 -1.36 
L 4 .221 .03 .31 .29 .271 .130 -1.81 
2008 
S 16 .311 .17 .46 .29 .300 .097 .386 
M 7 .302 .17 .40 .23 .314 .073 -.732 
L 4 .250 .03 .37 .34 .300 .151 -1.66 
S=Small Companies, M=Middle Companies, and L=Large Companies. 
 
Appendix 7-D-5 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right by Three 
Subcategories 
S=Small Companies, M=Middle Companies, and L=Large Companies. 
 
 
 
 
Transparency of ownership Concentration of ownership Voting & shareholder 
meeting procedures 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 
S 12 .090 .00 .18 .000 .020 .00 .25 .072 .018 .00 .11 .043 
M 7 .103 .00 .18 .097 .00 .00 .00 .00 .015 .00 .11 .042 
L 4 .090 .00 .18 .105 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2006 
S 12 .128 .00 .18 .081 .052 .00 .38 .124 .018 .00 .11 .043 
M 7 .129 .00 .18 .088 .035 .00 .25 .094 .015 .00 .11 .042 
L 4 .090 .00 .18 .105 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
2007 
S 14 .151 .00 .18 .070 .145 .00 1.00 .310 .018 .00 .11 .043 
M 7 .129 .00 .18 .088 .071 .00 .50 .189 .015 .00 .11 .042 
L 4 .090 .00 .18 .105 .062 .00 .25 .125 .055 .00 .22 .111 
2008 
S 16 .151 .00 .18 .070 .135 .00 .88 .279 .027 .00 .11 .050 
M 7 .129 .00 .18 .088 .232 .00 .88 .341 .015 .00 .11 .042 
L 4 .113 .00 .27 .136 .062 .00 .25 .125 .138 .00 .56 .277 
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Appendix 7-D-6 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure by Five Subcategories 
       S=Small Companies, M=Middle Companies, and L=Large Companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Business focus  Accounting policy review  Accounting policy details  Related party structure & 
transaction  
Information on auditors  
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 
S 12 .505 .13 .80 .228 .518 .22 .89 .277 .888 .33 1.00 .259 .020 .00 .25 .072 .500 .00 .75 .261 
M 7 .523 .27 .87 .208 .333 .00 67 .256 .333 .00 1.00 .333 .071 .00 .25 .122 .214 .00 .50 .267 
L 4 .483 .20 .60 .191 .416 .22 .89 .319 .583 .00 1.00 .500 .062 .00 .25 .125 .187 .00 .50 .239 
2006 
S 12 .544 .27 .80 .196 .546 .22 .89 .261 .861 .00 .1.00 .332 .083 .00 .50 .162 .562 .00 .75 .216 
M 7 .561 .40 .80 .138 .507 .00 .89 .356 .714 .00 1.00 .488 .071 .00 .25 .122 .392 .00 .75 .283 
L 4 .583 .47 .73 .113 .444 .22 .89 .300 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .062 .00 .25 .125 .312 .00 .50 .239 
2007 
S 14 .600 .27 .93 .239 .648 .33 .89 .216 .952 .00 1.00 .178 .125 .00 .50 .168 .604 .50 .75 .128 
M 7 .742 .60 .93 .146 .603 .00 .89 .278 .857 .00 1.00 .378 .142 .00 .50 .196 .392 .00 .75 .283 
L 4 .650 .47 .93 .206 .638 .33 .89 .56 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .062 .00 .25 .125 .312 .00 .50 .239 
2008 
S 16 .638 .27 .93 .228 .713 .33 .89 .167 .958 .00 1.00 .166 .187 .00 .50 .216 .625 .50 .75 .130 
M 7 .771 .53 .93 .162 .650 .00 1.00 .310 .857 .00 1.00 .378 .250 .00 1.00 .353 .428 .00 1.00 .345 
L 4 .800 .53 1.00 .210 .666 .33 .56 .240 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .187 .00 .50 .239 .625 .50 1.00 .250 
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Appendix 7-D-7 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure and Process by Four Subcategories 
 
 
Board structure and 
composition  
Role of the board  Director training & 
compensations  
Executive compensation & 
evaluation  
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 
S 12 .479 .00 .88 .254 .208 .00 .50 .160 .111 .00 .33 .164 .101 .00 .33 .088 
M 7 .410 .25 .63 .118 .119 .00 .33 .116 .000 .000 .000 .000 .095 .00 .22 .076 
L 4 .343 .13 .50 .157 .145 .00 .25 .125 .000 .000 .000 .000 .083 .00 .11 .055 
2006 
S 12 .468 .13 .75 .177 .270 .17 .50 .107 .111 .000 .33 .164 .129 .11 .33 .064 
M 7 .464 .25 .63 .156 .214 .08 .33 .081 .095 .000 .33 .162 .142 .00 .33 .105 
L 4 .437 .13 .75 .260 .125 .00 .25 .107 .000 .000 .000 .000 .083 .00 .11 .055 
2007 
S 14 .531 .25 .75 .151 .305 .17 .50 .114 .166 .000 .33 .174 .018 .00 .22 .064 
M 7 .500 .25 .63 .161 .261 .17 .42 .089 .095 .000 .33 .162 .047 .00 .22 .087 
L 4 .531 .13 .75 .277 .229 .00 .42 .184 .000 .000 .000 .000 .083 .00 .11 .055 
2008 
S 16 .552 .25 .75 .145 .347 .17 .58 .127 .166 .000 .33 .174 .148 .11 .33 .0865 
M 7 .660 .50 .75 .094 .285 .17 .50 .106 .095 .000 .33 .162 .142 .00 .33 .105 
L 4 .500 .13 .63 .250 .312 .00 .50 .219 .000 .000 .000 .000 .083 .00 .11 .055 
             S=Small Companies, M=Middle Companies, and L=Large Companies. 
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Appendix 7-E Descriptive Statistics of S&P T&D (Company Age) 
         Appendix 7-E-1 Descriptive Statistics of Overall S&P T&D 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 
Y 8 .287 .09 .44 .35 .265 .117 -.269 
M 6 .248 .15 .39 .24 .224 .098 .594 
O 9 .204 .12 .31 .19 .193 .059 .365 
2006 
Y 8 .317 .20 .45 .25 .306 .086 .567 
M 6 .272 .17 .39 .22 .250 .084 .443 
O 9 .274 .16 .39 .23 .255 .072 .315 
2007 
Y 10 .363 .26 .50 .24 .346 .090 .385 
M 6 .348 .24 .48 .24 .362 .091 .061 
O 9 .315 .16 .41 .25 .316 .082 -.818 
2008 
Y 12 .380 .27 .51 .24 .387 .086 .227 
M 6 .375 .24 .54 .30 .398 .111 .130 
O 9 .368 .19 .53 .34 .377 .108 -.265 
Y= Younger companies, M=Medium Companies, and O=Old Companies. 
 
Appendix 7-E-2 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 
Y 8 .056 .00 .11 .11 .071 .034 -.277 
M 6 .041 .00 .11 .11 .035 .047 .326 
O 9 .043 .00 .07 .07 .071 .034 -.549 
2006 
Y 8 .071 .04 .11 .07 .071 .020 .000 
M 6 .071 .00 .18 .18 .071 .067 .527 
O 9 .059 .00 .14 .14 .071 .043 .292 
2007 
Y 10 .096 .04 .21 .17 .071 .060 1.46 
M 6 .113 .00 .36 .36 .071 .124 1.99 
O 9 .083 .00 .21 .21 .071 .079 1.01 
2008 
Y 12 .102 .04 .21 .17 .071 .059 1.20 
M 6 .107 .00 .32 .32 .071 .110 1.87 
O 9 .134 .00 .36 .36 .071 .134 .763 
Y= Younger companies, M=Medium Companies, and O=Old Companies. 
 
Appendix 7-E-3 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information 
Disclosure 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 
Y 8 .485 .26 .71 .45 .471 .164 .006 
M 6 .447 .262 .26 .66 .414 .176 .369 
O 9 .381 .17 .66 .49 .342 .147 .556 
2006 
Y 8 .532 .29 .77 .48 .542 .166 .145 
M 6 .476 .31 .66 .35 .442 .156 .326 
O 9 .501 .29 .71 .42 .457 .144 .201 
2007 
Y 10 .607 .34 .80 .46 .628 .162 -.418 
M 6 .604 .40 .77 .37 .657 .153 -.645 
O 9 .574 .29 .77 .48 .628 .156 -.710 
2008 
Y 12 .657 .51 .80 .29 .642 .111 .058 
M 6 .642 .40 .80 .40 .714 .182 -.759 
O 9 .647 .31 .83 .52 .714 .163 -.997 
Y= Younger companies, M=Medium Companies, and O=Old Companies. 
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Appendix 7-E-4 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure & Process 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. N Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 
Y 8 .217 .00 .49 .49 .228 .163 .235 
M 6 .214 .14 .34 .20 .200 .078 .876 
O 9 .155 .03 .29 .26 .142 .079 -.102 
2006 
Y 8 .246 .11 .43 .32 .257 .109 .364 
M 6 .228 .17 .34 .17 .214 .059 1.75 
O 9 .219 .03 .34 .31 .257 .103 -.784 
2007 
Y 10 .285 .14 .43 .29 .271 .102 .372 
M 6 .281 .20 .37 .17 .285 .061 .137 
O 9 .241 .03 .31 .29 .285 .101 -1.60 
2008 
Y 12 .303 .17 .46 .29 .285 .096 .580 
M 6 .323 .23 .46 .23 .328 .087 .334 
O 9 .276 .03 .40 .37 .314 .114 -1.41 
Y= Younger companies, M=Medium Companies, and O=Old Companies. 
 
Appendix 7-E-5 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right by Three 
Subcategories 
Y= Younger companies, M=Medium Companies, and O=Old Companies. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Transparency of ownership Concentration of ownership Voting & shareholder 
meeting procedures 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 
Y 8 .090 .00 .18 .084 .031 .00 .25 .088 .013 .00 .11 .039 
M 6 .090 .00 .18 .099 .00 .00 .00 .00 .018 .00 11 .045 
O 9 .101 .00 .18 .095 .00 .00 .00 .00 .012 .00 .11 .037 
2006 
Y 8 .125 .00 .18 .083 .031 .00 .25 .088 .013 .00 .11 .039 
M 6 .121 .00 .18 .093 .062 .00 .38 .153 .018 .00 .11 .045 
O 9 .121 .00 .18 .090 .027 .00 .25 .083 .012 .00 .11 .037 
2007 
Y 10 .136 .00 .18 .084 .093 .00 .50 .186 .013 .00 .11 .039 
M 6 .151 .00 .18 .074 .166 .00 1.00 .408 .018 .00 .11 .045 
O 9 .121 .00 .18 .090 .083 .00 .50 .176 .037 .00 .22 .078 
2008 
Y 12 .136 .00 .18 .084 .093 .00 .50 .186 .027 .00 .11 .051 
M 6 .151 .00 .18 .074 .145 .00 .88 .357 .018 .00 .11 .045 
O 9 .131 .00 .27 .102 .208 .00 .88 .306 .074 .00 .56 .184 
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Appendix 7-E-6 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure by Five Subcategories 
  Y= Younger companies, M=Medium Companies, and O=Old Companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Business focus  Accounting policy review  Accounting policy details  Related party structure 
& transaction  
Information on auditors  
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 
Y 8 .525 .27 .80 .203 .541 .22 .89 .268 .750 .33 1.00 .345 .00 .00 .00 .00 .500 .00 .75 .231 
M 6 .500 .13 .80 .241 .425 .00 .89 .340 .833 .00 1.00 .408 .041 .00 .25 .102 .416 .00 .75 .341 
O 9 .496 .20 .87 .213 .370 .11 .89 .248 .481 .00 1.00 .412 .083 .00 .25 .125 .194 .00 .50 .243 
2006 
Y 8 .558 .27 .80 .188 .541 .22 .89 .268 .916 .33 1.00 .235 .062 .00 .50 .176 .593 .50 .75 .129 
M 6 .533 .33 .80 .188 .481 .00 89 .327 .666 .00 1.00 .516 .083 .00 .25 .129 .500 .00 .75 .273 
O 9 .570 .40 .80 .137 .518 .00 89 .309 .888 .00 1.00 .333 .083 .00 .25 .125 .333 .00 .75 .279 
2007 
Y 10 .641 .27 .93 .236 .652 .33 .89 .217 .933 .00 1.00 .210 .093 .00 .50 .186 .593 .50 .75 .129 
M 6 .633 .27 .93 .272 .648 .33 .89 .191 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .125 .00 .25 .136 .583 .50 .75 .129 
O 9 .674 .47 .93 .161 .604 .00 .89 .278 .888 .00 1.00 .333 .138 .00 .50 .181 .333 .00 .75 .279 
2008 
Y 12 .683 .47 .93 .184 .763 .67 .89 .110 .944 .00 1.00 .192 .125 .00 .50 .189 .593 .50 .75 .129 
M 6 .677 .27 .93 .311 .648 .33 .89 .036 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .250 .00 .50 .223 .625 .50 .75 .136 
O 9 .748 .53 1.00 .172 .642 .00 1.00 .303 .888 .00 1.00 .333 .250 .00 1.00 .330 .500 .00 1.00 .353 
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Appendix 7-E-7 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure and Process by Four Subcategories 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Board structure and 
composition  
Role of the board  Director training & 
compensations  
Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 
Y 8 .437 .00 .88 .291 .197 .00 .50 .183 .125 .00 .33 .172 .111 .00 .33 .102 
M 6 .500 .25 .63 .158 .194 .00 .33 .113 .055 .00 .33 .136 .092 .00 .11 .045 
O 9 .388 .13 .63 .145 .129 .00 .33 .125 .00 .00 .00 .00 .086 .00 .22 .074 
2006 
Y 8 .437 .13 .75 .200 .260 .08 .50 .143 .125 .00 .33 .172 .138 .11 .33 .078 
M 6 .479 .38 .63 .122 .236 .17 .33 .062 .055 .00 .33 .136 .111 .111 .111 .00 
O 9 .472 .13 .75 .205 .194 .00 .33 .102 .074 .00 .33 .147 .123 .00 .33 .103 
2007 
Y 10 .484 .25 .75 .155 .322 .17 .50 .121 .166 .00 .33 .178 .07 .00 .22 .078 
M 6 .583 .38 .75 .129 .291 .17 .42 .102 .111 .00 .33 .172 .111 .111 .111 .00 
O 9 .513 .13 .75 .211 .231 .00 .42 .123 .074 .00 .33 .147 .037 .00 .22 .078 
2008 
Y 12 .531 .25 .75 .173 .343 .25 .58 .129 .166 .00 .33 .178 .138 .11 .33 .078 
M 6 .625 .50 .75 .079 .361 .17 .50 .136 .111 .00 .33 .172 .148 .11 .33 .090 
O 9 .583 .13 .75 .187 .277 .00 .50 .144 .074 .00 .33 .147 .123 .00 .33 .103 
    Y= Younger companies, M=Medium Companies, and O=Old Companies. 
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Appendix 7-F Descriptive Statistics of S&P T&D (Industry Type)  
          Appendix 7-F-1 Descriptive Statistics of Overall S&P T&D 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 B 18 .241 .15 .39 .24 .244 .075 .492 
I 5 .244 .09 .44 .35 .234 .122 .585 
2006 B 18 .290 .17 .39 .22 .275 .069 .044 
I 5 .283 .16 .45 .29 .255 .097 .778 
2007 B 19 .345 .24 .48 .24 .346 .069 .194 
I 6 .331 .16 .50 .34 .367 .110 -.023 
2008 B 20 .409 .49 .74 .25 .622 .092 -.073 
I 7 .342 .44 .71 .27 .614 .099 -.466 
B=Banks, and I=Insurances 
 
                 Appendix 7-F-2 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right 
       B=Banks, and I=Insurances 
 
 Appendix 7-F-3 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information 
Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B=Banks, and I=Insurances 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 B 18 .052 .00 .11 .11 .071 .034 -.525 
I 5 .039 .00 .11 .11 .035 .041 .340 
2006 B 18 .074 .00 .18 .18 .071 .049 .511 
I 5 .055 .00 .11 .11 .071 .036 -.655 
2007 B 19 .100 .00 .36 .36 .071 .095 1.517 
I 6 .067 .00 .21 .21 .071 .062 1.62 
2008 B 20 .129 .00 .36 .36 .071 .107 1.23 
I 7 .099 .00 .32 .32 .071 .105 1.40 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 B 18 .418 .17 .66 .49 .457 .151 .052 
I 5 .460 .26 .71 .46 .428 .181 .461 
2006 B 18 .485 .29 .69 .40 .500 .136 .035 
I 5 .536 .29 .77 48 .514 .172 .167 
2007 B 19 .579 .34 .77 .43 .600 .141 -.236 
I 6 .615 .29 .80 .51 .685 .172 -.989 
2008 B 20 .655 .40 .83 .43 .700 .138 -.518 
I 7 .641 .31 .80 .49 .714 .164 -1.00 
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                 Appendix 7-F-4 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure & Process 
 
       B=Banks, and I=Insurances 
 
 
Appendix 7-F-5 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right by Three 
Subcategories 
B=Banks, and I=Insurances. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 B 18 .191 .03 .34 .31 .185 .075 -.106 
I 5 .193 .00 .49 .49 .142 .164 .612 
2006 B 18 .242 .11 .34 .23 .257 .068 -308 
I 5 .212 .03 .43 .40 .200 .123 .405 
2007 B 19 .273 .20 .37 .17 .271 .049 .166 
I 6 .257 .03 .43 .40 .285 .137 -.376 
2008 B 20 .312 .23 .46 .23 .300 .071 .510 
I 7 .276 .03 .46 .43 .314 .134 -.524 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Transparency of ownership Concentration of ownership Voting & shareholder 
meeting procedures 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 B 18 .110 .00 .11 .088 .00 .00 .00 .00 .015 .00 .11 .040 
I 5 .070 .00 .18 .088 .027 .00 .25 .083 .012 .00 .11 .037 
2006 B 18 .129 .00 .18 .085 .044 .00 .33 .116 .015 .00 .11 .040 
I 5 .111 .00 .18 .088 .027 .00 .25 .083 .012 .00 .11 .037 
2007 B 19 .142 .00 .18 .077 .142 .00 1.00 .289 .031 .00 .22 .067 
I 6 .121 .00 .18 .090 .055 .00 .50 .166 .012 .00 .11 .037 
2008 B 20 .149 .00 .27 .084 .151 .00 .88 .260 .055 .00 .56 .149 
I 7 .121 .00 .18 .090 .152 .00 .88 .317 .024 .00 .11 .049 
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Appendix 7-F-6 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure by Five Subcategories 
       B=Banks, and I=Insurances  
 
 
 Business focus  Accounting policy review  Accounting policy details  Related party structure & 
transaction  
Information on auditors  
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 B 18 .481 .13 .87 .222 .428 .00 .89 .257 .642 .00 1.00 .380 .035 .00 .25 .090 .375 .00 .75 .306 
I 5 .548 .27 .80 .187 .469 .11 .89 .322 .703 .00 1.00 .454 .055 .00 .25 .110 .333 .00 .75 .279 
2006 B 18 .533 .27 .80 .167 .500 .00 .89 .245 .809 .00 1.00 .386 .053 .00 .25 106 .464 .00 1.00 .274 
I 5 .592 .40 .80 .157 .543 .00 .89 .357 .888 .00 1.00 .333 .111 .00 .50 .181 .472 .00 .75 .232 
2007 B 19 .619 .27 .93 .233 .619 .33 .89 .172 .955 .00 1.00 .172 .107 .00 .50 .161 .500 .00 1.00 .240 
I 6 .703 .47 .80 .170 .654 .00 89 .306 .888 .00 1.00 .333 .138 .00 .50 .181 .472 .00 .75 .232 
2008 B 20 .695 .27 1.00 .232 .698 .33 .89 .140 .958 .00 1.00 .166 .232 .00 1.00 .285 .571 .00 1.00 .228 
I 7 .725 .47 .93 .186 .666 .00 1.00 .319 .888 .00 1.00 .333 .166 .00 .50 .216 .555 .00 1.00 .273 
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             Appendix 7-F-7 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure and Process by Four Subcategories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
B=Banks, and I=Insurances  
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Board structure and 
composition  
Role of the board  
 
Director training & 
compensations  
Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 B 18 .455 .13 .63 .143 .154 .00 .33 .107 .071 .00 .33 .141 .087 .00 .11 .047 
I 5 .402 .00 .88 .284 .194 .00 .50 .190 .037 .00 .33 .111 .111 .00 .33 .111 
2006 B 18 .491 .13 .75 .166 .220 .08 .33 .070 .119 .00 .33 .165 .134 .11 .33 .064 
I 5 .416 .13 .75 .197 .240 .00 .50 .158 .037 .00 .33 .111 .111 .00 .33 .096 
2007 B 19 .544 .38 .75 .135 .261 .17 .42 .079 .142 .00 .33 .171 .023 .00 .22 .064 
I 6 .486 .13 .75 .220 .305 .00 .50 .166 .074 .00 .33 .147 .024 .00 .22 .074 
2008 B 20 .607 .38 .75 .108 .315 .17 .50 .109 .142 .00 .33 .171 .150 .11 .33 .082 
I 7 .527 .13 .75 .214 .333 .00 .58 .176 .074 .00 .33 .147 .111 .00 .33 .096 
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Appendix 7-G Descriptive Statistics of S&P T&D (Audit Peer Review &Non Audit 
Peer Review) 
               Appendix 7-G-1 Descriptive Statistics of Overall S&P T&D 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 A 14 .252 .15 .39 .23 .244 .072 .222 
N 9 .227 .09 .44 .35 .193 .123 1.02 
2006 A 14 .302 .21 .39 .18 .306 .059 .116 
N 9 .266 .16 .45 .29 .244 .101 1.11 
2007 A 15 .346 .24 .48 .24 .346 .069 .115 
N 10 .328 .16 .50 .34 .346 .109 .051 
2008 A 16 .386 .24 .54 .30 .387 .090 .162 
N 11 .357 .19 .51 .32 .377 .105 -280 
A=Audit Peer Review, and N=Non Audit Peer Review 
 
               Appendix 7-G-2 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Co. N Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 A 14 .005 .00 .11 .11 .071 .031 -.866 
N 9 .031 .00 .11 .11 .000 .041 .875 
2006 A 14 .079 .00 .18 .18 .071 .044 .740 
N 9 .047 .00 .11 .11 .071 .039 -.153 
2007 A 15 .120 .04 .36 .32 .071 .090 1.77 
N 10 .059 .00 .21 .21 .071 .066 1.65 
2008 A 16 .134 .04 .36 .32 .071 .102 1.43 
N 11 .091 .00 .32 .32 .071 .110 1.39 
A=Audit Peer Review, and N=Non Audit Peer Review 
 
 Appendix 7-G-3 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information 
Disclosure 
                   A=Audit Peer Review, and N=Non Audit Peer Review 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 A 14 .446 .17 .66 .49 .471 .155 -.181 
N  9 .415 .26 .71 .46 .342 .175 1.02 
2006 A 14 .514 .29 .71 .43 .542 .139 -.134 
N  9 .492 .29 .77 .49 .457 .172 .666 
2007 A 15 .581 .34 .77 .43 .600 .142 -.256 
N 10 .612 .29 .80 .51 .657 .170 -.947 
2008 A 16 .653 .40 .83 .43 .700 .137 -.496 
N 11 .644 .31 .80 .49 .714 .166 -1.02 
391 
 
Appendix 7-G-4 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure & Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A=Audit Peer Review, and N=Non Audit Peer Review 
 
Appendix 7-G-5 Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure & Investor Right by Three 
Subcategories 
A=Audit Peer Review, and N=Non Audit Peer Review. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max Range Median S.D Skew 
2005 A 14 .189 .03 .34 .31 .185 .076 -.030 
N  9 .196 .00 .49 .49 .171 .163 .551 
2006 A 14 .240 .11 .34 .23 .257 .071 -.331 
N  9 .215 .03 .43 .40 .214 1.49 .345 
2007 A 15 .271 .20 .37 .17 .271 .048 .275 
N 10 .260 .03 .40 .43 .285 .138 -.446 
2008 A 16 .308 .23 .46 .23 .285 .071 .705 
N 11 .282 .03 .46 .43 .314 .135 -.665 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Transparency of ownership Concentration of ownership Voting & shareholder 
meeting procedures 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 A 14 .123 .00 .18 .084 .00 .00 .00 .00 .015 .00 .11 .010 
N  9 .050 .00 .18 .080 .027 .00 .25 .083 .012 .00 .11 .037 
2006 A 14 .142 .00 .18 .077 .044 .00 .38 .116 .015 .00 .11 .040 
N  9 .090 .00 .18 .090 .027 .00 .25 .083 .012 .00 .11 .037 
2007 A 15 .155 .00 .18 .066 .142 .00 .78 .289 .031 .00 .22 .067 
N 10 .101 .00 .18 .095 .055 .00 .50 .166 .012 .00 .11 .037 
2008 A 16 .162 .00 .27 .072 .151 .00 .88 .260 .055 .00 .56 .149 
N 11 .101 .00 .18 .095 .152 .00 .88 .317 .024 .00 .11 .049 
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Appendix 7-G-6 Descriptive Statistics of Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure by Five Subcategories 
              A=Audit Peer Review, and N=Non Audit Peer Review. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Business focus  Accounting policy review  Accounting policy details  Related party structure 
& transaction  
Information on auditors  
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 A 14 .481 .13 .87 .222 .492 .22 .89 .253 .714 .33 1.00 .342 .053 .00 .25 .106 .410 .00 .75 .287 
N  9 .548 .27 .80 .187 .370 .00 .89 .314 .592 .00 1.00 .493 .027 .00 .25 .083 .277 .00 .75 .291 
2006 A 14 .542 .27 .80 .175 .563 .33 .89 .219 .881 .00 1.00 .309 .071 .00 .25 .117 .464 .00 .75 .274 
N  9 .577 .40 .80 .149 .444 .00 .89 .372 .777 .00 1.00 .441 .083 .00 .50 .176 .472 .00 .75 .232 
2007 A 15 .609 .27 .93 .227 .634 .33 .89 .187 .955 .00 1.00 .172 .125 .00 .50 .010 .162 .00 .75 .240 
N 10 .718 .47 .93 .172 .629 .00 .89 .294 .888 .00 1.00 .333 .111 .00 .50 .181 .472 .00 .75 .232 
2008 A 16 .681 .27 1.00 .222 .714 .33 .89 .149 .958 .00 1.00 .166 .232 .00 1.00 .010 .285 .00 1.00 .228 
N 11 .748 .47 .93 .199 .642 .00 1.00 .308 .888 .00 1.00 .333 .166 .00 .50 .216 .555 .00 1.00 .273 
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Appendix 7-G-7 Descriptive Statistics of Board & Management Structure and Process by Four Subcategories 
     A=Audit Peer Review, and N=Non Audit Peer Review. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Board structure and 
composition  
Role of the board  Director training & 
compensations  
Executive compensation & 
evaluation 
Year Co. No. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
2005 A 14 .455 .13 .63 .143 .148 .00 .33 .109 .071 .00 .33 .141 .087 .00 .11 .047 
N  9 .402 .00 .88 .284 .203 .00 .50 .186 .037 .00 .33 .111 .111 .00 .33 .111 
2006 A 14 .491 .13 .75 .166 .214 .08 .33 .078 .119 .00 .33 .165 .134 .11 .33 .064 
N  9 .416 .13 .75 .197 .250 .00 .50 .150 .037 .00 .33 .111 .111 .00 .33 .096 
2007 A 15 .544 .38 .75 .135 .256 .17 .33 .069 .142 .00 .33 .171 .023 .00 .22 .064 
N 10 .486 .13 .75 .220 .314 .00 .50 .170 .074 .00 .33 .147 .024 .00 .22 .074 
2008 A 16 .607 .38 .75 .108 .303 .17 .50 .095 .142 .00 .33 .171 .150 .11 .33 .082 
N 11 .527 .13 .75 .214 .351 .00 .58 .185 .074 .00 .33 .147 .111 .00 .33 .096 
